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Secular Democratic State in Historic Palestine: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?
Are you ready to attack Zionism as a racist ideology that must be abandoned completely as any racist ideology must be in a democratic, civilized, and moral society? It may be difficult for many Jews, but it is likely to be unavoidable.
Secular Democratic State in Historic Palestine: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?
By Dr Ghada Karmi
First published in Al-Adab, Lebanon
July 2002
Introduction
Over the last two decades, the idea of a two-state solution has become a persistent theme in the discourse on the Palestinians-Israeli conflict. In 1993, when the Oslo
Accords were signed, there was a prevalent view that the creation of an independent Palestinian state was only a matter of time. Although the Accords never explicitly said
this - indeed they indicated no specific end point - it did not deter most Palestinians and others from this view. Now, nearly nine years later and despite the changes on the
ground, the official Palestinian position with regard to an independent state remains the same. It has in fact been reinforced by European and US support, verbally at least,
and now represents the established view about the ultimate aim of Palestinian aspirations.
The history of the Palestinian state originates with the Palestine National Council (PNC) decision taken in 1974 to establish a Palestinian "authority" on any liberated part
of the Palestinian homeland. This was later defined to mean statehood and since then, the Palestinian leadership has consistently aimed for an independent state, to be set
up in the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital. The Arab League accepted "Palestine" as a member state in 1976. In November 1988, the PNC meeting in
Algiers formally accepted the existence of two separate states, Israel and the new Palestine. In 1997, Yasser Arafat announced that the PLO would declare the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state on May 4 1999. Though this never happened, he has been reiterating this position ever since. Although the exact
boundaries of the proposed state have not been defined, despite the rumours that came out form the Camp David and Taba talks in 2000-2001, the idea of such an entity
"alongside Israel" has taken firm hold. And it seems that there is widespread if tacit acceptance of the idea even in Israel; although there has never been any official Israeli
endorsement of a Palestine state, there is a feeling of resignation towards this as a probable outcome. As a result, the idea of two states as the preferred solution to the
conflict has become so dominant as to exclude all other possibilities. Yet, the current Israeli military assault on the Palestinians and Israel's cantonization and unrelenting
colonisation of Palestinian land has made it imperative to review this position. Is a Palestinian state in today's circumstances feasible?
The two-state solution
Irrespective of whether this solution is politically wise or desirable, a glance at the latest map of the occupied territories suggests that it might be impossible to realize it on
simple logistical grounds. The West Bank of today is pock-marked by Jewish settlements encircling Palestinian towns and separating them from each other, criss-crossed
by bypass roads built for the exclusive use of Israelis and breaking up Palestinian territory even more. Sharing the territory of the West Bank and Gaza with the
Palestinians are over 180,000 Jewish settlers and a Jewish population of over 200,000 in and around east Jerusalem. There is no territorial continuity between the
Palestinian areas in the West Bank, which are cut off from each other, from Gaza and from Jerusalem.
If the settlements remain, then any projected Palestinian state would have no meaningful territory on which to become established. The problem is further complicated by
the lack of natural resources and economic disruption from which the Palestinian areas currently suffer. This derives from thirty years of Israeli occupation which
transferred resources from the Palestinian inhabitants to the settlers, as well as the Israeli policy of closures imposed on Gaza and the West Bank since 1993. The
Palestinian areas suffer from high unemployment, (over 50 per cent in Gaza, over 30 per cent in the West Bank), imposed trade restrictions, an undeveloped industrial base
and poor natural resources. Any Palestinian state set up on this basis is not economically viable and could only survive with a massive infusion of billions of dollars in aid.
Israel's vision for a final settlement cedes little to Palestinian aspirations for a state of their own. Israel would keep much of the land and control all the resources. East
Jerusalem would remain part of Israel's "united capital" forever. No Israeli plan so far has offered the Palestinians enough territory for a viable state. Without a total
removal of the settlements and an Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem, the formula hitherto put forward for a Palestinian state, to be set up in the whole of the West
Bank and Gaza up to the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, simply cannot occur. In order to realize the aim of the two states, one would have to postulate
either a voluntary Israeli renunciation of the settlements and East Jerusalem or an external agency willing to pressurize Israel into doing so. Neither of these options is
currently on offer and in any case, the practical difficulties of evacuating all the settlers, and disengaging from the West Bank in terms of security, water and infrastructure
would be so formidable as to make an Israeli government of any persuasion unwilling to do it.
