Nader/Camejo Challenge Electronic Voting Results in New Hampshire

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Kevin Zeese 202.265.4000

Nader/Camejo Challenge Electronic Voting Results in New Hampshire

Washington, DC:The Nader/Camejo campaign has filed a challenge to the voting results in New Hampshire after receiving numerous complaints from voting rights activits. Below is Nader's letter to New Hampshire requesting a recount. Also, below is Nader's view on electronic voting without a paper trial. In addition, the Nader/Camejo campaign offered our campaign to poll watchers who wanted to be credentialed to be inside to monitor electronic voting. Hundreds of democracy activists in Maryland working with TrueVoteMD.org were credentialed to monitor polling through the Populist Party which was created by Nader-Camejo supporters in Maryland.

November 5, 2004
Via fax: 603-271-6316

To The Secretary of State of New Hampshire:

The Nader/Camejo campaign requests a hand recount of the ballots in the presidential election in New Hampshire. Numerous voting rights activists have requested that we seek a recount of this vote.

We have received reports of irregularities in the vote reported on the AccuVote Diebold Machines in comparison to exit polls and trends in voting in New Hampshire. These irregularities favor President George W. Bush by 5% to 15% over what was expected. Problems in these electronic voting machines and optical scanners are being reported in machines in a variety of states.

We are requesting that the state undertake this recount or a statistically significant sample audit of these vote counts.

We would like to make sure every vote counts and is counted accurately.

Sincerely,

Ralph Nader
Paperless Electronic Voting

A bedrock of democracy is making sure that every vote counts. The counting of votes needs to be transparent so people can trust that their vote is counted as they cast it. Paperless electronic voting on touch screen machines does not provide confidence to ensure votes are counted the way voters intend. The software on which votes are counted is protected as a corporate trade secret and the software is so complex that if malicious code was embedded no analysis could discover it. Further, because there is no voter verified paper record, it is not possible to audit the electronic vote for accuracy, nor is it possible to conduct an independent recount. This Primary Day six million voters will be voting on paperless electronic voting machines. This is a grotesquely designed, over-complicated expensive system fraught with the potential for mistakes and undetected fraud.

On July 23, 2003 the Johns Hopkins Information Security Institute reviewed the electronic voting system in Maryland and found that it had security “far below even the most minimal security standards . . . .” Johns Hopkins computer security experts concluded: “If we do not change the process of designing our voting systems, we will have no confidence that our election results will reflect the will of the electorate.”

Computers are inherently subject to programming error, equipment malfunction, and malicious tampering. If we are to ensure fair and honest elections, and retain voter confidence in our democratic process, we need to ensure that there are no such questions. Therefore, it is crucial that any computerized voting system provide a voter-verifiable paper audit trail and that random audits of electronic votes be conducted on Election Day. Paperless electronic voting machines make it impossible to safeguard the integrity of our vote thereby threatening the very foundation of our democracy.

The seller of the machines, the Diebold Corporation, is a supplier of money to one of the major party candidates, George W. Bush. The CEO and top officers of Diebold are major contributors to the Bush campaign. This does not pass the smell test. Voters should report immediately any suspected malfunctions and deficiencies at voting precincts around the country to their Board of Elections. And voters should urge their legislators to require a voter verified paper ballot trail for random audits and independent recounts.