Homeless Man Wrongfully Convicted Twice

LOS ANGELES, CA - On September 24, 1997, a 42 year-old homeless African-American male living in an abandoned house was arrested for allegedly abducting and sexually molesting a young Hispanic boy. Although the suspect was described to police as being a “big kid,” police officers arrested him as the prime suspect. He was subsequently charged with four counts of lewd act upon a child under the age of 14, one count each for kidnapping a child under 14 years of age, failing to register as a sex offender, and falsely identifying himself to the arresting officer. Convicted of all counts in November 1998 except for the kidnapping charge, this homeless man was sentenced to 85 years to life in state prison.

Was this homeless individual, who police had arrested and considered the prime suspect, the actual perpetrator of these crimes? Before trial, when the defendant appeared in a police lineup, neither the victim nor the victim’s brother, the latter of which witnessed the abduction, were able to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of these crimes. That is, until the deputy district attorney admonished them and pointed out the defendant in the lineup. The public defender appearing with the defendant during this lineup, as an officer of the court, reported the manner in which the defendant had been identified in the lineup to the court. The public defender was dismissed as defense counsel for the defendant due to a conflict of interest and became a witness for the defendant and later testified on the defendant’s behalf during trial.

After dismissal of the public defender, an alternative public defender was then appointed to represent the defendant. A subsequent in-court identification of the defendant by the victim occurred when the victim, while on the stand, was again prompted by the deputy district attorney to identify the defendant by indicating where the defendant was sitting in court. And, although there was DNA evidence available for testing in the form of a stain, no DNA evidence to link the defendant to these crimes was presented during trial. But there was, however, a forensic report entered into evidence as an exhibit, the findings of which, the defendant is still unaware of.

Seven years and 68 days later, excluded as the perpetrator of these terrible crimes by post-conviction DNA testing, Myron E. Howard, now 49, is no longer incarcerated in either county jail or state prison for crimes that he did not commit. Howard remains, however, a convicted felon of one count of a lewd act upon a child under 14 and was required to register as a sex offender with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). This, in lieu of his conviction in November 1998 for that crime being overturned and the judgment against him vacated on July 29, 2004 upon the granting of a Writ of Habeus Corpus. Instead of being released from custody after his conviction was set aside and the judgment vacated, particularly when the prosecution indicated that it did not wish to retry Howard, he was rearraigned on the same charges previously filed against him on January 14, 1998. The alternate public defender, who filed the Writ of Habeus Corpus on Howard’s behalf on February 12, 2004, was dismissed by the court due to a conflict of interest and replaced with the same alternate public defender that Howard had attempted to have removed as his defense counsel in a hearing held February 24, 1998 to no avail, because he believed that she was not acting in his best interest. When he inquired about whether double jeopardy applied to his case, this latter alternate public defender advised him that it did not.

Following Howard’s rearraignment on July 29, 2004, a temporary commitment order was issued and he was held in custody and a pre-trial conference was scheduled for August 17, 2004. Howard’s defense counsel advised him that it would be in his own best interest to enter into a plea in which he would plead guilty to one count of a lewd act upon a child under 14 in exchange for his release from custody. As advised, he explicitly waived trial by court and trial by jury, relinquishing his right to confront and cross-exam witnesses, subpoena witness into court to testify in his defense, and against self-incrimination. Howard was further advised of the nature of charges against him, which were the same as those filed previously against him on January 14, 1998, the elements of each of the offenses in the information and the possible defenses to such charges. He was also advised of the possible consequences of entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), including the maximum penalty and administrative sanctions, the possible legal effects and maximum penalties incident to subsequent convictions, for the same or similar offenses.

The court found Howard’s waivers to have been knowingly, understandably and explicitly made, his defense counsel joined in his waivers. He then withdrew his not guilty plea to one count of a lewd act upon a child under 14, and entered a plea of no contest. The court found him guilty as to this one count, which resulted in Howard being convicted a second time, for a crime that he had been previously convicted of on November 2, 1998. The court found that there was a factual basis for Howard’s plea and accepted it under People v. West. Although Howard had been ordered to pay restitution to the victim upon his previous conviction in the amount of $10,000.00, however, in this instance restitution was waived as it was paid from his prison earnings while he was incarcerated. He also waived any rights to any earnings that he may have had from state prison. Howard’s conviction counted as a strike and registration as a sex offender is required.

