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|SF Rally-Speak Out At Japanese Consulate-Stop The Restarting Of Japanese NUKE Plants,|
|Date||Thursday February 11|
|Time||3:00 PM - 4:00 PM|
|Import this event into your personal calendar.|
275 Battery St. San Francisco
|Event Type||Press Conference|
|Organizer/Author||No Nukes Action Committee|
2/11 SF Rally-Speak Out At Japanese Consulate-Stop The Restarting Of Japanese NUKE Plants, Stop Radioactive Water Leaks At Fukushima, Protect The Children and Families of Fukushima
Rally and Speak Out At Japanese Consulate On Wednesday February 11, 2015 at 3:00
275 Battery St. San Francisco
The Abe Japanese government continues to reopen nuclear plants in Japan despite the great dangers of another Fukushima. At the same time anti-nuclear activists are under attack by the government using the new secrecy law and propaganda to remilitarize Japan. The government continues to tell the people of Japan and the world that the Fukushima disaster has been overcome. This lie was presented by the government to garner the Olympics in Japan. The US government also continues to support the restarting of the plants and for the full militarization of Japan.
Support the campaign to defend the children and families of Fukushima and show solidarity with the people of Japan who are fighting against the nuclear industry and the control of these billionaires who have captured the health and safety and regulatory agencies.
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For more information
Fukushima Teacher Speaks Out: How Officials and Popular Academics Have Responded to Disaster Victims in the Wake of Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Nuclear Accident
On Fukushima Prefecture and Hiroshi Kainuma: How Officials and Popular Academics Have Responded to Disaster Victims in the Wake of Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Nuclear Accident
On Fukushima Prefecture and Hiroshi Kainuma: How Officials and Popular Academics Have Responded to Disaster Victims in the Wake of Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Nuclear Accident
February 4, 2016
By Toshinori Shishido
• About the author
I worked as a full-time teacher at a public high school in Fukushima for about twenty-five-and-a-half years, until July 31, 2011. During the first four years of my career, I taught at Futaba High School in Futaba-machi, home to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.
Naturally, I have heard stories about the harsh working conditions of nuclear workers. For example, in a certain area of the power plant, working for 10 minutes would exceed the legal maximum daily radiation exposure limit. So each shift was officially recorded as 10 minutes even though their actual worked shift was 8 hours. The workers would primarily wipe water leaking from the piping surrounding the nuclear reactor. When workers died of illnesses like cancer, their families received unusually high amounts of cash as lump-sum payments, while actual workmen's compensation insurance was not provided.
At the time of the 2011 nuclear accident, I was living in a city 53 kilometers (33 miles) away from the power plant with my wife and two children. I was working at a public school 60 kilometers (37 miles) from the plant.
After the accident, on the evening of March 15, 2011, the maximum airborne radioactive levels of 23 microsievert/hour was detected in Fukushima City, where I worked. Outside the school the following day, however, the annual school acceptance announcements were held as scheduled. Several faculty, including myself, met with the principal to insist that usual outdoor announcement be cancelled as to avoid having young students exposed to radiation -- but the announcement event was forced outdoors. The principal cited reasons such as, "the Fukushima Prefecture office strongly supports the outdoor plan" and he "had no choice as the school principal."
From April 2011 on, aside from the prohibition of outdoor gym classes, neither my school nor the Fukushima Board of Education took any measures to prevent further radiation exposure for students. The school had students practice club activities outdoors as usual. Indoor club athletes were made to run outdoors as well, without any protective measure against radiation exposure. Despite the standard practice, measures such as gargling, washing hands, changing clothes, and showering weren't deemed necessary for students when returning from outdoor activities.
Since I had some knowledge about radiation exposure, I advised the students to take caution to remove potential contamination whenever possible. However, in response to my giving the students advice to prevent radioactive materials from entering the building, I had been cautioned by the Fukushima Prefectural Board of Education, in the form of official "guidance" which forbids me to even talk about radiation and nuclear power plants to the students. Given that I was officially barred from protecting students from radiation exposure, I decided to make my move: along with my family, I evacuated my hometown and relocated to Sapporo city in Hokkaido. We were supported by staff and Toru Konno at the Hokkaido Prefectural government who led the way through the interference by Fukushima Prefecture, and Sapporo City, as well as by the support of the people at the NPO Musubiba. Once we evacuated, we found out about a financial system by Fukushima Prefecture which supports voluntary evacuees from the areas outside of the officially restricted zone (though it only approved applications from evacuees pre-December 2012; those who evacuated thereafter would not be financially supported).
