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The forced community
In a reality of life changed by mobility, flexibility, and globalization, traditional forms of community such as family or neighborhood are disintegrating; at the same time, the subject seeks and creates new substitute communities.
The forced community
Communal spirit cannot be imposed “from above”; it must develop organically—even in Europe.
Nation states have always tried to talk their populations into feeling a sense of community. Yet nations are largely constructed, historically conditioned entities. The aggressive competitiveness of some of these states led to two world wars in the last century. Since then, a united Europe has been presented to people as the ideal of a peaceful community. However, it remains a utopia—and is rightly perceived as hypocrisy as long as class differences continue to erect social barriers between people.
by Neue Debatte
[This article posted on 2/7/2019 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://www.manova.news/artikel/die-zwangsgemeinschaft.]
To this day, it is largely ignored that stable communities cannot be imposed “from above” as compulsory communities, but develop “from below” through cooperation. That is why it must be the task of the state to create the conditions for communities to succeed, and not to design them, because it simply lacks the ability to do so.
The fairy tale
Summer 2006. World Cup. Germany is swimming in a sea of black, red, and gold flags. It seems like a breakout from decades of patriotic rigidity. National pride, ecstasy, and community as far as the eye can see. Instead of a wild “summer of love” like in Woodstock in 1969, the nation experiences a perfect “summer fairy tale” with “peace, joy, and soccer cake.”
Many felt that the World Cup was a high point of rediscovered German patriotism. Is that really the case? Did 2006 bring a new-old sense of community? Was the “summer fairy tale” surrounded by a unifying momentum? No. Six weeks of soccer may be enough to create a superficial sense of community, but not enough to create a genuine community. That requires much more than a round leather ball, flags, and canned beer.
The utopian goal of society to be a community
Being embedded in a community is a basic social need. The prospect of fulfilling the desire for community is therefore seductive. In politics, this is achieved by joining a political group with a specific ideology. However, neither the right wing, with its emphasis on nationalism, nor the left wing, which promises community through internationalism, nor the center, which today entices with the vision of a united Europe, can fulfill this desire.
According to social theorist Zygmunt Bauman's (1) definition of community, the different camps are striving for the same goal:
“Community — the word has become synonymous with a lost paradise to which we hope to return one day, and so we feverishly search for the way there” — Zygmunt Bauman (social theorist).
The “right-wing project,” which emphasizes the exclusion of other people based on cultural differences — us and them — and propagates the nation-state, comes closest to community, at least on the surface. But why only at first glance? According to another definition by Bauman, a community is only a community as long as
it excludes other groups,
is small (manageable for all members), and
is self-sufficient (enabling human action in society).
By definition, the concept of community excludes both a nation state and the vision of a “European Union” (EU), because although both exclude others, neither are manageable in size nor offer self-sufficiency. As a construct, the EU is therefore objectively incapable of filling the gap of community and community spirit — neither yesterday, today nor tomorrow.
Community building “from above” is not stable
State structures in which millions of people live together cannot be covered by the definition of community. In the legal construct of the “state,” the great challenge for the ruling regime is to convey to the people of the state, i.e., the subjects assigned to the construct, who are usually integrated into “real” communities such as families, circles of friends, neighborhoods, or even soccer teams, that within the political construct, manageability, demarcation—from other peoples—and self-sufficiency exist within the political construct, and that a state community therefore exists.
In order to complete this distortion of reality, artifice is necessary to suggest a community in the sense of a state or national community, without actually fulfilling the definitional requirements of a community. This includes, above all, references to a common history, a common culture, a common faith, common values, and common enemies.
The Kingdom of Italy provides an example of a nation state founded by decree “from above” that was intended to represent a community. It was created in 1861 on the territory of today's Republica Italiana as a result of the unification of originally independent principalities and regions. This process was preceded by several revolutionary uprisings and the Italian Wars of Independence.
