Haiti: Judiciary Independence and the Interim Government

University of PittsburgH - School of Law
Center for Internatonal Legal Education - CILE
April 18, 2006


The Independence of the Judiciary in Haiti under the Interim Government
Alex Braden, Brandon Gardner, James Gabello, Ravi K. Reddy*




“We have a culture of impunity in Haiti”, Mario Joseph, Bureau des
Avocats Internationaux (BAI).

Haiti´s judicial system has suffered from a succession of
overbearing Executives, a lack of adequate legal training and
resources, and from the rampant perception that in this impoverished
island nation, justice is only for the rich. Since the 2004 ouster of
the democratically elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide,
threats to the judicial independence, both internal and from without,
have only increased under the rule of the interim government of Haiti
(IGH). The IGH has limited the effective functioning of the judiciary
by exerting excessive influence over the judiciary, encouraging
corruption among judges, impeding judicial training, and bringing a
halt to the international community’s reform efforts. This report
examines the failures of the IGH in these areas and considers the
prospects for improvement under René Préval´s incoming administration.
OUTLINE (Click on the links in this outline to jump within the report.)

I. Separation of Powers
A. Executive Selection and Removal in Violation of the
Constitution
B. Other Methods of Illegitimate Executive Pressure -
Effective Removal

II. École de la Magistrature
III. The International Community Relative to the Independence of the
Judiciary
IV. Conclusion


I. Separation of Powers

A. Executive Selection and Removal in Violation of the Constitution

Pursuant to Article 60 of the 1987 Constitution
of Haiti,
the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch, and the Judicial Branch
of Haiti are independent of one another, and the influence of each
may not extend beyond the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution
and by law.[1] Under the Constitution, Justices of the Cour de
Cassation (Supreme Court) are appointed by the President from a list
submitted by the Senate of three persons per court seat, and are to
be removed only because of a legally determined abuse of authority or
because of permanent physical or mental incapacity.[2] The judges of
the lower courts are also to be appointed by the President, from
lists submitted by the Departmental Assembly or the Communal
Assemblies.[3]

While Haiti has always fostered a “culture of the
Executive”, whereby the President weilds more authority than a
literal reading of the Constitution would provide, the interim
government of Prime Minister Latortue has asserted almost absolute
power in the judicial selection process.[4] Because the Senate has
not functioned since January 2004, the Prime Minister has directly
picked Cour de Cassation Justices without having the three-person
list selected by the Senate as the Constitution provides. The Prime
Minister has also directly selected lower court judges without
reference to the lists of the Departmental Assembly or the Communal
Assemblies.[5] These appointment procedures have had the effect of
de-legitimizing the judicial process as a whole, and the effect has
been most tangibly felt in the rural regions of the country, where
many unqualified Justices of the Peace have been appointed because of
their political ties to Prime Minister Latortue and not because of
the credibility they hold as capable men and women within their
communities. [6]

The most egregious action taken by Prime Minister
Latortue in derogation of his Constitutional authority came in
December 2005, when he removed five of the ten Cour de Cassation
Justices, on the grounds that they were too old.[7] Latortue alleged
neither a legal abuse of authority nor mental incapacity, as required
by the Constitution, nor did he follow constitutional removal
procedures. Rather, Prime Minister Latortue removed the Justices by
executive decree.[8] This illegal action, in violation of the
Constitution, arguably represents the nadir of Executive Branch
interference with the judiciary in Haiti, at least since the new
Constitution was adopted in 1987. [9] In fact, some have suggested
that not even the Duvalier dictatorships would have attempted such an
audacity.[10]

Strangely, this maneuver produced an unexpected result; across the
political spectrum, judges and lawyers joined in protest against this
flagrant executive encroachment on judicial independence. In fact,
Judge Peres-Paul, president of the Haitian Judge’s Association
(L’ANAMAH) and a staunch Aristide opponent who usually deferred to
the positions of Prime Minister Latortue, led the charge in calling
for a judicial strike in retaliation to the Prime Minister’s
action.[11] And even though little came of the judicial strike
itself, there is some reason for optimism. The implication seems to
be that mere politics are no longer enough to keep judges from
fighting for a Judiciary that attempts to check the Executive when it
operates outside its Constitutionally mandated sphere.[12]

