Obama’s Problematic Surge in Afghanistan

President Obama has called for another troop surge in Afghanistan of about 30, 000
American troops. Obama has also said that some US forces would start to withdraw
from Afghanistan in July of 2011, if conditions on the ground warrant phased troop
reductions.

The perspective at the Pentagon by Secretary of Defense Gates, and General McChrystal
is that by having a surge in Afghanistan—it will produce similar results to what happened
in Iraq. Obama’s surge would allow for the US to defend Kandahar, and then expand the
offensive into Helmand province.

A more modest strategy favoring an increase in troop trainers to train Afghan replacement forces, was put forth by Senator Levin. Vice President Biden, and Ambassador Eikenberry were on record as opposing the surge in Afghanistan,
because of corruption within the Karzai government, and wanting to focus the
security effort on al Qaeda, and not the Taliban.

Recent US intelligence estimates have put the number of al Qaeda jihadists within Afghanistan at only about 100 fighters. Moreover, the Taliban has been estimated at only about 25,000 insurgents, which is really not enough forces to threaten most of the Afghanistan cities, except Kandahar, and several other areas. Which is why many leaders like Senator Levin, and Prime Minister Brown in the UK were not favoring the surge, and
were favoring a few thousand trainers to increase the size of the Afghan Army by
50,000 troops.

Another problem with the surge relates to the strategy within Helmand province which
has been a Taliban stronghold. McChrystal’s offensive into Helmand province is one reason the American casualty levels have increased to 298 so far in 2009, which is about
double the body count from last year which was 155 dead.

One of the main problems with the Helmand offensive is that many of the farmers who
live in the provinces grow poppies for the heroin trade, and they do not want to grow less
profitable crops which the US favors. The Obama strategy will probably encounter similar problems to what LBJ did in rural areas in Vietnam, where many of the rural areas remain loyal to the Taliban, and the American offensive only serves to destroy more crops, and villages, and increase the insurgency.

In his West Point speech Obama contended that Afghanistan will not become another
Vietnam. Obama said that: “Unlike Vietnam, we are joined by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy of our action. Unlike Vietnam, we are not facing a broad-based popular insurgency.”


One of the main flaws in Obama’s logic is that he doesn’t want to recognize that many
Afghans view the US, as an occupation Army much like the Soviets. Moreover, many
Afghans perceive Americans as being anti-Islamic, and they believe that the Taliban
support Islam. As a result, the resentment of Americans among the Afghan people is
similar in many ways to anti-American sentiments which were prevalent in Vietnam. The insurgency in Afghanistan may be more popular than the Pentagon would want us to believe, so the battle for the hearts and minds of the Afghans is a struggle that cannot be easily won.

Another major problem with Obama’s surge in Afghanistan is that Obama is unlikely to
make good on the time frame for the start of the troop reductions in July of 2011. President Obama appears to be employing the same strategy that worked so well for
the Bush Administration in Iraq of promising some eventual withdrawal of troops, and then contending that the insurgency in Afghanistan is worsening again, so even more
troops, and casualties are needed to fight the war—which started back in 2001.

With record unemployment rates, massive deficits, and health care problems in America
--there are other priorities than Afghanistan. Obama’s troop surge in Afghanistan really
strains an overburdened economy, will increase troop casualty levels, and will probably
bog down into another quagmire.