Women in Black: Friday 4/5 Demonstration

There were at least 50 Women in Black, handing out leaflets and making speeches in support of the Palestinians at this event. It was very well done and well -organized. The sense of peaceful determination was very strong.

http://www.indybay.org/news/2002/04/120713.php#120986

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S)
February 12, 2006
Profile of the Hamas movement
The emblem of Hamas – the Islamic Resistance Movement
Posters distributed by Hamas prior to the Legislative Council elections,
demonstrating its determination to continue the strategy of armed confrontation
with Israel (“the resistance”). The poster on the right shows a masked gunman
with a rifle, with rifle bullets arranged in the form of a 6—Hamas’ list number in
the elections. At the upper part of the poster is a bold caption saying, “The
resistance [i.e., the terrorist-operative activity] is the symbol of the [Islamic]
nation’s honor and the secret of its glory and victory”. The poster on the left
features a caption saying, “One hand builds and the other resists”; in the
background is the Temple Mount with the Al-Aqsa Mosque at its center (Source:
the Hamas website, January 24).
2
Overview
On January 25, 2006, the Hamas movement won a landslide victory in the elections
for the Palestinian Authority’s Legislative Council. According to the official results
published by the Palestinian Authority’s Elections Committee, Hamas won 74 out of
the 132 council seats. The Fatah movement, Hamas’ rival and the leader of the
Palestinian national movement since its very beginning, suffered a defeat winning only
45 seats.
Hamas’ victory in the elections is without a doubt an earth-shattering event on the
internal Palestinian scene, whose shockwaves are expected to wash over Arab
countries and reach throughout the Muslim world. It is the first time that the Middle
East has seen the rise to power of a radical Islamic movement with a terroristoperative
wing in democratic elections, reflecting the wishes and desires of many
Palestinians who have grown tired of the Palestinian Authority’s and Fatah’s corruption
and inefficiency. Accordingly, Hamas’ conduct on the internal Palestinian scene and
its policy towards Israel are going to have far-reaching consequences, extending
beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
A photograph expressing the message of the continuation of
the violent confrontation: a child carrying a rifle during a
victory procession held by the movement’s supporters
(Source: Hamas’ website, January 26)
3
This document includes the following chapters:
The background for the establishment of the Hamas movement, and its
worldview.
Characteristics of Hamas’ platform, published before the Legislative Council
elections.
Characteristics of the Hamas leadership.
Hamas’ operative-terrorist activity
���� Hamas and suicide bombing terrorism
���� Hamas’ operative activity during the past year
Hamas’ civilian infrastructure
Hamas as an alternative to the Palestinian Authority and Fatah
The claim on the alleged separation between the political-information wing
and the operative wing
Hamas’ activity outside the Palestinian Authority administered territories
Appendix: list of prominent terrorist attacks perpetrated by Hamas since the
movement’s establishment
4
The background for the establishment of the Hamas
movement, and its worldview
The Hamas1 movement was established in the Gaza Strip in late 1987, with the
outbreak of the first violent confrontation, based on the social and religious foundation
laid by the Muslim Brotherhood (mosques, kindergartens, education institutions,
clinics, and so forth). The establishment of the movement reflected a decision made by
the Palestinian Islamists, under the leadership of Ahmed Yassin, the founder of Hamas,
not to content themselves with only the da’wah.2 The decision taken was to
supplement the Muslim Brotherhood’s radical Islamic ideology with Palestinian
nationalist overtones, by defining the elimination of Israel and the establishment
of an Islamic Palestinian state in its stead as a primary objective, and embracing a
strategy of violent activity as a primary means towards the accomplishment of this
objective.
1 Hamas, in classical Arabic, means might, heroism, fighting spirit. In classical Arabic poetry, hamasa
were battle songs meant to inspire the soldiers’ fighting spirit. In modern times, the meaning of the term
has grown to include general enthusiasm (see the Lisan al-Arab dictionary and the Arabic-Hebrew
Dictionary of Modern Arabic, by David Ayalon and Pessah Shinar). Hamas is also the acronym for the
Islamic Resistance Movement—Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah.
2 That is, changing the Palestinian society by propaganda, preaching, education, and religious-political
indoctrination (in like manner to the Muslim Brotherhood).
5
A poster which appeared on Hamas’s Internet site. It illustrates the connection between
the Muslim Brotherhood and the importance of the battle for hearts and minds. Hassan
al-Bana, Muslim Brotherhood founder, appears at the top with Ahmad Yassin (right
and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Rantisi (left). Below is movement’s slogan: “Da’wah [religiouspolitical
indoctrination], Fikrah [thought, idea, attitude], shahadah [death as a martyr
for the sake of Allah].”
Hamas’ worldview, as reflected in its covenant (1988), states that the Palestinian
problem is of a religious rather than a national-territorial nature, and at its heart is
the conflict between Islam and the “infidel” Jews. Accordingly, it may not be
resolved by means of political compromises based on the principle of “two states
for two peoples” (which Hamas opposes), but rather by means of jihad (holy war) to
the liberation of the entire Palestine and the elimination of the State of Israel. This
worldview sees the land of Palestine -- “from the river to the sea” – as an Islamic
religious endowment (waqf) that may not be relinquished, even partially, and stresses
the key significance of Jerusalem.
Based on this radical Islamic worldview, Hamas opposed the agreements reached
between the Palestinian Authority/PLO and Israel, including the Oslo Accords. This is
also the reason Hamas refused to acknowledge the political legitimacy of the
6
Palestinian Authority, avoided joining it and rejected the Palestinian Authority’s
demand to disarm. Moreover, Hamas embraced its own independent policy of
terrorism against Israel, sought to undermine the Oslo Accords and used violence to
extort concessions from Israel.
In the 1990s, Hamas created the murderous suicide bombing terrorism, perfecting
it and making it into the main “strategic” weapon in the current confrontation. The first
Palestinian suicide bombing attack, in Mehola, was perpetrated by a Hamas suicide
bomber on April 16, 1993. In the 1990s, Hamas waged a murderous campaign of
suicide bombing terrorism in Israeli cities as a means to undermine the Oslo Accords.
Since the beginning of the current conflict (September 2000) until the lull agreement
(March 2005), Hamas was the leading perpetrator of suicide bombing attacks (some
40 percent of all attacks) and the most prominent perpetrator of deadly suicide bombing
attacks (such as the attack at Tel-Aviv’s Dolphinarium and the Park Hotel in Netanya—
see Appendix).
However, as may be seen in statements made by the movement’s senior figures after
the Legislative Council elections, Hamas does not rule out conditional ceasefires of
temporary nature (hudna) or lulls in the fighting, aiming to reduce the magnitude of the
confrontation with Israel (tahdi’a), if necessitated by Palestinian interests and those of
the movement itself. Indeed, unlike the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas took part in
the lull agreement, and in 2005 embraced a restrained policy of terrorist attacks,
reflected in diminishing its involvement in suicide bombing terrorism (surrendering the
lead to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad).
Characteristics of Hamas’ platform, published before
the Legislative Council elections
On the eve of the Legislative Council elections (January 2006), the Hamas
movement published its platform, a central part in its elections campaign. The platform
reflected the movement’s radical Islamic fundamental positions and terminology, as
7
published in its 1988 covenant, with only minor differences. In the platform, Hamas did
not cover up or obscure its commitment to its own fundamental principles, foremost
among which is the movement’s commitment to the principles of radical Islam, jihad
(holy war), and the elimination of the State of Israel.
In its election campaign, Hamas continued to stress its fundamental principles
alongside emphasizing social and civilian objectives. Its platform emphasized the
movement’s striving towards reforms and changes in a series of issues (war against
corruption, war against unemployment, women’s status, political rights, and so forth)
under the title of “Change and Reform”, the name of Hamas’ elections list. There is no
doubt that the call for reforms struck a chord with the Palestinian people, who have
had enough of the corruption associated with the Palestinian Authority leadership and
Fatah, and who were captivated by Hamas’ clean, responsible, non-corrupt image.
What follows are the main points of the platform:3
Fundamental principles: the Palestinian people are part of the
Arab/Islamic nation. Islam is the source of political, economic, social, and legal
authority. Historic Palestine is an inseparable part of the Arab/Islamic land,
and the Palestinians have an unchallenged right to it. The Palestinian people
have a right to self-determination, a right to Jerusalem and the holy places, and a
right to establish a sovereign state with Jerusalem as its capital. The (so-called)
right of return belongs to all the Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian people
have a right to resist the (Israeli) occupation by all means available,
including armed struggle (i.e., by violence and terrorist activities).
Interior policy: the Hamas movement calls for a governmental and legal
reform, while protecting individual and group rights. The platform calls to fight
corruption through transparency and monitoring of budget management, protect
the civilian society institutions, provide financial assistance to underprivileged
3 According to the Hamas website (January 11, 2005).
8
sectors of society, form social solidarity, and ensure economic rights to prisoners.
In education, the platform calls to implement a compulsory education law and
states that Islam (as interpreted by Hamas) is the basis of education. The
platform also calls for improvements in women’s status.
Foreign policy: the platform calls to embrace a strategy that stresses
tightening the bonds with the Arab/Muslim world, while maintaining the
relations with the international community. The platform is opposed to
normalizing relations with Israel, calls for an “economic disengagement from
Israel”, and calls for support of the “resistance” (i.e., terrorist activity).
After the elections, spokesmen on behalf of Hamas issued statements reflecting
its interest to adapt the (unchanged) fundamental concepts to the new reality.
Thus, for example, Mahmoud al-Zahar, a Hamas senior in the Gaza Strip, announced
(January 29) that his movement would be willing to consider a long-term ceasefire
(hudna), in exchange for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the borders of 1967
and the implementation of the “right of return”. In a press conference held on January
28, Khaled Mash’al, Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, stated that the
agreements with Israel would be upheld since they were a reality impossible to ignore.
9
Hamas’ charm offensive to western audiences:4 Following Hamas’ victory in the
elections, Political Bureau Chairman Khaled Mash’al announces that the
agreements with Israel are a reality impossible to ignore (Source: the Hamas
website)
Characteristics of the Hamas leadership
The Hamas movement was formed in the Gaza Strip, where the movement’s seat
of power was situated. However, over the years, following the IDF’s killing of some of
its leaders and the deportation of others, the Hamas leadership split into two centers.
The first is the “external” leadership, based in Damascus after its expulsion from
Jordan in 1999 (with representations in Arab and Muslim countries, primarily Iran,
Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia); the second is the “internal” leadership, based in the
Palestinian Authority administered territories, with most of its power concentrated in
the Gaza Strip, the seat of the more senior Hamas figures.
The “external” leadership, influenced and assisted by Syria and Iran, is still the
movement’s highest authority, even though the influence of the “internal” leadership
is expected to increase in the wake of the election results. Traditionally, the “external”
4 In parallel, Hamas persists in its extremist rhetoric to the Palestinian and Arab Muslim world.
10
leadership espoused stricter, more radical positions than the “internal” leadership,
this owing to its separation from the constraints of the Palestinian people and its
proximity to Iran and Syria.
The “external” leadership is made up of a combination of Palestinian Muslim
Brotherhood members who had studied abroad (mainly in Persian Gulf countries) and
joined Hamas after its establishment, and “internal” members deported from the
Palestinian Authority administered territories. After the death of Hamas founder
and leader Ahmed Yassin (who died in a targeted killing on March 22, 2004), the
focus of the leadership shifted from the “inside” to the “outside”. Presently, the
movement’s leader is Chairman of the Political Bureau, Khaled Mash’al, based in
Damascus and occupying the position since 1996. His deputy, also based in Damascus,
is Moussa Muhammad Abu Marzouq, for whom the US issued an arrest warrant
(August 20, 2004) for assisting and financing terrorism.
Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, Khaled
Mash’al (left); Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah
(right). These are the two players who will continue to
