Has (German Minister) Pistorius lost his mind?

Has (German Minister) Pistorius lost his mind?

This is not just about the German ‚Minister for War Preparedness‘, but about all European politicians who have been telling us for months about the ‘Russian attack in two years’. The question is: why are politicians and military leaders so confidently spreading theories that do not stand up to scrutiny? And how should we deal with such people? (The text refers to the EU, but it may also be of interest to readers in the US and other countries, even if the problems there are different.)
(This is also not about ‘whitewashing’ Russian armys conduct of the war in Ukraine. We will never know whether Russian missiles caused 28 deaths in a residential building during the attack on the ‚Orion‘ field telephone factory in Ternopil on 19 November 2025, or whether it was the debris from these missiles shot down by Ukrainian air defences (https://t.me/prozorov_fr/12139 ). In any case, it is certain that this type of warfare in densely populated areas harms precisely the Russian-speaking population that is supposedly being defended.)
But criticising the Russian army is one thing, and deliberately spreading panic is quite another. Let us now see what Western sources say about the likelihood of Russia attacking European NATO members.
1) Even if the United States is excluded and purchasing power is adjusted, NATO's military spending is several times that of Russia:
https://militaryppp.com/2025/06/09/nato-in-2024-can-europe-defend-itself/
In this context, it is often pointed out that Russia is significantly increasing its spending. NATO has been doing the same for years (‚5 per cent‘ target), which raises the question of who is reacting to whom.
2) Western armies are also vastly superior:
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293174/nato-russia-military-comparison/ + https://www.greenpeace.de/publikationen/Kraeftevergleich_NATO-Russland.pdf
3) This is confirmed by NATO Secretary General Rutte, who should have a certain overview:
https://kyivindependent.com/nato-shouldnt-overstate-russian-capabilities-alliance-chief-says/ + https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/regierungspressekonferenz-vom-17-oktober-2025-2389904
4) If you don't trust all these sources, just watch the news to see how slowly the Russian army is advancing towards western Ukraine.

Why is this fantasy still being propagated? Three hypotheses are examined here:
1) psychological
2) political
3) material.

1) Psychological explanations
Assuming that these European politicians and military leaders are of sound mind (unlike other presidents), there must be other reasons. It may be quite revealing to examine whether they subscribe to a conspiracy theory (CT). First, some information on the effect of CTs (according to Katharina Nocun + Pia Lamberty, Fake Facts, Wie Verschwörungstheorien unser Denken bestimmen; Quadriga Verlag, Cologne 2021) :
* Susceptibility to CTs increases with a feeling of loss of control (page 55). In fact, the EU “elite” has had to cope with three serious events of this kind in recent years:
1) China is no longer content with the role of outsourced workbench, but is overtaking the US and the EU.
2) More and more countries are adopting the methods of waging wars that violate international law, as demonstrated by the West in Yugoslavia, Iraq, etc.
3) The US regime is responding to 1) and 2) by throwing its loyal vassal, the EU, to the dogs.
* VT are resistant to factual information (p. 62).
* Confirmation bias ensures that information that confirms one's own opinion is preferred (p. 61); the cognitive dissonance caused by deviating data is reduced by classifying it as unreliable.
* Those who find themselves in an filter bubble / echo chamber
( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filter_bubble + https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Echo_chamber_(media) ) , where they only hear a repetition of their own words, tend to become radicalised.
* Being part of a group reinforces the effect (p. 49).
* The more one has invested in an idea, the more difficult it is to question it or acknowledge it as wrong (p. 50).
* Critics are seen as tools of the opponent (p. 176).
* According to the “optimism bias”, the risk of one's own “countermeasures” is underestimated (p. 63).
* Unfortunately, people with a higher propensity for CT have a stronger preference for order and structure and a lower tolerance for ambiguity. If that doesn't remind you of the military and the police... (p. 57).
There is therefore evidence that the behaviour of EU politicians and military personnel can be partly explained by their belief in conspiracy theories.
In addition, there are numerous “normal” cognitive biases to which the author (and readers) are also subject 🤔. This raises the question of whether life as a professional politician or in the military general staff makes them particularly susceptible to these biases because they spend a long time in the same closed group. Here is a list (abridged and with examples from the german version https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_kognitiver_Verzerrungen , see also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases )

