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The Munich Security Conference - Fairytale aunt or horror novel?
From February 14 to 16, the 'Munich Security Conference' will once again take place in Munich. Its staff member Nico Lange (Senior Fellow), with the participation of Ulrike Strauss (Chief Operating Officer & Head of Strategic Projects), has published a brochure entitled 'But NATO! - 10 popular myths about Putin's war against Ukraine', downloadable from: https://securityconference.org/zeitenwende/10-populaere-mythen/ .
They present them as “historical facts, counter-arguments and specialist information”. The arguments are worth examining more closely. (The first quote is always 'Richtig ist:' from the chapter introduction. The glossary is not analyzed in order not to make this text too long. The original language of the pdf is German.)
They present them as “historical facts, counter-arguments and specialist information”. The arguments are worth examining more closely. (The first quote is always 'Richtig ist:' from the chapter introduction. The glossary is not analyzed in order not to make this text too long. The original language of the pdf is German.)
Chapter 1: TOO LITTLE DIPLOMACY
Page 3 “Even before the start of the Russian attack on Ukraine and also during the war, there were and are many diplomatic efforts.”
P.4 “Unfortunately, the Russian side has so far shown itself unwilling to engage in serious talks about a peaceful solution. Russia insists on demands that fundamentally call into question the existence of Ukraine as a state and clearly violate the United Nations Charter and international law.”
→ Strikingly, there is very little information about the contacts in the weeks before the Russian invasion https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_negotiations_in_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine and the Russian proposals https://gesetze-ganz-einfach.de/russlands-vertragsvorschlag-fuer-sicherheitsgarantien/ .
Putin may tell his nationalist version of the Ukrainian-Russian history, but the core issue for Russia is Ukraine's entry into NATO, not its existence as such.
Let us briefly recall the 'Cuban missile crisis': John F. Kennedy had medium-range nuclear missiles stationed in Turkey, which threatened Moscow. Khrushchev responded by shipping similar medium-range missiles to Cuba. Kennedy was prepared for a nuclear war, which was avoided at the last minute by the withdrawal of the Russian missile transport and, somewhat later, by the dismantling of the American missiles in Turkey.
With this in mind, it is not surprising that Putin does not like it when NATO missiles can be deployed in Ukraine within 7-10 minutes flying distance of Moscow.
Chapter 2: NEGOTIATIONS IN ISTANBUL
P.6 “There was no finalized peace agreement accepted by both sides in March 2022. The West has never prevented Ukraine from negotiating or reaching an agreement with Russia.”
→ In the same chapter, the author himself relativizes this statement:
P.9 “The then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson did not visit Kiev until April 9, 2022. During this visit, Johnson said that the security guarantees provided for in the draft agreement in Istanbul by the UK and other Western states would not be affordable in his view.”
→ In addition, there are numerous confirmations from third parties that the agreement was not signed but almost finalized and that Russia accepted the territorial integrity of Ukraine, e.g. from the Ukrainian chief negotiator Arachamija https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/news/ukraine-krieg-erdogan-macht-lobbys-fuer-das-scheitern-der-istanbul-verhandlungen-verantwortlich-li.2256403 .
P.8 “In Butsha alone, the Russian occupiers tortured and killed more than 450 civilians within a month.”
→ It makes sense to look at the chronology here:
1) The first massacre by Russian troops following a Ukrainian partisan attack has been documented in detail by the New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/22/video/russia-ukraine-bucha-massacre-takeaways.html ,
2) It is likely that Russian intelligence used lethal torture in the search for members of the Ukrainian territorial defense and their weapons.
3) The allegations of rape by Russian soldiers are also credible after the experiences with Soviet soldiers in World War II and Russian soldiers in Chechnya.
4) Some eyewitness accounts of war crimes (with or without alcohol intoxication) are consistent with Collins 2008 in 'Microsociology of violence'
https://www.amazon.com/Violence-Micro-sociological-Theory-Randall-Collins/dp/0691143226asin=0691143226&revisionId=&format=4&depth=1 , chapter 3, page 94. He has shown that war crimes (with or without orders) are typical side effects of wars, even in armies of states that call themselves democratic.
5) The first autopsied body from the mass grave next to the church died from metal arrows https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/24/dozens-bucha-civilians-killed-flechettes-metal-darts-russian-artillery . This ammunition was used by the USA in Vietnam. It is known that the USA also passed on old weapons to Ukraine. Butsha was constantly shelled by the Ukrainian army during the Russian occupation, which lasted more than a month.
6) Jablonska Street, where dead civilians with white armbands were found, was also within the range of Ukrainian snipers. White armbands were an identifying mark of the Russian army and of civilians in their occupied territory (to investigate who tied whose hands behind their backs and when would go too far here, answer on request).
