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Ahmadinejad Used Bush's Tactics
Supreme Jurisprudent Ali Khamenei gloated Saturday that the Iranian public had "humiliated" Bush by electing hard liner Mahmud Ahmadinejad as president. But in fact, the campaigning style of the two men suggests that in some ways they are soul mates.
Newly elected Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad won in some part by using the same electoral tools as George W. Bush and Karl Rove.
1. Smear Tactics
Ahmadinejad's supporters smeared his chief rival, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani by spreading all sorts of false rumors about him. Negative campaigning is illegal in Iran, but complaints to the rightwing judges went nowhere because they support Ahmadinejad. (See below).
Bush supporters in South Carolina in the 2000 elections smeared his Republican rival for the nomination John McCain by falsely suggesting (via a phony telephone poll) that he had had an interracial affair that produced an illegitimate child. In the 2004 campaign, the White House directed the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth to smear John Kerry as a liar and coward with regard to his distinguished military record, while chicken hawk Bush, who did not even properly serve out his time as a reservist back in the US, was depicted as some sort of war hero.
2. False Consciousness
Ahmadinejad, a rightwinger, poses as a champion of the common people, and once dressed up as a street sweeper. He thus got a lot of working class people to vote for him, even though he will do the bidding of billionaire clerical hardliners who have done little for ordinary folks.
Likewise, George W. Bush affects a southern drawl (he is from Connecticut) and makes himself out to be a friend of the common man, with his "tax cuts" and program to "save" social security. In fact, everything Bush does primarily benefits the rich and actually hurts the interests of workers and farmers. Nevertheless, as with Ahmadinejad, he gets many in the working classes to vote for him.
3. Posing as a Critic of the Government You Run
Ahmadinejad is allowed to attack the Iranian government because he has impeccable credentials as a rightwinger and loyalist to Supreme Jurisprudent Ali Khamenei. He can therefore complain about state corruption without being pilloried or punished. His anti-government rhetoric struck a chord with many Iranians and helped him get elected. If a liberal reformer had spoken that way about the Iranian government, he would have been accused of disloyalty and lack of patriotism.
Likewise, George W. Bush affects a rhetoric of "cleaning up Washington" and breaking the gridlock and overcoming partisanship. In reality, corruption has flourished in his regime, with severe questions constantly being raised about lobbyists essentially bribing Delay, Duke and others. The grandson of a senator and son of a president who calls the white-tie corporate crowd his "base" represents himself as an outsider to Washington and a critic of the government! Yet liberals like Dick Durbin who criticize the government are pilloried as traitors.
4. Benefitting from Dominance of the Judiciary
Ahmadinejad was supported by the clerical rightwing judiciary and Supreme Jurisprudent Ali Khamenei. When other candidates complained about ballot stuffing, the rightwing judges backed Ahmadinejad.
Bush: Five words: Florida and the Supreme Court.
5. Religious Congregations and the Military
Ahmadinejad was supported by many mosque preachers all over the country, as well as by religious volunteers for a paramilitary called basij. Some 300,000 basij all over Iran essentially acted as a political party to support Ahmadinejad.
Bush depends heavily on the support of evangelical and fundamentalist churches in the United States, which abuse their tax-exempt, non-partisan status by actually becoming foot soldiers for the Republican Party. The US military is also disproportionately Republican and supports Bush. Air Force cadets are apparently put under enormous pressure to become evangelicals, under the Bush regime.
By the way, speaking of cadets, Space Cadet Michael Ledeen over at the American Enterprise Institute alleged last week that hardliners brought two million Pakistanis over to vote for Ahmadinejad. Presumably they would have been brought in to Zahedan in Iranian Baluchistan from Quetta.
Ledeen fancies himself a Middle East expert and is trying hard to get up a US war on Iran, having been helpful in getting up the Iraq War, which he promised us would go so well.
Let me explain a few basics to Mr. Ledeen.