exert their influence, from Syria and Lebanon, on
Hamas’ conduct in the Palestinian Authority
administered territories.
11
The lead figures of Hamas’ “internal” leadership operate in the Gaza Strip. Some
of Hamas’ leaders are also based in the West Bank, in Israeli prisons, but the extent of
their seniority and influence is lesser. Below are profiles of some of Hamas’ most
prominent leaders both “outside” and “inside”.5
Khaled Abd al-Rahim Isma’il Mash’al (Abd al-Qader):
���� Head of the Hamas Political Bureau and the movement’s leader. Born
in 1956 in the village of Silwad, near Ramallah. In 1967, he moved to
Kuwait where he resided until 1990 and studied physics in the university.
He joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1981 and Hamas in 1987. In 1990, he
moved to Jordan and in 1996 was appointed the head of the Hamas Political
Bureau in Jordan.
���� On September 25, 1997, Israel made a failed attempt on his life by
injecting him poison on the street in Amman. In November 1999, he was
deported from Jordan and moved to Damascus, from where he operates the
Hamas movement in the Palestinian Authority administered territories, with
Syria’s and Iran’s influence and assistance, to this day.
Isma’il Abd al-Salam Ahmed Haniyya (Abu al-Abd):
���� Considered to be one of the movement’s least
extremist leaders. Headed the Hamas list in the
Legislative Council elections and is to head the new
Palestinian government (unless Hamas chooses to replace
him with a “dummy candidate” on its behalf).
���� Born in 1963 in the Al-Shati refugee camp in the
Gaza Strip to a family descended from the village of Al-Jora, near Ashkelon
5 Among other sources, the profiles of the various Hamas seniors were compiled from biographic details
as published in the movement’s publication, Filastin al-Muslimah (April 28, 2005).
12
(Ahmed Yassin’s birthplace). Graduate of the Arabic Education College in
the Islamic University of Gaza (a focus of Hamas’ activity). Formerly an
activist for the Islamic Bloc (Hamas’ student wing) and chairman of the
students’ council.
���� In 1989, he was arrested by the Israeli security forces and spent three
years in the Ketziot prison. He was released in May 1992 and, in December
of that year, was deported to Marj al-Zuhur in Lebanon, alongside the other
Hamas deportees. After his return to Gaza, about a year after his
deportation, he was appointed the dean of the Islamic University. In 1997,
upon Ahmed Yassin’s release from prison, he became his office chief until
Yassin’s death in a targeted killing in 2004.
Mahmoud Khaled Za’but al-Zahar (Abu Khaled):
���� One of Hamas’ founders, considered to
be extremist in his views towards Israel and
the Palestinian Authority, even though after
the Legislative Council elections he
attempted to obscure his positions and
present an ostensibly pragmatic image.
���� Born in 1945, he grew up in Isma’iliya, where he resided until the age of
13. He studied medicine in the Ein Shams University in Cairo and worked
as a physician in the Gaza Strip until 1982. He was fired due to his anti-
Israeli rhetoric. Since 1985, he is a lecturer in the Islamic University of
Gaza, from which several Hamas seniors originated.
���� He was arrested by Israel and was among those deported to Marj al-
Zuhur in Lebanon (1992). After the killing of Ahmed Yassin, he was
declared Rantisi’s deputy. His son died in a targeted killing aimed against
him (September 10, 2003).
13
Muhammad Diyab Ibrahim Def:
���� A senior operative of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam
Brigades, Hamas’ terrorist-operative wing. Born in
Khan Yunis in 1965. His family originates from
Kawkaba (east of Ashkelon). Formerly a student in
the Islamic University of Gaza. Considered to be
the student of Yahya “the Engineer” Ayyash. After
Ayyash’s killing in 1996, he was made commander
of the movement’s terrorist-operative wing.
���� Muhammad Def stood behind a series of murderous terrorist
attacks that took place in Israeli cities in February-March 1996. Among
those were two suicide bombing attacks on bus no. 18 in Jerusalem and
abductions of soldiers (Nachshon Wachsman, Aryeh Frankental, and Shahar
Simani). He survived several targeted killing attempts. In one of them, on
December 26, 2002, he was severely injured. In the wake of the attempts to
kill him, he went underground. Today, he is still actively involved in
managing Hamas’ operative infrastructure.
���� After the disengagement, Muhammad Def appeared in public within the
context of Hamas’ campaign to portray the disengagement as its own
achievement. In his address, he repeated most of the known motifs of
Hamas’ campaign, calling for the “liberation” of Jerusalem, the West Bank,
Acre, Safed, Nazareth, Ashkelon, and “every stretch of Palestine”. The Gaza
Strip, according to Def, was “liberated” only through jihad (holy war), and
the next phase is going to be “crushing the occupation” in the West Bank
and Jerusalem through the armed struggle (“blood for blood, destruction for
destruction,” Hamas’ website, August 27, 2005).
14
Muhammad Def in his appearance after the disengagement: a
call for the elimination of the State of Israel by terrorism
Sa’id Muhammad Siyam (Abu Mus’ab): a senior member of the
movement’s leadership and one of its more pragmatic
figures. Born in 1959 in Gaza, resident of Sheikh
Radwan, father of six. He was one of those deported to
Marj al-Zuhur (1992). Works as a teacher and a preacher.
Participated in many of the movement’s important
forums, was its representative in the monitoring
committee of the National and Islamic Forces. Served as
the movement’s spokesman between December 2001 and
April 2002, and was responsible for the establishment of the Radio al-Aqsa
station (April 2003), broadcasting from the Gaza Strip.
Muhammad Mahmoud Hassan Abu Tir (SheiAbu Mus’ab): born in 1951
in the East Jerusalem village of Umm Tuba. He joined
Fatah in the early 1970s, in the wake of which he was
held prisoner in Israel. During his stay in prison, he
became religious and became an activist of the Muslim
Brotherhood, and then of Hamas. Detained in Israel on
several occasions. He was released in 2005 after
serving seven years in prison. During the latest election
15
campaign in East Jerusalem, in which he granted interviews to Israeli media, he
was detained for several days and later released.
Sheikh Hamed Suleiman Jaber al-Bitawiconsidered to be one of Hamas’
most veteran, senior activists in the Nablus
region. Born in 1944 in the village of Beita (near
Nablus). He is among the founders and leaders of
radical Islamism in the West Bank and among
Israeli Arabs. Head of Al-Tadamun (“Solidarity”)
charitable association controlled by Hamas in
Nablus. He also serves as Chairman of the
Palestinian Islamic Scholars Association, which issued a religious ruling (fatwa)
praising suicide bombing attacks. He is also one of the Palestinian representatives
in the Union of Good’s board of trustees. In 1992, he was deported by Israel to
Lebanon (Marj al-Zuhur) alongside other Hamas activists.
Sheikh al-Bitawi, armed with a gun, at a gathering in
Nablus. To his right is Jamal Mansour, a Hamas senior in
Nablus who died in a targeted killing in July 2001 (Photo:
the Hamas website)
Hamas’ terrorist-operative activity
Hamas and suicide bombing terrorism
16
Hamas has a terrorist-operative infrastructure (the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades)
in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and a logistical support infrastructure abroad.
Furthermore, Hamas established a militia called the Popular Army, deployed in
population centers in the Gaza Strip and engaged in defense and security tasks. Hamas’
operatives stood behind the perpetration of most suicide bombing attacks inside
Israeli territory since the beginning of the current confrontation. Hamas’ operative
infrastructures are guided from abroad as well as by the Hamas leadership in the Gaza
Strip.
Throughout the course of the current confrontation, Hamas perfected and extended
the use of suicide bombing terrorism as its main “strategic weapon” in the terrorist
campaign against Israel. Out of 147 suicide bombing attacks perpetrated in the five
years of the current confrontation, 58 were perpetrated by Hamas (i.e., some 40 percent
of the total number of suicide bombing attacks). In its terrorist attacks, Hamas was
responsible for most of Israel’s fatalities during the confrontation (482 out of 1,084
fatalities, some 44 percent of the total number of killed during the confrontation). Since
the lull agreement (March 2005), Hamas perpetrated a single suicide bombing attack (in
Beersheba), within the context of the restrained policy of terrorist attacks it embraced
(see below).
Prominent among the terrorist attacks perpetrated by Hamas was the suicide bombing
at the Park Hotel in Netanya on Passover Eve (March 27, 2002). That terrorist attack,
in which 30 people were killed, triggered Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002), in
which the IDF took control of population centers in the West Bank, thus beginning a
new chapter in the current confrontation. Other noteworthy deadly terrorist attacks
perpetrated by the organization include the suicide bombing attack on bus no. 2 in
Jerusalem (August 19, 2003, 23 killed), and a suicide bombing attack at a nightclub
near Tel-Aviv’s Dolphinarium (June 1, 2001, 21 killed).6
6 See Appendix for a list of prominent terrorist attacks perpetrated by Hamas in the 1990s and in the
course of the current confrontation.
17
Hamas’ operative activity during 2005
As a result of the lull agreement (March 2005), the Hamas movement
embraced a more restrained policy of terrorist attacks than in the earlier years of
the confrontation. Hamas’ self-imposed restraint was also a result of the need to
consider the moods prevailing among the Palestinian public, against the backdrop of its
participation in the municipal elections (where it achieved significant accomplishments)
and the Legislative Council elections, where it won by a landslide.
However, even during the lull, Hamas did not stop perpetrating terrorist
attacks. In this context, in 2005, a Hamas cell from Mount Hebron perpetrated a series
of shooting attacks in Judea (Beit Hagai and the Gush Etzion junction), leading to the
deaths of seven civilians. Another prominent terrorist attack perpetrated by Hamas
during the lull was the abduction and murder of Sasson Nuriel, a resident of Pisgat
Ze’ev, perpetrated by Hamas operatives in Ramallah (September 21). In that case, the
Hamas movement publicly claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack, viewing
abduction terrorist attacks as being “legitimate” even during the lull (for the
promotion of the release of terrorists held prisoner in Israel).
Abduction and murder by Hamas: Sasson Nuriel bound by his captors
(Source: the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades website)
18
In the sphere of suicide bombings, Hamas embraced a restrained policy. The
Hamas movement, which in previous years was the leader in suicide bombing
attacks, perpetrated “only” two suicide bombing attacks in 2005. The first was
perpetrated before the lull agreement at IDF’s Orkhan outpost in the Gaza Strip
(January 2005), while the second was perpetrated at the Beersheba central bus
station (August). The attack in Beersheba, in which some 40 civilians were injured,
was perpetrated by the Hamas infrastructure in Al-Thahiriya (Mount Hebron); however,
Hamas avoided publicly claiming responsibility for the attack to maintain its alleged
public commitment to the lull.
In the course of the lull in the fighting as well as after the disengagement, the
Hamas movement took a central part in firing rockets and mortar shells on West
Negev towns. Hamas’ self-imposed restraint in these (still ongoing) terrorist attacks
began following harsh public criticism directed at Hamas in the wake of a technical
malfunction that led to the explosion of a truck carrying Qassam rockets, during a
Hamas “victory procession” in Jebaliya (September 23). As a result of the
explosion, 19 Palestinians were killed and some 80 were injured. The Palestinian
Authority publicly blamed Hamas for the explosion. The Hamas movement issued a
false announcement laying the blame at Israel’s door and even “retaliated” by firing
dozens of rockets on Sderot and other West Negev towns. This resulted, as mentioned,
in harsh public criticism, and impelled Hamas to change its fire policy from the Gaza
Strip.
During the lull, the Hamas movement extended behind-the-scenes assistance
to other terrorist organizations to perpetrate “quality” terrorist attacks. Thus, for
example, the Hamas movement helped Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades prepare the
explosive stockings meant to be used by would-be female suicide bomber Wafaa Bass,
whose plan to perpetrate a suicide bombing attack in an Israeli hospital was thwarted
when she was detained at the Erez crossing (June 2005). Hamas also assisted the
Popular Resistance Committees, a terrorist organization based in the Gaza Strip
operating as some sort of Hamas’ operative wing. Hamas’ assistance was also used
to “settle scores” on the interior Palestinian scene: a prime example was the
19
assassination of Moussa Arafat (September 7) by Popular Resistance Committees
operatives, with the assistance and, possibly, guidance of Hamas.
Moussa Arafat: a political murder planned and organized by the
Popular Resistance Committees with the assistance (and, possibly,
guidance) of Hamas (Al-Alam, October 13, 2005)
Hamas’ civilian infrastructure
Alongside its terrorist-operative infrastructure, Hamas also formed an extensive
civilian infrastructure (da’wah) in the Palestinian Authority administered territories.
Said infrastructure extends assistance to the Palestinian population in matters of
welfare, religion, and education, while also serving as a supportive apparatus for the
terrorist-operative activity.
This is reflected in transferring funds to support families of shahids
(“martyrs”), prisoners, and wanted operatives (with some of the funds trickling
down to the terrorist-operative system as well); providing jobs and employment to