Of course, the fact that the Haitian judicial community has
finally begun to fight back gives no comfort to the five removed
Justices. Shortly after their removal, five replacements were
hand-picked by Prime Minister Latortue and appointed through an
illegal procedure.[13] As of the writing of this report, the removed
Justices are pursuing legal challenges to both their removal and to
the illegal appointment of the new Justices. Because their claims
raise important Constitutional questions, however, there is a strong
likelihood that the case will be appealed to the Cour de Cassation,
at which point the new Justices would be forced to recuse themselves
from the case. Then, the remaining Justices (who may be more
sympathetic to the Prime Minister, as he decided not to remove them)
will be forced to decide on the legality of Prime Minister Latortue’s
removal and appointment processes concerning their fellow Justices.
Were this scenario to occur, it is hard to imagine a positive
result, especially given the possible legal and political
ramifications of such a decision. For example, if the Cour de
Cassation rules that the Prime Minister acted lawfully, then the
entire Constitution is called into question, and a dark shadow will
be cast over the entire Judicial branch. If, on the other hand, the
Cour de Cassation finds that the Prime Minister’s activity was
illegal, such a finding could create uncertainty as to whether the
decisions of the illegally appointed Cour de Cassation should be
overturned.

If Haiti’s Constitution is to represent more than a mere collection
of platitudes, it is imperative that President Préval break the cycle
of executive tampering with the judiciary, even though he may have a
Constitutional obligation to remove them all. Good may result from
Haiti’s “culture of the Executive” if President Préval honors his
campaign promise to promote the independence of the Judiciary by
dutifully following the Constitution, his capable stewardship could
set a strong precedent of Haitian accession to the rule of law.[14]


B. Other Methods of Illegitimate Executive Pressure - Effective Removal

Haitian judges remain largely vulnerable to the political,
structural, and cultural pressures that have undermined the judicial
system for decades. For individual judges, these forces often seem
insurmountable. For example, Jean-Sénat Fleury, the judge who oversaw
the much-publicized case of Fr. Gerard Jean-Juste after his first
arrest in 2004, resigned after the Ministry of Justice removed his
caseload.[15] According to Judge Fleury, the Justice Ministry
explained that his caseload was suspended on the basis of complaints
that he was operating too slowly. While the actions of the Minister
of Justice appear to constitute nothing more than bald-faced
retaliation, the particular justification offered is especially
stunning given the fact that Haiti’s prisons are teeming with
prisoners who continue to await trial after years of unconstitutional
incarceration.[16]

Judge Fleury’s resignation illustrates the damaging impact of
baseless executive interference in the operations of the judiciary.
In the first place, the Justice Minister’s decision removed a
competent, independent judge from the bench. Moreover, it served as
a warning to other judges, who will now think twice before making
similar, politically sensitive rulings. As long as the Ministry of
Justice retains the power to micromanage individual judicial dockets,
it retains the power to severely constrain the exercise of an
independent judiciary. In an interview given several months after
his resignation, Judge Fleury observed that “in this system a judge
has two choices. You can accept poverty and humiliation, or you can
accept unemployment.”[17]

Since leaving the bench, Judge Fleury has authored a volume on the
Cour de Cassation and judicial reform in Haiti;[18] however, many
jurists facing the untenable choice he describes have succumbed to
the temptation of a third alternative – corruption. Salaries for
Haitian judges are notoriously low at each level of the judicial
hierarchy, and with literally thousands of detainees languishing in
pre-trial detention, opportunities abound for judges to accept
substantial “grease payments” in exchange for expedited treatment.
It seems that even some of those who have taken principled stands
against Executive Branch interference are not immune to this
phenomenon. At least one well-respected judge interviewed in
preparation of this report stated that after publishing findings of
fact unfavorable to the Justice Ministry, he was arbitrarily
disciplined by the Justice Ministry.[19] The judge remained in his
post, explaining that he could offer more effective resistance by
working within the system. Nevertheless, shortly after giving his
interview, reports emerged that this judge had previously accepted
eighty thousand gourdes[20] from a Port-au-Prince woman to facilitate
the release of her husband from prison.[21]