1. You can't move 2 million people through the Baluchistan desert in a short period of time. A population movement that massive could even be seen by satellite.
2. Pakistanis are largely Sunnis. They don't like the Iranian regime, which is their rival. They would not go vote in Iran. Even the Shiite minority would not, and it wouldn't vote for Ahmadinejad if it could.
3. The voting rolls for Iranian Baluchistan show about 800.000 voters. Where are the two million Pakistanis?
4. Baluchistan voted for reformist candidates. (Most Baluchis are Sunnis and are afraid of the Shiite hardliners).
Can you imagine that people like Ledeen are actually allowed to come on television as "experts" or to publish in political journals despite spewing complete nonsense? If your son gets drafted and sent to die in Iran, it will be in some part because of the propaganda spread by people like Ledeen, who, by the way, has some sort of weird relationship both to the more fascistic elements in Italian military intelligence and to the Likud extremists in Israel. NB: The false Niger uranium documents were forged by a former agent of Italian military intelligence . . .
All that said, it is probably true that there was some ballot stuffing by Ahmadinejad supporters. It was alleged by clerical moderate Karrubi, and it is plausible. These presidential elections are the least free and fair since the early 1990s, though all along there has been a problem of the exclusion and vetting of candidates by the clerics. On the other hand, it seems undeniable that Ahmadinejad's campaign struck a chord with many Iranians tired of corruption and economic stagnation. He may well have won the second round even without those "extra" ballots.
By the way, rightwing US commentators often slam Iranian elections because the candidates are vetted by the clerical Guardian Council for their loyalty to the Khomeinist ideology. In the past two years, the vetting has grown ever more rigorous, excluding relative liberals from running for parliament or president. The commentators are correct.
However, in the United States the "first past the post" system of winner-takes-all elections and the two-party system play a similar role in limiting voters' choices of candidates. Neither libertarians nor socialists are likely to be serious contenders for the presidency in the United States, since neither of the two dominant parties will run them. The US approach to limiting voter choice is systemic and so looks "natural," but US voters have a narrower range of practical choices in candidates than virtually any other democratic society.
http://www.juancole.com/2005/06/ahmadinejad-uses-bushs-tactics-supreme.html
1. Smear Tactics
Ahmadinejad's supporters smeared his chief rival, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani by spreading all sorts of false rumors about him. Negative campaigning is illegal in Iran, but complaints to the rightwing judges went nowhere because they support Ahmadinejad. (See below).
Bush supporters in South Carolina in the 2000 elections smeared his Republican rival for the nomination John McCain by falsely suggesting (via a phony telephone poll) that he had had an interracial affair that produced an illegitimate child. In the 2004 campaign, the White House directed the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth to smear John Kerry as a liar and coward with regard to his distinguished military record, while chicken hawk Bush, who did not even properly serve out his time as a reservist back in the US, was depicted as some sort of war hero.
2. False Consciousness
Ahmadinejad, a rightwinger, poses as a champion of the common people, and once dressed up as a street sweeper. He thus got a lot of working class people to vote for him, even though he will do the bidding of billionaire clerical hardliners who have done little for ordinary folks.
Likewise, George W. Bush affects a southern drawl (he is from Connecticut) and makes himself out to be a friend of the common man, with his "tax cuts" and program to "save" social security. In fact, everything Bush does primarily benefits the rich and actually hurts the interests of workers and farmers. Nevertheless, as with Ahmadinejad, he gets many in the working classes to vote for him.
3. Posing as a Critic of the Government You Run
Ahmadinejad is allowed to attack the Iranian government because he has impeccable credentials as a rightwinger and loyalist to Supreme Jurisprudent Ali Khamenei. He can therefore complain about state corruption without being pilloried or punished. His anti-government rhetoric struck a chord with many Iranians and helped him get elected. If a liberal reformer had spoken that way about the Iranian government, he would have been accused of disloyalty and lack of patriotism.