The new nation state, which was established as a constitutional monarchy after its proclamation, plunged straight into bloody world affairs. The kingdom took part in the colonial conquest of Africa, fought with the Ottoman Empire for control of Libya, and participated in both world wars. In June 1946, the nightmare was over and the Italian Republic was proclaimed. And even though the nation state of Italy is currently preparing to close its borders to refugees and migrants, there is still no real interest among the population in Italy as Italy. Rather, Neapolitans see themselves as Neapolitans, Venetians as Venetians, and Romans as Romans.
The “common enemy” only creates a community of convenience.
What about the common moral values propagated by governments in the “free West”? The inviolable dignity of human beings, for example, or the right to life and physical integrity, are enshrined in articles and paragraphs. These leave room for interpretation. The empty phrases become flexible and are bent to suit interests. One example is the trade and sale of military equipment. It is not moral values but material values that guide action here.
Moral values have been so overused in political debate that referring to them has lost its meaningful effect. That is why other goals are needed to hold “the shop” together internally.
As early as 1954, psychologist Muzafer Sherif was able to prove with his well-known summer camp experiment (2) that common goals between different communities bring about peace.
It is no surprise that, despite the experience of two world wars, people are looking externally for “common” enemies that would threaten these “test-tube communities.” Almost 20 years after 9/11, international terrorism and the joint “war on terror,” which has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent people, are no longer enough. Even when terrorist groups operate outside their area of action, they primarily pursue goals that are internal to the state or limited to a specific territory.
The religious card was played as a trump card. International Islamist terrorism was implied, thereby discrediting Islam per se. This attempt proves futile in the face of wars over resources and strategic influence that are being waged with the approval or direct or indirect participation of Western states in the Middle East, among other places. An offensive, hostile attitude toward Russia and the US remains the only way out on the European continent—China is too far away, both geographically and ideologically.
Crusting over, isolating, breaking apart
In order to break out of the existing nation-state constructs and build a “morally clean” new superstate of Europe, attributes that everyone likes to claim must be emphasized: prosperity, security, and peacefulness. This implies that social insecurity and, above all, aggression await in other places. Prosperity, according to this logic, only exists in tandem with poverty; security only exists when there is insecurity; and peacefulness only exists when war and violence serve as a mirror.
This, in turn, fits in with the understanding of homogeneous communities. In such communities, there is no need for external criticism, reflection, or experimentation. As a result, ways of thinking and perspectives become increasingly entrenched. This has consequences. For example, as soon as new social behavior patterns emerge that are recognized and accepted as useful in society, thereby changing it, the homogeneous community will not respond by adapting, but with resistance, as it is hardly capable of change. It will continue to isolate itself and ultimately break apart (see Bauman, 2009).
This reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of what a state has to do with community in the first place—it has nothing to do with community.
The state structure is the embodiment of a class society in which the balance of power and control is clearly distributed: a few individuals who currently hold the bulk of wealth through financial companies, corporations, asset and real estate management companies rule over many others. Even political participation, which ultimately channels itself into elections, does nothing to change this division. The large-scale privatization of common property is an unmistakable indicator of this.
Competitive thinking harms the peaceful coexistence of different communities
The modern state, which not only emphasizes competitive thinking between peoples, but also pits individuals against each other in competition—and thus promotes aggression between people—can be compared to a meadow where countless colorful dairy cows stand together in many small groups. As in politics, for example with extreme left-wing or right-wing groups, their demands and goals sometimes differ starkly from one another. What holds the groups together internally are their own ideologies, which inspire the communities. Externally, they strive for separation, and consequently fight against “the other” groups.
The owner of the competitive meadow—in reality, multinational corporations that infiltrate politics and dissolve communities—stands at the fence and observes the events. In doing so, they are careful to ensure that the individual groups remain manageable in terms of their effectiveness and thus controllable at all times. If an overarching goal brings the groups closer together, thereby eliminating the competitive situation, as can currently be observed with the yellow vests in France, the prevailing conditions are called into question.