Hamas seniors in “charity committees” and other Hamas-associated institutions;
providing assistance to mosques affiliated with Hamas and entrenching the
movement’s influence in universities (that have served as pools for the recruitment of
Hamas operatives, including suicide bombers) and other education institutions.
20
Hamas places special importance on the sphere of education: it holds extensive
“educational” activity in the Palestinian Authority administered territories
(kindergartens, schools, summer camps, clubs), rivaling, in fact, that of the
Palestinian Authority. In this alternative education system, the students are
indoctrinated with radical Islamic messages and subjected to harsh incitement,
laying the foundation for hatred against Israel and the perpetration of terrorist attacks
against it. In Hamas’ da’wah infrastructure, the public, and the young generation in
particular, is educated to violence and hatred, giving rise to a new generation of young
Hamas members taught to continue down the path of terrorism in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.
Hamas has at its disposal large amounts of money (estimated at dozens of millions
of dollars a year), having their source primarily in Iran and Islamic foundations and
institutions in Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf countries, as well as Islamic
foundations in Western Europe (and other secondary sources of funding). This allows
the Hamas movement to invest moneys in welfare and make itself popular with the
Palestinian public, which was reflected in its landslide victory in the Legislative
Council elections.
Hamas as an alternative to the Palestinian Authority
and Fatah
Since the very beginning, the Hamas movement presented itself as an
opposition and an alternative to the Palestinian Authority and Fatah, first and foremost
on the ideological level, as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. It
embraced an Islamic worldview, contrary to the secular worldview espoused by
Fatah founders and senior figures in the Palestinian national movement. The
difference in worldviews was also reflected in the relations with Israel, categorical
opposition to the Oslo Accords, to the recognition of Israel and its right to exist, and to
political agreements with it. In order to realize the jihad strategy, Hamas embraced an
21
independent policy of terrorist attacks, even if such was detrimental to the interests
of the Palestinian Authority, and adamantly refused to disarm its members.
The Palestinian Authority, on its part, did not exert actual efforts to force Hamas
to stop terrorist attacks, disarm, and curb its takeover of important institutions in
Palestinian society (“charity associations”, education institutions, and mosques,
ostensibly controlled by the Palestinian Authority). In the late 1990s and in the
beginning of the current confrontation, there were several attempts by Yasser Arafat to
impose his rule on Hamas; however, they were short-lived and ineffective.
Abu Mazen, Arafat’s successor, issued numerous statements on “one authority, one
rule, and one weapon”. However, he took no measures to impose his political views
and agenda on Hamas. The Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip and northern
Samaria, rather than serving as leverage for strengthening the Palestinian Authority,
was well used by Hamas to gain popularity by portraying the disengagement as a
triumphant result of its path and for intensive activity to deepen its control of the Gaza
Strip, making it into “Hamastan”.
The claim on the alleged separation between the
political-information wing and the operative wing
One of the claims intended to grant an immunity of sorts to Hamas leaders (who
might now find themselves in key positions in the Palestinian Authority leadership) is
the claim on the alleged existence of separate Hamas wings: the operative wing and
the political-propaganda wing. It may be assumed that when Hamas perpetrates terrorist
attacks after its victory in the Legislative Council elections, it will once again attempt to
make use of that claim. This, in order to provide immunity of sorts to its leaders, who
will be in positions of power (with greater exposure) so as to not turn the Palestinian
Authority into a target of punitive and retaliatory activities by Israel.
This claim is fundamentally untrue, since on many occasions it is difficult to draw a
clear line between two supposedly separate wings in Hamas. The movement’s so-called
political leaders have been involved in guiding and coordinating Hamas’ policy,
including its various aspects:
22
Determining and guiding the movement’s policy of terrorist attacks and
approving strategic terrorist attacks: both on the level of the kinds of terrorist
attacks the movement needs to perpetrate (suicide bombing attacks, Qassam
rocket and mortar fire) and on the level of instructing the operative wing members
who turn to them to receive instructions on this issue.
Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, Ahmed Yassin’s successor as leader of
Hamas, who also died in a targeted killing by Israel (the back
cover of the 2004 edition of the Hamas covenant, published in
Qalqilya). Al-Rantisi, described as a figure dealing with policy
and propaganda, carries a rifle, with masked gunmen in the
background. Beneath Al-Rantisi’s photograph is the following
caption: “Oh Lord, take our blood until you are satisfied”,
whose meaning is the encouragement of self-sacrifice for Allah
(i.e., terrorist attacks).
Direct guidance of leaders of operative groupings: in the course of the
confrontation, some of Hamas’ leaders have taken part in terrorist-operative
activity. A noteworthy example of that was Abbas Bin Muhammad al-Sayyid
(now serving cumulative prison terms in Israel), the Hamas leader in
Tulkarm, who initiated, planned, and coordinated the Park Hotel terrorist
attack along with other acts of terrorism, killing dozens of Israeli civilians and
injuring hundreds.
23
Abbas al-Sayyid, a graduate of Yarmuk University in Jordan and medical
equipment engineer by trade, portrays by his character and activity both the
terrorist and the political wing of Hamas: on one hand, Al-Sayyid headed the
Hamas operative infrastructure in Tulkarm and was involved in covert activity of
initiating and coordinating terrorist attacks against civilians, involved in the very
details of operative activity aimed towards the realization of those attacks. On
the other hand, he held close contacts with Hamas’ senior political and operative
cadres, and was involved in a variety of activities of political, propaganda, and
organizational character: representing Hamas at conventions, giving political
speeches quoted on the media, purchasing arms and ammunition, recruiting
operatives, organizing demonstrations and mourning processions, engaging in
propaganda activities, and even providing legal assistance (through his aide) to
Hamas detainees.
Abbas al-Sayyid, a Hamas leader in Tulkarm
wearing two caps: the political-propaganda
cap and the terrorist-operative cap. He
planned the suicide bombing attack at the
Park Hotel in Netanya and is currently
serving a lifetime sentence in Israel
Creating an extensive infrastructure for the battle for hearts and minds,
encouraging terrorism, mainly suicide bombing terrorism. This, through intensive
24
involvement of the Hamas leadership in propaganda and education, using a welloiled
religious-education system that indoctrinates generations of Palestinians
(from infancy to university) to deny the existence of Israel, educating them to a
holy war against Israel and the Jews.
Extensive fundraising activities in Arab countries and Western Europe:
Hamas seniors have been involved in recruiting funds from Iran and Islamic
foundations in Saudi Arabia, Persian Gulf countries, and European countries.
Some of the funds were used to establish the terrorist-supportive apparatus, and
sometimes also trickled down to operative elements. Those funds served the
Hamas movement, which on more than one occasion triggered harsh reactions on
the part of the Palestinian Authority, as reflected in the Legislative Council
election campaign.7
Coordination with terrorist organizations and state sponsors of
terrorism: Hamas’ senior activists abroad and in the Palestinian Authority
administered territories hold close contacts with Iran and Syria, members of the
“Axis of Evil”, as well as with terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah. They
are also engaged in fundraising in Saudi Arabia, Persian Gulf countries and
Europe for terrorist purposes. Within this context, they are responsible for
securing the political, operative, and economic backing from countries that
support Hamas. The Hamas leadership in Damascus, even though its activity is
portrayed as propaganda, is also involved in transmitting operative instructions
for terrorist-operative activity against Israel.
7 During a television debate between Saeb Erekat and Mahmoud al-Zahar (as part of the campaign), Saeb
Erekat asked whether the Palestinian people did not have a right to receive a list of all the funds that had
been transferred to the charity associations (Al-Arabiyyah Television, January 25, 2006).
25
Hamas’ activity outside the Palestinian Authority administered
territories
Right: Khaled Mash’al meets with the Iranian president during his visit to Syria
(January 19-20, 2006) (Source: Al-Manar Television); left: Khaled Mash’al meets
with Khamenei during his visit to Iran (December 12-13, 2005) (Photo: Mehr
Agency, December 13)
Syria serves as the main arena for Hamas’ activity politically, propaganda-wise,
and operatively. Senior members of the movement’s leadership reside in Syria, from
where they conduct their activity. Those are primarily members of Hamas’ Political
Bureau, headed by Khaled Mash’al, alongside members of the operative
headquarters headed by Imad al-Alami.
26
The meeting of Syrian President Bashar Assad with a Hamas delegation headed
by Khaled Mash’al in the wake of the victory in the elections (January 29). The
photograph on the upper right shows Assad with Hamas leader Khaled Mash’al;
the photograph on the bottom shows Imad al-Alami (middle), responsible for
terrorist-operative activity, in a rare public appearance (Source: Syrian
Television).
The Syrian regime, supporting the Palestinian terrorist organizations, allows the
movement’s leadership and the operative headquarters to conduct their various
activities from Syrian territory. This includes formulating and designing the
movement’s operative policy; operative guidance, reflected in guiding terrorist activity;
training terrorist operatives; funding terrorist groups in the West Bank and in the Gaza
Strip, and purchasing arms and ammunition.
On several occasions in the past, driven by American pressure,
Syria acted towards lowering the visibility of such activity, even though it claimed it
27
was political-propaganda in nature. In practice, there has been no change in the
pattern of action employed by Hamas (and other terrorist organizations) in Syria,
and they continue to act from Syrian territory undisturbed.
In addition, Hamas conducts activities in a number of other countries, primarily
Iran, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, which provide support and assistance with funds
and operative training. Saudi Arabia is also the originator of radical Islamic
ideological materials spread by Hamas in schools and universities in the Palestinian
Authority administered territories. As a result of the close relationship between Hamas
and Iran, Khaled Mash’al holds regular meetings with the Iranian senior leadership.
Within this context, he visited Iran (December 12-13, 2005); furthermore, Khaled
Mash’al met with Ahmadinejad during a two-day visit held by the Iranian president to
Damascus (January 19-20, 2006).
It should be emphasized that the Hamas movement also operates in European
countries through its affiliated figures and foundations. Such activity is reflected in
the field of propaganda (Filastin al-Muslimah, a Hamas publication distributed from
the UK) and in raising funds through Islamic foundations, raising funds in Europe and
transferring them to Hamas-affiliated “charity associations” in the Palestinian Authority
administered territories.
28
Appendix
List of prominent terrorist attacks perpetrated by
Hamas since its establishment8
1. The abduction and murder of IDF soldiers Avi Sasportas
(February 16, 1989), Ilan Saadon (May 3, 1989), and Nissim
Toledano (December 13, 1992).
2. The abduction of IDF soldier Nachshon Wachsman (October
9-14, 1994); Nachshon Wachsman and Nir Poraz were killed.
3. Suicide bombing attack on bus no. 5 in Tel-Aviv (October 19,
1994), 22 killed.
4. Two suicide bombing attacks on bus no. 18 in Jerusalem
(February 25, 1995; March 3, 1996), 47 killed.
5. Suicide bombing attack at Tel-Aviv’s Dolphinarium (June 1,
2001), 21 killed.
6. Suicide bombing attack at the Jerusalem Sbarro restaurant
(August 9, 2001), 15 killed.
7. Suicide bombing attack at the Park Hotel in Netanya, on
Passover Eve (March 27, 2002), 30 killed. The suicide
bombing attack triggered Operation Defensive Shield.
8. Suicide bombing attack at a billiard parlor in Rishon
Letzion (May 7, 2002), 15 killed.
8 For details on other suicide bombing attacks, see “Suicide terrorism during the current Israeli-
Palestinian confrontation (September 2000 – December 2005)”, Intelligence and Terrorism Information
Center (January 1, 2006).
29
9. Suicide bombing attack on bus no. 32 in the Jerusalem
neighborhood of Gilo (June 18, 2002), 19 killed.
10. Suicide bombing attack on bus no. 2 in Jerusalem (August
19, 2003), 23 killed. The suicide bombing attack brought about
the end of the temporary ceasefire (hudna).
11. Suicide bombing attack at Café Hillel in Jerusalem
(September 9, 2003), 7 killed.
12. Suicide bombing attack at a bus stop in Tzrifin (September
9, 2003), 9 killed.
13. Suicide bombing attack by two suicide bombers who blew
themselves up on two adjacent buses in Beersheba (August
31, 2004), 16 killed.
14. Suicide bombing attack at the Beersheba central bus station
(August 1, 2005), some 40 wounded.
15. The abduction and murder of Israeli civilian Sasson Nuriel
(September 25, 2005).