Likewise, George W. Bush affects a rhetoric of "cleaning up Washington" and breaking the gridlock and overcoming partisanship. In reality, corruption has flourished in his regime, with severe questions constantly being raised about lobbyists essentially bribing Delay, Duke and others. The grandson of a senator and son of a president who calls the white-tie corporate crowd his "base" represents himself as an outsider to Washington and a critic of the government! Yet liberals like Dick Durbin who criticize the government are pilloried as traitors.
4. Benefitting from Dominance of the Judiciary
Ahmadinejad was supported by the clerical rightwing judiciary and Supreme Jurisprudent Ali Khamenei. When other candidates complained about ballot stuffing, the rightwing judges backed Ahmadinejad.
Bush: Five words: Florida and the Supreme Court.
5. Religious Congregations and the Military
Ahmadinejad was supported by many mosque preachers all over the country, as well as by religious volunteers for a paramilitary called basij. Some 300,000 basij all over Iran essentially acted as a political party to support Ahmadinejad.
Bush depends heavily on the support of evangelical and fundamentalist churches in the United States, which abuse their tax-exempt, non-partisan status by actually becoming foot soldiers for the Republican Party. The US military is also disproportionately Republican and supports Bush. Air Force cadets are apparently put under enormous pressure to become evangelicals, under the Bush regime.
By the way, speaking of cadets, Space Cadet Michael Ledeen over at the American Enterprise Institute alleged last week that hardliners brought two million Pakistanis over to vote for Ahmadinejad. Presumably they would have been brought in to Zahedan in Iranian Baluchistan from Quetta.
Ledeen fancies himself a Middle East expert and is trying hard to get up a US war on Iran, having been helpful in getting up the Iraq War, which he promised us would go so well.
Let me explain a few basics to Mr. Ledeen.
1. You can't move 2 million people through the Baluchistan desert in a short period of time. A population movement that massive could even be seen by satellite.
2. Pakistanis are largely Sunnis. They don't like the Iranian regime, which is their rival. They would not go vote in Iran. Even the Shiite minority would not, and it wouldn't vote for Ahmadinejad if it could.
3. The voting rolls for Iranian Baluchistan show about 800.000 voters. Where are the two million Pakistanis?
4. Baluchistan voted for reformist candidates. (Most Baluchis are Sunnis and are afraid of the Shiite hardliners).
Can you imagine that people like Ledeen are actually allowed to come on television as "experts" or to publish in political journals despite spewing complete nonsense? If your son gets drafted and sent to die in Iran, it will be in some part because of the propaganda spread by people like Ledeen, who, by the way, has some sort of weird relationship both to the more fascistic elements in Italian military intelligence and to the Likud extremists in Israel. NB: The false Niger uranium documents were forged by a former agent of Italian military intelligence . . .
All that said, it is probably true that there was some ballot stuffing by Ahmadinejad supporters. It was alleged by clerical moderate Karrubi, and it is plausible. These presidential elections are the least free and fair since the early 1990s, though all along there has been a problem of the exclusion and vetting of candidates by the clerics. On the other hand, it seems undeniable that Ahmadinejad's campaign struck a chord with many Iranians tired of corruption and economic stagnation. He may well have won the second round even without those "extra" ballots.
By the way, rightwing US commentators often slam Iranian elections because the candidates are vetted by the clerical Guardian Council for their loyalty to the Khomeinist ideology. In the past two years, the vetting has grown ever more rigorous, excluding relative liberals from running for parliament or president. The commentators are correct.
However, in the United States the "first past the post" system of winner-takes-all elections and the two-party system play a similar role in limiting voters' choices of candidates. Neither libertarians nor socialists are likely to be serious contenders for the presidency in the United States, since neither of the two dominant parties will run them. The US approach to limiting voter choice is systemic and so looks "natural," but US voters have a narrower range of practical choices in candidates than virtually any other democratic society.
http://www.juancole.com/2005/06/ahmadinejad-uses-bushs-tactics-supreme.html
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"Ahmadinejad, a rightwinger, poses as a champion of the common people, and once dressed up as a street sweeper. He thus got a lot of working class people to vote for him, even though he will do the bidding of billionaire clerical hardliners who have done little for ordinary folks."