7) Presumably, the Russian army fired to the rear as security during their withdrawal from Butscha and hit civilians in the process.
8) Before journalists were allowed into the village after the return of the Ukrainian army, Ukrainian 'special forces' and secret service agents carried out a 'purge', during which shots were fired and the population was told to stay at home
https://overton-magazin.de/krass-konkret/graeueltaten-an-zivilisten-was-ist-in-bucha-geschehen/ , Disturbing photo, unverifiable: https://t.me/lepostillon/2127 , https://overton-magazin.de/top-story/tscheche-wegen-pluenderungen-in-butscha-und-irpin-zu-sieben-jahre-gefaengnis-verurteilt/ , https://fr.rua.gr/2024/12/31/un-mercenaire-tcheque-a-propos-du-massacre-de-bucha-nous-avons-tue-des-civils-puis-ils-ont-dit-que-cetait-les-russes-qui-lavaient-fait/ .
Conclusion: The Russian army killed civilians in Butsha (groups 1,2,3,4,7). So did the Ukrainian army (groups 5,6,8). However, the Ukrainian army or its advisors were skillful enough to turn it into a single massacre that served to block negotiated solutions and justify the use of heavier weapons.
Chapter 3: BOMBARDING THE DONBASS
P.10 “This claim is deliberately spread by the Russian side as a pretext for the war of aggression. There was no bombing of the Donbass by Ukraine before the Russian invasion.”
→ A look at the hundreds of OSCE reports since 2014 https://www.osce.org/press-releases/?filters=+im_taxonomy_vid_1:(896)&solrsort=score%20desc&rows=10 shows that even during the ceasefire after Minsk, there was constant firing from east to west and west to east, including artillery and rockets.
P.12 “In the case of the approximately 3,500 civilian victims in the Donbass in 2014 and 2015, it is not possible to say exactly whether they were on one side of the conflict and whether these people were ‘pro-Ukrainian’ or ‘pro-Russian’.
→ Since both sides fired, it can be assumed that these civilians who were killed died on both sides of the front line. (Incidentally, they all spoke Russian and many also spoke Ukrainian, as was customary in the Donbass).
P.12 “There were also no plans by Ukraine to attack the Donbass militarily.”
→ The OSCE observers' statistics show a fourfold increase in incidents in the Donetsk region in the week before the Russian invasion https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/512683 . Eyewitnesses living near the frontline reported increased use of Turkish drones by the Ukrainian army to find weaknesses in the defense line.
Chapter 4: THE UKRAINE WAR IS UNIMPORTANT FOR GERMANY
P.16 “The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is taking place in the immediate vicinity and is also endangering security in Germany and throughout Europe.”
→ The military budgets of NATO and Russia are 10 to 1 https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article254461586/Greenpeace-Studie-Nato-ist-Russland-militaerisch-ueberlegen-mit-einer-Ausnahme.html . In this respect, I find it somewhat dishonest to stir up fears of the Russian army marching through to the English Channel.
It would be more honest to point to the West's interest in the lithium deposits in the Donbass, which are currently inaccessible. Or the disconnection of the Ukrainian power grid from the Russian grid to the EU grid shortly before the Russian invasion.
Chapter 5: DANGER OF ESCALATION
P.18 “This claim is part of Russia's psychological warfare. The risk of a Russian attack on us does not increase if we help Ukraine. The risk for us, on the other hand, will increase if we let Russia have its way in Ukraine.”
P.20 “After more than two years of war, however, it can be said that the feared escalations through the delivery of certain weapons or by attacking certain targets have not materialized.”
→ The Ukrainian civilian population probably sees things differently. The FAB bombs with which the Russian army is attacking Ukrainian civilians (and civilians in the basement) in Bachmut etc. have become increasingly heavy and destructive. The bombardments are targeting more and more sectors, including 'dual use' areas such as energy supply.
→ This narrow view is probably related to the fixation on a nuclear strike. This has not happened so far because it would have greatly worsened Russia's position vis-à-vis the BRICS states. It is now superfluous due to the existence of the Oreshnik missiles, which the author could not have foreseen.
However, the Doomsday Clock, which indicates how many seconds are left until the self-inflicted end of the world, continues to advance https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doomsday_Clock .
Chapter 6: TOO MUCH MONEY FOR HELP
P.22 “The aid for Ukraine has not led to any reduction in social spending in Germany. Not supporting Ukraine now would cost Germany much more later.”
→ The chapter only describes direct payments. (Hopefully the shipment in the photo on p. 25 with Arabic lettering arrived safely and was distributed).