http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e0206.pdf

Suicide bombing terrorism during
the current Israeli-Palestinian
confrontation
(September 2000 – December 2005)
The suicide bombing attack in Zion Square, its
reward and cost…
JJJaaannnuuuaaarrryyy 111,,, 222000000666
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S)
Payment: A check for
$15,000 paid to the
suicide bomber’s family
by Saddam Hussein’s
representatives in the
Palestinian Authorityadministered
territories.
Results of the suicide
bombing attack: 11 dead
and 170 wounded. In the
photo: the scene a short
time after the attack
(Photo: Reinhard Kraus,
Reuters).
The suicide bomber:
Nabil Mahmoud Jamil
Halabiya, Hamas suicide
bomber, who carried out
the suicide bombing
attack in Zion Square in
Jerusalem (December 1,
2001).
2
Overview
Since the end of September 2000, the Palestinian terrorist organizations have
been waging a campaign of terrorism against Israel, unprecedented in scope and
ferocity. During it they have made extensive use of suicide terrorism, “human
bombs” which they view as the “strategic weapons” which will most effectively
murder Israeli civilians. As far as the terrorist organizations are concerned, the use of
such weapons to strike at population centers -- Israel’s soft underbelly -- will cause
large numbers of casualties, damage the economy and society, and overcome some of
Israel’s security measures.
During the current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation the Palestinian
terrorist organizations have carried out 147 suicide bombing attacks. They caused
the deaths of 525 Israelis, the overwhelming majority of whom were civilians –
that is, approximately half of the 1,084 killed so far by terrorist attacks. The largest
number of suicide bombing attacks were carried out during the first four months
of 2002. Since then there has been a slow but noticeable reduction, principally as a
result of IDF actions against terrorist centers in the West Bank after Operation
Defensive Shield (April 2002) and of the building many sections of the security
fence.
This study was originally written in Hebrew and then translated into English. The
English version was updated on December 31, 2005 and contains a number of changes.

Yearly distribution of suicide bombing
* In 2002, 24 suicide bombing attacks were carried out before Operation
Defensive Shield (April 2002) and 36 after it.
There were fewer suicide bombing attacks in (2005, during the so-called”lull in
the fighting”) because of the following reasons:. Effective Israeli security force
measures; the positive influence of the security fence; the decrease in legitimacy
among the Palestinians, especially in the Gaza Strip. It was influenced by the
opposition of the Palestinian Authority (PA) under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to
suicide bombing attacks. However, such attacks continue to be carried out and are
still supported by parts of the general Palestinian public, and sometimes are even
indirectly tolerated by the PA.
During the lull, after the understandings reached at the Sharm el-Sheikh summit
meeting in February 2005, six murderous suicide bombing attacks were carried out
in Tel Aviv, Netanya (two attacks), Beersheba, Hadera and near the IDF roadblock in
Tulkarm (as compared to 15 during 2004). Four were carried out by the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and one by Hamas. It should be noted that a number of planned
suicide bombing attacks were foiled by Israeli security forces.
7
15
26
60
35
4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 ספטמבר 2000
Operation Defensive
Shield (April 2002) *
The year of
the lull
Completion of the
security fence in
4
This study is not comprehensive, relating to all the aspects of Palestinian suicide
terrorism. It is an addition to the list of works which have already appeared (See
bibliography) and should be considered a tool for studies carried out in the future. It is
divided into two parts:
Part A: A general description of Palestinian suicide terrorism during the
five years of the current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation
(September 2000 to December 2005). It deals with different aspects of suicide
bombing terrorism, such as: the terrorist organizations which carry out the
attacks, the roles of Syria and Iran, terrorist targets, the results of the attacks, the
suicide bombers’ motives and profiles of the suicide bombers and their victims.
Part B: A description of the suicide bombing attacks and data on the
victims of the past five years. This section examines the main characteristics of
the 146 suicide bombing attacks carried out so far and describes their victims.
The information was provided by the Israel Security Agency (ISA) with
additions from the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center
for Special Studies.1
1
Most of the information comes directly from the Website of the office of the Prime Minister
of Israel (http://www.pmo.gov.il). There are data presented by the ISA head, Yuval Diskin, at a
session of the Interior and Environment Committee of the Knesset (reported to the media by
the Committee on July 19, 2005). Information about the numbers and status of the victims
was taken from the Website of Israeli National Insurance (http://www.laad.btl.gov.il) and from the
Foreign Ministry. Additional data and the analytical introduction were provided by the
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) at the Center for Special Studies (CSS).
Several of the illustrations were taken from the Display of Captured Materials and Archives
of the ITIC.
5
20
112
184
119
15
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Part A: Five years of suicide
bombing terrorism
Overview
Between the beginning of the current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation (the
end of September 2005) and December 2005 the Palestinian terrorist organizations
carried out 25,7702 terrorist attacks. In those attacks 1,084 Israelis were killed. Of the
attacks, 147 were suicide bombing attacks (as of December 31, 2005) carried out
by 156 male and 8 female suicide bombers.3 Some 450 of other suicide bombing
attacks were foiled at various stages by the Israeli security forces and as a result of the
detentions of potential suicide bombers, their comrades and handlers. It should be
noted that this study does not include planned attacks that were not realized.
2. Since May 2005 395 more attacks were carried out, so that as of December 31, 2995, the total number of
attacks reached 25,770
3 In addition to the 142 suicide bombing attacks listed by the ISA were the one in Netanya (July),
Beersheba (August), Hadera (October) Netanya (December). and near the IDF roadblock in
Tulkarm (December)
A total of 450 suicide
bombing attacks
which were prevented

Part A: Five years of suicide
bombing terrorism
Overview
Between the beginning of the current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation (the
end of September 2005) and December 2005 the Palestinian terrorist organizations
carried out 25,7702 terrorist attacks. In those attacks 1,084 Israelis were killed. Of the
attacks, 147 were suicide bombing attacks (as of December 31, 2005) carried out
by 156 male and 8 female suicide bombers.3 Some 450 of other suicide bombing
attacks were foiled at various stages by the Israeli security forces and as a result of the
detentions of potential suicide bombers, their comrades and handlers. It should be
noted that this study does not include planned attacks that were not realized.
2. Since May 2005 395 more attacks were carried out, so that as of December 31, 2995, the total number of
attacks reached 25,770
3 In addition to the 142 suicide bombing attacks listed by the ISA were the one in Netanya (July),
Beersheba (August), Hadera (October) Netanya (December). and near the IDF roadblock in
Tulkarm (December)
A total of 450 suicide
bombing attacks
which were prevented
6
The objective of most of the 147 suicide bombing attacks was to
indiscriminately kill Israeli civilians. The attacks killed 527 Israelis and
wounded approximately 3,350.4 The numbers clearly illustrate the murderous
nature of suicide bombing attacks as compared with all other types of terrorist
attacks: although statistically suicide bombing attacks constituted only half of a
percent of all attacks, they were responsible for half of the number of Israelis
killed during the period in question.