It seems that the most direct means by which to combat bribery in the
courts requires the effective investigation, prosecution, and
sanctioning of judges who abuse their power for personal financial
gain. At present, however, no such mechanism exists among
self-regulating judicial organizations. Tellingly, the President of
the Haitian Judge’s Association (L’ANAMAH) explained in an interview
that a Code of Ethics for Judges has been promulgated and is in
force, but was unable to find a copy of the Code in his office at the
Palais de Justice.[22] Further, statutory prosecution of corrupt
judges has been wholly lacking, as not a single judge has been
charged under Haitian law with illegally accepting payment for
services rendered.[23] On the other hand, individuals discovered to
have bribed judges are routinely prosecuted. Given the fact that a
few thousand gourdes can mean the difference between freedom and
indefinite detention for their loved ones, this is a calculated risk
that the family members of prisoners are likely to accept.

Beyond eliminating the “culture of impunity” that has long plagued
the Haitian courts, there are methods available to reduce the
incentives for judges to accept bribes.[24] Virtually every recent
report issued on the status of the Haitian judiciary calls for
legislation to raise judges’ salaries to livable levels, and to
provide better material resources such as computers, telephones, and
legal pads.[25] To develop a pay scale and working environment that
affords greater dignity to their vocation, it follows that judges
themselves will be more likely to respect the integrity of the
institution. Further, by lengthening and guaranteeing judicial
mandates at every hierarchical stratum, judges will enjoy a measure
of job security that would help to minimize the inclination exploit
their authority.

While improvement of the infrastructural and remunerative situation
facing judges requires only a proper allocation of money (in Haiti,
more easily said than done), the Latortue administration has only
undermined the ability of judges to attain a sense of security in
their positions. Since assuming power in 2004, the interim
government has proven time and time again that its attitude toward
the judiciary is one of capricious domination. From suspending the
caseloads of judges presiding over politically volatile cases, to
removing Cour de Cassation justices in outright defiance of the
Constitution, the Ministry of Justice has made every effort to
consolidate judicial power in the Executive Branch.[26]

President-elect Préval has a singular opportunity to restore to the
courts the independence and authority granted to them under the
Constitution. To do so, Préval must not give in to the “mentality of
presidentiality” that prevails among Haitian citizens and that has
compelled the nation’s heads of state since the days of the Duvaliers.

When asked whether a Préval administration will reverse the harm done
to the judiciary at the hands of the interim government, nearly every
judge, lawyer, and academic interviewed for this report responded
with hesitant optimism. This “wait and see” attitude is
understandable, given that every historical attempt to consolidate
Haitian democracy has been sabotaged by one faction or another.

Nevertheless, there are significant reasons to expect substantial
improvement once Préval assumes office. In the first place, the
drama surrounding his February election seized the attention of the
international media. While a focus by outsiders on Haitian politics
will naturally subside, this heightened scrutiny will encourage the
incoming administration to maintain a heightened level of
transparency, at least in its early days. Additionally, the fact
that Préval struggled against and overcame the subterfuge of his
opponents appears to have cast an aura of righteous vindication
around his election. Préval received nearly fifty-two percent of the
popular vote, and the fact that his election was ultimately confirmed
with very little subsequent unrest suggests that even those who
opposed him during the campaign are willing to give his government a
chance. Of course, it remains to be seen whether Préval will achieve
anything of consequence before the sabers begin to rattle anew.