→ The economic consequences of the switch from Russian gas to US fracked gas and the damage caused by the attack on the Nord Stream pipelines carried out by 'allies' are excluded.
→ With regard to cut spending in the social sector (and in education, health, 'development cooperation', infrastructure maintenance), a glance at the newspaper is probably enough.
Chapter 7: CORRUPTION
P.26 “Ukraine is making significant progress in the fight against corruption. The EU and Germany are making their aid conditional on Ukraine continuing to curb corruption.”
→ The latest report from Transparency International indicates an improvement of 3 out of 100 points since 2022. Better than nothing, but significant?
The 'aid' from the EU and Germany probably depends more on political and military circumstances than on progress in the fight against corruption.
Chapter 8: UKRAINE A PART OF RUSSIA
P.30 “Ukraine is not Russia and the Ukrainians voted for independence by a large majority back in 1991.”
→ I think that's perfectly fine. However, there is a reason why the Minsk agreements provided for a strengthening of federal elements:
P.32 “During the 2004 election campaign, narratives of a supposed division of Ukraine into East and West and of an alleged oppression of Russian speakers in Ukraine emerged for the first time.”
→ Two maps shed light on this. First, the language preferences:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russische_Sprache_in_der_Ukraine#/media/Datei:Official_Russian_language_support_in_Ukraine.PNG
In contrast, the use of Russian, the main language in Donbass, is de facto forbidden in public, as is the publication of newspapers only in Russian https://dpa-factchecking.com/germany/220701-99-876250/ .
Then there are the political ones:
2006: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partei_der_Regionen#/media/Datei:Ukr_elect06_pr.jpg
2019: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parlamentswahl_in_der_Ukraine_2019#/media/Datei:Результати_Парламентських_виборів_в_Україні_2019_року_за_округами.svg
All socialist or regionalist parties that were elected in the east have since been suspended.
P.32 “In the fall of 2013, however, after a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Yanukovych suddenly refused to sign a fully negotiated association agreement between Ukraine and the EU. As a result, the major Euromaidan protests began, which escalated into the Revolution of Dignity.”
→ Former US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, a frequent visitor to the MSC, has also stated what “promoting democracy in Ukraine” has cost: https://www.unian.info/politics/910206-since-1991-us-has-invested-5-billion-to-promote-democracy-in-ukraine-but-they-did-not-finance-maidan-nuland.html (not including the cookies she handed out on the Maidan).
And she also said what she thinks of the EU when determining the posts in the post-Yanukovych government: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957 .
P.33 “Viktor Yanukovych's regime had 100 demonstrators shot.”
→ There were as many as 108 dead demonstrators. In addition, 13 police officers were shot dead. Some of the Maidan demonstrators were armed. The authorship of all the shootings is very controversial, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maidan_casualties .
Chapter 9: NATO EXTENSION
P.34 “Vladimir Putin is to blame for this war. There was never a commitment by the West not to expand NATO eastwards. NATO is a purely defensive alliance and Russia has recognized that it has no veto power over the NATO membership of other countries.”
→ There are enough 'unsuspicious' Western politicians and media reports that testify to verbal promises. In writing, there is only the NATO-Russia Founding Act and an OSCE document, which are ambiguous: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia%E2%80%93NATO_relations#Founding_Act , https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/russland-ukraine-osze-lawrow-diplomatie-1.5519884 .
The entire enlargement process and Moscow's protests are described quite well in
Renate Dillmann, Medien.Macht.Meinung - Auf dem Weg in die Kriegstüchtigkeit, Papyrossa, Cologne 2024, original in German, translated. I quote:
* The promise NATO made to Soviet President Gorbachev not to expand eastwards (James Baker, US Secretary of State, 1990: “not one inch”).
* The NATO eastward enlargement rounds, in which 14 countries joined NATO between 1999 and 2020 and the border of the “defense alliance” was moved 1,000 kilometers to the east.
* Russian President Putin's speech to the Munich Security Conference in 2007, in which he announced a change in his country's policy if NATO's forward movement were to continue.
* Russia's intervention in the war that Georgia waged against two separatist provinces in 2008. It was preceded by the fact that the USA had previously put Georgia's NATO membership on the agenda of the NATO summit.
* The EU's planned association agreement with Ukraine in 2013, which was intended to bring Ukraine closer to the EU economically, and the refusal of Ukrainian President Yanukovych to sign this agreement without amendments.
* The subsequent militant Euromaidan protest supported by the West and the subsequent coup against Ukrainian President Yanukovych.
* The protest in the south-eastern parts of the country against the coup government and the establishment of the “People's Republics”.