Name Link Example
Action bias https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Action_bias Better to do something pointless than nothing at all
Backfire https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/backfire_effect Anything that does not fit into the world view is used as evidence of malicious intent, e.g. Russian ceasefire proposals at Christmas
Bandwagon effect https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandwagon_effect
Belief perseverance https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belief_perseverance Merz: „Diplomatic means have been exhausted“ https://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/eu-in-the-media/german-chancellor-merz-on-ukraine-no-hope-left-for-a-diplomatic-solution-to-the-conflict/
Choice-supportive bias https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Choice-supportive_bias Arms shipments
Cognitive Dissonance (to avoid) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_dissonance Inability to even acknowledge the opponent's proposals and analyse them objectively
Confirmation bias https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias Reinforced by information selection in newspapers
Correspondence bias https://www.scribbr.com/research-bias/correspondence-bias/ The change in perception of Putin from a positive image following his 2001 speech in the ‚Bundestag‘ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9jyLQmyg9hs to today's 'demon'
Dichotomy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dichotomy ‘All or nothing’, months of discussions about territorial concessions, instead of placing the disputed territories under international administration as a neutral zone, or similar: https://usrussiaaccord.org/making-the-case-for-east-ukraine-by-benjamin-s-dunham/
Dunning-Kruger https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect Overconfidence, e.g. the series of “game-changing wonder weapons” in the early years of the war
Escalation of Commitment https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Escalation_of_commitment After every failure, go one better, e.g. increasingly long-range weapons
Framing https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Framing_effect_(psychology) ‘Prepare for war so you don't have to fight it’ – how buying weapons becomes a peaceful activity
Frequency illusion https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frequency_illusion E.g. drone flights, which have been taking place for years, are being noticed more frequently following corresponding “reporting”
Herd mentality bias https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herd_behavior
Hindsight bias https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindsight_bias The explanation of Russia's invasion of Ukraine while ignoring the history since Gorbachev
Horn effect https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horn_effect To create an enemy image
Illusory truth effect https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illusory_truth_effect Making misinformation credible through constant repetition
Labeling https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Labeling_theory For years, those in favour of a ceasefire were labelled “Putin's helpers”, but now the West is calling for a ceasefire
Lake Wobegon effect https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Lake_Wobegon_effect Constant progress reports, even when the withdrawal is already being prepared
Law of the instrument https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_the_instrument Soldiers are trained for warfare, so they “solve” everything with war and find it difficult to think of other solutions
Mere exposure effect https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mere-exposure_effect Manipulation method, e.g. the increasing number of photos of friendly female soldiers on the front pages of formerly “liberal” newspapers
Negativity bias https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negativity_bias Ignore negotiation offers
Neglect of probability https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neglect_of_probability Ignoring the rising risk of nuclear war due to misinterpretation
Peer pressure https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer_pressure
Projection https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological_projection Do the “warnings” of a Russian attack perhaps reflect a secret desire to attack Russia?
Self-licensing https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-licensing Every visit with new weapons deliveries includes a visit with gifts to a nursery school, hospital, etc
Sunk cost fallacy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk_cost No one would inflate a bicycle tyre with a large hole in it, but billions are being poured into well-known Ukrainian corruption networks

There seems to be some evidence that the sofa war heroes who decide on war and peace in our countries are increasingly prone to these perceptual distortions.

2) Political explanations
It is well known that a compelling enemy image can help to gloss over internal conflicts (Klaus Moegling, https://www.klaus-moegling.de/aktuelle-auflage-neuordnung/ , p.167). This can involve distinct groups within one's own country (Jews, migrants, Palestinians) or an entirely different country.
Some people are then prepared to follow Goebbels (and today Pistorius, https://gewerkschaftliche-linke-berlin.de/kriegstuechtig-wie-nur-je-von-zeitenwende-kriegstuechtigkeit-und-heimatschutz/ ) for the sake of “war readiness” (and war invalidity), even if their fridge is empty and they have no heating.

I will refrain from describing the domestic political situation in all countries where this applies. The following examples should suffice:
- Macron (without a political base)
- Netanyahu (pending criminal proceedings)
- Zelensky (in office “extended”)
- Trump (pending criminal proceedings and sex scandals)
Of course, there are tax-funded institutions that help out at the right time with the right events and narratives, as we saw in the drone hysteria campaign (the fact check on this, “The EU on the way to Sender Gleiwitz”, can be sent to you in German).
Let us just note that the “elites” of an EU that is losing its lustre and a Federal Republic of Germany in which all the social achievements of the last 150 years are gradually being dismantled may well have a political interest in a permanent war and a new enemy in the East. Or are simply incapable, for the reasons described in 1), of finding a way out of the impasse into which they have led us all.