II. École de la Magistrature

The Constitution of the Republic of Haiti calls for the creation of a
school of the Magistrature.[27] The creation of a professional
judiciary is one of the most important long-term investments in
Haiti.[28] In 1995, the mandate of the Constitution, with the
assistance of international funding, was fulfilled when the École de
la Magistrature (EMA) was founded.[29] Since the school’s inception
in 1995 approximately 500 judges have been trained.[30] The EMA has not been in operation since 2004 when it was taken over by members of the former military.[31]

According to Mr. Jean Claude Douyon, head of the EMA, negotiations
are currently underway to remove the former military members who are
occupying the school.[32] With an expressed need for well-trained
judges throughout the country, and a need to alleviate the backlog of
cases pending in the judicial system, there is an immediate need for
the EMA to begin operating. In addition to reopening the school, Mr.
Douyon, has proposed that the school begin taking in students on a
continuous basis, regardless of immediate need in the judicial
system.[33] During the period of operation, from 1995 to 2004, the
school produced three classes of judges.[34] His contention is that
if the school operates on a continuous basis, there will always be a
pool of qualified judges to draw from.[35] Mr. Douyon stated that
regardless of the government in power, there is a plan for the
EMA.[36]

Some in Haiti have expressed concerns regarding the ability of the
EMA to produce quality judges. Mr. Léon Saint-Louis, a Port-au-Prince
attorney who has researched the EMA previously, criticized the EMA
for its lack of organization, law, and protocol.[37] He stated that
he believes the quality of judges that were coming out of the school
was higher before. “In the beginning, we had lawyers with much
experience who would accept to become a judge.”[38] He expressed
concern that because students at the EMA are themselves recent
graduates of law school, they lack the practical experience to be
effective judges.[39] While Saint Louis expressed a belief that the
EMA could be reformed, he stated that there must be better
organization if the school is to be effective. Furthermore, he
believes that more experienced candidates need to be recruited.

There is general agreement that the École de la Magistrature can
serve an important function in educating judges, however, without the
commitment of funding and resources to the school no changes will
take place. Even with funding, all speculation on improvements to the
operation of the school remains contingent on the removal of former
military members from its grounds.


III. The International Community Relative to the Independence of the
Judiciary

The view of professors and practitioners and judges is that there are
two prerequisites to judicial reform in Haiti: 1) a democratically
elected government, and 2) assistance from the international
community to apply the system.[40] However, it is believed that too
many conditions are placed on the supply of international aid.[41]
As Mario Joseph of the BAI noted in an earlier interview, the judges
in Haiti are like water in a vase, they will conform to the shape of
their container.[42] As long as the system requires corruption, they
will acquiesce. If, however, the system demands independence,
impartiality, competence, and adherence to the law, they will
likewise comply. Although the international community had many
projects afoot in Haiti during the previous democratic governments
seeking to reform the judiciary, each donor has a distinctly-shaped
container, and the conflicting views and methods coupled with the
uncoordinated nature of international community involvement in Haiti
have resulted in little to no change in the system itself.

Furthermore, many blame the international community itself for
actively kidnapping President Aristide and forcing him into exile[43]
or providing the resources, funding and training for the rebel groups
that overthrew the democratic government of Haiti[44] and financially
strangling the Aristide Administration through withholding IMF and
World Bank funds while forcing Haiti to service the debts.[45] Prior
to the installment of the IGH, evidence of the role of USAID in
Haitian politics was apparent in the role of the International
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), a USAID subcontractor, in
intentionally subverting the Aristide government.[46] “They [IFES
workers interviewed by the authors of the University of Miami Report]
further stated that IFES/USAID workers in Haiti want to take credit
for the ouster of Aristide, but cannot ‘out of respect for the wishes
of the U.S. government.’”[47] Although the international community
demanded reform of the judicial and other institutions throughout
this time, it also stands accused of undermining the very democratic
foundation of Haiti.

The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) has operated in Haiti in
conjunction with USAID since August 2004[48]. According to its
website, the operation in Haiti has focused on improving the
performance of the Justice of the Peace (JP) courts in Haiti as 80%
of Haiti’s cases are decided on the JP level.[49] However benign the
intention to reform Haiti’s courts, the NCSC has drawn the ire of
other judicial reform actors as a result of its location, in
Pétionville[50], and because other organizations believe that the
NCSC is hand-feeding the IGH decrees without local input. One
representative of an international organization characterized the
work of the NCSC as such: “Il n’y a pas un échange, c’est un
théâtre.”[51] Another asked where the Haitian identity was in reform
of this kind.[52] Even the mere perception of a bias towards one
political party or ideology will hinder the development of meaningful
judicial reform in Haiti, and sadly, the USAID funded projects have
done just that.