I have been teaching part-time in Hokkaido. Since finding out that within the public school system the Fukushima Prefecture Board of Education can intervene to oversee public high school relocation anywhere, I have been teaching at private schools only. Aside from my part-time job, I have been involved in a nuclear power plant damages lawsuit as a plaintiff as well as a member of the refugee organization.
1. Fukushima Prefectural Government and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)'s Fukushima Nuclear Accident
The reactors at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, especially Unit 1 and Unit 2, were delivered and installed from the US after the US manufacturer finished all of their construction. As for Units 3, 4, 5, and 6 the Japanese manufacturer added their own "improvements" to the original structure.
I will try to avoid a lengthy explanation. TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant frequently had accidents immediately after beginning operation and the nuclear workers' exposure levels amounted to twice to ten times the average exposure dose at other nuclear plants. Furthermore, TEPCO kept a lot of serious accidents hidden from Fukushima Prefecture and the Japanese government. TEPCO proposed using Unit 3 for so-called pluthermal power generation, utilizing fuel which can contain weapons-grade plutonium in order to reduce the plutonium surplus in Japan. Eisaku Sato, then-governor of Fukushima, strongly objected to the proposal.The Japanese government arrested and convicted Governor Sato on bribery charges with the amount of the bribe recognized as "zero yen." They drove him to resign, then elected Yuhei Sato as the new governor. As described above, neither the Fukushima governor nor the organization called the Fukushima Prefectural Government had power over TEPCO.
2. Nuclear accident and the Fukushima Prefectural Government
March 11, 2011, when a massive earthquake hit a wide area including Fukushima Prefecture, the building of the Fukushima prefectural office (which had been planned to function as a Disaster Response Headquarters) was damaged in the earthquake. The headquarters were set up in a small building next to the main office building to serve temporary functions. The prefectural government has never publicized records of proceedings and documents from over 20 meetings in the beginning. From the 25th meeting, they finally began keeping records of proceedings.
At the time, the temporary disaster response headquarters was believed to have had little to no communication lines, and had reportedly only two satellite mobile phones. Although the communication infrastructure began to be rebuilt gradually, what was happening then still remains largely unknown. There has been no official investigation into the correspondence between the local governments, the central government and TEPCO, and no evacuation orders to the local communities.
As far as public record goes, the only time Fukushima Governor issued an announcement in the first week was on the evening of March 14th. "Follow the instructions and do not panic,""High school entrance announcements will be held as planned on March 16th," -- these two lines were broadcast repeatedly throughout local media.
From another angle, the recordings of the TEPCO video conference shows that Fukushima Prefecture requested TEPCO make a public announcement saying "the explosion in the Unit 3 at Fukushima Daiichi will not cause health damage." Appalled by the request, thinking they "couldn't say such an irresponsible thing," TEPCO decided to "ask the central government to suppress Fukushima Prefecture," -- as evidently recorded during the video conference.
However Fukushima Prefecture repeatedly expressed that in the "Nakad ri" region -- which includes the prefectural capitol, Fukushima City, and the commercially and industrially flourishing Koriyama City -- there would be zero risk of health damage from radiation.
There has been a use of protective measures like wearing long-sleeves and masks for school children, which may have been a globally familiar sight through media reports. However this was not a recommendation or an order issued by Fukushima Prefecture, but rather a result of demands from local PTAs to boards of education in individual school districts.
Towards the end of March 2011, right before the school year resumed, the Fukushima governor was seen out in local grocery stores saying "Fukushima today is business as usual," in which he began acampaign to "dispel harmful rumors" about local agricultural produce being contaminated by radiation. The governor also opposed widening the evacuation zone beyond the 20km radius of the nuclear power plant, and has repeatedly made remarks to avoid increasing the number of evacuees from outside the official evacuation zone.
As a result, aside from two local Fukushima newspapers, NHK, and four private television networks in addition to NHK Radio and Radio Fukushima, there was little to no mention of messages from outside Fukushima offering free housings and support networks for voluntary evacuees.Fukushima Prefecture also prohibited the use of not only public conference centers, but private facilities for hosting "counseling room" for evacuation as well. People around me practically had no knowledge of local autonomous support groups offering evacuation support. I have heard numerous times that "there is no evacuation order from outside the prefecture, meaning we have been abandoned." In fact, it was Fukushima Prefecture who had been interfering with such efforts to reach our community.