3) Material explanations
Let us be guided by optimism bias and assume that corruption in the defence sector in the EU is not (yet) as advanced as it is in Ukraine.
Nevertheless, it is obvious that there are situations here too where what someone represents politically and what they earn overlap. Take the example of former CIA director and US Secretary of State Pompeo: https://brooklynpeace.ourpowerbase.net/civicrm/mailing/url?u=28353&qid=3132958 .
The systemic conditions for this also exist in the Federal Republic of Germany:
1) The “revolving doors” between the Bundeswehr and the “Ministry of Defence” and industry are constantly in motion: https://www.bundeswehr-journal.de/2025/wenn-ehemalige-soldaten-bei-der-ruestungsindustrie-anheuern/
2) The parliament, which should control such things, is practically paralysed. An investigation about the “Defence” committee of the previous Bundestag revealed: "Of 11 executive members, 5 have lobby contacts, so it is fair to say that this committee is firmly in the hands of people who are more committed to the arms industry than to their constituents. Of the remaining 27 members, 5, two of whom also are members of peace-oriented institutions. In addition, experience shows that there are those who have not disclosed their contacts/secondary activities. This means that of 38 people, at least 10 have militaristic lobby contacts and at least 2 have peace-oriented contacts at the same time."
(The list ‘Defence Committee of the Bundestag 2022’ can be sent on request in German.)
The situation is similar at EU level: https://www.attac.at/news/details/wie-ruestungskonzerne-europas-sicherheitspolitik-beeinflussen
If someone has the time and resources to investigate this more closely, some scandals are bound to come to light. Until then, this is a conjecture that is not admissible in court, but has a “probability bordering on certainty”.

What now?

How should one behave towards people who are influenced by conspiracy theories, suffer from heightened perceptual distortions, and have a political and material interest in maintaining and spreading certain misjudgements?
1) Sending extensively researched documentation is of little use. Even if it gets past the research assistants, it falls victim to the filters described above.
2) Seeking discussion, as the EVAL project https://www.evalww.com/ in Germany and Austria does, for example, is of limited use. (However, it became apparent here too that even after the discussion, Nico Lange from the Munich Security Conference continued to disseminate a paper on the war in Ukraine that contained a plethora of factual errors. The fact check ‘The MSC – fairy tale aunt or horror novel?’ is available on request in English).
3) The authors of “Fake Facts” have written a second book, “True Facts, Was gegen Verschwörungstheorien wirklich hilft; Quadriga Verlag, Cologne 2021” , which I have not taken into account here. It describes how to deal with conspiracy theory supporters in concrete terms.
It may also be helpful to take into account the recommendations of sect counselling centres.
4) It is probably better to seek dialogue with people you know through personal recommendation or mutual acquaintances in order to open their blinders a little.
5) Debunking, i.e. confronting people with facts, is not enough on its own (p. 281). Critical questions are more effective than extensive information (p. 285). In this respect, formats such as “Frag den Staat” (Ask the State) https://fragdenstaat.de/ and “Abgeordnetenwatch” (MP Watch) https://www.abgeordnetenwatch.de/ may be more effective, also because of the “silent readers” (p. 289).
6) The ability of “decision-makers” to self-correct is minimal, regardless of how they are treated. Anyone who has not yet noticed this from the decades-long war in Afghanistan and its “reappraisal” can now see it in the German government's miserable decision to let its own former employees fall into the hands of the Taliban rather than rescue them to Germany.
7) It follows from all this that, given the current state of “democratic culture” in the Federal Republic of Germany and the EU, pure dialogue formats are largely meaningless and inconsequential when it comes to important/conflictual/emotionally charged issues.
It may be reasonable to conduct such talks discreetly for a while, but if that does not work, only public pressure will help. (By “pressure” I do not only mean press statements, but also, for example, railway workers who refuse to handle arms deliveries abroad. What Italian dockworkers can achieve should also be possible elsewhere.)
In order for this pressure to build, the enemy stereotypes created by NATO must be “deconstructed”: https://nie-wieder-krieg.org/2025/12/04/resolution-ippnw-aksn/ .
As of 13 December 2025