* The Russian-backed referendum in Crimea on its secession from Ukraine and return to the Russian Federation in 2014, which was not recognized by Ukraine or the Western states. (In view of the unstable political situation in Ukraine, Russia was particularly concerned about the security of the Russian navy in the Black Sea).
* The war waged by the coup government in Kiev against the People's Republics from 2014 onwards, resulting in 14,000 deaths. Linked to this: the systematic disregard of the Minsk Agreement by the government in Kiev - without the two Western “guarantor powers” Germany and France intervening.
* The parallel massive armament of Ukraine by the NATO states since 2014 (which Angela Merkel has now even publicly declared to be the actual purpose of the Minsk Agreement).
* Ukraine's application to join NATO (2018) and Russian concerns about the possible deployment of medium-range missiles that could reach Moscow in ten to fifteen minutes.
* The many and all fruitless negotiations on Russian security concerns in the fall of 2021, in which the Western states individually and collectively rejected all Russian concerns and proposals and assessed the deployment of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border as an unacceptable attempt at intimidation.
* Finally, the announcement by Ukrainian President Zelensky at the Munich Security Conference in 2022 that Ukraine was considering revoking the Budapest Agreement - i.e. the agreement that no nuclear weapons would be stationed in Ukraine.
→ Gorbachov, who is quoted on p.36, also makes statements to the contrary: https://www.stern.de/politik/ausland/nato-osterweiterung-wie-der-westen-einst-gorbatschow-uebertoelpelte-3839144.html . Overall, however, his naivety in dealing with Western politicians is surprising.
→ People from Afghanistan, Iraq, Yugoslavia and Libya should be asked about their experiences with the members of the 'pure defense alliance'.
Chapter 10: KRIM
P.38 “Kievan Rus was a multi-ethnic empire and the core of the common identity of several East Slavic peoples. There is no historical evidence that Crimea belonged to Russia.”
→ Crimea was taken from the Ottoman Empire by Russia in 1783 and remained there until 1917. 134 years after all... The following years are characterized by frequent changes of affiliation, see a not entirely objective outline https://www.lpb-bw.de/ukraine-krim#c102119 , cf. also https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230521204858/https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38ec2.html .
Incidentally, the debate about the significance of the 2014 referendum in terms of international law ignores the fact that Crimea had left the Soviet Union in 1991, before Ukraine, and decided without Russian interference by 91% to re-establish the 'Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Crimean_autonomy_referendum .
An ASSR could declare its independence under Soviet law https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Refer%C3%A9ndum_sobre_el_estatus_pol%C3%ADtico_de_Crimea_de_1991 .
By the way, the debate about this seems just as pointless to me as about the affiliation of Alsace, Kashmir, Kosovo, South Tyrol/Alto Adige, etc.
The ethnic classification of the inhabitants of Crimea (after a long-lasting Russification policy and forced resettlement of Tatars) is predominantly Russian https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/292095/umfrage/ethnien-auf-der-krim/
I suspect that the majority of the current inhabitants would also now express in a referendum under UN supervision that they want to remain in Russia.
In reality, it is not so much about international law or the wishes of the population, but about Russia wanting to keep Sebastopol as indirect access to the Mediterranean and NATO wanting to cut it off.
The review of the brochure ends here.
Conclusions
The review of this publication by staff of the Munich In-Security Conference leads to the somewhat disappointing conclusion that alleged myths are being replaced by 'half-truth media' myths.
I assumed that the author himself believes what he writes and therefore send him twice a copy to correct the pdf. Unfortunately, there has been no response so far.
When such poorly researched 'analyses' are circulated, it is reasonable to assume that the MSC does not serve the pursuit of security for the population, but rather the sales interests of arms lobbies and the self-promotion and coordination of politicians who are looking for ways to slow down the loss of their supremacy.
Recommendations
If you want to find out more about how such opinion manipulation organizations work:
1) Jonas Tögel, Kognitive Kriegsführung, Neuste Manipulationstechniken als Waffengattung der NATO, Westend-Verlag, Frankfurt 2023,
can be ordered at: https://westendverlag.de/Kognitive-Kriegsfuehrung/1634
Also: Power Point from Jonas Tögel's (https://www.jonastoegel.de/publikationen ) book
“Kognitive Kriegsführung” https://www.no-to-nato.org/2024/03/buchprasentation-kognitive-kriegsfuhrung/ , as of Sep 1, 2024,
and: Video by Flavio von Witzleben “How does cognitive warfare work? // Propaganda researcher Dr. Jonas Tögel”,
https://youtu.be/eotTxodm7fg?t=63 , accessed Dec 28, 2024, automatic translation into English and other languages is possible.
