Wars hardly achieve their intended goal anymore

Wars hardly achieve their intended goal anymore
By Armin Groh

[This article published on Feb 23, 2022 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://makroskop.eu/07-2022/pazifismus-als-realpolitik/.]

Ethical arguments against war abound. But studies show there are also arguments for pragmatic pacifism based on experience.

What are the arguments against war? Beyond deontological arguments, as discussed in Part 1, it could be that peaceful means are also the better solution in terms of realpolitik. Willy Brandt was not the least convinced of this. In his speech on the occasion of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize, he emphasized:

"War is no longer the ultima ratio, but the ultima irratio. Even if this is not yet a general understanding: I conceive a policy for peace as the true realpolitik of this epoch."

That this attitude did not become the general insight of the epoch is shown all too clearly by the policies pursued since then. For countless crises, war and rearmament remained the instruments of politics advocated as rational. In the current Ukraine crisis, too, diplomacy seems to have reached its limits. Is a pacifist foreign policy in a Hobbesian world not simply too naive?

A person is considered naïve if he makes reckless judgments that lack experience and expertise. Consequently, if war is a rational means, the proponent of war would have to have the appropriate experience and expertise to prove the superiority of his position. Does he? This question calls for a look at international relations theory.

Nonviolent resistance nearly twice as effective on average

As Richard Jackson, director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies New Zealand, points out in his Pacifism Papers, this evidence is poor. Scientific proof would have to be based on a systematic comparison of peaceful and military means. In international relations theory, however, pacifism has a poor standing. Comparatively little attention is paid to peaceful means of conflict resolution. Nevertheless, he said, there is a growing literature that demonstrates the opportunities of peaceful means even under extremely difficult conditions. Here are some examples:

An exemplary case of the liberal mainstream's pro-war paradigm is the academic career of Erika Chenoweth. She had initially targeted a military career and also accused pacifist political scientists of naiveté. Her colleague Maria J. Stephan, however, challenged her to demonstrate the superiority of violence as a means of resistance in a systematic, historical comparison. Chenoweth noted to her astonishment that no one had previously undertaken such a comparison. Together with Stephan, she then examined hundreds of uprisings between 1900 and 2006. The uprisings considered were not for specific demands, but for maximal goals such as regime change, the end of an occupation, or secession.

Among the study's findings: Nonviolent resistance is, on average, nearly twice as effective as the violent alternative. The superiority of nonviolent resistance persists even under extremely repressive conditions. No resistance movement failed when it reached a size of 3.5% of the population. Moreover, this size only occurred in nonviolent movements.

Without question, these results require further differentiation, which must be based on qualitative studies, which were also conducted by Chennoweth and Stephan. There is an extensive literature here. Gandhi's liberation movement and Martin Luther King's civil rights movement are particularly well known. Among the many lesser-known successful movements are the People Power Movement in the Philippines, the singing revolution in the Baltic states, and Denmark's nonviolent actions against Nazi occupation.

Studies also document the successful civil resistance of communities and cities within civil wars, in exceptional cases also against extremely brutal groups such as the IS, Colombian guerrillas, Mexican narcos or Brazilian death squads.

Furthermore, there are positive experiences with unarmed peacekeeping like the Peace Brigades International, which were and are active in conflict regions like Colombia, Guatemala or Sri Lanka. The same applies to unarmed UN troops.

Various studies also clearly confirm that terrorism can be successfully combated without the use of the military through intelligence and police measures, as well as economic aid. These successes have not been limited to isolated incidents of terrorism. In 1978, for example, Italy experienced an escalation of terrorist violence with 925 bombings and shootings within a few months. Terrorism was overcome without waging war.

Last but not least, the world would be a far less desirable place had countless conflicts not been resolved or defused through diplomatic means, most notably the Cuban Missile Crisis. Jackson emphasizes that peaceful means do not work in every case, of course. But he says this is also true of military means, which involve additional risks.

The called spirits of Islamist terror

Wars have rarely safely achieved the intended objective for militarily superior forces since World War II. In the second half of the 20th century, about nearly half of wars ended in a draw. Moreover, success is measured only in the achievement of a specific objective such as regime change, not in the consequences for the broader population. The third Gulf War ended Saddam Hussein's rule but resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, the emergence of IS, and a dramatic crash in living standards. Intervention in Libya succeeded in toppling Gaddafi, but turned Libya into a failed state.

As Jackson goes on to point out, violence seems effective because it leads to an immediately visible result: the death of soldiers, the destruction of military assets, etc. But these effects obscure the fact that violence has no secure grip on the will of people. How those attacked will react cannot be calculated. This applies even more to the longer-term risks of war: The division of societies, the emergence of terrorist and guerrilla groups, or the failure of entire states. Moreover, those who rearm risk an arms race, at the end of which their own security will have deteriorated rather than improved. The U.S. has not been able to get rid of the ghosts of Islamist terror that were summoned against the Soviet Union.