Ahmadinejad's support among poor Iranians and Bush's support in areas like West Virginia and Oklahoma are not just a result of a manipulative PR message. If you look at the views of the rural poor in the US and Iran you find them to be "right-wing" compared to more well off people living in larger cities. Why is this?
In books like "What's he matter with Kansas" ( http://www.tcfrank.com/ ) the message is put forward that its manipulation. But how would that explain differences in social views in rural areas that exist outside of partisan politics. Part of it could be that issolated rural communities are less likely to be effected by cultural change and thus be intimidated by it in a way that makes them cultural conservatives, but in this modern era where culture is spread via TV and other forms of communication that reach rural communities in the US it would seem like there is probably more to the story. One answetr could be that poor communitiesscubject to an increasingly competative mass consumer culture are reacting to the social competition aspects of cultural change more than they are really reacting purely from the religious stands they often claim. Many poor people voted for Bush rather than Kerry not because Bush pretended to be poor and uneducated but because Kerry's manners and overall style appeared to be a flaunting of something that most people have no hopes of achieving (in this country education is an economic privllege aterall). If you look at many of the interviews in Iran you see the same thing; with people choosing Ahmadinejad over Rafsanjani since as some described Rafsanjani was trying to act like a new Shah (and flaunt his wealth ina way that humiliates those without money). The message of the reformers in Iran is a just one but when most of the population cant afford the Western clothes and styles the reformers are seen as protesting for (along with political reform), the demands can seem alienating (sortof like if the demand to end the Cuban embargo were mainly being sold to the public as the demand to let AMericans buy CUban cigars)
Ahmadinejad's support among poor Iranians and Bush's support in areas like West Virginia and Oklahoma are not just a result of a manipulative PR message. If you look at the views of the rural poor in the US and Iran you find them to be "right-wing" compared to more well off people living in larger cities. Why is this?
In books like "What's he matter with Kansas" ( http://www.tcfrank.com/ ) the message is put forward that its manipulation. But how would that explain differences in social views in rural areas that exist outside of partisan politics. Part of it could be that issolated rural communities are less likely to be effected by cultural change and thus be intimidated by it in a way that makes them cultural conservatives, but in this modern era where culture is spread via TV and other forms of communication that reach rural communities in the US it would seem like there is probably more to the story. One answetr could be that poor communitiesscubject to an increasingly competative mass consumer culture are reacting to the social competition aspects of cultural change more than they are really reacting purely from the religious stands they often claim. Many poor people voted for Bush rather than Kerry not because Bush pretended to be poor and uneducated but because Kerry's manners and overall style appeared to be a flaunting of something that most people have no hopes of achieving (in this country education is an economic privllege aterall). If you look at many of the interviews in Iran you see the same thing; with people choosing Ahmadinejad over Rafsanjani since as some described Rafsanjani was trying to act like a new Shah (and flaunt his wealth ina way that humiliates those without money). The message of the reformers in Iran is a just one but when most of the population cant afford the Western clothes and styles the reformers are seen as protesting for (along with political reform), the demands can seem alienating (sortof like if the demand to end the Cuban embargo were mainly being sold to the public as the demand to let AMericans buy CUban cigars)
As soon as I saw a picture of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran's new president, I knew there was something faintly familiar about him.
--
And it was not because he was mayor of Tehran, because, like many other Western journalists, I have been barred from visiting Iran in recent years.
Then, when I read a profile of him in the English-language Tehran Times, I realised where I must have seen him: in the former American embassy in Tehran.
Ahmadinejad was a founder of the group of young activists who swarmed over the embassy wall and held the diplomats and embassy workers hostage for 444 days.