2) Renate Dillmann, Medien.Macht.Meinung - Auf dem Weg in die Kriegstüchtigkeit, Papyrossa, Köln/Cologne 2024, http://www.papyrossa.de
3) Anne Morelli, Die Prinzipien der Kriegspropaganda, zu Klampen Verlag, Springe 2022, https://zuklampen.de/
If you want to know more about security:
Rethinking Security https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/
especially on Ukraine: https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/europa-szenario/
And for those who already have a ticket to Munich and want to use it more wisely:
Munich Peace Conference
https://friedenskonferenz.info/
Page 3 “Even before the start of the Russian attack on Ukraine and also during the war, there were and are many diplomatic efforts.”
P.4 “Unfortunately, the Russian side has so far shown itself unwilling to engage in serious talks about a peaceful solution. Russia insists on demands that fundamentally call into question the existence of Ukraine as a state and clearly violate the United Nations Charter and international law.”
→ Strikingly, there is very little information about the contacts in the weeks before the Russian invasion https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_negotiations_in_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine and the Russian proposals https://gesetze-ganz-einfach.de/russlands-vertragsvorschlag-fuer-sicherheitsgarantien/ .
Putin may tell his nationalist version of the Ukrainian-Russian history, but the core issue for Russia is Ukraine's entry into NATO, not its existence as such.
Let us briefly recall the 'Cuban missile crisis': John F. Kennedy had medium-range nuclear missiles stationed in Turkey, which threatened Moscow. Khrushchev responded by shipping similar medium-range missiles to Cuba. Kennedy was prepared for a nuclear war, which was avoided at the last minute by the withdrawal of the Russian missile transport and, somewhat later, by the dismantling of the American missiles in Turkey.
With this in mind, it is not surprising that Putin does not like it when NATO missiles can be deployed in Ukraine within 7-10 minutes flying distance of Moscow.
Chapter 2: NEGOTIATIONS IN ISTANBUL
P.6 “There was no finalized peace agreement accepted by both sides in March 2022. The West has never prevented Ukraine from negotiating or reaching an agreement with Russia.”
→ In the same chapter, the author himself relativizes this statement:
P.9 “The then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson did not visit Kiev until April 9, 2022. During this visit, Johnson said that the security guarantees provided for in the draft agreement in Istanbul by the UK and other Western states would not be affordable in his view.”
→ In addition, there are numerous confirmations from third parties that the agreement was not signed but almost finalized and that Russia accepted the territorial integrity of Ukraine, e.g. from the Ukrainian chief negotiator Arachamija https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/news/ukraine-krieg-erdogan-macht-lobbys-fuer-das-scheitern-der-istanbul-verhandlungen-verantwortlich-li.2256403 .
P.8 “In Butsha alone, the Russian occupiers tortured and killed more than 450 civilians within a month.”
→ It makes sense to look at the chronology here:
1) The first massacre by Russian troops following a Ukrainian partisan attack has been documented in detail by the New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/22/video/russia-ukraine-bucha-massacre-takeaways.html ,
2) It is likely that Russian intelligence used lethal torture in the search for members of the Ukrainian territorial defense and their weapons.
3) The allegations of rape by Russian soldiers are also credible after the experiences with Soviet soldiers in World War II and Russian soldiers in Chechnya.
4) Some eyewitness accounts of war crimes (with or without alcohol intoxication) are consistent with Collins 2008 in 'Microsociology of violence'
https://www.amazon.com/Violence-Micro-sociological-Theory-Randall-Collins/dp/0691143226asin=0691143226&revisionId=&format=4&depth=1 , chapter 3, page 94. He has shown that war crimes (with or without orders) are typical side effects of wars, even in armies of states that call themselves democratic.
5) The first autopsied body from the mass grave next to the church died from metal arrows https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/24/dozens-bucha-civilians-killed-flechettes-metal-darts-russian-artillery . This ammunition was used by the USA in Vietnam. It is known that the USA also passed on old weapons to Ukraine. Butsha was constantly shelled by the Ukrainian army during the Russian occupation, which lasted more than a month.
6) Jablonska Street, where dead civilians with white armbands were found, was also within the range of Ukrainian snipers. White armbands were an identifying mark of the Russian army and of civilians in their occupied territory (to investigate who tied whose hands behind their backs and when would go too far here, answer on request).
7) Presumably, the Russian army fired to the rear as security during their withdrawal from Butscha and hit civilians in the process.