Accordingly, the understanding of the state as a community can only refer to a certain section of all social groups, namely those that show the greatest agreement on political and social issues in particular. This in turn requires distancing oneself from intranational extremes in order to exist as a community. Thus, the idea of the nation and/or state as a community of all subjects is reduced to absurdity.
The state strives for traditional rule
In summary, it can first be said that modern states, not only in Europe, are political power structures (cf. Max Weber) whose origins can be traced back to warrior castes and the manipulative power of priests and temples (3). They developed alongside civilizations, allying themselves with other power groups or fighting them, depending on necessity.
In the historical dimension of state formation, this can be traced back to countless crusades and raids, wars of faith, colonial wars, wars of conquest and unification, annexations and incorporations through diplomatic actions.
The rival groups always agreed on one thing: keeping the common people away from power. The basis of today's European nation states is therefore the consolidation of traditional ownership and power structures, whose origins lie in violence. This did not cease after the Second World War; instead, the acts of war were “outsourced,” primarily to Africa and Indochina.
“Rule means the chance of finding obedience to a command of a certain content from specified persons.” — Max Weber, sociologist (4).
State legal rule, a mixture of bureaucracy and judicial power (administration of justice), which is based primarily on contracts that are to be observed by both the ruled and the rulers, is beginning to crumble.
It is clear that in both the political and social spheres, rule is moving away from the law, while the ruled people and their representatives are increasingly at the mercy of the law. (cf. Fritz R. Glunk, Regieren ohne Regierung [Governing without Government]).
As a result, legal rule is receiving less and less support from the population, which inevitably leads to the withdrawal of legitimacy and thus to the end of rule. If it wants to assert its claim to power, it transforms itself into tyranny during a transitional phase. Its only legitimacy is violence. This, in turn, is fought in the form of revolutions and uprisings.
Therefore, states often seek ways to transform legal rule into traditional rule. It is necessary to justify one's own existence as a necessary construct because it enables community. If this momentum fails, rule would be questioned even more.
Traditional rule derives its legitimacy from the belief of the ruled in an order that has always existed and must therefore be obeyed, i.e., legitimacy must be granted. Such a form of society, similar to the feudalistic society of the European Middle Ages, splits apart. The resulting constellation cannot represent a community in the sense of the definition mentioned at the beginning. The sense of community disappears completely: the ruler becomes the master, the ruled become subjects.
Occasional communities do not fulfill the tasks of genuine communities
Yet a sense of community is one of the basic human needs. Humanistic psychologist Abraham Maslow (5) speaks of a need for love and belonging, the fulfillment of which—in combination with other needs—makes the subject a subject in the first place. But in order to join communities, one must first have them. This is the real problem at the moment: there is a lack of established forms of community. And the desire for excess is the result of a lack of genuine communities.
In a reality of life changed by mobility, flexibility, and globalization, traditional forms of community such as family or neighborhood are disintegrating; at the same time, the subject seeks and creates new substitute communities. The disadvantage: the subject predominantly enters into occasion-based communities (cf. Bauman, 2009) in order to obtain “collective protection against individually experienced uncertainties.”
The big city is one such form of occasion-based community: artificial, superficial bonds, like those between hedgehogs, whose spines prevent real closeness. However, the unsatisfactory sense of community created by the “spiny distance” generates a tension in the subject that it tries to resolve. This happens in two ways:
Withdrawal into the private sphere.
Attack on the public sphere.
What unites both ways is the “will to excess.” The homo apathicus retreats more and more into the private sphere in order to realize his need for love. Why? Society makes it difficult for them to realize this need as a couple, family, or neighborhood, which increasingly conflicts with the logic of a performance-oriented society. That is why withdrawal, as a rejection of society, has something excessive about it, because it represents an excessive will to be human.
Homo hyperactivus, on the other hand, comes to terms with social logic and his inhumanity. He is a cosmopolitan who lives in a “community-free zone” (cf. Bauman, 2009) and enters into occasion-based communities. His “will to excess,” understood as an excessive affirmation of social conditions, manifests itself in restless, distracted, and boundless behavior—whether as a workaholic, an adrenaline junkie, or a sports fanatic.