The one-state solution
For these reasons, a Palestinian state as envisaged is not feasible, and the situation on the ground makes even a physical separation of the two peoples hard to achieve.
Given these circumstances, abandoning the two-state solution in favour of one state to include both peoples would seem the obvious alternative. The history of the single
state solution on the Palestinian side in fact goes back nearly thirty years. The proposal to create what was then called a secular democratic state in Palestine was first
propounded in 1969 by the left-wing PLO faction, the DFLP, and formally adopted in the modified version of a "democratic state of Palestine" by the PNC meeting that
year. With a few exceptions, the proposal was met with rejection on both sides. The Israelis considered it quite simply a recipe for their destruction, and the Palestinians
thought it an unacceptable concession to the enemy. It was never followed through by either side and was quietly dropped after 1974, as the option of a West Bank state
began to unfold.
In recent times and faced with the current political impasse, the idea of one state for the two peoples has begun to resurface among a small number of left wing Israelis and
Palestinians, albeit from varying perspectives and for different motives. The debate centres on what form this state should take, whether bi-national or secular and
democratic. Bi-nationalism is not a new idea in Israeli thinking. During the 1930s and 40s, European intellectual Zionists like Martin Buber, Judah Magnes and Arthur
Ruppin, were much interested in creating a bi-national state in Palestine in which both communities could live together. Some Zionists proposed living with the Arabs in a
cantonization arrangement on the Swiss model. This would give the Jews self-government in the localities in which they lived and the rest of the country would be split up
into Christian and Muslim self-governing cantons.
A few Palestinians agreed with the cantonization idea, because they thought it could be a way of halting Zionist ambitions towards creating a Jewish state in Palestine. But
the vast majority were opposed to bi-nationalism in any form, since it would have given a foreign minority who had no rights to the country an equal share of Palestine and
would enable them to pursue their Zionist aim of domination. On the Jewish side, the advocates of bi-nationalism remained a small, ineffective minority and their ideas
were superseded in 1948 when Israel was set up as a Jewish state. The discourse on this theme then went into abeyance, but has re-surfaced among a few modern day
left-wing Zionists who are today concerned with bi-nationalism once again..
In a bi-national state, Jews and Palestinians would coexist as separate communities in a federal arrangement. Each people would run its own affairs autonomously and be
guaranteed the legal right to use its own language, religion and traditions. Both would participate in government in a single parliament, which would be concerned with
matters of supra-communal importance, defence, resources, the economy and so on. Such a state could be modeled on the cantonal structure of Switzerland or the
bi-national arrangement of Belgium. In the Palestine/Israel case, the cantonal structure would be based on the present demographic pattern of the country where densely
Arab populated areas like the Galilee would become Arab cantons, and Jewish ones like Tel Aviv would be Jewish cantons, and so on. This leaves a number of practical
issues to be resolved, as for example, the exact composition and powers of the parliament, the exercise the right of return for Jews and that for Arabs and so on.
However, the debate is still new and the Palestinian side, beyond a very small number of people, of whom the Knesset member Azmi Bishara and the Palestinian academic
Edward Said are the most prominent, has yet to enter it. But at least implicit in these proposals is a recognition that Israel is in fact something of a bi-national state
already, since a fifth of its current population inside the Green Line is Palestinian Arab. The democratic secular state on the other hand envisions a one-man, one-vote
polity without reference to ethnicity or creed. It would aim to create an equitable pluralist society on the Western democratic model, and is opposed to an arrangement of
separate communities. This idea has far fewer adherents and these, outside the tiny ranks of anti-Zionist Jews like Professor Ilan Pappe of Haifa University, and others
who are, like myself, mostly Palestinian.
Objections to the one-state solution
Irrespective of which system is chosen, the one-state solution is unlikely to find acceptance amongst the mass of Palestinians or Israelis. Currently, there are several
arguments put forward against it:
*Firstly it is maintained that Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians will never accept integration. There is therefore a choice between separation and military conquest by one
side. Separation is the more humane of these possibilities.
But is the premise true? In reality there are many instances in world history of integration between peoples who appeared to be totally irreconcilable before the resolution
of a conflict. Perhaps the most relevant, though still fragile, example is South Africa. England following the Civil War is another. It should never be forgotten that more than
half the Jewish population of Israel came from Arab countries, where they were relatively well integrated. Though most of these now speak Hebrew and see themselves as
Israelis, they retain strong elements of their Arabic culture and have recently begun to celebrate these openly.