Who is a suicide bomber? What is
suicide activity?
For the purposes of this document suicide activity is defined as an attack or
attempted attack during which the terrorist reaches his objective or its vicinity
carrying or wearing an explosive device which is he is supposed to detonate to blow
himself up (i.e., the suicide bomber is aware that he has no chance of remaining
alive,5 assuming the explosive device detonates as planned).6
From the point of view of those who support such attacks, most of whom base
their rationale on modern radical Islam, the act is not suicide as the term is generally
accepted, i.e., an act of desperation carried out for personal reasons (intihar), which is
forbidden by Islam. Quite the opposite, it is an act of martyrdom carried out by a
Muslim (male or female) for the sake of Allah (istishhad). Thus a suicide bomber is
referred to as istishhadi (and not shaheed), that is , one who has knowingly sacrificed
himself or herself for the sake of Allah.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that often there is no clear distinction between
istishhadi (suicide bomber) and shaheed (or shaheeda), which is a classic Islamic
4
In addition, there were those suffering from shock and those who were not seriously injured
and who were not included in the statistics.
5
This document does not deal with any attack in which the terrorist has a possibility of
remaining alive, even if he greatly endangers his (or her) life.
6
Since September 2000 there were instances in which for whatever reason, the explosive did
not detonate, and the suicide terrorists were apprehended and incarcerated.
7
term referring to one who has fallen for the sake of Allah, usually as an act of selfsacrifice
on the battlefield in a holy war against the infidel (jihad), usually against an
infidel enemy of superior military strength. According to the modern Islamist
interpretation, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, a shaheed is
anyone who dies during the confrontation. That includes anyone who is killed in a
planned action against Israel or was killed by Israel (i.e., in a targeted killing or by
sniper fire or in an exchange of fire, etc.) or even more prosaically during a “work
accident.”7
The term istishhadi is used by the Palestinian terrorist organizations and their
sponsors to give a special distinction to suicide bombers who have of their own
free will chosen to become shaheeds and knowingly gone out on a mission from
which they have no chance of returning alive. The suicide bombing act is called
‘amaliyyah istishhadiyyah (an act of self-sacrifice for the sake of Allah) and the
“battlefields” are areas populated by Israelis: crowded streets, shopping malls, buses,
restaurants, etc. It is a modern term which is not found in classic or medieval Islamic
literature, but which is very popular today in Palestinian society and the Arab world.
The istishhadi, the suicide bomber, enjoys great popularity and is surrounded by an
aura of respect stemming from his risk-taking, his bravery, and the absolute
knowledge that blew himself up and died in the attack. Thus istishhadi is necessarily
shaheed, but not every shaheed is necessarily istishhadi. Nevertheless, the
distinction is not always clearly made.
Such a perception, which according to supporters of suicide bombing attacks
provides Islamic religious legitimization, was expressed in an MA thesis presented
at Al-Najah University in Nablus in December 2001, one year into the current violent
Palestinian-Israeli confrontation. It dealt with the issue of acts of istishhad in
Palestinian society8 and, relying on both traditional Islamic sources and statements
7
Preparing or carrying an explosive device which detonates prematurely.
8
The MA candidate was a Palestinian student names Yasser Mahmoud ‘Ali Abu Bakar, a
Fatah activist who studied at Al-Najah. His thesis was entitled “The growth of the idea of
istishhad in Palestinian society.” For further information see our Special Bulletin, “The
suicide bombers and martyr culture at Al-Najah University in Nablus,” at
http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/11_04/najah.htm.made by modern Islamic religious leaders (among them Dr. Yussuf al-Qardawi),
defined istishhadi as “an individual who decided to carry out the act of istishhad
orally and physically [i.e., with premeditation].” Such an individual, according to the
thesis, was not committing an act of suicide motivated by personal distress
(intihar), which is forbidden by Islam, but quite the opposite. An istishhadi, he
wrote, sacrifices his life for [various] causes, the most important of which is to
satisfy Allah and attain paradise. The person who commits suicide [because of
personal distress] kills himself out of frustration and desperation, and for no reason.
The istishhadi, according to the conclusion of the MA thesis, is “one who leaves his
home, his studies, his work and his entire life and strides [knowingly] to his death [for the sake of Allah].”

Advantages gained by the suicide bomber
and his family
According to classic Muslim literature, many advantages and benefits are
promised to the shaheed, for example: he extricates himself from the Torments of the
Tomb, he is exempt from the terrors of Judgment Day, he is forgiven for all the sins
he committed during his lifetime, he is entitled to recommend that his relatives – up
to 70 of them – enter paradise (an important and exceptional privilege in Muslim
society) where the men will marry 72 black-eyed virgins (hurriyyat) and the women,
each a single shaheed,9 and he will live in the highest heaven with Allah, who will
take care of all his needs, in the presence of the prophet Muhammad and righteous
men.10
9
For that reason the posters and obituaries of many suicide bombers call the act a “marriage”
and the suicide bomber a “bridegroom,” and describe him as a bridegroom accompanied to
his wedding with songs and dances.
10
The main hadith (oral tradition) referring to the benefits accrued to the shaheed is the
following:
قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: (للشهيد عند الله ست خصال: يُغفر له في أول دفعة ويرى مقعده من الجنة
ويجار من عذاب القبر، ويأمن من الفزع الأآبر، ويوضع على رأسه تاج الوقار الياقوتة منه خير من الدنيا وما
فيها، ويزوج اثنتين وسبعين من الحور العين، ويشفع في سبعين من أقربائه).
The benefits the shaheed receives in the next world, most of them credited to the prophet Muhammad.

The bundle of benefits presented to the shaheed after his death is also promised
to the suicide bomber, the istishhadi. Verifying the issue with an expert on Muslim
law, we learned that as opposed to the popular myth, the suicide bomber does not
receive an exclusive “bundle” after this death that differentiates him from the
shaheed. For example, 72 black-eyed virgins are granted to both the shaheed who
was randomly killed during the confrontation in an exchange of gunfire with IDF
soldiers and the same is granted to the suicide bomber who chose to blow himself up
in a crowd of Israeli civilians.
Although according to Islamic law there is no difference between the shaheed
and the suicide bomber, Saddam Hussein’s representatives, who gave large sums of
money to the families of shaheeds during the confrontation, were careful to create an
artificial distinction (which has no authorization in Muslim religious law) between
the two as a means of increasing motivation to carry out suicide bombing attacks.
A document was found among correspondence between activists for the Arab
Liberation Front (Saddam Hussein’s representatives in the PA-administered
territories) which dealt with the question of who a suicide bomber was (See below).11
Their interest in the subject was not theoretical, because the distinction made between
a “regular” shaheed and one killed in a suicide bombing attack had practical
importance. Depending on the category, the Iraqi régime sent (sometimes through
the “charitable societies” which support the families of shaheeds) larger sums
For further information see the following Internet sites:
1) http://islamonline.net/Arabic/Eid_AlAdha/1425/Sacrifice/Articles/04.shtml for the
article by Dr. Rajab Abu Malih Muhammad of Cairo University, who is responsible
for the religious verses appearing on the site;

2) http://alsaha.fares.net/sahat?128 [at] 2.pfF7ha8AP6P.0@.1dd4d09f;
3) http://www.kalemat.org/sections.php?so=va&aid=239;
4) http://www.imanway.com/vb/printthread.php?t=2888.
11
For further information see our Special Bulletin “Iraqi Support for and Encouragement of
Palestinian Terrorism ,” at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/iraq/iraq_f_a.htm.
10
(initially $15,000 and later $25,000) to the families of suicide bombers (with a special
certificate) than to those of “ordinary” shaheeds ($10,000).
A concrete example of the interest in the issue of who a suicide bomber is could be found at the beginning of May 2002, when the Arab Liberation Front’s
representative in Jenin claimed that the two terrorists who had carried out a
shooting attack in Afula on November 27, 2001 (two Israeli civilians killed and
48 wounded) were not considered suicide bombers. In fact, it was stated, they fired
machine guns (which gave them a chance of escaping) and did not use explosives to
knowingly sacrifice themselves for the sake of Allah (which would not give them a
chance of remaining alive). Rakad Salem (Abu Mahmoud), secretary of the Arab
Liberation Front and of the Ba’ath party in the PA-administered territories (in charge
of distributing funds for Saddam Hussein), was asked to decide the issue

Advantages gained by the suicide bomber
and his family
According to classic Muslim literature, many advantages and benefits are
promised to the shaheed, for example: he extricates himself from the Torments of the
Tomb, he is exempt from the terrors of Judgment Day, he is forgiven for all the sins
he committed during his lifetime, he is entitled to recommend that his relatives – up
to 70 of them – enter paradise (an important and exceptional privilege in Muslim
society) where the men will marry 72 black-eyed virgins (hurriyyat) and the women,
each a single shaheed,9 and he will live in the highest heaven with Allah, who will
take care of all his needs, in the presence of the prophet Muhammad and righteous
men.10
9
For that reason the posters and obituaries of many suicide bombers call the act a “marriage”
and the suicide bomber a “bridegroom,” and describe him as a bridegroom accompanied to
his wedding with songs and dances.
10
The main hadith (oral tradition) referring to the benefits accrued to the shaheed is the
following:
قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: (للشهيد عند الله ست خصال: يُغفر له في أول دفعة ويرى مقعده من الجنة
ويجار من عذاب القبر، ويأمن من الفزع الأآبر، ويوضع على رأسه تاج الوقار الياقوتة منه خير من الدنيا وما
فيها، ويزوج اثنتين وسبعين من الحور العين، ويشفع في سبعين من أقربائه).
The benefits the shaheed receives in the next world, most of them credited to the prophet Muhammad.