During our recent visit to Haiti, interviews with the UNDP and the
OAS indicated that most of the international community initiatives
meant to promote judicial reform have ceased to operate during the
administration of the Interim Government of Haiti. Exacerbating the
problem further is the fact that there remains a lack of coordination
among the many inter-governmental organizations, the non-governmental organizations, foreign development actors and the Haitian authorities as competing organizations vie for ideological dominance. “It is a war, and here [Haiti] is a front for many ideological battles.”[53] One of the overarching problems remains that the international community’s absence of a clear plan, and the confusion created by competing reform movements, only augments the corruption in Haiti.[54]

The United Nations Development Program’s attempt to inculcate an
independent judiciary in Haiti centers on the use of participatory
democracy to create Haitian ownership of reform through its support
of the Forum Citoyen pour la Réforme de la Justice.[55] The UNDP
representatives we spoke with during our delegation confirmed that
their work, outside the act of promulgating discussion documents,
effectively ground to a halt over the past two years under the IGH.

Until the coup, the OAS Mission in Haiti’s judicial reform component
sent Haitian judges to study the judicial systems of other OAS member
states with an eye to reform. However, instability in Haiti forced
the OAS to suspend the project with the exception of one training
mission to Chile in May of 2004. The focus of the OAS shifted
predominantly to the distribution of electoral cards to facilitate
the elections, a necessary step [as outlined above] for the process
of judicial reform in Haiti. In preparation for the new government,
the OAS judicial reform pillar is “brainstorming” to create a plan
for working with the future government.[56]


IV. Conclusion

An illegitimate executive actively meddles with the constitutional
order, even high-minded judges are bribed with impunity, the EMA is
occupied by the disbanded army, and the international community’s
efforts at judicial reform have been largely suspended. The situation
in Haiti is dire, yet there is hope that the approaching return of
democratic rule will bring with it a renewed respect for the rule of
law and its embodiment in the Haitian Constitution.

Perhaps the most important prospect for positive change once
democracy resumes is in the person of Réne Préval himself. After
all, his upcoming inauguration will mark the beginning of the
President-elect’s second tenure in Palais National. During his
previous term, from 1996 to 2001, Préval displayed a commitment to
the investigation of human rights abuses by government actors, and to
the independent judicial resolution of such issues. Notably,
then-President Préval was the fist, and thus far only, Haitian
president to leave office at the natural expiration of his term.
Dubious though this distinction may be, it does indicate that Préval
has demonstrated respect for Constitutional limits on executive
authority, and that he can successfully resist the trappings and
enticements of presidential power that have so thoroughly possessed
others in his position. Because the problems plaguing the Haitian
legal system are so entrenched and widespread as to have become
virtually institutionalized, a Préval government will certainly have
to struggle mightily to undo these wrongs while operating within
Constitutional strictures. Consequently, any substantial change
achieved through legal means is unlikely to take place overnight.
Nevertheless, to the same extent that Préval must honor the promises
of his campaign while adhering to the laws of his office, the Haitian
citizens who gave him his mandate must also give him the trust and
patience to fulfill it.


* The authors are all law students from the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law and could not have completed this project without the
institutional support of the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux in
Haiti, the assistance of Maren Dobberthein,and Vladimir Laguerre for
translations and scheduling and the generous funding of the
University of Pittsburgh Center for International Legal Education.


[1] Haitian Const. Art. 60, 60-1.

[2] Haitian Const. Art. 175, 177.

[3] Haitian Const. Art 175.

[4] Interview with Supreme Ct Justice Mr. Michel D. Donatien (Mar.
10, 2006).

[5] Interview with Attorney Mario Joseph of the Bureau des Avocats
Internationaux (Mar. 8, 2006).