Moreover, military force is not simply an instrument, but a social institution that reaches into the whole of society. Thucydides already recognized the negative effects of the Peloponnesian War on Athenian democracy. Among the dangers, as Sheldon Wolin notes, following Thucydides with regard to the United States:[i]

Behaviors acquired in the war zone, such as ruthlessness and indifference to suffering. A tendency of politicians to extend their power over the population. The concealment of "state secrets" rather than transparency. A reduced tolerance of rule-of-law norms, opposition, and demands for socioeconomic reform. Increased manipulation instead of deliberation, resulting in a loss of reality, both on the part of the population and the political leadership.

The permanent institutionalization of violence also carries the risk of positive feedback. The military and armaments must be financed, creating far-reaching dependencies. These dependencies, in turn, promote the justification of violence. Eisenhower's warning about the military-industrial complex that emerged in the course of World War II has gained particular notoriety here.

Last but not least, the military can be used by the political leadership against the population in case of doubt. This danger may be low in established democracies, but fragile democracies regularly fail to do so. For Jackson, the model of peacekeeping that dominates the liberal mainstream is therefore counterproductive.[ii] It essentially involves copying a Western liberal democracy: competing parties, elections, a liberalized economy, and a military apparatus that is supposed to be controlled by democratic institutions and good governance.

Experience shows that liberal peacekeeping rarely leads to success. Violent conflict, repression and structural violence have persisted, and democratic consolidation has failed to materialize. More recently, the Sahel has experienced a series of coups d'état. It can be linked to a militarization of the affected states organized and financed by AFRICOM to fight terrorism.

A pacifist state?

The disadvantages of institutionalizing violence raise the question of alternatives. According to Wolfgang Streeck, the renunciation of a security apparatus capable of attack is an essential element of democratization. Accordingly, disarmament, not rearmament, would be the order of the day. In Switzerland, the militia system is a central element of its participatory democracy. The composition of the army, which consists almost exclusively of conscripts and reservists, counteracts the centralization and independence of power.

The model of a pacifist, demilitarized state discussed in peace research and advocated by Jackson goes much further (in Switzerland there was actually a corresponding popular initiative). Such a model may seem absurd. However, the arguments put forward in favor of it in peace research are at least worth considering insofar as they open up perspectives on an alternative way of dealing with security issues.

Empirically, the possibilities for comparison are limited because there are not many independent states without a military. Currently, there are 25 states that have no military or only police units that can be called upon for defense. Most of them are microstates such as Andorra, Iceland or Samoa. The only two demilitarized states with larger populations are Costa Rica and Panama.

In addition to domestic political, economic and ecological disadvantages of the military, arguments in favor of a pacifist state include the following: War, even a defensive war, is extremely costly and destructive. Civil resistance would cost fewer lives, according to historical experience. It is also an effective instrument. Until now, the rule of thumb has been that a repressive regime fails because of the civil resistance of at least 5 % of the population. According to Chennoweth, this limit could even be 3.5 %. However, a pacifist state can systematically organize civil resistance among the general population through diplomacy, demonstrations, boycotts, blockades, sabotage, and many other techniques. In Lithuania, such an approach has been implemented to a limited extent.

According to Jackson, other advantages of institutionalizing civil resistance include: civil resistance is inclusive - even children, the elderly, and the disabled can participate in practicing its techniques. A policy of nonviolence also tends to strengthen democratic participation and reduce inequalities. Organized civil resistance, even as a complement to the security apparatus, thus has interesting implications for a republican theory of democracy. External defense is undoubtedly a generally communicable element of social identification. However, it is also obvious that this concept is not in the interest of state and private power concentration.

A pragmatic pacifism

There are different attempts to formulate a pragmatic pacifism based on experience. According to Robert Holmes, one of the most widely cited pacifist philosophers, war since World War II is no longer morally justifiable for the reasons stated. The influential American historian Howard Zinn goes even further. He is one of the few for whom the downfall of the Nazi regime was a serious possibility even by means other than the extremely costly Second World War. He could not prevent the Holocaust, and a victory over racism, totalitarianism and war was not achieved.

The German philosopher Olaf Müller formulates his pragmatic pacifism somewhat more cautiously. Due to the complexity of social behavior and the inevitable interweaving of facts and values, an objective scientific justification for going to war is impossible. In the end, however, pacifism could not justify its position objectively and scientifically either. On the whole, however, it represents the much more attractive position. There could be extreme cases, such as European fascism, in which even the pragmatic pacifist could resort to military means. Ultimately, however, it cannot be proven that there is no peaceful way out of a conflict. Müller rejected the Kosovo war and all Western wars in the Middle East.

According to Robert Holmes, pacifism can claim, if nothing else, that the consequences of a peaceable policy are still unknowable, but that its implementation is unquestionably worth trying:

"No one can predict what the consequences would be if a country like the United States spent 300 billion a year on research and techniques of nonviolent resistance and education and training of people [...]."

Willy Brandt would no doubt have agreed.
[i] Wolin, Sheldon (2010): Democracy Incorporated. Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism. P. 247 f.
[ii] Jackson, Richard (2018): Post-liberal peacebuilding and the pacifist state. Peacbuilding, Vol. 6, No1, pp. 1-16.

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Is that it for pacifism?

Armin Groh | February 07, 2022

Armin Groh studied philosophy, history and music. He works as a high school teacher for these subjects in Rhineland-Palatinate. He led a multi-year project to promote scientific thinking in the natural and social science subjects with the University of Cologne. He is an author with Klett-Verlag.