South America’s New Militarism

Several months ago, an official Brazilian commission visited Vietnam. With the goal of “sharing information about resistance doctrine,” the commission composed of colonels and lieutenant-colonels visited Hanoi, Ho Chi Min City (formerly Saigon), and the Cu Chi Province, where 250 kilometers (150 miles) of underground tunnels constructed during the war with the United States still remain. On the Brazilian army’s webpage, Gen. Claudio Barbosa Figuereido, head of the Amazon Military Command, asserts that Brazil will face actions similar to those that have taken place in Vietnam, and now in Iraq, should the Amazon come into conflict:

The resistance strategy does not differ much from guerrilla warfare, and it is an option the army will not hesitate to adopt facing a confrontation with another country or group of countries with greater economic and military power.” He added, “The jungle itself should serve as an ally in combating the invader.”1 The news had little impact on the media, but it demonstrates that Brazil’s armed forces have their own strategic plans and that they see the United States as a potential military enemy.

Last December, Venezuela signed an agreement with Russia to purchase 110,000 Kalashnikov rifles; 33 assault, attack, and heavy transport helicopters, and 50 fighter bombers. It signed another with Spain to acquire naval aeronautical material, including four corvettes; and it signed one with Brazil for 50 training and combat jets. The purchases form part of “the constant updating of the Venezuelan armed forces, their high level of maintenance, and permanent plans for modernization and arms acquisition,” the South American Military Balance study states.2

The news was received with strong criticism from White House Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and the Department of State calls it “the beginning of an arms race.” For its part, the South American nation activated its reserve command last April, “which should reach 2 million members and is included in Venezuela’s new doctrine of defense.”3 The decision was made on April 13, the three-year anniversary of the coup d’etat that drove Hugo Chavez from office during a period of several hours.

Media sources say that Peter Goss, director of the CIA, announced last February to a United States Senate commission that the agency has “evidence” of meetings between the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and Osama Bin Laden’s Islamic network to coordinate terrorist attacks in the region.4 According to this version, the “terrorist threat” looms large in Latin America, as evidenced by the attacks on the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish solidarity institution AMIA in Buenos Aires, carried out in the 1990s, in which hundreds of people died.

Taken out of context, these three pieces of news—and many others—could give the impression that South America is heading toward imminent military confrontation and that militarization is taking place a very rapid rate. The reality, however, is another matter. According to a study carried out by the Military Power Review in 2004, Venezuela, in spite of its revamped armed forces, is ranked just sixth for military strength in South America. Brazil ranks first (653 points), Peru is second (423), and Argentina is third (419), followed by Chile (387), Colombia (314), and Venezuela (282).

On the other hand, Latin America is one of the most stable areas in the world, and few of its resources from the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are dedicated to the military budget, a mere 1.5%. This figures contrasts with the 4% of GDP dedicated to military spending by the European Union, 3% for the United States (which accounts for 47% of total military spending worldwide), and 12% for the Middle East. A good part of the current purchases and investment in armaments by various South American countries will cover nothing more than the renovation of war materials acquired in the 1960s, which have become useless and obsolete.

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