8) Before journalists were allowed into the village after the return of the Ukrainian army, Ukrainian 'special forces' and secret service agents carried out a 'purge', during which shots were fired and the population was told to stay at home
https://overton-magazin.de/krass-konkret/graeueltaten-an-zivilisten-was-ist-in-bucha-geschehen/ , Disturbing photo, unverifiable: https://t.me/lepostillon/2127 , https://overton-magazin.de/top-story/tscheche-wegen-pluenderungen-in-butscha-und-irpin-zu-sieben-jahre-gefaengnis-verurteilt/ , https://fr.rua.gr/2024/12/31/un-mercenaire-tcheque-a-propos-du-massacre-de-bucha-nous-avons-tue-des-civils-puis-ils-ont-dit-que-cetait-les-russes-qui-lavaient-fait/ .
Conclusion: The Russian army killed civilians in Butsha (groups 1,2,3,4,7). So did the Ukrainian army (groups 5,6,8). However, the Ukrainian army or its advisors were skillful enough to turn it into a single massacre that served to block negotiated solutions and justify the use of heavier weapons.
Chapter 3: BOMBARDING THE DONBASS
P.10 “This claim is deliberately spread by the Russian side as a pretext for the war of aggression. There was no bombing of the Donbass by Ukraine before the Russian invasion.”
→ A look at the hundreds of OSCE reports since 2014 https://www.osce.org/press-releases/?filters=+im_taxonomy_vid_1:(896)&solrsort=score%20desc&rows=10 shows that even during the ceasefire after Minsk, there was constant firing from east to west and west to east, including artillery and rockets.
P.12 “In the case of the approximately 3,500 civilian victims in the Donbass in 2014 and 2015, it is not possible to say exactly whether they were on one side of the conflict and whether these people were ‘pro-Ukrainian’ or ‘pro-Russian’.
→ Since both sides fired, it can be assumed that these civilians who were killed died on both sides of the front line. (Incidentally, they all spoke Russian and many also spoke Ukrainian, as was customary in the Donbass).
P.12 “There were also no plans by Ukraine to attack the Donbass militarily.”
→ The OSCE observers' statistics show a fourfold increase in incidents in the Donetsk region in the week before the Russian invasion https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/512683 . Eyewitnesses living near the frontline reported increased use of Turkish drones by the Ukrainian army to find weaknesses in the defense line.
Chapter 4: THE UKRAINE WAR IS UNIMPORTANT FOR GERMANY
P.16 “The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is taking place in the immediate vicinity and is also endangering security in Germany and throughout Europe.”
→ The military budgets of NATO and Russia are 10 to 1 https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article254461586/Greenpeace-Studie-Nato-ist-Russland-militaerisch-ueberlegen-mit-einer-Ausnahme.html . In this respect, I find it somewhat dishonest to stir up fears of the Russian army marching through to the English Channel.
It would be more honest to point to the West's interest in the lithium deposits in the Donbass, which are currently inaccessible. Or the disconnection of the Ukrainian power grid from the Russian grid to the EU grid shortly before the Russian invasion.
Chapter 5: DANGER OF ESCALATION
P.18 “This claim is part of Russia's psychological warfare. The risk of a Russian attack on us does not increase if we help Ukraine. The risk for us, on the other hand, will increase if we let Russia have its way in Ukraine.”
P.20 “After more than two years of war, however, it can be said that the feared escalations through the delivery of certain weapons or by attacking certain targets have not materialized.”
→ The Ukrainian civilian population probably sees things differently. The FAB bombs with which the Russian army is attacking Ukrainian civilians (and civilians in the basement) in Bachmut etc. have become increasingly heavy and destructive. The bombardments are targeting more and more sectors, including 'dual use' areas such as energy supply.
→ This narrow view is probably related to the fixation on a nuclear strike. This has not happened so far because it would have greatly worsened Russia's position vis-à-vis the BRICS states. It is now superfluous due to the existence of the Oreshnik missiles, which the author could not have foreseen.
However, the Doomsday Clock, which indicates how many seconds are left until the self-inflicted end of the world, continues to advance https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doomsday_Clock .
Chapter 6: TOO MUCH MONEY FOR HELP
P.22 “The aid for Ukraine has not led to any reduction in social spending in Germany. Not supporting Ukraine now would cost Germany much more later.”
→ The chapter only describes direct payments. (Hopefully the shipment in the photo on p. 25 with Arabic lettering arrived safely and was distributed).
→ The economic consequences of the switch from Russian gas to US fracked gas and the damage caused by the attack on the Nord Stream pipelines carried out by 'allies' are excluded.
→ With regard to cut spending in the social sector (and in education, health, 'development cooperation', infrastructure maintenance), a glance at the newspaper is probably enough.
Chapter 7: CORRUPTION
P.26 “Ukraine is making significant progress in the fight against corruption. The EU and Germany are making their aid conditional on Ukraine continuing to curb corruption.”
→ The latest report from Transparency International indicates an improvement of 3 out of 100 points since 2022. Better than nothing, but significant?
