Appeal of Acquittals

November 5, 2004

Press Release
Legal affairs desk

Richard R. Syré
552 Chicago Ave.
Minocqua, WI 54548
715 356 5573
http://www. newnorth.net/~rrsyre/verdict.htm
mailto:rrsyre [at] newnorth.net
Dear Editor:

Enclosed is my memorandum to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees on the repeal of Rule 29 (d), a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court on Nov. 10, 1986, permitting government appeal of the Order for Judgment of Acquittal.

The freedom of the judge to convict or acquit according to the dictates of good conscience is placed in check by the power to prosecute judicial officials for the betrayal of their oath of office. The point of balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability is the rule barring conviction upon appeal of acquittals.

A procedure allowing false convictions upon appeal of just acquittals as a means of evading accountability upon the oath of office to faithfully execute the law is a remarkable corruption of the judicial process. Against good conscience the Supreme Court has induced Congress to accept judicial review of acquittals as constitutional principle. This spoiling of the judicial process is all the more alarming because Rule 29(d) may have been promulgated for that purpose.

On March 29, 1985, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided court ordered acquittals barred neither appeal nor retrial of the accused. This decision provided the legal pretext for reversing the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s acquittal in Commonwealth v. Syré (469 A2d 1059) reversed on April 3, 1985(489 A2d 1340).
Anticipating that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would reverse the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s second ruling in my favor finding official jury tampering (501 A2d 671) I sued the Pennsylvania Supreme Court asking the federal court for an injunction against further government appeals. I alleged that the purpose of government appeal was to evade accountability upon evidence of unjust prosecution and official jury tampering, 662 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa., 1987).

The United State Supreme Court overruled the Pennsylvania justices in Smalis v. Pennsylvania removing their legal pretext for appeal of court ordered acquittals. On Nov. 10, 1986, the United States Supreme Court restored that pretext by promulgating Rule 29 (d). On the same date the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the finding of official jury interference (518 A2d 535) and without remand to the Pennsylvania Superior Court pursued me in disbarment and extradition proceedings aimed at compelling me to abandon claims of false prosecution which now include the claim that conviction upon review of acquittal is false constitutional procedure.

MEMORANDUM TO HOUSE AND SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEES ON REPEAL OF RULE 29(d)

Rule 29, Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, is the means by which the power of the court to acquit is invoked. Section (d) adopted on Nov. 10, 1986, allows the government to appeal the Order for Judgment of Acquittal stripping the appellate court of the power of independent judgment in refusing to consent to the jury conviction and diminishing congressional powers of judicial oversight.

The freedom of the judge to vote for the verdict according to the dictates of good conscience is checked by the power to impeach or prosecute the judge for the betrayal of oath of office. Government appeal of the court ordered acquittal, procedurally limited to a good faith denial of consent to the conviction, contradicts the balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability. Appeal of the acquittal like the appeal of a pardon is a procedural nonsequitur contradicting the basic principles upon which powers to convict are placed in check through judicial review and congressional and executive powers of judicial oversight.

The potential grounds upon which the appellate court denies consent to the conviction exceed the power of the appellate court to determine them upon a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. The appellate court has no power to determine in fact or law questions concerning the corruption of the judicial process or other betrayals of the oath of office to faithfully execute the laws. Accordingly, the judgment of acquittal is independent. It denies consent to the conviction without assigning error. Questions of judicial corruption are thereby referred to impeachment and criminal proceedings in which the presumption of judicial integrity in actions against the judge may be overcome on charges alleging bad faith acquittal or conviction.

The balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability limits a judge’s power to favor the accused and bars convictions reversing acquittals. Corrupt acquittals are cured by means of a retrial where complete agreement to the conviction is possible. It is extraordinary that this rule placing the oath of office in the balance of power equation has been nullified by congressional action requested by the United States Supreme Court for reasons not expressed in case law or congressional debate.


Rule 29(d) is an affront to every judge in its suggestion that the denial of consent to the conviction on grounds of reasonable doubt is untrustworthy. The diminished power of congressional oversight and diminished appellate power to order the judgment of acquittal provides a ground upon which every conviction may be challenged.