*Secondly, it is pointed out that Israel has the military power to do what it likes. In these circumstances the Palestinians should take what they can get and live to fight
another day.
This may be a realistic philosophy, but the Palestinians show no inclination to capitulate. Despite their military weakness, they continue to fight as we see in the current
Intifada because they perceive that military power is not the only form of power. There is a moral argument against capitulation to injustice and this has entrenched itself
in Palestinian consciousness. Recent developments on the international stage seem to have endorsed this position. Any deal that ignored the moral argument would not last
long
*Thirdly, it is argued that although far from perfect, the two-state solution offers a way forward which could later be developed into something more just - for example a
federation or an economic union. Others would view it as the first step leading to a one-state solution. Many take this position because they believe a direct confrontation
with Zionism given the present balance of power would prove ineffective. Let Zionism wither away as demographic and economic reality seeps in, they think.
Not attacking Zionism now simply stores up trouble for the future. The imbalance of power between Israel and a Palestinian state would ensure that 'further
developments' would always be to Israel's advantage and to Palestine's disadvantage. In the context of the essentially racist nature of Zionism, I cannot conceive that a
two-state resolution would result in any form of equality between the two.
*Fourthly, proponents of a unitary state are accused of diverting energy and attention away from what is attainable (two states) in favour of what is utopian and
impossible to realize (one state).
This objection might be justified if the two-state solution were either both feasible in terms of practicality or desirable in terms of principle.
*Fifthly, it is argued that the creation of a unitary state poses formidable obstacles. How would it come about? Would Jews have a 'right of return' like the Palestinians?
What would be the character of the hybrid state that would emerge and how would it be accepted by the rest of the Arab world? Would it be predominantly Arab with a
Jewish aspect or the other way round?
These questions are hard to answer. There is no real historical precedent to draw on for guidance. The reality is that such issues will be faced when the initial and hardest
step is taken, that is the decision to set up a unitary state. Once that is achieved, the rest must come through discussion and experience. It would be idle to pretend that the
Zionist project in Palestine has not created a massive problem for the region. Dealing with its consequences will not be easy, but that cannot be a reason for not trying or
for aiding the survival of Zionism through supporting the continuation of a Jewish state.
Bi-nationalism and the right of return
In the context of a unitary state solution, the bi-national state proposal is obviously less unacceptable, since it can be designed to mimic closely a two-state solution tipped
in favour of the stronger side. But from a Palestinian viewpoint, for bi-nationalism to be equitable and not just a re-hash of the present formula of Israeli hegemony, it must
provide for the right of return of Palestinian refugees to the state and for restitution of the land and resources which were stolen from them. The Jewish law of return must
be cancelled and the bi-national state should be configured along non-Zionist lines, since it was the exclusivist and discriminatory nature of Zionism, which created the
original problem. The prominent Israeli sociologist, Sami Smoocha, who conducted several surveys of Jewish society since the 1970s, has observed that the Jewish public
in Israel was 'both racist and rigid' and it was this which was the cause of the persisting Jewish-Arab conflict.
The discussion is, however, somewhat academic in the light of current Israeli public opinion, where bi-nationalism in any form attracts minimal support.
The secular democratic state
The secular state idea can be expected to attract few adherents at the moment.. For it would effectively spell the end of Zionism and force Israelis to share equitably the
land they view as exclusively Jewish with non-Jews. It is scarcely better for the Palestinians, for whom it means the end of the dream of a sovereign Palestinian state
which had become familiar and seemed until recently so attainable. The prospect of life with the Israelis, after decades of hatred and the present Israeli assault, would seem
unacceptable. And yet, what alternative is there now to a one-state solution? Ironically enough, it is the Israelis government's annexationist policies in the occupied
territories which have destroyed the two-state option. In fragmenting the West Bank so effectively, they have ensured that no separate state can exist there and thus
opened the door to the one-state alternative. As a result, the option of a Palestinian state is no longer feasible.