3. Hiroshi Kainuma, "the Sociologist"
In 2011, an author from Fukushima became renowned after publishing the book "Fukushima theory -- the birth of a nuclear village," based on a thesis he wrote as a sociology student at the University of Tokyo Graduate School of Interdisciplinary Information Sciences. His name is Hiroshi Kaiuma, born in Iwaki City, Fukushima, and graduated from the University of Tokyo Literature department at the age of 25 and advanced to the graduate program. I must note that this is difficult to grasp if you are not well-connected within Fukushima. But in short, Iwaki City, where Mr. Kainuma was born and raised, has very little connection to the Futaba district which hosts TEPCO's power plant. In terms of large-scale trading areas, while the Futaba district is part of the Sendai, Miyagi Prefecture trade area, Iwaki City would be part of Mito City in Ibaraki Prefecture. In any case, Mr. Kainuma did not have strong connections to the Fukushima Prefectural government prior to March 11th, 2011.
Since the meltdown, however, he has somehow become "the Fukushima spokesperson who speaks about Fukushima on TV and radio."
Additionally, I have written several critiques of his writings, one of which can be found on the following link (in Japanese): "Personal note on 'Fukushima theory' -- the birth of a nuclear village"http://togetter.com/li/815862
4. Hiroshi Kainuma and the Fukushima Prefectural Government
After 3/11, his master's thesis was published in books and he began to be featured in various media, including an appearance as a commentator on the popular evening program "Hodo Station (News Station)." We must note that the content of his remarks have been consistent -- such as, "The acceptance of nuclear power plant by local communities was necessary for the regions' survival"; "Those outside of Fukushima protesting against nuclear energy do not understand the reality of nuclear-hosting communities." His views and comments on the anti-nuclear movement have been antagonistic from the beginning, for example, "People who oppose nuclear energy are rubbing local communities the wrong way."
Mr. Kainuma currently holds the title of Junior Researcher of the Fukushima Future Center for Regional Revitalization, but at the same time he is a PhD student at the University of Tokyo. While it would be appropriate to call him a sociology researcher, I feel it's an overestimation to refer to him as a sociologist.
Currently the gist of Mr. Kainuma's speech is towards the "recovery of Fukushima in visible forms" and its target audience is outside Fukushima Prefecture. While many others have in fact been referring to "bags" jammed with contaminated waste -- seen everywhere and impossible to be ignored upon entering Fukushima -- Mr. Kainuma continues to emphasize the "ordinary Fukushima" without mentioning the bags.
I see the previous governor of Fukushima, Yuhei Sato, in Mr. Kainuma in many ways, like in his seeming lack of experience interacting with people in temporary housings immediately following the meltdowns, or with shelter residents still living with much confusion and inconveniences as a result of the disaster.
Even the current Fukushima governor does not seem to have made too many visits to temporary shelters during or after elections.
To those who evacuated Fukushima to outer prefectures like myself, the Prefecture kept even more distance. By principle, they never made any official inspection visits to meet the evacuees. There is a notable lack of inspection visits not only in remote areas such as Hokkaido, but also in places like Yamagata and Niigata which are adjacent to Fukushima Prefecture.
In the wake of the disaster, though there was housing support for those who evacuated the areas outside of Fukushima as well, such efforts have gradually died down -- as of March 2016, state subsidies for housing would be available only for evacuees who are from Fukushima. In addition, the housing subsidy program for those who evacuated the non-restricted zone will end in March 2017. However, there is no housing program for returning residents to Fukushima even if they decide to move back there.
Starting March 2017, voluntary evacuees still living in outer prefectures need to choose one of the three following choices:
1) Return home to Fukushima while paying out-of-pocket for most of the expenses associated with the move and your life thereafter; 2) Continue living outside Fukushima while relinquishing your rights to access resources as a disaster victim; 3) Upon proving your need for financial assistance, receive housing subsidies for up to 2 years to live in privately-owned housing.
The reason for this policy change was credited to correspondence between the Minister of Environment and the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, a non-governmental agency to provide scientific grounds for nuclear policy. The Minister of Environment asked the NRA if "it is considered desirable to evacuate the areas that don't have restrictions" to which the NRA answered, "these areas are no longer fit to be evacuated." It should be noted that there was no legal ground for this correspondence to be treated as official; how this exchange was reviewed and by whom is unknown.
Based on this document issued by the NRA, the Japanese government made a Cabinet decision to largely reduce support for evacuees through the Nuclear Accident Child Victim's Support Law.
Following this decision, Fukushima Prefecture also determined its policy would end support for the voluntary evacuees from non-restricted areas.
Hiroshi Kainuma is working from an assumed role to justify such policy of Fukushima Prefecture, utilizing his position as a so-called sociologist. Even if he has ideas and views that differ from Fukushima Prefecture's policy, he does not speak about them on media or at talk events.