The 'aid' from the EU and Germany probably depends more on political and military circumstances than on progress in the fight against corruption.
Chapter 8: UKRAINE A PART OF RUSSIA
P.30 “Ukraine is not Russia and the Ukrainians voted for independence by a large majority back in 1991.”
→ I think that's perfectly fine. However, there is a reason why the Minsk agreements provided for a strengthening of federal elements:
P.32 “During the 2004 election campaign, narratives of a supposed division of Ukraine into East and West and of an alleged oppression of Russian speakers in Ukraine emerged for the first time.”
→ Two maps shed light on this. First, the language preferences:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russische_Sprache_in_der_Ukraine#/media/Datei:Official_Russian_language_support_in_Ukraine.PNG
In contrast, the use of Russian, the main language in Donbass, is de facto forbidden in public, as is the publication of newspapers only in Russian https://dpa-factchecking.com/germany/220701-99-876250/ .
Then there are the political ones:
2006: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partei_der_Regionen#/media/Datei:Ukr_elect06_pr.jpg
2019: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parlamentswahl_in_der_Ukraine_2019#/media/Datei:Результати_Парламентських_виборів_в_Україні_2019_року_за_округами.svg
All socialist or regionalist parties that were elected in the east have since been suspended.
P.32 “In the fall of 2013, however, after a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Yanukovych suddenly refused to sign a fully negotiated association agreement between Ukraine and the EU. As a result, the major Euromaidan protests began, which escalated into the Revolution of Dignity.”
→ Former US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, a frequent visitor to the MSC, has also stated what “promoting democracy in Ukraine” has cost: https://www.unian.info/politics/910206-since-1991-us-has-invested-5-billion-to-promote-democracy-in-ukraine-but-they-did-not-finance-maidan-nuland.html (not including the cookies she handed out on the Maidan).
And she also said what she thinks of the EU when determining the posts in the post-Yanukovych government: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957 .
P.33 “Viktor Yanukovych's regime had 100 demonstrators shot.”
→ There were as many as 108 dead demonstrators. In addition, 13 police officers were shot dead. Some of the Maidan demonstrators were armed. The authorship of all the shootings is very controversial, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maidan_casualties .
Chapter 9: NATO EXTENSION
P.34 “Vladimir Putin is to blame for this war. There was never a commitment by the West not to expand NATO eastwards. NATO is a purely defensive alliance and Russia has recognized that it has no veto power over the NATO membership of other countries.”
→ There are enough 'unsuspicious' Western politicians and media reports that testify to verbal promises. In writing, there is only the NATO-Russia Founding Act and an OSCE document, which are ambiguous: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia%E2%80%93NATO_relations#Founding_Act , https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/russland-ukraine-osze-lawrow-diplomatie-1.5519884 .
The entire enlargement process and Moscow's protests are described quite well in
Renate Dillmann, Medien.Macht.Meinung - Auf dem Weg in die Kriegstüchtigkeit, Papyrossa, Cologne 2024, original in German, translated. I quote:
* The promise NATO made to Soviet President Gorbachev not to expand eastwards (James Baker, US Secretary of State, 1990: “not one inch”).
* The NATO eastward enlargement rounds, in which 14 countries joined NATO between 1999 and 2020 and the border of the “defense alliance” was moved 1,000 kilometers to the east.
* Russian President Putin's speech to the Munich Security Conference in 2007, in which he announced a change in his country's policy if NATO's forward movement were to continue.
* Russia's intervention in the war that Georgia waged against two separatist provinces in 2008. It was preceded by the fact that the USA had previously put Georgia's NATO membership on the agenda of the NATO summit.
* The EU's planned association agreement with Ukraine in 2013, which was intended to bring Ukraine closer to the EU economically, and the refusal of Ukrainian President Yanukovych to sign this agreement without amendments.
* The subsequent militant Euromaidan protest supported by the West and the subsequent coup against Ukrainian President Yanukovych.
* The protest in the south-eastern parts of the country against the coup government and the establishment of the “People's Republics”.
* The Russian-backed referendum in Crimea on its secession from Ukraine and return to the Russian Federation in 2014, which was not recognized by Ukraine or the Western states. (In view of the unstable political situation in Ukraine, Russia was particularly concerned about the security of the Russian navy in the Black Sea).
* The war waged by the coup government in Kiev against the People's Republics from 2014 onwards, resulting in 14,000 deaths. Linked to this: the systematic disregard of the Minsk Agreement by the government in Kiev - without the two Western “guarantor powers” Germany and France intervening.
* The parallel massive armament of Ukraine by the NATO states since 2014 (which Angela Merkel has now even publicly declared to be the actual purpose of the Minsk Agreement).