Powerlessness is the basic mood of both character types, i.e., the homo apathicus and the homo hyperactivus. The “will to excess” is a way for the subject to escape powerlessness within the limits of what is possible. But is that all there is to it? Can the subject find the lost paradise of community on its own?
Certainly not on its own. The subject cannot influence the conditions of material equality and self-determination.
It is time to create conditions for community
That is why we have professional politicians and the law. Or, in the words of Zygmunt Bauman:
“The two things that a community would have to provide in order to directly counteract the pathology of our atomized society are equality of resources, without which the powerlessness of individuals de jure cannot be transformed into the self-determination of individuals de facto, and collective protection against individual deficits and strokes of fate.” — Zygmunt Bauman.
The past cannot be changed, but the future can be shaped positively — even under adverse circumstances. Provided there is a shift from competition to cooperation.
Editorial note: This article first appeared on the portal “Neue Debatte. Journalism and Science from Below.”
Deborah Ryszka, born in 1989, M.Sc. Psychology. After university and professional psychological detours into neuroscience and education, she is now currently camped in university philosophy. She tries as far as possible to escape the social directive of unrestrained public self-expression to the point of self-abandonment. In the words of Epicurus: "Live in seclusion. Avoid the ravages of society—its admiration as well as its condemnation. Do not let its errors, stupidities, and mean lies reach you, not even in the form of books."
Gunther Sosna studied psychology, sociology, and sports science in Kiel and Hamburg, and worked in communications, advertising, and as a journalist for daily newspapers and magazines. He lived in other European countries for over ten years and worked internationally in public relations and advertising. He is the initiator of Neue Debatte (New Debate). He regularly writes about sociological topics, militarization, and social change. He also conducts interviews with activists, politicians, lateral thinkers, and creative minds from all milieus and social classes on current issues.
Sources and notes:
(1) Zygmunt Bauman (1925-2017) was a Polish-British sociologist and one of the most prominent social theorists. Among other things, Bauman dealt with power in postmodernism. He argued that power moves at the speed of electronic signals. It is therefore difficult to grasp, extraterritorial, and physically independent. According to Bauman, power therefore flows through space and time. Above all, it does not adhere to national borders, which in modern times were defended by border controls and wars between power blocs.
(2) Muzafer Sherif (1906-1988) was a Turkish social psychologist. He became known for his research on social influence and conflicts within and between groups. With his summer camp experiment, Sherif was able to prove that it is not enough to establish contact between different groups in order to break down stereotypes, but that it is particularly necessary to strive for common goals and pursue them through active cooperation.
(3) Dr. Reinhard Paulsen: LINKStaatenbildung, Zivilisation und das Recht des Stärkeren (State formation, civilization, and the law of the strongest).
(4) Max Weber (1864-1920) was a German economist and sociologist. Weber's theories had a particular influence on the sociology of economics, power, and religion. He is known, for example, for his distinction between ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility, as well as for the principle of “value-free judgment.” In scientific theory, the requirement of value-free judgment means that the truth of a statement should be assessed independently of its content. Statements should not be considered correct simply because they correspond to one's own value system of opinions, beliefs, ideas, and ideals, nor should they be considered false simply because they do not correspond to one's own value system. Weber took the position that scientific theories pursue the goal of describing facts in the world. Value judgments are irrelevant to this. In order to answer the question “What is the case in the world?”, answering the question “What should be the case in the world?” would be irrelevant. Weber is considered one of the classics of sociology and cultural and social sciences.
(5) Abraham Harold Maslow (1908-1970) was an American psychologist. He became famous for the hierarchy of needs named after him. Maslow differentiates between deficit motives, which arise from a state of deficiency, and growth motives, which aim at self-actualization of the subject. This perfection can only be achieved if the deficit motives consisting of (1) physiological needs, (2) safety needs, (3) love needs, and (4) esteem needs are fulfilled.