For instance, when Mr. Kainuma was relatively unknown before 3/11, he had reportedly interviewed local anti-nuclear activists. Another instance tells us that although he had met and interviewed several people who have moved voluntarily out of the non-restricted areas, he proceeds to ignore the voices and opinions of them as though they had never existed.
Last year, nuclear reactors in Japan started resuming operation. Mr. Kainuma has not been seen or heard expressing opposition to it. Neither Fukushima Prefecture nor the Prefectural Assembly expresses any intentions to oppose nuclear restorations.
5. The current presence of "Hiroshi Kainuma"
Through the circumstances described above, Hiroshi Kainuma is working so as to be portrayed by the media as a Fukushima Prefecture spokesperson, intent on selling "business-as-usual" appeal and depicting a Fukushima that "overcame a nuclear disaster."
Meanwhile, and quite unfortunately, many Fukushima residents agree with his words and actions. Just as there are many people hoping to forget the scars from the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, there are many who explicitly "do not evacuate," comprising an overwhelming majority of the Fukushima population and wishing to forget and move past the disaster and nuclear crisis.
Here we have an academic scholar who speaks for us and to those who are outside Fukushima as well, saying to leave the nuclear disaster in the past.
Thus, this concludes the significance of Hiroshi Kainuma's existence today.
Restart of Japan Takahama nuke plant refuels question about spent MOX fuel
January 30, 2016 (Mainichi Japan)
The No. 3 reactor, left, is seen at the Takahama nuclear power plant in Fukui Prefecture on Jan. 29, 2016. (Mainichi)
Japan has resumed its "pluthermal" power generation project using uranium-plutonium mixed oxide fuel (MOX fuel) for the first time in three years and 11 months, with the reactivation of the No. 3 reactor at the Takahama nuclear power plant in Fukui Prefecture on Jan. 29.
The spent MOX fuel to be generated at the plant, however, will have nowhere to go for reprocessing, just as conventional spent nuclear fuel -- leaving Japan with yet another nuclear waste problem.
"The reactor restart bears great significance in terms of promoting the nuclear fuel cycle," said Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Motoo Hayashi at a press conference on Jan. 29.
The government has promoted the nuclear fuel cycle as part of its national policy and has been seeking to breed plutonium while using it to fuel fast-breeder reactors.
However, the Monju prototype fast-breeder reactor in Fukui Prefecture has hardly been operational due to a sodium leak accident in 1995 and a spate of other problems, giving way to the pluthermal project that emerged as an alternative way out.
The prospect of successfully reprocessing spent nuclear fuel -- a precondition for the nuclear fuel cycle -- is nowhere in sight in Japan. Construction of the Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.'s spent fuel reprocessing plant in Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture, is lagging behind schedule, and spent fuel has been accumulating on the premises of each nuclear plant across the country. At the Takahama complex, spent nuclear fuel has filled two-thirds of its capacity.
In October last year, the government drew up a plan to expand the country's capacity to hold spent nuclear fuel. Kansai Electric Power Co. unveiled a plan to start operating an interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel outside of Fukui Prefecture sometime around 2030, but no specific steps are in sight.
While the destination of conventional spent nuclear fuel is already unclear, reprocessing of spent MOX fuel poses yet further challenges. Because spent MOX fuel is beyond the capacity of the Rokkasho plant, there needs to be built yet another plant dedicated to reprocessing spent MOX fuel. However, there's not even a blueprint for building such a plant.
"For the time being, we will properly keep (spent MOX fuel) within the grounds of the Takahama plant," said a Kansai Electric Power Co. official.
Hideyuki Ban, co-director of the Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, said, "It is unclear whether spent nuclear fuel will really be reused, while the final disposal site has yet to be decided. It is likely that spent fuel will continue to be kept at each nuclear plant. Power companies are now facing the high price for having prioritized reactor restarts and construction."
Defiant to the end, last of Group of Six anti-nuclear scientists about to retire
February 06, 2016
By HISASHI HATTORI/ Senior Staff Writer
KUMATORI, Osaka Prefecture--Tetsuji Imanaka is the last of the so-called Kumatori Group of Six, a maverick band of nuclear scientists at an elite university here that spent decades speaking out against nuclear energy.
At 65, Imanaka is now ready to collect his pension and part company with Kyoto University’s Research Reactor Institute--and he remains as steadfast as ever in his beliefs.
Imanaka cannot have found it easy to go against the government’s policy of promoting nuclear power, yet that's what he's done since he joined the institute in 1976.
He says he never experienced harassment, but then again he never got promoted beyond the post of research associate.