The bundle of benefits presented to the shaheed after his death is also promised
to the suicide bomber, the istishhadi. Verifying the issue with an expert on Muslim
law, we learned that as opposed to the popular myth, the suicide bomber does not
receive an exclusive “bundle” after this death that differentiates him from the
shaheed. For example, 72 black-eyed virgins are granted to both the shaheed who
was randomly killed during the confrontation in an exchange of gunfire with IDF
soldiers and the same is granted to the suicide bomber who chose to blow himself up
in a crowd of Israeli civilians.
Although according to Islamic law there is no difference between the shaheed
and the suicide bomber, Saddam Hussein’s representatives, who gave large sums of
money to the families of shaheeds during the confrontation, were careful to create an
artificial distinction (which has no authorization in Muslim religious law) between
the two as a means of increasing motivation to carry out suicide bombing attacks.
A document was found among correspondence between activists for the Arab
Liberation Front (Saddam Hussein’s representatives in the PA-administered
territories) which dealt with the question of who a suicide bomber was (See below).11
Their interest in the subject was not theoretical, because the distinction made between
a “regular” shaheed and one killed in a suicide bombing attack had practical
importance. Depending on the category, the Iraqi régime sent (sometimes through
the “charitable societies” which support the families of shaheeds) larger sums
For further information see the following Internet sites:
1) http://islamonline.net/Arabic/Eid_AlAdha/1425/Sacrifice/Articles/04.shtml for the
article by Dr. Rajab Abu Malih Muhammad of Cairo University, who is responsible
for the religious verses appearing on the site;

2) http://alsaha.fares.net/sahat?128 [at] 2.pfF7ha8AP6P.0@.1dd4d09f;
3) http://www.kalemat.org/sections.php?so=va&aid=239;
4) http://www.imanway.com/vb/printthread.php?t=2888.
11
For further information see our Special Bulletin “Iraqi Support for and Encouragement of
Palestinian Terrorism ,” at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/iraq/iraq_f_a.htm.
10
(initially $15,000 and later $25,000) to the families of suicide bombers (with a special
certificate) than to those of “ordinary” shaheeds ($10,000).
A concrete example of the interest in the issue of who a suicide bomber is could be found at the beginning of May 2002, when the Arab Liberation Front’s
representative in Jenin claimed that the two terrorists who had carried out a
shooting attack in Afula on November 27, 2001 (two Israeli civilians killed and
48 wounded) were not considered suicide bombers. In fact, it was stated, they fired
machine guns (which gave them a chance of escaping) and did not use explosives to
knowingly sacrifice themselves for the sake of Allah (which would not give them a
chance of remaining alive). Rakad Salem (Abu Mahmoud), secretary of the Arab
Liberation Front and of the Ba’ath party in the PA-administered territories (in charge
of distributing funds for Saddam Hussein), was asked to decide the issue

A captured document dealing with the
distinction between ordinary shaheeds
and suicide bombers
To the dear comrade Abu Mahmoud [secretary of the
Arab Liberation Front and the Ba’ath party in the PAadministered
territories]
Greetings and salutations
Enclosed please find the letter I received from Jenin.
Please read and make the decision.
With respect and estimation
Abu Layla
To the respected comrade, may peace be upon you,
As part of the grants Iraq gives to the families of martyrs,
it was decided to pay the sum of 25 thousand dollars to
those families [i.e., the families of suicide bombers]. In
practice the distribution of the grant is carried out by
those entrusted to do so in the Jenin district, but a
problem has arisen concerning the family of martyr ‘Abd
al-Karim Abu Na’asah. The family has a connection to
the [Arab Liberation] Front.
On November 27, 2001, ‘Abd al-Karim Abu Na’asah and
Mustafa Abu al-Sariah used machine guns to carry out a
suicide attack in the central bus station in Afula. Both
were killed in the action, and all the details indicate that it
was clearly a suicide action. [However,] the
representative of the Arab Liberation Front in Jenin
claims that it cannot be considered a suicide action
because they did not use explosive belts.
On the other hand, the families of the martyrs have
rejected the claim and are determined that it was a
suicide action (‘amaliyyah istishhadiyyah), with regard to
both categorizing it as a suicide action and the finacial
rights [they are entitled to according to that category].
We ask that you raise the issue before the Arab
[Liberation Front] brothers where you are, especially
since their representatives here with us asked that they
be presented with the issue at a broad forum to [receive]
a decision [about the matter in question]. Please deal
with this, and inform us of the [decision] reached [about
the matter].
Blessings,
Jenin, May 9 [possibly August 9], 2002

Suicide bombing attacks according to
the terrorist organizations which
carried them out
Hamas has carried out the largest number of suicide bombing attacks of all the
Palestinian terrorist organizations: 58 attacks, or about 40% of the total. The PIJ has
carried out 39, or about 27% of the total. The various Fatah factions have carried out
33, or about 23% of the total. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) has carried out 8 attacks. Eight attacks were joint operations between two or
more terrorist organizations, including between Islamic and secular organizations.
Only one suicide bomber attempted to carry out a suicide bombing attack on his
own initiative.
However, during the past year (under Abu Mazen and during the lull) there has
been a marked increase in the activity of the PIJ, which as become the
organization most active in carrying out suicide bombing attacks. During
2005 it was responsible for five deadly suicide bombing attacks as opposed to
two by Hamas (one in January, before the lull).

Yearly statistics for suicide bombing
attacks
Suicide bombing activity according to
organization
An analysis of the graph shows that 67% of the suicide bombing attacks were
carried out by Hamas and the PIJ, that is, the two Islamist Palestinian terrorist
organizations in competition with the PA and sponsored by Iran and Syria.
A total of 147 suicide
bombing attacks
14
Particularly conspicuous is the PIJ, which despite its relatively small size carried out
a large number of murderous suicide bombing attacks in Israeli cities, most of them
through its terrorist-operative infrastructure in Samaria. It is also the organization
which carried out the largest number of suicide bombing attacks during the lull.
An examination of suicide bombing attacks in Jerusalem shows a slightly
different distribution from the rest of the country. In Jerusalem the various Fatah
factions (Tanzim and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades) and Hamas carried out the largest
number of suicide bombing attacks. Each of the two organizations carried out 13
suicide bombing attacks (33.8%). The PIJ was responsible for three suicide bombing attacks and one was the result of personal initiative.12

Syria and Iran sponsor suicide bombing
terrorism
Syria and Iran are the most important patrons of the terrorist organizations
carrying out suicide bombing attacks. They support them in a variety of ways: Syria
allows Hamas and the PIJ to act from its territory. The headquarters of these two
organizations are established in Damascus and they use Syria as a base from which to
orchestrate their terrorist activities, including suicide bombing attacks, and transmit
know-how and weapons to the PA-administered territories. Syria and Lebanon also
allow the organizations’ terrorist-operatives to train in their territory. Iran allocates
funds to encourage terrorism which it then either transmits to the terrorist
organizations directly, or through the Iranian Revolutionary Guards13 or through
Hezbollah.
12
For further information see our Special Bulletin “Jerusalem as a preferred target for
Palestinian terrorism during the five years of violent confrontation ,” at
http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/ct_iss_be.htm.
13
For example, the double suicide bombing attack carried out near the central bus station in
Tel Aviv on January 5, 2003, was carried out by a Fatah cell from Nablus and funded by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

Syria and Iran have provided military aid and political support for Hezbollah,
which has played a central role in encouraging Palestinian terrorism (including
suicide bombing terrorism), throughout the current violent Palestinian-Israeli
confrontation. Since Israel withdrew from Lebanon (May 2000), and more so since
2003, Hezbollah has handled Palestinian terrorist infrastructures in the PAadministered
territories, especially Fatah/Tanzim/Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades.
Hezbollah orchestration and support include instructions for carrying out attacks of
mass destruction inside Israel, mediation between operatives in various centers,
transmission of large sums of money and the upgrade of the terrorist infrastructures’
weapons and terrorism capabilities.
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah as a source of inspiration for
Fatah/Tanzim operatives in Ramallah. Supporting the Fatah
infrastructure and exploiting the money it transfers to them as
leverage, Hezbollah goads them into carrying out mass-killing
suicide bombing attacks.
Among the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the PIJ’s dependence on Syria and
Iran is especially evident. Syria allows the organization’s leadership, headed by Dr.
Ramadan Shalah, to operate from its territory and from its headquarters in Damascus
to orchestrate terrorist activities in the PA-administered territories. Iran, the
organization’s principal patron, provides generous financial support and in fact funds
most of its budget. Through their massive support of the organization, Syria and Iran
have fostered the organization’s dependence on them and have thus acquired the
capability to escalate (or, should they so choose, to deflate) the terrorism in the PAadministered
territories without being directly involved (it should be recalled in this
context that the PIJ is the organization which, directed by Syria, has carried out most
of the suicide bombing attacks during the lull.)


Orchestrating terrorism from
Damascus
Hamas Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Khaled Mashal,
head of Hamas’s political bureau
A document captured during Operation Defensive Shield
(April 2002): a Palestinian intelligence report dated
October 31, 2001, regarding Iran’s intentions to use
Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations to
escalate the – original document and translation
Ramadan Shalah,
PIJ leader
17
Translation
The Palestinian National Authority
Preventive Security Headquarters
General Staff
Date: October 31, 2001
Reference: 2001.10.1200
To: Brother President, Abu ‘Amar [Yasser Arafat], may Allah preserve him
Blessings of the homeland
In re: The opposition parties are working energetically to increase joint action
According to information in our hands, intensive meetings are being held in
Damascus attended by the leaders of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the
Popular Front [for the Liberation of Palestine] and Hezbollah to increase joint action
“inside” [i.e., the PA-administered territories] with financial aid from Iran. That
was after a message was sent from Iran to the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic
Jihad leadership stating that no calm was to be permitted [in the situation]
during the present time. Hezbollah will increase its financial aid to escalate
[violence] in the near future. What is now required [from the opposition parties] is to
carry out suicide bombing attacks against Israeli targets in the Gaza Strip, the West
Bank and inside Israel.
Blessings of the revolution
Your brother
Jibril Rajoub
[Comments hand-written by Arafat:]
[At the head of the page:] Personal
Copies to: al-Majiada, al-Haj Ismail, Amin, al-Dahlan

Suicide bombing targets: civilians in the
crosshairs14
Most of the suicide bombing attacks were directed by the terrorist
organizations against civilian targets, especially within the green line,15 to cause
as much indiscriminate wholesale murder of civilians as possible. Of the 147
suicide bombing attacks carried out since September 2000, 107 (73%) targeted
civilians. Only 40 attacks (27%) targeted the military or security forces.
The most common military-security targets were IDF posts, patrols and
roadblocks manned by soldiers, the police and the Border Guard. Most of the suicide
bombing attacks against those targets were crowned with failure. Only eight of
the 40 attacks caused the deaths of security personnel: 12 dead,16 or 2.29% of the 525
killed in suicide bombing attacks.
Although the suicide bombing attacks against military/security targets led to
relatively few deaths, the opposite is true of attacks targeting civilians. Such
attacks led to the indiscriminate slaughter of Israeli civilians, men, women, the
aged, children and infants. Of the 107 suicide bombing attacks targeting civilians, 69
(64%) had a lethal outcome. In those attacks 512 individuals were killed.
The civilian targets most often and most forcefully hit, and those with the greatest
number of casualties, were:
Local and inter-urban buses and bus stops: among the hardest hit were
three local buses in Jerusalem (23, 19 and 17 civilians killed), an inter-urban bus
14
The Palestinian terrorist organizations which carry out the suicide bombing attacks claim
that targeting civilians is legitimate because all Israeli citizens have served or will serve in the
Isreali army, thus there is no difference between civilian and soldier.
15
The pre-1967 Israeli border.
16 To the number of security personnel who were killed in suicide bombing attacks should
be added those who happened to be in the vicinity of attacks on civilian targets, such as
buses, restaurants, crowded streets, etc. where they were not the primary targets.
19
at the Megiddo crossroads (17 killed) and two local buses in Haifa (15 civilians
killed in each explosion).
Places of entertainment, such as restaurants, cafés, clubs and shopping
malls: among the most devastating were the attack at the Park Hotel in Netanya
on the eve of the Passover Seder in 2002 (29 killed, the worst attack during the
current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation17), the attack at the
Dolphinarium club in Tel Aviv (22 killed, the overwhelming majority of whom
were teenagers), the attack at the Maxim restaurant in Haifa (21 killed), the
attack at the billiard club in Rishon Letzion (16 killed), the attack at the Matza
restaurant in Haifa (15 killed) and the attack at the Sbarro restaurant in
Jerusalem (15 killed).
Places where people congregate, especially in Israel’s big cities: markets,
malls, main streets. Two of the worst suicide bombing attacks were at the old
central bus station in Tel Aviv (23 killed) and at the Ben Yehuda pedestrian
mall in Jerusalem (11 killed).
17
The attack served as the catalyst for Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002).

