Verified Voting: Diebold Vulnerabilities Affect 27 States

For Immediate Release Thursday, June 8, 2006

Contact: Courtenay Strickland Bhatia, President & CEO, Verified Voting Foundation +1
415 487-2255 work or +1 415 235-0126 cell, courtenay [at] verifiedvoting.org Pamela
Smith, Nationwide Coordinator, Verified Voting Foundation +1 760 613-0172 cell,
pam [at] verifiedvoting.org

Verified Voting's Preliminary Equipment Summary Shows Diebold Vulnerabilities Affect
27 States

San Francisco – Verified Voting today released a preliminary* summary of states
whose elections are at risk due to newly-revealed security vulnerabilities in
Diebold voting systems, including the Diebold TSx, TS, and optical scan machines, as
uncovered by computer expert Harri Hursti of Black Box Voting.

The summary, which is the first part of an ongoing Verified Voting effort to track
voting equipment in use throughout the country from all vendors, was presented
yesterday at a Capitol Hill briefing held by Verified Voting and the National
Committee for Voting Integrity. The briefing provided technical information on the
recently revealed Diebold vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities would allow
substitution of false vote totals without any trace or the insertion of malicious
software, using the smart card technology and design features integral to the
machines.

"These security vulnerabilities are classic examples of why we worry about
electronic voting,"� said Verified Voting Founder David L. Dill, who is a Computer
Science Professor at Stanford University. "There will be an endless series of
security holes, and not just with Diebold equipment. Instead of trying to make
perfectly secure systems, we need to plan for security problems, by ensuring that we
can independently check the results of the machines. That's what voter-verified
paper records are all about."�

According to the Verified Voting's preliminary information on the Diebold systems,
27 states are at risk with varying degrees of vulnerability, depending in part on
whether the jurisdiction has a voter-verified paper record. Diebold TSx touch
screen machines can be equipped to produce such a record, although not all
jurisdictions with the TSx chose that option. Diebold TS systems do not offer a
voter-verified paper record. Optical scan voting systems use a paper ballot
(inherently voter-verified), but they too must be audited to check for accuracy.
The three largest states in the country – California, Texas, and Florida – all fall
into the at-risk group.

"It's important for policymakers, local election officials, and voters to know
whether their state or local jurisdiction is at risk so that appropriate action can
be taken immediately for upcoming elections," said Courtenay Strickland Bhatia,
President & CEO of Verified Voting. "But states and jurisdictions without Diebold
equipment should not rest easy," Bhatia added. "Because these vulnerabilities are
emblematic of the problem overall, every jurisdiction should require voter-verified
paper records and routine, random, manual audits to provide for election integrity."

Eight states had primaries this past Tuesday, and four more hold their primaries
next week. Twenty-six more states throughout the country have primary elections from
late June through September.

Of the 27 states listed in the report, nine are at high risk, using paperless
Diebold TSx and TS machines without any means to recover from exploitation of this
vulnerability. Hundreds of counties are at medium risk, having a blended system of
Diebold TSx, TS, and optical scan systems, with some votes in some jurisdictions
capable of being recovered through paper records. Eighteen states are at lower
risk, but only if meaningful audits are carried out using manual counts of the paper
record to check the machine vote totals. Most states do not have audit requirements
at this time.

For very close races, votes in just a few jurisdictions can determine statewide
results. In such cases having just one unverifiable jurisdiction throws the entire
election into doubt.

In order to provide a way to verify accuracy of election results and allow for
recovery in the event of voting system problems, Verified Voting urges all states
that have not yet passed legislation mandating a voter-verified paper record and
routine, random audits to pass such laws this year. In states that already have a
voter-verified paper record, random audits should be conducted prior to
certification of election results.

"Such audits can and should be voluntarily undertaken by election officials whether
or not a law requiring them has been passed," Bhatia stated.

For jurisdictions where there is no voter-verified paper record, Verified Voting
urges voters to insist that local officials provide paper ballots as an alternative
way to vote at the polling place.

Pennsylvania provided an example of the critical importance of providing paper
ballots as an alternative in the polling place two weeks ago, when hundreds of
voting machines failed to start on time or malfunctioned during the day, and
thousands of voters used paper ballots successfully. Recent experiences in
California and Georgia, where thousands of voters were disenfranchised by machine
malfunctions, have shown that no electronic voting jurisdiction can afford to go
without paper ballots.

Voter-verified paper records provide the necessary tool to conduct routine, random
audits: manual counts of a significant portion of the paper records, compared to the
machine totals. Such auditing facilitates detection of problems before election
results are certified, and makes recovery possible when machine counts are in error,
whether due to fraud or machine malfunction. These diagnostic and recovery systems
are all the more important because voting system software is proprietary and, for
the most part, not available for inspection.

At present, Verified Voting encourages the use of precinct-count optical scan voting
systems and accessible ballot-marking devices, combined with audits, as a practical,
cost-effective and accessible means of providing verifiability and recovery
capabilities.

The Verified Voting preliminary summary of Diebold equipment vulnerability by state
and county is attached and can be downloaded at
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/Diebold_States_Summary.pdf
Updates to the Verified Voting database of voting equipment in use throughout the
country will be posted to our web site as they become available.

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* This preliminary report does not claim to be complete; information subject to
change, addition or correction.

Verified Voting Foundation, 1550 Bryant St., Suite 855, San Francisco, CA 94103, +1
415 487-2255 telephone http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org