“Many people have commented that I must have been bullied because I banded together with my colleagues under the banner of building a nuclear-free Japan,” Imanaka told a 60-strong audience gathered here Jan. 28 for a lecture to mark his retirement in March. “But that was not the case. It is also true, though, that nobody has praised me for being anti-nuclear,” he added, drawing guffaws.
Imanaka's other colleagues in the group with the exception of one are all retired. They are: Toru Ebisawa, 77; Keiji Kobayashi, 76; Takeshi Seo, who died in 1994 at the age of 53; Shinji Kawano, 74; and Hiroaki Koide, 66.
The group's moniker came from the name of the town that hosts the research center.
Although all six scientists harbored doubts about promoting nuclear energy, Imanaka said, “We did not set out to become activists or form a clique.”
Rather, “We acted according to our own beliefs as individuals.”
The group was relatively unknown before the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster.
But in the aftermath of the triple meltdown at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant, the “rebels” increasingly came under the spotlight as civic groups scrambled to seek their expertise to grasp the ramifications of the nuclear accident and the potential dangers of nuclear energy.
Koide, who retired last year, has addressed 300 or so gatherings across the country since the catastrophe.
But the group's efforts to educate the public about the potential danger of, and challenges facing nuclear energy, date back to 1980 when it initiated a series of seminars at the institute.
“Experts have a responsibility to explain science and technology in lay language to citizens,” Imanaka said of the endeavor.
With Imanaka’s departure, those seminars are about to end. After more than 35 years, the final 112nd session will be held on Feb. 10.
The group's commitment to continue sounding the warning against nuclear power has been widely appreciated by the public at large.
But the members have all had to pay a price for openly defying the “nuclear village,” as the program involving the government, powerful utilities enjoying regional monopolies and academia is called.
None of the six ever got promoted to beyond the level of assistant professor.
Still, Koide, who finished his career also as a research associate, recalled his academic life fondly.
In his lowly position, he was able to focus on his research free from pressure and harassment.
The catalyst for the group's anti-nuclear activities was a lawsuit filed in 1973 by a citizens group over a license issued to Shikoku Electric Power Co. to build the Ikata nuclear power plant in Ehime Prefecture.
In the suit, the plaintiffs demanded nullification of the license on grounds that safety screening of the plant by the government was insufficient. It was the nation's first lawsuit involving the safety of a nuclear reactor.
The researchers stood by the plaintiffs over 19 years of court battles, offering their technical expertise and testimony, right up until the Supreme Court finalized the verdict against them.
Kobayashi, an expert on reactors, also helped residents who sought to shut down the Monju prototype fast-breeder reactor in Fukui Prefecture.
The money-guzzling, problem-plagued project is the centerpiece of the government’s vision to recycle spent nuclear fuel. But the reactor has rarely operated since it went online in 1995.
Imanaka specialized in assessing the spread of radioactive contamination. He traveled to Ukraine more than 20 times to examine the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident site for contamination.
He, along with Seo, also estimated how much radiation was released in the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in the United States.
After the Fukushima disaster, Imanaka embarked on a project to detect radiation levels in Iitate, a village to the northwest of the plant whose residents are still living as evacuees due to high radiation levels.
Keiji Miyazaki, professor emeritus of nuclear energy at Osaka University, was of two minds about the goals of the Kumatori Group of Six.
“We, as a promoter of nuclear power, could learn from the argument they made on scientific grounds,” said Miyazaki, 78, who assisted in the development of the Monju fast-breeder reactor. “But at times, they rather seemed to be activists than researchers.”
The Fukushima disaster showed that a nuclear accident far exceeding anyone's expectations can happen in Japan, which is what the Kumatori Group of Six had been saying all along, despite the pro-nuclear power bloc always ruling it out as improbable.
Still, Koide said he was left with a “sense of defeat” because he and his peers failed to prevent it after all.
Five years on, the toll from the disaster continues.
Some 100,000 evacuees in Fukushima Prefecture are still displaced.
Kobayashi is pushing for a nationwide debate over whether Japan should embrace nuclear energy.
“It has been established that an accident can take place,” he said. “All of society, not just some officials and experts, should discuss whether we should continue to accept the risks involved in nuclear energy.”
The final session of the seminar will bring together Imanaka and the surviving members of the group together for the first time in a long while.
They will pose for a picture with the photo of the late Seo in the background and renew their resolve to carry on their mission to serve the public with their technical knowledge.
“The next seminar will be the last one at the institute, but we are ready to come together and fulfill our responsibility as nuclear scientists if an accident like Fukushima recurs,” Imanaka said.
By HISASHI HATTORI/ Senior Staff Writer