Somewhere in the BBC archives is the interview I recorded with him and his colleagues, long after the siege was over. They all seemed rather similar - quiet, polite, but with a burning zeal.
And now, contrary to almost every expectation except his own, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been elected president.
Complete control?
He is the first non-cleric to hold the job since Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989, yet he is much more fundamentalist than either of the religious figures who have been in office since then.
Abroad, the Americans were the least surprised by the result, since this was how they assumed Iran was anyway: seething with hatred for the US, and determined to dominate the region by threat and undercover terrorism.
The British, French and Germans were the most taken aback, because they had previously argued that the Iranian government was basically pretty moderate and wanted to reach an accommodation with the West.
So now it seems as though the conservatives control not simply Iran's basic religious and political structure through the supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, but also the government itself.
The gridlock between conservatives and reformers which has dominated Iranian politics since 1989 has finally been resolved.
Iran's rulers are now at one in their Islamic fundamentalism.
Firm believer
But is this really true? I somehow doubt it.
Politics are far more fractured in Iran than in most Western countries, and expressions like "the conservatives" or "the reformists" have much less practical meaning in the Iranian Majlis than they would in Congress, the Commons, the Reichstag or the Chambre des Deputes.
In the Majlis, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has had the support of a group - as in other post-revolutionary societies, Iranian politicians still instinctively steer away from the concept of outright political parties - known as the Abadgaran, 'the Developers'.
Many Abadgaran members are like him: under 50, often from working-class backgrounds, intense, strong believers still in Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution of 1978-9.
They even dress alike, with their dark suits, their beards, their open-necked shirts.
The differences with the establishment figures who support Ayatollah Khamenei are considerable.
There is nothing working-class about them; and (unless I am reading it very wrong) Ahmadinejad's huge success in getting out the vote in the slums of south Tehran and elsewhere will have unsettled them.
The Khomeini revolution, back in 1978 and 1979, claimed to be acting in the interests of the poor against the wealthy and corrupt.
Still, the class divisions in Iran are as strong as ever. Few poor people have made it to the top in Iran - until now, that is.
Social tension
Iranian politics are as complex and sophisticated as any I have observed around the world.
The complexity is increased by Iran's constitution, which gives the unelected religious leadership greater powers than those of the elected president.
This was why President Khatami, who wanted to open the country more to the West, never could. The gridlock always stopped him.
President Ahmadinejad will certainly move in the opposite direction. He has already reversed many of Khatami's earlier changes in Tehran.
If his followers harass people in the streets, attacking men who shave and women who show their hair, wear make-up and bright colours, there will be much greater social tension and the possibility of future violence.
The implications of this will be worrying to the religious leadership. It is the better-off in Iran who usually want to follow Western styles.
And although Ayatollah Khamenei is a religious conservative, he will not want class warfare breaking out in the streets.
So although President Ahmadinejad won a sizeable majority last Friday, he will not necessarily be able to do what he wants.
Ayatollah Khamenei, who intervened before the election to ensure that leading reformist presidential candidates who had been forbidden to stand were put on the ballot-paper after all, sees himself as a referee in Iran's political life; not just another political player.
Nuclear option
But Mr Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei will certainly agree about one thing - the nuclear issue.
Iran believes it lives in a difficult neighbourhood, with Israel, China, Russia, India and Pakistan - all nuclear powers, real or potential - close by, and the US over the horizon.
Iran wants the nuclear option too.
The US is no overwhelming threat to Iran now, unless it decides to attack it from the air and alienate world opinion utterly.
The best the British, French and Germans can do is persuade Iran to be more cautious and tactful in following its nuclear ambitions. Ayatollah Khamenei may see the sense of that.
But unless I have remembered him wrongly from the old days, caution and tact are not qualities you immediately associate with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4626081.stm
--
And it was not because he was mayor of Tehran, because, like many other Western journalists, I have been barred from visiting Iran in recent years.
Then, when I read a profile of him in the English-language Tehran Times, I realised where I must have seen him: in the former American embassy in Tehran.