Nor, from a Palestinian viewpoint, is it even desirable; a two-state solution, had it ever happened, would have been unstable and ultimately unacceptable to the
Palestinians. It would have given them at best a truncated entity, certainly demilitarized and economically dependent, on a fifth of their original homeland (even were they
offered the whole of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, these would form only 23 per cent of Mandate Palestine). It would be unable to absorb the 4 million
displaced Palestinians, and would end any hope of their right to return to their original homes. Most seriously, it would have set the seal of approval on the Zionist claim
to Palestine as the exclusive land of the Jews which no Palestinian has ever accepted.
The Palestinian sense of injustice, which fundamentally derives from the loss of their homeland and the denial of their right to return to it, will not be redressed by an
unequal arrangement of two states. And if the injustice is left unresolved, it will remain a source of instability and a cause of "terrorism" in the region. No one denies that
there will be massive obstacles in the way of implementing a one-state solution in Israel/Palestine. Nor can the past be reversed, but a solution even at this late stage, which
permits the equitable sharing of the whole land between the two peoples and repatriates the refugees will help lay the foundations for a stable future. Given the present
structure of Israel and the occupied territories, which is bi-national in all but name, a formal policy of bi-nationalism is not unthinkable. It may even ultimately pave the
way to the secular democratic state in historic Palestine. This might seem utopian now, but is it any more so than the Zionist enterprise of constructing a Jewish state in
someone else's country?
Dr Ghada Karmi is a London-based Palestinian academic and writer. Her most recent book (co-edited with Eugene Cotran), is The Palestinian Exodus, 1948-1998, (Ithaca Press, 1999). Her
memoir, In search of Fatima, will be published by Verso Press this autumn. She is also Joint Vice-Chair of CAABU and member of IOPA international board
By Dr Ghada Karmi
First published in Al-Adab, Lebanon
July 2002
Introduction
Over the last two decades, the idea of a two-state solution has become a persistent theme in the discourse on the Palestinians-Israeli conflict. In 1993, when the Oslo
Accords were signed, there was a prevalent view that the creation of an independent Palestinian state was only a matter of time. Although the Accords never explicitly said
this - indeed they indicated no specific end point - it did not deter most Palestinians and others from this view. Now, nearly nine years later and despite the changes on the
ground, the official Palestinian position with regard to an independent state remains the same. It has in fact been reinforced by European and US support, verbally at least,
and now represents the established view about the ultimate aim of Palestinian aspirations.
The history of the Palestinian state originates with the Palestine National Council (PNC) decision taken in 1974 to establish a Palestinian "authority" on any liberated part
of the Palestinian homeland. This was later defined to mean statehood and since then, the Palestinian leadership has consistently aimed for an independent state, to be set
up in the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital. The Arab League accepted "Palestine" as a member state in 1976. In November 1988, the PNC meeting in
Algiers formally accepted the existence of two separate states, Israel and the new Palestine. In 1997, Yasser Arafat announced that the PLO would declare the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state on May 4 1999. Though this never happened, he has been reiterating this position ever since. Although the exact
boundaries of the proposed state have not been defined, despite the rumours that came out form the Camp David and Taba talks in 2000-2001, the idea of such an entity
"alongside Israel" has taken firm hold. And it seems that there is widespread if tacit acceptance of the idea even in Israel; although there has never been any official Israeli
endorsement of a Palestine state, there is a feeling of resignation towards this as a probable outcome. As a result, the idea of two states as the preferred solution to the
conflict has become so dominant as to exclude all other possibilities. Yet, the current Israeli military assault on the Palestinians and Israel's cantonization and unrelenting
colonisation of Palestinian land has made it imperative to review this position. Is a Palestinian state in today's circumstances feasible?
The two-state solution
Irrespective of whether this solution is politically wise or desirable, a glance at the latest map of the occupied territories suggests that it might be impossible to realize it on
simple logistical grounds. The West Bank of today is pock-marked by Jewish settlements encircling Palestinian towns and separating them from each other, criss-crossed
by bypass roads built for the exclusive use of Israelis and breaking up Palestinian territory even more. Sharing the territory of the West Bank and Gaza with the
Palestinians are over 180,000 Jewish settlers and a Jewish population of over 200,000 in and around east Jerusalem. There is no territorial continuity between the
Palestinian areas in the West Bank, which are cut off from each other, from Gaza and from Jerusalem.