Communal spirit cannot be imposed “from above”; it must develop organically—even in Europe.
Nation states have always tried to talk their populations into feeling a sense of community. Yet nations are largely constructed, historically conditioned entities. The aggressive competitiveness of some of these states led to two world wars in the last century. Since then, a united Europe has been presented to people as the ideal of a peaceful community. However, it remains a utopia—and is rightly perceived as hypocrisy as long as class differences continue to erect social barriers between people.
by Neue Debatte
[This article posted on 2/7/2019 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://www.manova.news/artikel/die-zwangsgemeinschaft.]
To this day, it is largely ignored that stable communities cannot be imposed “from above” as compulsory communities, but develop “from below” through cooperation. That is why it must be the task of the state to create the conditions for communities to succeed, and not to design them, because it simply lacks the ability to do so.
The fairy tale
Summer 2006. World Cup. Germany is swimming in a sea of black, red, and gold flags. It seems like a breakout from decades of patriotic rigidity. National pride, ecstasy, and community as far as the eye can see. Instead of a wild “summer of love” like in Woodstock in 1969, the nation experiences a perfect “summer fairy tale” with “peace, joy, and soccer cake.”
Many felt that the World Cup was a high point of rediscovered German patriotism. Is that really the case? Did 2006 bring a new-old sense of community? Was the “summer fairy tale” surrounded by a unifying momentum? No. Six weeks of soccer may be enough to create a superficial sense of community, but not enough to create a genuine community. That requires much more than a round leather ball, flags, and canned beer.
The utopian goal of society to be a community
Being embedded in a community is a basic social need. The prospect of fulfilling the desire for community is therefore seductive. In politics, this is achieved by joining a political group with a specific ideology. However, neither the right wing, with its emphasis on nationalism, nor the left wing, which promises community through internationalism, nor the center, which today entices with the vision of a united Europe, can fulfill this desire.
According to social theorist Zygmunt Bauman's (1) definition of community, the different camps are striving for the same goal:
“Community — the word has become synonymous with a lost paradise to which we hope to return one day, and so we feverishly search for the way there” — Zygmunt Bauman (social theorist).
The “right-wing project,” which emphasizes the exclusion of other people based on cultural differences — us and them — and propagates the nation-state, comes closest to community, at least on the surface. But why only at first glance? According to another definition by Bauman, a community is only a community as long as
it excludes other groups,
is small (manageable for all members), and
is self-sufficient (enabling human action in society).
By definition, the concept of community excludes both a nation state and the vision of a “European Union” (EU), because although both exclude others, neither are manageable in size nor offer self-sufficiency. As a construct, the EU is therefore objectively incapable of filling the gap of community and community spirit — neither yesterday, today nor tomorrow.
Community building “from above” is not stable
State structures in which millions of people live together cannot be covered by the definition of community. In the legal construct of the “state,” the great challenge for the ruling regime is to convey to the people of the state, i.e., the subjects assigned to the construct, who are usually integrated into “real” communities such as families, circles of friends, neighborhoods, or even soccer teams, that within the political construct, manageability, demarcation—from other peoples—and self-sufficiency exist within the political construct, and that a state community therefore exists.
In order to complete this distortion of reality, artifice is necessary to suggest a community in the sense of a state or national community, without actually fulfilling the definitional requirements of a community. This includes, above all, references to a common history, a common culture, a common faith, common values, and common enemies.
The Kingdom of Italy provides an example of a nation state founded by decree “from above” that was intended to represent a community. It was created in 1861 on the territory of today's Republica Italiana as a result of the unification of originally independent principalities and regions. This process was preceded by several revolutionary uprisings and the Italian Wars of Independence.