Ahmadinejad was a founder of the group of young activists who swarmed over the embassy wall and held the diplomats and embassy workers hostage for 444 days.
Somewhere in the BBC archives is the interview I recorded with him and his colleagues, long after the siege was over. They all seemed rather similar - quiet, polite, but with a burning zeal.
And now, contrary to almost every expectation except his own, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been elected president.
Complete control?
He is the first non-cleric to hold the job since Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989, yet he is much more fundamentalist than either of the religious figures who have been in office since then.
Abroad, the Americans were the least surprised by the result, since this was how they assumed Iran was anyway: seething with hatred for the US, and determined to dominate the region by threat and undercover terrorism.
The British, French and Germans were the most taken aback, because they had previously argued that the Iranian government was basically pretty moderate and wanted to reach an accommodation with the West.
So now it seems as though the conservatives control not simply Iran's basic religious and political structure through the supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, but also the government itself.
The gridlock between conservatives and reformers which has dominated Iranian politics since 1989 has finally been resolved.
Iran's rulers are now at one in their Islamic fundamentalism.
Firm believer
But is this really true? I somehow doubt it.
Politics are far more fractured in Iran than in most Western countries, and expressions like "the conservatives" or "the reformists" have much less practical meaning in the Iranian Majlis than they would in Congress, the Commons, the Reichstag or the Chambre des Deputes.
In the Majlis, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has had the support of a group - as in other post-revolutionary societies, Iranian politicians still instinctively steer away from the concept of outright political parties - known as the Abadgaran, 'the Developers'.
Many Abadgaran members are like him: under 50, often from working-class backgrounds, intense, strong believers still in Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution of 1978-9.
They even dress alike, with their dark suits, their beards, their open-necked shirts.
The differences with the establishment figures who support Ayatollah Khamenei are considerable.
There is nothing working-class about them; and (unless I am reading it very wrong) Ahmadinejad's huge success in getting out the vote in the slums of south Tehran and elsewhere will have unsettled them.
The Khomeini revolution, back in 1978 and 1979, claimed to be acting in the interests of the poor against the wealthy and corrupt.
Still, the class divisions in Iran are as strong as ever. Few poor people have made it to the top in Iran - until now, that is.
Social tension
Iranian politics are as complex and sophisticated as any I have observed around the world.
The complexity is increased by Iran's constitution, which gives the unelected religious leadership greater powers than those of the elected president.
This was why President Khatami, who wanted to open the country more to the West, never could. The gridlock always stopped him.
President Ahmadinejad will certainly move in the opposite direction. He has already reversed many of Khatami's earlier changes in Tehran.
If his followers harass people in the streets, attacking men who shave and women who show their hair, wear make-up and bright colours, there will be much greater social tension and the possibility of future violence.
The implications of this will be worrying to the religious leadership. It is the better-off in Iran who usually want to follow Western styles.
And although Ayatollah Khamenei is a religious conservative, he will not want class warfare breaking out in the streets.
So although President Ahmadinejad won a sizeable majority last Friday, he will not necessarily be able to do what he wants.
Ayatollah Khamenei, who intervened before the election to ensure that leading reformist presidential candidates who had been forbidden to stand were put on the ballot-paper after all, sees himself as a referee in Iran's political life; not just another political player.
Nuclear option
But Mr Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei will certainly agree about one thing - the nuclear issue.
Iran believes it lives in a difficult neighbourhood, with Israel, China, Russia, India and Pakistan - all nuclear powers, real or potential - close by, and the US over the horizon.
Iran wants the nuclear option too.
The US is no overwhelming threat to Iran now, unless it decides to attack it from the air and alienate world opinion utterly.
The best the British, French and Germans can do is persuade Iran to be more cautious and tactful in following its nuclear ambitions. Ayatollah Khamenei may see the sense of that.
But unless I have remembered him wrongly from the old days, caution and tact are not qualities you immediately associate with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4626081.stm
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