If the settlements remain, then any projected Palestinian state would have no meaningful territory on which to become established. The problem is further complicated by
the lack of natural resources and economic disruption from which the Palestinian areas currently suffer. This derives from thirty years of Israeli occupation which
transferred resources from the Palestinian inhabitants to the settlers, as well as the Israeli policy of closures imposed on Gaza and the West Bank since 1993. The
Palestinian areas suffer from high unemployment, (over 50 per cent in Gaza, over 30 per cent in the West Bank), imposed trade restrictions, an undeveloped industrial base
and poor natural resources. Any Palestinian state set up on this basis is not economically viable and could only survive with a massive infusion of billions of dollars in aid.
Israel's vision for a final settlement cedes little to Palestinian aspirations for a state of their own. Israel would keep much of the land and control all the resources. East
Jerusalem would remain part of Israel's "united capital" forever. No Israeli plan so far has offered the Palestinians enough territory for a viable state. Without a total
removal of the settlements and an Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem, the formula hitherto put forward for a Palestinian state, to be set up in the whole of the West
Bank and Gaza up to the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, simply cannot occur. In order to realize the aim of the two states, one would have to postulate
either a voluntary Israeli renunciation of the settlements and East Jerusalem or an external agency willing to pressurize Israel into doing so. Neither of these options is
currently on offer and in any case, the practical difficulties of evacuating all the settlers, and disengaging from the West Bank in terms of security, water and infrastructure
would be so formidable as to make an Israeli government of any persuasion unwilling to do it.
The one-state solution
For these reasons, a Palestinian state as envisaged is not feasible, and the situation on the ground makes even a physical separation of the two peoples hard to achieve.
Given these circumstances, abandoning the two-state solution in favour of one state to include both peoples would seem the obvious alternative. The history of the single
state solution on the Palestinian side in fact goes back nearly thirty years. The proposal to create what was then called a secular democratic state in Palestine was first
propounded in 1969 by the left-wing PLO faction, the DFLP, and formally adopted in the modified version of a "democratic state of Palestine" by the PNC meeting that
year. With a few exceptions, the proposal was met with rejection on both sides. The Israelis considered it quite simply a recipe for their destruction, and the Palestinians
thought it an unacceptable concession to the enemy. It was never followed through by either side and was quietly dropped after 1974, as the option of a West Bank state
began to unfold.
In recent times and faced with the current political impasse, the idea of one state for the two peoples has begun to resurface among a small number of left wing Israelis and
Palestinians, albeit from varying perspectives and for different motives. The debate centres on what form this state should take, whether bi-national or secular and
democratic. Bi-nationalism is not a new idea in Israeli thinking. During the 1930s and 40s, European intellectual Zionists like Martin Buber, Judah Magnes and Arthur
Ruppin, were much interested in creating a bi-national state in Palestine in which both communities could live together. Some Zionists proposed living with the Arabs in a
cantonization arrangement on the Swiss model. This would give the Jews self-government in the localities in which they lived and the rest of the country would be split up
into Christian and Muslim self-governing cantons.
A few Palestinians agreed with the cantonization idea, because they thought it could be a way of halting Zionist ambitions towards creating a Jewish state in Palestine. But
the vast majority were opposed to bi-nationalism in any form, since it would have given a foreign minority who had no rights to the country an equal share of Palestine and
would enable them to pursue their Zionist aim of domination. On the Jewish side, the advocates of bi-nationalism remained a small, ineffective minority and their ideas
were superseded in 1948 when Israel was set up as a Jewish state. The discourse on this theme then went into abeyance, but has re-surfaced among a few modern day
left-wing Zionists who are today concerned with bi-nationalism once again..
In a bi-national state, Jews and Palestinians would coexist as separate communities in a federal arrangement. Each people would run its own affairs autonomously and be
guaranteed the legal right to use its own language, religion and traditions. Both would participate in government in a single parliament, which would be concerned with
matters of supra-communal importance, defence, resources, the economy and so on. Such a state could be modeled on the cantonal structure of Switzerland or the
bi-national arrangement of Belgium. In the Palestine/Israel case, the cantonal structure would be based on the present demographic pattern of the country where densely
Arab populated areas like the Galilee would become Arab cantons, and Jewish ones like Tel Aviv would be Jewish cantons, and so on. This leaves a number of practical
issues to be resolved, as for example, the exact composition and powers of the parliament, the exercise the right of return for Jews and that for Arabs and so on.
