Statesmanship instead of missiles

Tomahawks for Ukraine: statesmanship instead of missiles

by Johannes Varwick

[This article posted on 10/20/2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, http://www.nachdenkseiten.de.]

Statesmanship instead of missiles

The possible delivery of Tomahawks increases the risk of escalation, but will not decide the war. Europe still lacks a strategy.

Tomahawks could reach targets deep in the Russian hinterland – but at what price?

In the “fog of war,” reliable statements with a long half-life are increasingly difficult to make. Much happens behind closed doors, much defies clear assessment or must also be understood as a contribution to psychological warfare – not least in order to maintain or gain public support for the line that is recognized as the right one. This also applies to the debate about the delivery of long-range weapon systems of various kinds to Ukraine, which is intended to support it in its legitimate defensive struggle against Russian aggression.

Over the past three and a half years, new weapons systems have repeatedly been discussed as potential “game changers” – Leopard tanks, F-16 fighter jets, and missile systems such as ATACMS, SKALP, Taurus, and now the US Tomahawks. Military-technical issues often dominate the debate, while strategic goals and the political framework are clearly neglected. More arms deliveries could improve Ukraine's negotiating position, according to the prevailing Western camp. This would only prolong a war of attrition that Ukraine cannot win, according to the minority position.

So what is at stake? Far-reaching weapon systems are intended to enable Ukraine to strike deep into Russian territory, following the logic that “attack is the best form of defense.” This is not only politically necessary, but also permissible under international law, as it is a matter of exercising the legitimate right to self-defense. Those who fight with their hands tied behind their backs cannot be successful, and it is time to remove these shackles.

This debate is anything but new. In the final stages, the Biden administration had already decided in the fall of 2024 to allow Ukraine to use longer-range US missiles on Russian territory. However, this probably referred primarily to parts of the Russian region of Kursk occupied by Ukraine – which Ukraine presumably held as a bargaining chip for negotiations with Russia, accepting heavy losses.

However, the effectiveness of the missiles depends heavily on target selection and guidance.

The approval was also justified by the fact that Russia had already escalated the situation by stationing ten thousand soldiers from North Korea, and that this was now being countered. The ATACMS missiles and their ground-based launchers have probably been used by Ukraine since then, increasingly with tactical success. The same applies to the British Storm Shadow and French SKALP missiles, which – although fired from aircraft – have a similar range to the ATACMS, up to 300 kilometers. These highly effective and difficult-to-intercept missiles can be used to effectively combat enemy troops, equipment, and military infrastructure far behind the front lines. Depending on their armament, including cluster munitions, they are suitable for large-scale destruction of enemy troops. Even if Ukraine only has a limited number of missiles at its disposal, this has certainly hampered Russian warfare.

If Donald Trump—who has already made several 180-degree turns in the past regarding his support for Ukraine—now actually delivers long-range weapon systems such as Tomahawk missiles, strategic questions arise: Will it really persuade Russia to back down? Or will it only give Ukraine short-term tactical advantages – with the risk that the war will reach a new level of escalation and provoke Russian reactions that will both harm Ukraine and make a direct conflict between Russia and NATO more likely?

In the case of the American Tomahawk missiles currently under discussion, which have a maximum range of around 2,500 kilometers, there is an additional factor: to fire them, launch facilities are needed – typically destroyers at sea or submarines – which Ukraine does not have. The recently developed ground-based launch systems, on the other hand, are few and far between, and it is highly questionable whether they will be made available to Ukraine. If this were to happen, however, the US would not deliver them directly to Ukraine, but would sell them to willing European countries, which would then pass them on to Ukraine. According to US calculations, the risk would then lie with the European countries.

However, the effectiveness of the missiles depends heavily on target selection and guidance, for which Ukraine would be dependent on direct US support, such as intelligence information and satellite technology. This would cross the threshold of becoming a party to the war – in Russia's perception, but also in reality. The risk that Russia might fear that such attacks could hit its strategic nuclear weapons and thus undermine its own second-strike capability makes it seem unlikely that this would be an effective means of Ukrainian warfare.

Militarily, individual weapon systems – with the exception of nuclear weapons – are not game changers.

In all likelihood, the US would therefore grant Russia a certain response time in the event of deployment and communicate the target selection in advance. However, it is conceivable that symbolic targets, such as the Kerch Bridge or military infrastructure in Russia that is important for the war effort, could be destroyed. Whether the goal of bombing Russia into the negotiating table in a certain way will be achieved is uncertain. What is certain, however, is that Ukraine wants to draw the Europeans, or better still the US, directly into the war, because from Ukraine's perspective this could be a way to turn the war in its favor.

But militarily, individual weapons systems – with the exception of nuclear weapons – are not game changers, even if the delivery of long-range missiles would certainly cause damage to Russia. The hawkish faction in Germany applauds this and calls on the federal government – after all, Germany has always marched in step with the US – to now also deliver German Taurus missiles. However, this will not change Ukraine's strategic situation in the foreseeable future. Russia will not stop its massive attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure and its bombing of Ukrainian cities, nor will it be deterred from gradually advancing on the front lines.

The extent of Western support in training and equipping Ukrainian soldiers, as well as the massive assistance in target acquisition and reconnaissance, has not yet led Russia to abandon its aggression, but rather to two foreseeable outcomes: First, Russia is also seeking external support – and has clearly found it. The deployment of North Korean soldiers to Russia is one example of this. China would also probably try to prevent a Russian defeat (which currently seems highly unlikely). Second, Russia will continue to escalate its attacks on Ukrainian targets. The war of attrition, which has so far been fought mainly on the front lines and with attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, could escalate into an even more intense war of destruction.

The old question in this war is that of escalation dominance. Russia believes it is on its side; Ukraine thinks it can achieve this with Western support. The spiral of escalation continues unabated. Many who have given bad advice and pursued poor policies for years are now glossing over the failure of their own course or continuing to spread slogans of perseverance – while at the same time demanding that we continue on exactly this path. This is a lack of strategy in the worst sense. However, effective support for Ukraine would require movement at the diplomatic level. The key question is whether there are – or will soon be – serious talks about a solution or a peace agreement. The US at least seems to be continuing to think in this direction. We can only wish them success in their upcoming attempt in Budapest, as part of the planned meeting between Trump and Putin, and support this line.

The Europeans, on the other hand, have no clear idea of how the war should end. Instead, they are making unrealistic demands and relying on slogans of perseverance. But what is there to persevere for? For a political compromise with Russia that will one day be necessary anyway – and for which thousands more deaths or the risk of a potentially uncontrollable escalation are not necessary? Answering this question would require real statesmanship—not just martial rhetoric and symbolic missile diplomacy. However, efforts in this direction are in short supply in Germany and Europe.

Prof. Dr. Johannes Varwick is a political scientist and teaches international relations and European politics at Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg. He has been president of the Scientific Forum for International Security (WIFIS) since May 2024.