The new nation state, which was established as a constitutional monarchy after its proclamation, plunged straight into bloody world affairs. The kingdom took part in the colonial conquest of Africa, fought with the Ottoman Empire for control of Libya, and participated in both world wars. In June 1946, the nightmare was over and the Italian Republic was proclaimed. And even though the nation state of Italy is currently preparing to close its borders to refugees and migrants, there is still no real interest among the population in Italy as Italy. Rather, Neapolitans see themselves as Neapolitans, Venetians as Venetians, and Romans as Romans.
The “common enemy” only creates a community of convenience.
What about the common moral values propagated by governments in the “free West”? The inviolable dignity of human beings, for example, or the right to life and physical integrity, are enshrined in articles and paragraphs. These leave room for interpretation. The empty phrases become flexible and are bent to suit interests. One example is the trade and sale of military equipment. It is not moral values but material values that guide action here.
Moral values have been so overused in political debate that referring to them has lost its meaningful effect. That is why other goals are needed to hold “the shop” together internally.
As early as 1954, psychologist Muzafer Sherif was able to prove with his well-known summer camp experiment (2) that common goals between different communities bring about peace.
It is no surprise that, despite the experience of two world wars, people are looking externally for “common” enemies that would threaten these “test-tube communities.” Almost 20 years after 9/11, international terrorism and the joint “war on terror,” which has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent people, are no longer enough. Even when terrorist groups operate outside their area of action, they primarily pursue goals that are internal to the state or limited to a specific territory.
The religious card was played as a trump card. International Islamist terrorism was implied, thereby discrediting Islam per se. This attempt proves futile in the face of wars over resources and strategic influence that are being waged with the approval or direct or indirect participation of Western states in the Middle East, among other places. An offensive, hostile attitude toward Russia and the US remains the only way out on the European continent—China is too far away, both geographically and ideologically.
Crusting over, isolating, breaking apart
In order to break out of the existing nation-state constructs and build a “morally clean” new superstate of Europe, attributes that everyone likes to claim must be emphasized: prosperity, security, and peacefulness. This implies that social insecurity and, above all, aggression await in other places. Prosperity, according to this logic, only exists in tandem with poverty; security only exists when there is insecurity; and peacefulness only exists when war and violence serve as a mirror.
This, in turn, fits in with the understanding of homogeneous communities. In such communities, there is no need for external criticism, reflection, or experimentation. As a result, ways of thinking and perspectives become increasingly entrenched. This has consequences. For example, as soon as new social behavior patterns emerge that are recognized and accepted as useful in society, thereby changing it, the homogeneous community will not respond by adapting, but with resistance, as it is hardly capable of change. It will continue to isolate itself and ultimately break apart (see Bauman, 2009).
This reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of what a state has to do with community in the first place—it has nothing to do with community.
The state structure is the embodiment of a class society in which the balance of power and control is clearly distributed: a few individuals who currently hold the bulk of wealth through financial companies, corporations, asset and real estate management companies rule over many others. Even political participation, which ultimately channels itself into elections, does nothing to change this division. The large-scale privatization of common property is an unmistakable indicator of this.
Competitive thinking harms the peaceful coexistence of different communities
The modern state, which not only emphasizes competitive thinking between peoples, but also pits individuals against each other in competition—and thus promotes aggression between people—can be compared to a meadow where countless colorful dairy cows stand together in many small groups. As in politics, for example with extreme left-wing or right-wing groups, their demands and goals sometimes differ starkly from one another. What holds the groups together internally are their own ideologies, which inspire the communities. Externally, they strive for separation, and consequently fight against “the other” groups.
The owner of the competitive meadow—in reality, multinational corporations that infiltrate politics and dissolve communities—stands at the fence and observes the events. In doing so, they are careful to ensure that the individual groups remain manageable in terms of their effectiveness and thus controllable at all times. If an overarching goal brings the groups closer together, thereby eliminating the competitive situation, as can currently be observed with the yellow vests in France, the prevailing conditions are called into question.
Accordingly, the understanding of the state as a community can only refer to a certain section of all social groups, namely those that show the greatest agreement on political and social issues in particular. This in turn requires distancing oneself from intranational extremes in order to exist as a community. Thus, the idea of the nation and/or state as a community of all subjects is reduced to absurdity.