Suicide bombing attacks inside Israel
vs. attacks against Jewish settlements in
Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip
The main targets for suicide bombing attacks were Israeli cities within the
green line: 100 suicide bombing attacks, 68% of all terrorist attacks (and the most
lethal of them). Forty-seven attacks, about 32%, were carried out in the Gaza Strip
(26) and the Judea and Samaria (21).
The distribution of suicide bombing attacks according to area is as follows:
Greater Jerusalem, the suicide bombing attack focus, 30 attacks.
The Sharon area (Netanya, Hadera, Kfar Saba), 19 attacks. This district has
become the focus for attacks during the lull (three out of five carried out here).
Greater Tel Aviv, 17 attacks.
The area around Wadi Ara (which connects the coast north of Hadera with
the interior), 10 attacks.
Afula, Beit Shean and the Jordan Valley, 10 attacks.
The Haifa area, 9 attacks.
The Galilee (1) and the south (4)attacks (two regions conspicuous for
theirack of suicide bombing attacks).
The above data show that suicide bombing terrorism (and terrorism in general)
focused on Jerusalem more than any other Israeli city. That is, in our assessment,
due to its status as the capital city of the State of Israel and a well-known symbolic
city for the whole world, and also because it is a mixed city, with Jewish and Arab
populations living in close proximity. Jerusalem also lies close to many Palestinian
21
Haifa and the
surrounding area, 9
Galilee, 1
Wadi Ara area, 10
South of Israel, 4
Afula, Beit Shean and
the Jordan Valley, 10
Sharon area, 19
Judea and Samaria, 21
Gaza Strip, 26
Greater Jerusalem, 30
Greater Tel Aviv, 17
cities and villages (such as Bethlehem and Ramallah), whose residents enjoy good
accessibility to the city, which makes it easy for the terrorist organizations to infiltrate
suicide bombers.18 However, as noted, the Sharon area, to which the PIJ has
channeled most of its efforts, has become the focus of suicide bombing attacks
during the lull.
Distribution of suicide bombing attacks
according to area
18
For further information on terrorist attacks in Jerusalem (particularly suicide bombing
attacks), see our Special Bulletin “Jerusalem as a preferred target for Palestinian terrorism
during the five years of violent confrontation ,” at
http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/ct_iss_be.htm.

Profile of suicide bombing attack
victims
Lacking a reliable, comprehensive database suicide bombing attack victims (a
subject worthy of study in its own right) we cannot provide definitive profiles of
those who were killed in the attacks. Nevertheless, certain traits can be gleaned from
the partial data we have, which is mostly based on the information found on the
Internet site of Israel’s National Insurance Institution (See below). Following is some
of the information about those killed:
Civilians vs. the military: The majority of the victims were Israeli civilians
(425 of the total 525), with 27 foreign nationals (most of them foreign workers).
Seventy three belonged to the security forces, most of them who happened to
be in the area of the attack at the time. Only 12 members of the security forces
were killed in attacks deliberately carried out against military-security targets
and the rest (61) were killed during suicide bombing attacks targeting sites
which were clearly civilian.
A total number
of those killed in
suicide bombing
attacks is 525
23
Civilians
Military-security personnel
foreign citizens
425
73
27
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Women 228
43.7% Men 297
56.3%
Men vs. women: Of the total number of victims, 297 (56.5%) were men and
228 (43.7%) were women. The difference is small and in our assessment has no
statistical significance.
A large number of infants, children, teenagers and the elderly: Among
the victims were a large number of those belonging to the weaker sectors of
the population. Twenty-eghit percent of the victims were younger than three
years old, children under the age of 13, teenagers aged 14-18 and individuals
older than 66. Fifty percent were between 19 and 45 and 22% between 46 and
65.
24
22%
11%
2% 3%
12%
50%
0-3 years
4-13 years
14-18 years
19-45 years
46-65 years
65+ years
Weaker sectors of the population
We have no data about the national and ethnic background of the victims,
their education or socio-economic status.

Profile of the suicide bombersa
general description
No exact profile can be drawn of a typical suicide bomber operating during the
current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation because their nature has changed
during the five years of attacks. The following are the main features of the suicide
bombers and illustrate the changes that have occurred in the overall profile.
Age: The overwhelming majority, about 75%, of the suicide bombers are
between the ages of 17 and 24. However, during 2004 the average aged
decreased and there was an increase in the number of underage suicide
bombers (younger than 17).19 At the same time, suicide bombers over the age
of 35 have almost disappeared, although there were few to begin with.
19
Suicide bombers who because they were younger were also less well-educated and
therefore easier to manipulate and their operational level was lower.
25
Family status: Most of the suicide bombers were single, one reason for
which is their young age.20 Nevertheless, a small number were married, from
which it can be understood that marriage did not prevent them from becoming
suicide bombers.
Origin: During the first three years of the confrontation (2000-2003) most of
the suicide bombers (64%) resided in Samaria (the Nablus-Jenin district). That
was because the terrorist-operative infrastructures of the Palestinian terrorist
organizations in Samaria were the most prominent in planning and carrying out
suicide bombing attacks (not by chance was Jenin called “the suicide bomber
capital”). Seventeen percent came from Judea. During 2004 the number of
suicide bombers from the Gaza Strip increased (44% as opposed to 16% in
previous years); they targeted civilian and military installations in the Gaza
Strip itself or the crossing points from the Gaza Strip into Israel. At the same
time there was a substantial decrease in the number of suicide bombers
from the West Bank.21 In 2005, during the lull, the number of suicide
bombers from Samaria increased because of the leading role played by the
PIJ infrastructures there (particularly in Jenin and Tulkarm) in planning
suicide bombing attacks in Israel.
Education: Most of the suicide bombers were educated. From 2000-2003
22% of the suicide bombers were graduates of PA-administered territories
universities, whose campuses serve as recruiting centers;22 34% were high
20
In their video-taped wills the suicide bombers claimed they avoided marriage in this world
because they preferred to reach paradise and have 72 black-eyed virgins.
21
That was caused by the damage done to the terrorist infrastructure in Samaria as a result of
Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002) and the difficulties faced by the suicide bombers
caused by the completion of the buffer zone and the security fence. The PIJ’s infrastructures
in Samaria overcame the obstacles and renewed their activities in 2005.
22
During the current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation the univerisities in the PAadministered
territories have been conspicuous as centers for disseminating hate propaganda,
inciting to violence and terrorism and glorifying suicide bombers. The student organizations
of the various Palestinian terrorist organizations have been active in recruiting students to the
terrorist organizations and to terrorist activities including suicide bombing attacks. Even after
26
school graduates and only 9% had only a basic education. The education of the
rest is unknown, although it is reasonable to assume they had elementary and
high school education but were not university graduates. During 2004 there
was a decrease in the number of suicide bombers who were university-(8%)
and high school-educated (8%)
The universities in the PA-administered
territories are recruiting centers for suicide
bombers
The front cover of a hate-propaganda kit distributed by Jumaa al-Islamiyyah,
the PIJ student organization at Al-Najah University. On the lower right is a
veiled suicide bomber wearing an explosive belt and a headband bearing the
inscription “The Jerusalem Battalions” (the PIJ’s terrorist-operative wing).
Above him is the Al-Najah University campus. To his left is a dedicatory
inscription for the kit which says, among other things, “To those who
understand, understand well that right is taken by main force and not given as
a gift
the death of Arafat the situation has remained substantially the same. For further information
see our Special Bulletin “In the era of Abu Mazen, universities in the Palestinian Authority
administered territories continue to serve as centers of incitement,” at
http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/4_05/univ.htm.

Suicide bomber motivation
During the current confrontation, suicide bombing terrorism, which began in the
1990s, has become the Palestinian terrorist organizations’ main “strategic
weapon.” There are many reasons that is so, including its lethal ability to wreak
terrible devastation, its great public and media impact (in Israel, in the PAadministered
territories, in the Arab-Muslim world and abroad),24 its ability to disrupt
(sometimes even significantly) daily life in Israel and the relative ease with which it
can be funded and carried out.25 In addition, the terrorist organizations, which
consider themselves the weaker side of the confrontation, represent the use of
suicide bombing terrorism as the best response to Israel’s military superiority.
The reason the lone suicide bomber is willing to sacrifice his life in the service
of the terrorist organizations originates in a variety of motives: religious Islamic
motives such as istishhad (the death of a martyr for the sake of Allah) and the
promised rewards in paradise;26 nationalist motives such as the “liberation” of
“Palestine” from the Israeli occupier;27 personal, organizational and social motives
such as revenge on the Israeli enemy for the deaths of Palestinians, the desire to rid
oneself of suspicion of collaboration with Israel or of other suspicions and the need of
female suicide bombers to atone for what is perceived in Palestinian society as
24
After every suicide bombing attack, the popular Arab TV station Al-Jazeera and other
Arab channels customarily interview the heads of the terrorist organizations and provide them
and their terrorist actions with a pan-Arabic media forum to disseminate their propaganda.
Hezbollah’s TV station Al-Manar openly encourages suicide bombing attacks. The Arab
(and foreign) media customarily issue the suicide bombers’ videotaped wills and biographies,
helping to give them mythic proportions and turn them into role models.
25
During the early years of the confrontation there was no lack of volunteers for suicide
bombing attacks, with the result that suicide bombers were available and easily located by all
the Palestinian terrorist organizations. There is also no lack of money to fund suicide
bombing attacks.
26
Many suicide bombers were fanatical Muslims or born-again Muslims who became
fanatical. Some of them were indoctrinated by the mosques and extremist clerics (Palestinian
and others) who not only legitimized suicide bombing attacks, but encouraged them. Insofar
as we have been able to discover, not a single suicide bombing attack was carried out by a
Christian Palestinian.
27
The secular terrorist organizations, such as Fatah, have also used religious Islamic
terminology on their posters and in the obituaries of suicide bombers. That reflects, in our
assessment, the Islamization of the current violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation.
31
“sullying the family honor.” Sometimes more than one motive is at play when a
potential suicide bomber takes it upon himself (or herself) to carry out an attack.
A poster of Hamas shaheeds killed during
December 2003 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The upper inscription is one of the Qur’an verses
often used by the supporters of suicide bombing
attacks to justify them. Under the Hamas insignia
the inscription reads “The Palestinian resistance
movement [Hamas] sacrifices for the sake of
Allah, may he be praised and exalted, a select
group of the best members of the Brigades of the
shaheed Izzedine al-Qassam, in the expectation
that they will receive their reward from Allah in
the next world. Their pure souls rose
heavenward at the hour they fought against the
occupying enemy [and thereby sacrificed their
lives]. Thus this is a jihad which leads to victory
or death as a martyr for the sake of Allah
[istishhad].