However, the debate is still new and the Palestinian side, beyond a very small number of people, of whom the Knesset member Azmi Bishara and the Palestinian academic
Edward Said are the most prominent, has yet to enter it. But at least implicit in these proposals is a recognition that Israel is in fact something of a bi-national state
already, since a fifth of its current population inside the Green Line is Palestinian Arab. The democratic secular state on the other hand envisions a one-man, one-vote
polity without reference to ethnicity or creed. It would aim to create an equitable pluralist society on the Western democratic model, and is opposed to an arrangement of
separate communities. This idea has far fewer adherents and these, outside the tiny ranks of anti-Zionist Jews like Professor Ilan Pappe of Haifa University, and others
who are, like myself, mostly Palestinian.
Objections to the one-state solution
Irrespective of which system is chosen, the one-state solution is unlikely to find acceptance amongst the mass of Palestinians or Israelis. Currently, there are several
arguments put forward against it:
*Firstly it is maintained that Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians will never accept integration. There is therefore a choice between separation and military conquest by one
side. Separation is the more humane of these possibilities.
But is the premise true? In reality there are many instances in world history of integration between peoples who appeared to be totally irreconcilable before the resolution
of a conflict. Perhaps the most relevant, though still fragile, example is South Africa. England following the Civil War is another. It should never be forgotten that more than
half the Jewish population of Israel came from Arab countries, where they were relatively well integrated. Though most of these now speak Hebrew and see themselves as
Israelis, they retain strong elements of their Arabic culture and have recently begun to celebrate these openly.
*Secondly, it is pointed out that Israel has the military power to do what it likes. In these circumstances the Palestinians should take what they can get and live to fight
another day.
This may be a realistic philosophy, but the Palestinians show no inclination to capitulate. Despite their military weakness, they continue to fight as we see in the current
Intifada because they perceive that military power is not the only form of power. There is a moral argument against capitulation to injustice and this has entrenched itself
in Palestinian consciousness. Recent developments on the international stage seem to have endorsed this position. Any deal that ignored the moral argument would not last
long
*Thirdly, it is argued that although far from perfect, the two-state solution offers a way forward which could later be developed into something more just - for example a
federation or an economic union. Others would view it as the first step leading to a one-state solution. Many take this position because they believe a direct confrontation
with Zionism given the present balance of power would prove ineffective. Let Zionism wither away as demographic and economic reality seeps in, they think.
Not attacking Zionism now simply stores up trouble for the future. The imbalance of power between Israel and a Palestinian state would ensure that 'further
developments' would always be to Israel's advantage and to Palestine's disadvantage. In the context of the essentially racist nature of Zionism, I cannot conceive that a
two-state resolution would result in any form of equality between the two.
*Fourthly, proponents of a unitary state are accused of diverting energy and attention away from what is attainable (two states) in favour of what is utopian and
impossible to realize (one state).
This objection might be justified if the two-state solution were either both feasible in terms of practicality or desirable in terms of principle.
*Fifthly, it is argued that the creation of a unitary state poses formidable obstacles. How would it come about? Would Jews have a 'right of return' like the Palestinians?
What would be the character of the hybrid state that would emerge and how would it be accepted by the rest of the Arab world? Would it be predominantly Arab with a
Jewish aspect or the other way round?
These questions are hard to answer. There is no real historical precedent to draw on for guidance. The reality is that such issues will be faced when the initial and hardest
step is taken, that is the decision to set up a unitary state. Once that is achieved, the rest must come through discussion and experience. It would be idle to pretend that the
Zionist project in Palestine has not created a massive problem for the region. Dealing with its consequences will not be easy, but that cannot be a reason for not trying or
for aiding the survival of Zionism through supporting the continuation of a Jewish state.
Bi-nationalism and the right of return
In the context of a unitary state solution, the bi-national state proposal is obviously less unacceptable, since it can be designed to mimic closely a two-state solution tipped
in favour of the stronger side. But from a Palestinian viewpoint, for bi-nationalism to be equitable and not just a re-hash of the present formula of Israeli hegemony, it must
provide for the right of return of Palestinian refugees to the state and for restitution of the land and resources which were stolen from them. The Jewish law of return must
be cancelled and the bi-national state should be configured along non-Zionist lines, since it was the exclusivist and discriminatory nature of Zionism, which created the
original problem. The prominent Israeli sociologist, Sami Smoocha, who conducted several surveys of Jewish society since the 1970s, has observed that the Jewish public
in Israel was 'both racist and rigid' and it was this which was the cause of the persisting Jewish-Arab conflict.