At sentencing, Howard waived arraignment for judgment and stated there was no legal cause why sentence should not have been pronounced, and the court ordered the judgment that follows. For his conviction on the sole count to which he pled no contest, the court ordered probation denied and that Howard serve six (6) years in prison, the mid-term sentence for this count. He was ordered to pay restitution in amount of $200, which the court waived because it was already taken from his state prison earnings while he was is custody. Howard was ordered to register with the local police agency, LAPD, as a sex offender, as prescribed by law. Howard’s credits due to having been incarcerated in both county jail and state prison from September 24, 1997 until December 1, 2004, exceeded the time imposed by the court. He had a credit of 2,623 actual days and 393 good time/work time days that totaled 3,016 days. Entering into this plea with the court as advised by his defense counsel, Howard also waived his appellant rights. The court then found that Howard had fully completed his state prison sentence and parole period. At the time of his original sentence on February 10, 1999, he had also provided a DNA sample.

Finally, after the court accepted Howard’s plea, and the People had stricken the strikes, allegations, and the remaining six counts contained in the information filed on January 14, 1998, Myron E. Howard was released on December 1, 2004. This was an instance where jurisprudence in California went far beyond the bounds of justice. The irrelevancy of innocence and truth in Howard’s case prevailed over the prohibition against unconstitutionally contrived convictions, not to mention false arrest, false imprisonment, denial of due process of law, violation of civil rights, and possibly, malicious prosecution. Howard’s case is a troubling example of how an innocent defendant, while under duress, can be coerced into entering a plea that is supposedly in his own best interest, when in fact the plea is nothing more than an admission of guilt that results in a second conviction of the previously charged crime. In such cases, it is the only means available to gain one's his freedom and release from custody. By Howard entering into such a plea, although he had been excluded as the perpetrator of the crimes earlier charged against him, his early conviction overturned and judgment vacated, he was then convicted for a second time of one of those earlier crimes.

There are many issues raised in Howard's case beginning with whether probable cause existed at the time of Howard's arrest and subsequent detention? Whether DNA testing was conducted by LAPD prior to the proceedings brought against Howard? Whether the suggestive identifications of Howard in the police lineup, and subsequently in court, were admissible? Whether double jeopardy attached in his case once a jury was empanelled and sworn? Whether the defendant was held without legal authority or falsely imprisoned from 7/29/04 until his release on 12/1/04 once DNA testing excluded him as the perpetrator and his conviction was overturned and the judgment against him vacated, and the People did not wish to retry him? Whether the length of time that elapsed after the defendant filed a Writ of Habeus Corpus until its subsequent granting, violated state of federal law? Whether the Court's rearraignment of the defendant on the same information originally filed on 1/14/98, after the People indicated in open court and on the record, that they did not wish to retry the defendant, was constitutional? Whether the People, if they desired to retry Howard, were required to file, the same or new charges against him within 30 days? Whether the court's rearraignment of Howard on the same information filed against him on 1/14/98 was an abuse his discretion by the court? Whether the plea that defendant in this case, entered into with the Court, in his own best interest under People v. West was authorized by state and federal law? Whether defendants, while under duress and not otherwise guilty of the crime or crimes charged against them, or of a crime or crimes that they have been previously convicted of that have been overturned and the judgment vacated, are being coerced into entering pleas to gain their freedom and release from custody in Los Angeles County by pleading no contest to a crime or crimes not originally charged against them, or to a crime or crimes for which their prior conviction has been overturned and its judgment vacated, is constitutional?

The question remains, under what legal theory has Myron E. Howard, a factually innocent individual, been held to answer for a crime he has been proven not to have committed? And, why was his constitutional right to the procedural defense of "double jeopardy" not applicable in his case?