The state strives for traditional rule
In summary, it can first be said that modern states, not only in Europe, are political power structures (cf. Max Weber) whose origins can be traced back to warrior castes and the manipulative power of priests and temples (3). They developed alongside civilizations, allying themselves with other power groups or fighting them, depending on necessity.
In the historical dimension of state formation, this can be traced back to countless crusades and raids, wars of faith, colonial wars, wars of conquest and unification, annexations and incorporations through diplomatic actions.
The rival groups always agreed on one thing: keeping the common people away from power. The basis of today's European nation states is therefore the consolidation of traditional ownership and power structures, whose origins lie in violence. This did not cease after the Second World War; instead, the acts of war were “outsourced,” primarily to Africa and Indochina.
“Rule means the chance of finding obedience to a command of a certain content from specified persons.” — Max Weber, sociologist (4).
State legal rule, a mixture of bureaucracy and judicial power (administration of justice), which is based primarily on contracts that are to be observed by both the ruled and the rulers, is beginning to crumble.
It is clear that in both the political and social spheres, rule is moving away from the law, while the ruled people and their representatives are increasingly at the mercy of the law. (cf. Fritz R. Glunk, Regieren ohne Regierung [Governing without Government]).
As a result, legal rule is receiving less and less support from the population, which inevitably leads to the withdrawal of legitimacy and thus to the end of rule. If it wants to assert its claim to power, it transforms itself into tyranny during a transitional phase. Its only legitimacy is violence. This, in turn, is fought in the form of revolutions and uprisings.
Therefore, states often seek ways to transform legal rule into traditional rule. It is necessary to justify one's own existence as a necessary construct because it enables community. If this momentum fails, rule would be questioned even more.
Traditional rule derives its legitimacy from the belief of the ruled in an order that has always existed and must therefore be obeyed, i.e., legitimacy must be granted. Such a form of society, similar to the feudalistic society of the European Middle Ages, splits apart. The resulting constellation cannot represent a community in the sense of the definition mentioned at the beginning. The sense of community disappears completely: the ruler becomes the master, the ruled become subjects.
Occasional communities do not fulfill the tasks of genuine communities
Yet a sense of community is one of the basic human needs. Humanistic psychologist Abraham Maslow (5) speaks of a need for love and belonging, the fulfillment of which—in combination with other needs—makes the subject a subject in the first place. But in order to join communities, one must first have them. This is the real problem at the moment: there is a lack of established forms of community. And the desire for excess is the result of a lack of genuine communities.
In a reality of life changed by mobility, flexibility, and globalization, traditional forms of community such as family or neighborhood are disintegrating; at the same time, the subject seeks and creates new substitute communities. The disadvantage: the subject predominantly enters into occasion-based communities (cf. Bauman, 2009) in order to obtain “collective protection against individually experienced uncertainties.”
The big city is one such form of occasion-based community: artificial, superficial bonds, like those between hedgehogs, whose spines prevent real closeness. However, the unsatisfactory sense of community created by the “spiny distance” generates a tension in the subject that it tries to resolve. This happens in two ways:
Withdrawal into the private sphere.
Attack on the public sphere.
What unites both ways is the “will to excess.” The homo apathicus retreats more and more into the private sphere in order to realize his need for love. Why? Society makes it difficult for them to realize this need as a couple, family, or neighborhood, which increasingly conflicts with the logic of a performance-oriented society. That is why withdrawal, as a rejection of society, has something excessive about it, because it represents an excessive will to be human.
Homo hyperactivus, on the other hand, comes to terms with social logic and his inhumanity. He is a cosmopolitan who lives in a “community-free zone” (cf. Bauman, 2009) and enters into occasion-based communities. His “will to excess,” understood as an excessive affirmation of social conditions, manifests itself in restless, distracted, and boundless behavior—whether as a workaholic, an adrenaline junkie, or a sports fanatic.