The discussion is, however, somewhat academic in the light of current Israeli public opinion, where bi-nationalism in any form attracts minimal support.
The secular democratic state
The secular state idea can be expected to attract few adherents at the moment.. For it would effectively spell the end of Zionism and force Israelis to share equitably the
land they view as exclusively Jewish with non-Jews. It is scarcely better for the Palestinians, for whom it means the end of the dream of a sovereign Palestinian state
which had become familiar and seemed until recently so attainable. The prospect of life with the Israelis, after decades of hatred and the present Israeli assault, would seem
unacceptable. And yet, what alternative is there now to a one-state solution? Ironically enough, it is the Israelis government's annexationist policies in the occupied
territories which have destroyed the two-state option. In fragmenting the West Bank so effectively, they have ensured that no separate state can exist there and thus
opened the door to the one-state alternative. As a result, the option of a Palestinian state is no longer feasible.
Nor, from a Palestinian viewpoint, is it even desirable; a two-state solution, had it ever happened, would have been unstable and ultimately unacceptable to the
Palestinians. It would have given them at best a truncated entity, certainly demilitarized and economically dependent, on a fifth of their original homeland (even were they
offered the whole of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, these would form only 23 per cent of Mandate Palestine). It would be unable to absorb the 4 million
displaced Palestinians, and would end any hope of their right to return to their original homes. Most seriously, it would have set the seal of approval on the Zionist claim
to Palestine as the exclusive land of the Jews which no Palestinian has ever accepted.
The Palestinian sense of injustice, which fundamentally derives from the loss of their homeland and the denial of their right to return to it, will not be redressed by an
unequal arrangement of two states. And if the injustice is left unresolved, it will remain a source of instability and a cause of "terrorism" in the region. No one denies that
there will be massive obstacles in the way of implementing a one-state solution in Israel/Palestine. Nor can the past be reversed, but a solution even at this late stage, which
permits the equitable sharing of the whole land between the two peoples and repatriates the refugees will help lay the foundations for a stable future. Given the present
structure of Israel and the occupied territories, which is bi-national in all but name, a formal policy of bi-nationalism is not unthinkable. It may even ultimately pave the
way to the secular democratic state in historic Palestine. This might seem utopian now, but is it any more so than the Zionist enterprise of constructing a Jewish state in
someone else's country?
Dr Ghada Karmi is a London-based Palestinian academic and writer. Her most recent book (co-edited with Eugene Cotran), is The Palestinian Exodus, 1948-1998, (Ithaca Press, 1999). Her
memoir, In search of Fatima, will be published by Verso Press this autumn. She is also Joint Vice-Chair of CAABU and member of IOPA international board
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For Muslim fundamentalists, a Jewish state in the area just isn't part of the script. It can't be. Not if Islam is supposed to be the big winner. The Jews, who were treated as second- or third-class citizens in the Arab world can’t now be regarded as equals with a state of their own. That too is against the script.
Remember, too, that Israel is a western society with much of the cultural decadence fundamentalists love to hate, including emancipated women.
And peace would remove the scapegoat. People would start thinking about deficiencies and corruption of their regimes.
Peace means Israel as legitimate example. With peace, Arab reformers might be encouraged to call for copying what they see in Israel.
Another inconvenient fact is that there are other minorities in the Middle East the self-determination fans ignore. Why is it that the Muslim Kurds, whose nationalism is far older than that of the Palestinians and who greatly outnumber the Palestinians, are not entitled to self-determination? It seems that some Muslims are more equal than others.
Real peace with Israel means Kurds, Copts, Berbers and Sudanese blacks and animists can tell Arab governments: We want equality or what the Jews have. Examining these issues provides a new matrix for looking at the problem. The brutal reality remains that the neighbours don't want genuine peace with Israel. And they are willing to fight to the last Palestinian to achieve their goal.
For Muslim fundamentalists, a Jewish state in the area just isn't part of the script. It can't be. Not if Islam is supposed to be the big winner. The Jews, who were treated as second- or third-class citizens in the Arab world can’t now be regarded as equals with a state of their own. That too is against the script.
Remember, too, that Israel is a western society with much of the cultural decadence fundamentalists love to hate, including emancipated women.
And peace would remove the scapegoat. People would start thinking about deficiencies and corruption of their regimes.