* Ukraine's application to join NATO (2018) and Russian concerns about the possible deployment of medium-range missiles that could reach Moscow in ten to fifteen minutes.
* The many and all fruitless negotiations on Russian security concerns in the fall of 2021, in which the Western states individually and collectively rejected all Russian concerns and proposals and assessed the deployment of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border as an unacceptable attempt at intimidation.
* Finally, the announcement by Ukrainian President Zelensky at the Munich Security Conference in 2022 that Ukraine was considering revoking the Budapest Agreement - i.e. the agreement that no nuclear weapons would be stationed in Ukraine.
→ Gorbachov, who is quoted on p.36, also makes statements to the contrary: https://www.stern.de/politik/ausland/nato-osterweiterung-wie-der-westen-einst-gorbatschow-uebertoelpelte-3839144.html . Overall, however, his naivety in dealing with Western politicians is surprising.
→ People from Afghanistan, Iraq, Yugoslavia and Libya should be asked about their experiences with the members of the 'pure defense alliance'.
Chapter 10: KRIM
P.38 “Kievan Rus was a multi-ethnic empire and the core of the common identity of several East Slavic peoples. There is no historical evidence that Crimea belonged to Russia.”
→ Crimea was taken from the Ottoman Empire by Russia in 1783 and remained there until 1917. 134 years after all... The following years are characterized by frequent changes of affiliation, see a not entirely objective outline https://www.lpb-bw.de/ukraine-krim#c102119 , cf. also https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230521204858/https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38ec2.html .
Incidentally, the debate about the significance of the 2014 referendum in terms of international law ignores the fact that Crimea had left the Soviet Union in 1991, before Ukraine, and decided without Russian interference by 91% to re-establish the 'Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Crimean_autonomy_referendum .
An ASSR could declare its independence under Soviet law https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Refer%C3%A9ndum_sobre_el_estatus_pol%C3%ADtico_de_Crimea_de_1991 .
By the way, the debate about this seems just as pointless to me as about the affiliation of Alsace, Kashmir, Kosovo, South Tyrol/Alto Adige, etc.
The ethnic classification of the inhabitants of Crimea (after a long-lasting Russification policy and forced resettlement of Tatars) is predominantly Russian https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/292095/umfrage/ethnien-auf-der-krim/
I suspect that the majority of the current inhabitants would also now express in a referendum under UN supervision that they want to remain in Russia.
In reality, it is not so much about international law or the wishes of the population, but about Russia wanting to keep Sebastopol as indirect access to the Mediterranean and NATO wanting to cut it off.
The review of the brochure ends here.
Conclusions
The review of this publication by staff of the Munich In-Security Conference leads to the somewhat disappointing conclusion that alleged myths are being replaced by 'half-truth media' myths.
I assumed that the author himself believes what he writes and therefore send him twice a copy to correct the pdf. Unfortunately, there has been no response so far.
When such poorly researched 'analyses' are circulated, it is reasonable to assume that the MSC does not serve the pursuit of security for the population, but rather the sales interests of arms lobbies and the self-promotion and coordination of politicians who are looking for ways to slow down the loss of their supremacy.
Recommendations
If you want to find out more about how such opinion manipulation organizations work:
1) Jonas Tögel, Kognitive Kriegsführung, Neuste Manipulationstechniken als Waffengattung der NATO, Westend-Verlag, Frankfurt 2023,
can be ordered at: https://westendverlag.de/Kognitive-Kriegsfuehrung/1634
Also: Power Point from Jonas Tögel's (https://www.jonastoegel.de/publikationen ) book
“Kognitive Kriegsführung” https://www.no-to-nato.org/2024/03/buchprasentation-kognitive-kriegsfuhrung/ , as of Sep 1, 2024,
and: Video by Flavio von Witzleben “How does cognitive warfare work? // Propaganda researcher Dr. Jonas Tögel”,
https://youtu.be/eotTxodm7fg?t=63 , accessed Dec 28, 2024, automatic translation into English and other languages is possible.
2) Renate Dillmann, Medien.Macht.Meinung - Auf dem Weg in die Kriegstüchtigkeit, Papyrossa, Köln/Cologne 2024, http://www.papyrossa.de
3) Anne Morelli, Die Prinzipien der Kriegspropaganda, zu Klampen Verlag, Springe 2022, https://zuklampen.de/
If you want to know more about security:
Rethinking Security https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/
especially on Ukraine: https://www.sicherheitneudenken.de/europa-szenario/
And for those who already have a ticket to Munich and want to use it more wisely:
Munich Peace Conference
https://friedenskonferenz.info/
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