[6] Id.

[7] Supra, note 4. The official reason for removal was that the
judges were over 60 years old, even though some of of the
replacements were actually older than the removed Justices.

[8] Id. Of course, this official reasoning given that the Justices
were too old to serve was ridiculous; the real reason for their
removal was Prime Minister Latortue’s disapproval with the Justice’s
ruling in a particular case. That case was State v. Simeus, and it
concerned a candidate for President whose eligibility was being
challenged by the CEP (Provisional Election Council) on the grounds
that Mr. Simeus was disqualifed for office due to the fact that he
held U.S. citizenship. According to the 1987 Constitution of Haiti,
Article 135, a candidate for the Haitian presidency must be a
native-born Haitian, never have renounced his/her Haitian
nationality, and have resided in the country for five consecutive
years prior to the election. The Court ruled in favor of Mr. Simeus’
potential candidacy even though Mr. Simeus freely admitted in press
interviews that he had gained U.S. citizenship and that he had a
residence in Texas. In our interview with him, former Justice
Donatien was passionate in defending the legal reasoning underpinning the Court’s decision, which has been roundly criticized. Justice Donatien went into great technical detail to explain that the CEP had not made an adequate showing as a matter of law that Simeus had
obtained U.S. citizenship. Further, Justice Donatien argued that
there is a legal difference between having Haitian and U.S.
citizenship and renouncing Haitian citizenship in favor of becoming a
U.S. Citizen. Additionally, Justice Donatien pointed to a 1984 Law
on Publication, Article 30 of which mandated that no Haitian national
could lose their citizenship without that information being printed
in the Official Journal, which was not done in the case of Mr.
Simeus. Finally, Justice Donatien questioned whether the provisions
of the Constitution, which would seemingly bar Mr. Simeus’ candidacy,
could be applied retroactively to someone born prior to its adoption
so as to deny him proper Haitian citizenship.

[9] William P. Quigley, The Absence of An Independent Judiciary in
Haiti, Human Rights Report, Draft of 12/12/2005.

[10] Supra, note 5.

[11] Interview with Judge Jean Peres-Paul, President of L’ANAMAH
(Mar. 08, 2006).

[12] Every one of the eight judges and lawyers, who represented a
wide spectrum of political viewpoints that spoke to us about the
removal of the Cour de Cassation Justices, were in total agreement
that the Prime Minister’s act was unconstitutional.

[13] For example, the new Justices were sworn in before there was
official publication of their nominations, as required by the
Presidential Decree of 8/22/1995, On the Organization of Judges.
Also, the Justices were sworn in at the Ministry of Justice and not
in public, which also was a violation of the law.

[14] Interview with Chantal Thériault, Chef du Pilier Justice, OAS
(Mar. 10, 2006). Ms. Thériault observed that this very idea was part
of the platform that President-elect Préval ran on during his
Presidential campaign, and that during his first Presidential term
from 1996-2001 Préval had established a good record of respecting
judicial independence.
[15] See Brian Concannon, Jr., An Prensip: The Subordination of the
Haitian Judiciary May 12, 2005.

[16] Haitian Const, Art. 26. Art. 26 provides: “No one may be kept
under arrest more than forty-eight (48) hours unless he has appeared
before a judge asked to rule on the legality of the arrest and the
judge has confirmed the arrest by a well-founded decision.”
Interview with Gervais Charles, head of the Bar Association of
Port-au-Prince (Mar. 7, 2006). Mr. Charles indicated that
Port-au-Prince currently houses over 2000 prisoners, many hundreds of
which have never seen a judge.

[17] Interview with Judge Jean-Sénat Fleury (Mar. 7, 2006).

[18] Cour de Cassation en Face de la Reforme Judicial en Haiti.

[19] The name of this prominent judge has been withheld so as not to
incriminate the individual who paid him a bribe.

[20] Roughly equivalent to $2,000 U.S.