Peace means Israel as legitimate example. With peace, Arab reformers might be encouraged to call for copying what they see in Israel.
Another inconvenient fact is that there are other minorities in the Middle East the self-determination fans ignore. Why is it that the Muslim Kurds, whose nationalism is far older than that of the Palestinians and who greatly outnumber the Palestinians, are not entitled to self-determination? It seems that some Muslims are more equal than others.
Real peace with Israel means Kurds, Copts, Berbers and Sudanese blacks and animists can tell Arab governments: We want equality or what the Jews have. Examining these issues provides a new matrix for looking at the problem. The brutal reality remains that the neighbours don't want genuine peace with Israel. And they are willing to fight to the last Palestinian to achieve their goal.
Why don't you take a look at http://www.cactus48.com.
You might learn something.
But then again, you just want to spread your Zionist bullshit--- you're obviously not interested in the TRUTH.
You probably work for that Zionist propaganda machine CAMERA that is no doubt funded by Americans' tax dollars that Zionists continue to swindle from American citizens to keep them in the dark about your racist Zionist, anti-democratic, apartheid Israel, that we also are funding with our tax dollars.
We're not going to pay for your racist home away from home any longer! Get used to it! The game is OVER!
Down with Zionism! Down with all racism!
Powerful argument, and you raise issues I've never heard before. Truth be known I detest Islam because it is misognysitic, homophobic, self righteous, intolerant, exclusive and run by self appointed spokesmen for their god (properly called Ventriloquists).
Then again the same goes of Christianity and yes, Judaism (don't Jewish women sit in the balconies in Orthodox Temples, with their heads covered and not allowed to speak in congregation whilst the men jabber and make deals on the floor below?)
And Judaism being fair to women? Give me a break, especially in Orthodox congregations and a Religious State (aka Israel). Judaism is as inherently misogynistic as Islam and Christianity or have you not read Deuteronomy and Leviticus. The only heroines in the TeNaK (Old Testament to goyim) are prostitutes and whores including Sarah the wife of Abraham, whom he brokered to a Babylonian king.
And Hinduism, uggh, as stultifying and misogynistic as monotheism, and maybe more so, they use to force widows (and someplaces still do) to jump on the funeral pyres of their husbands.
It is refreshing to have pointed out the vices and evils of Islam, as if I needed that, but let's not gloss over and apologizes for the vices and evils of Judaism and Y'srael.
May Canaan sink into the sea, may a dormant volcano erupt and devour that foul land. Worthless only for growing olives.
From what I've seen of the Patriot forms they boil down to, misogyny, homophobia, latent, where not blatant racism, greed (hurrah for me, the hell with you).
Develop, consume, destroy the Planet. I am talking of George Bush's constitutency, the Bible Belt, Jerry Falwell (who doesn't believe in Global Warming) and
the corporate elite whose only purpose for wealth is to get more and prove to other "captains of industry" that size does matter.
And don't flag me with the baggage of being a lefty. I'm not, I'm a staunch anti Marxist and even a stauncher anti Trotskyite, anti Stalinist, anti Zionist, anti anything who is in the final analysis anti human and unbearable oppressive.
In fact, before you were probably born, I was a Goldwater Republican and a proud (then) Right Wing Extremist, use to call Kennedy a commie.
I am however, in my old age, a social liberal and am old and wise enough now to have a good understanding of why problems exist, and who causes the problems, and one of the causes has been Patriarchialism, i.e. the male domination paradigm with all of it's attendant fears and needs.
The So called American Ideal of "free trade" and Capitalism, has resulted in Globalism, aka New World Order, of exploitation of third world countries and export of good ole American jobs to these exploited countries.
And the American Ideal of keeping what you earn, will turn this country into a third world nation (no taxes, no roads, no air traffic control, no infrastructure) and to hell with the aged, the infirm, the unfortunate amongst us, let them die out and perish, their reward for not being well connected or inheriting wealth and privilege or even being able to attend a decent school and get a decent education.
What is this American Ideal? I hate it when people toss around slogans, slogans which demand definition and discussion. Just as a person I am communing with at the moment, tosses out Republic, as if I am suppose to know what he means and implies.
Hell, Plato envisioned a republic, a stultifying, elitist republic ruled over by some benevolent, all knowing, philosopher king (meaning himself) but Plato was himself an "ugly" minded person, and looked down upon the masses as useless eaters.
Enuf