Powerlessness is the basic mood of both character types, i.e., the homo apathicus and the homo hyperactivus. The “will to excess” is a way for the subject to escape powerlessness within the limits of what is possible. But is that all there is to it? Can the subject find the lost paradise of community on its own?
Certainly not on its own. The subject cannot influence the conditions of material equality and self-determination.
It is time to create conditions for community
That is why we have professional politicians and the law. Or, in the words of Zygmunt Bauman:
“The two things that a community would have to provide in order to directly counteract the pathology of our atomized society are equality of resources, without which the powerlessness of individuals de jure cannot be transformed into the self-determination of individuals de facto, and collective protection against individual deficits and strokes of fate.” — Zygmunt Bauman.
The past cannot be changed, but the future can be shaped positively — even under adverse circumstances. Provided there is a shift from competition to cooperation.
Editorial note: This article first appeared on the portal “Neue Debatte. Journalism and Science from Below.”
Deborah Ryszka, born in 1989, M.Sc. Psychology. After university and professional psychological detours into neuroscience and education, she is now currently camped in university philosophy. She tries as far as possible to escape the social directive of unrestrained public self-expression to the point of self-abandonment. In the words of Epicurus: "Live in seclusion. Avoid the ravages of society—its admiration as well as its condemnation. Do not let its errors, stupidities, and mean lies reach you, not even in the form of books."
Gunther Sosna studied psychology, sociology, and sports science in Kiel and Hamburg, and worked in communications, advertising, and as a journalist for daily newspapers and magazines. He lived in other European countries for over ten years and worked internationally in public relations and advertising. He is the initiator of Neue Debatte (New Debate). He regularly writes about sociological topics, militarization, and social change. He also conducts interviews with activists, politicians, lateral thinkers, and creative minds from all milieus and social classes on current issues.
Sources and notes:
(1) Zygmunt Bauman (1925-2017) was a Polish-British sociologist and one of the most prominent social theorists. Among other things, Bauman dealt with power in postmodernism. He argued that power moves at the speed of electronic signals. It is therefore difficult to grasp, extraterritorial, and physically independent. According to Bauman, power therefore flows through space and time. Above all, it does not adhere to national borders, which in modern times were defended by border controls and wars between power blocs.
(2) Muzafer Sherif (1906-1988) was a Turkish social psychologist. He became known for his research on social influence and conflicts within and between groups. With his summer camp experiment, Sherif was able to prove that it is not enough to establish contact between different groups in order to break down stereotypes, but that it is particularly necessary to strive for common goals and pursue them through active cooperation.
(3) Dr. Reinhard Paulsen: LINKStaatenbildung, Zivilisation und das Recht des Stärkeren (State formation, civilization, and the law of the strongest).
(4) Max Weber (1864-1920) was a German economist and sociologist. Weber's theories had a particular influence on the sociology of economics, power, and religion. He is known, for example, for his distinction between ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility, as well as for the principle of “value-free judgment.” In scientific theory, the requirement of value-free judgment means that the truth of a statement should be assessed independently of its content. Statements should not be considered correct simply because they correspond to one's own value system of opinions, beliefs, ideas, and ideals, nor should they be considered false simply because they do not correspond to one's own value system. Weber took the position that scientific theories pursue the goal of describing facts in the world. Value judgments are irrelevant to this. In order to answer the question “What is the case in the world?”, answering the question “What should be the case in the world?” would be irrelevant. Weber is considered one of the classics of sociology and cultural and social sciences.
(5) Abraham Harold Maslow (1908-1970) was an American psychologist. He became famous for the hierarchy of needs named after him. Maslow differentiates between deficit motives, which arise from a state of deficiency, and growth motives, which aim at self-actualization of the subject. This perfection can only be achieved if the deficit motives consisting of (1) physiological needs, (2) safety needs, (3) love needs, and (4) esteem needs are fulfilled.
For more information:
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