[21] The woman, whose husband was arrested and jailed on allegations
of being a Lavalas (pro-Aristide) street-leader, is an outspoken
activist against the illegal detention of Haitian citizens. In 2004,
she bribed the judge in question, seeking to expedite her husband’s
release. The woman’s husband still remains imprisoned as of March,
2006.

[22] Supra, note 11.

[23] Interview with Léon Saint-Louis, Port-au-Prince human rights
attorney (Mar. 10, 2006).

[24] Interview with Renan Hedouville, Secretary General of Comité des
Avocats pour le Respect des Libertés Individuelles (Mar 10, 2006).

[25] See, e.g. Organization of American States Inter-American
Commision on Human Rights report, Haiti: Failed Justice or the Rule
of Law? Challenges Ahead for Haiti and the International Community,
Oct. 26, 2005, at 59-60.

[26] Supra n. 15.

[27] Haitian Const., Art. 176.

[28] Haiti Democracy Project, The Restoration of Democracy and
Justice. Available at
<http://www.haitipolicy.org/archives/Sept-Nov2001/part2.htm>

[29] Interview with Jean Claude F. Douyon, Director of the École de
la Magistrature (EMA), (Mar. 9, 2006). Mr. Douyan indicated that the
EMA is primarily funded by the governments of France and Canada.

[30] France and Haiti– Cultural, scientific and technical
cooperation, Ministere des Affaires etrangeres,
<http://tinyurl.com/foc8n>

[31] Interview with Judges Jean-Sénat Fleury and Brédy Fabien (Mar.
7, 2006).

[32] Supra, n. 29.

[33] Id. According to Mr. Douyon, the EMA currently admits students
only at the need of the Ministry of Justice.

[34] Supra, n. 28.

[35] Supra, n. 29.

[36] Id.

[37] Supra, n. 23.

[38] Id.

[39] Id.

[40] Interview with Professor Josué Pierre-Louis, Doyon Université
Quisqueya, Faculté de Droit (Mar. 9, 2006).

[41] Id.

[42] Supra, n. 4.

[43] IJDH, BAI, Yale Law School and TransAfrica Petition to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Against U.S., Haiti and
Dominican Republic for Overthrowing Haiti's Democracy, available at:
<http://www.ijdh.org/articles/article_iachr_2-1-06.htm>, Amy Wilentz,
Coup in Haiti, The Nation March 4, 2004, available at:
<http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040322/wilentz>

[44] <http://www.law.miami.edu/cshr/CSHR_Report_02082005_v2.pdf>
20-24. See also: IJDH, BAI, Yale Law School and TransAfrica Petition
to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Against U.S., Haiti
and Dominican Republic for Overthrowing Haiti's Democracy, supra n..
43,

[45] Nicolas Rossier, Aristide and the Endless Revolution, Film (2005).

[46] <http://www.law.miami.edu/cshr/CSHR_Report_02082005_v2.pdf, 20-22>.

[47] <http://www.law.miami.edu/cshr/CSHR_Report_02082005_v2.pdf>, 22.

[48]
<http://ipd.ncsconline.org/ncsc/main.aspx?
dbID=DB_LatinAmericaandCarribean296#hai>

[49] Id.

[50] A relatively affluent suburb of Port-au-Prince.

[51] Interview with Guilaine Moinerie, Conseillère Technique UNDP
Haïti (Mar. 10, 2006).

[52] Interview with Gracia Joseph S. Maxi, Expert National UNDP Haïti
(Mar. 10, 2006).

[53] Supra, n. 51. See Also, Walt Bogdanich and Jenny Nordberg, Mixed
U.S. Signals Helped Tilt Haiti Toward Chaos, New York Times, January
29, 2006, available at: <http://tinyurl.com/hoxoh>
(Outlining the
conflicting messages coming from the United States, one, the
‘official’ policy from the embassy and the conflicting policy from
the International Republican Institute which claimed to be the real
voice of Bush Administration policy in Haiti.).

[54] Supra, n. 14.

[55] <http://www.forumcitoyen.org.ht>,
<http://www.undp.org/surf-panama/docs/cso.doc>

[56] Supra, n. 14