The suicide bombing ethos: turning the
suicide bombers into myths and role
models
Until the outbreak of the current confrontation, suicide bombing attacks were a
controversial topic28 used mostly by the Islamic terrorist organizations. However,
during the current confrontation they moved towards the main stream of
Palestinian consensus. The suicide bombing ethos was glorified by the cult of the
shaheeds (both male and female), especially those who died in mass murder suicide
bombing attacks.
28
The main reason for the controversy was the religious Islamic ban on intihar, suicide
for personal reasons. Until the current confrontation, such attacks were carried out
primarily by the Palestinians (Hamas, the PIJ) or local and international terrorist
organizations (Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, Chechens). They were also carried out by secular
terrorist organizations (the Kurdish PKK in Turkey, the Tamils in Sri Lanka). The
suicide bombing attacks of Iranian-backed Hezbollah, inspired by Shiite martyrology
from the dawn of Islam, greatly influenced the Palestinian terrorist organizations,
which they viewed as having allowed Hezbollah to use terrorist and guerrilla actions
instead of political terrorism to make Israel withdraw from Lebanon.
32
The cult of the shaheeds, which has become widespread in Palestinian
society, culture and media, is expressed and perpetuated in many ways: streets and
institutions are named after them; posters dedicated to their memory are hung and
distributed in schools and universities; indoctrination is rife in summer camps and
sports events; special days are set aside for their memory, including a “Shaheed
Week”; songs, books, concerts and plays glorify their actions; they figure
prominently in all forms of Palestinian media, written, spoken and electronic.
The cult of the shaheeds glorifies and perpetuates the actions of the suicide
bombers (istishhadiyyin) and turns them into admired figures and role models in
Palestinian society. The cult has also raised the social status of the suicide
bombers and their families. All of the above have increased the motivation of
potential suicide bombers.29
During the current confrontation the cult of the shaheeds has also spread to the
Arab-Muslim world, including to Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Lebanon.
Books, songs, TV and regular movies, newspaper articles, TV commentaries and
religious edicts (fatwas) all praise the suicide bombers’ actions and encourage the
Palestinians to continue suicide bombing attacks against Israel. (When, however,
suicide bombing attacks are carried out against their own régimes (i.e., the
condemnation of the suicide bombing attacks at the hotels in Jordan, November
2005, they are roundly condemned as terrorist activities.) The international furor
caused by the suicide bombing attacks of Al-Qaeda and those affiliated with it also
influenced the Palestinian terrorist organizations,30 although their suicide bombing
attacks anteceded Al-Qaeda’s.
29
After the death of Arafat and now, under Abu Mazen, the public legitimacy of carrying
out suicide bombing attacks in Israeli territory has decreased. The reasons for that are:
Palestinian society is tired and hopes for an improvement in daily life, and Abu Mazen has
publicly challenged the usefulness of suicide bombing attacks and decreased in the official
PA media the extent of incitement to carrying out terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, Fatah,
Hamas and the PIJ have continued their efforts to carry them out. Most were foiled by the
Israeli security forces, with the exception of five which were carried out during the lull.
30
Among the documents captured by the IDF during its action in the PA-administered
territories were posters, pictures and other documents expressing identification with Al-
Qaeda and the global jihad.
The suicide bomber as a role model: Young men, apparently students, in front
of a poster of Mahmoud Ahmad Marmash, the Hamas suicide bomber who
carried out the attack at the Sharon shopping mall in Netanya on May 18, 2001,
killing five and wounding more than 100. Behind them are other posters
commemorating Hamas shaheeds and slogans calling for more attacks. The
photo was apparently taken at an educational institution and was one of
documents found during Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002) (Photo from
the collection of captured Palestinian materials at the Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center)

Indoctrinating the younger generation
with istishhad
A page from the geography notebook of a
10th grade student in Rafah, with a picture
of a hand grenade and thoughts about
death: “How [can] we die in spite of
ourselves?...[Certainly] we are capable of
dying as martyrs for the sake of Allah [i.e.,
in a suicide bombing attack, istishhad];”
“The unity of those who die as martyrs for
the sake of Allah…"(in a suicide bombing
attack, al-istishhadin). (Photo from Special
Information Bulletin “Albums and school
notebooks imbued with messages of
admiration for Palestinian martyrs,” which
can be found at
http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/si_86
_4/index.htm)

Fostering the suicide bomber myth at
the Arab Information Center in Egypt31
31
A great deal of hate propaganda reaches the PA-administered territories and Israeli Arabs
from Egypt. The Arab Information Center is an independent publishing house operating in
Egypt and run by Palestinian Islamists with the involvement of members of the Egyptian
opposition. It openly conducts an pro-Palestinian anti-Israeli propaganda campaign. It issues
publications of an anti-Semitic nature preaching hatred of Israel and encouraging terrorism.
Such publications are directed against the State of Israel, the Jewish people and the Zionist
movement. The Center exports them to the Arab-Muslim world and Muslim communities in
the West, and they also reach the PA-administered territories and Israeli Arabs.
A book called The Suicide Bombs: the
Balance of Deterrence and the First
Signs of Victory. It is one of a series
called Jerusalem Books and was written
by Dr. Wajdi ‘Abd al-Fatah Sawahil, a
specialist in genetic engineering, and
issued by the Arab Information Center in
2003. It calls for a continuation of the
suicide bombing attacks which he sees
as a trump card, the only one left to
Palestinian in the violent confrontation
with Israel.
A postcard with pictures of Hamas shaheeds, some of
them well-known terrorist-operatives whose reputations
have reached mythic proportions. It shows those,
among others, those who died in suicide bombing
attacks, some of the particularly deadly: ‘Abd al-Basit
Odeh, who carried out the suicide bombing attack at the
Park Hotel in Netanya on the eve of the Passover Seder
in 2002; Shadi al-Tubasi, who blew himself up at the
Matza restaurant in Haifa; and Dhiya’Muhammad, who
blew himself up at a bus station in the French Hill in
Jerusalem.

The role of financial incentives in
suicide bombing attacks
The financial rewards given to the families of suicide bombers has played a
considerable role in increasing suicide bomber motivation and can be added to the
factors listed above. During the confrontation, immense sums of money have been
transferred to the terrorist organizations in the PA-administered territories and to
their civilian infrastructures (da’wah) through a variety of channels: the terrorist
headquarters “outside” (chiefly those operating in Syria) are conduits for money
from Iran and other sources; funds are transferred from Hezbollah in Lebanon
directly to the terrorist infrastructures in the PA-administered territories; Arab
financial support for the so-called intifada comes primarily from Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf States; large amounts of the contributions from funds, foundations and
charitable societies abroad are channeled into the Hamas civilian infrastructure.
Some of the funds have also found their way into the bank accounts of terroristoperatives,
mostly suicide bomber handlers and dispatchers, and of the families of
suicide bombers after their deaths. Suicide bombers who agreed to sacrifice their lives
knew that the terrorist organization that sent them out would take care of their
families financially. Their families did in fact receive significant financial support,
generally sums much higher than those received by the families of “ordinary”
shaheeds,32 to say nothing of the prestige of being related to a suicide bomber. The
money served as an incentive for others to join the ranks of the suicide bombers.33
32
For example, Saddam Hussein’s régime customarily transferred higher sums of money to
the families of suicide bombers than to those of “ordinary” shaheeds. To encourage suicide
bombing attacks, it provided $25,000 to families of suicide bombers and $10,000 to the
families of “ordinary” shaheeds.
33
For further information see our Special Bulletin "Spotllight on Al-Tadhamun Charitable
Society," at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/3_05/charity_2g.htm.

The wages of murder – increased payment to the families of suicide bombers as an
incentive to carry out suicide bombing attacks: A check for $25,000 presented by
representatives of Saddam Hussein in the PA-administered territories to the family of
Fuad Ismail Ahmad al-Hourani, a Hamas suicide bomber who blew himself up in the
Moment Café in Jerusalem on March 9, 2002.
The participation of women in suicide

The participation of women in suicide
bombing attacks
Despite the traditional structure of Palestinian Arab society, and despite the
standards of morality imposed on its women, during the current confrontation many
women have participated in acts of terrorism, including suicide bombing attacks.
According to the data provided by the ISA, since January 2002 women have been
involved in 83 acts of terrorism, 67 of them involved in suicide bombing attacks.
However, as compared to the men, women have played an extremely small part in
the overall number of suicide bombing attacks.
Of all the suicide bombers, 155 were men and boys and only eight were women.
However, most of their attacks were deadly and resulted in the 38 deaths and the
wounding of 390 (only one attack did not result in deaths). Dozens more women
expressed their willingness to carry out suicide bombing attacks but their attempts
were foiled by the Israeli security forces. Fatah has had the greatest number of
women suicide bombers (five of the eight), two others belonged to the PIJ and only
one to Hamas, which has the greatest number of male suicide bombers.
38
The main reason for the relatively small number of women suicide bombers is, in
our assessment, rooted in Hamas’s religious Islamic restraints (stronger than
those of the PIJ) regarding the use of female suicide bombers. The women’s
willingness to carry out suicide bombing attacks stems, to a great extent, from
personal problems and not specifically religious Islamic or Palestinian nationalist
motivation. An analysis of the female suicide bombers profile shows that most of
them were on the fringes of Palestinian society because somehow they had disobeyed
one of the unwritten laws governing the behavior of women in conservative
Palestinian society.34
The exploitation of the weaker sectors
of Palestinian society
Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002), which led to the destruction of terrorist
infrastructures in the West Bank and to closer control of the area by Israeli security
forces, and the completion of sections of the security fence and the buffer zone
have made it increasingly difficult for suicide bombers to enter Israel from the West
Bank.
For that reason the Palestinian terrorist organizations have stepped up their
exploitation of the weaker sectors of society which, they feel, receive less attention
from the Israeli security forces. Those include minors, women, the ill or men and
women whose social image is negative. The Palestinian terrorist organizations try to
exploit their innocent appearances and their personal difficulties to fool the Israeli
security forces during examinations at crossing points.
34
For further information see our Special Bulletin "The involvement of women in suicide
bombing attacks," at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/6_04/women.htm.

Part B: A description of the suicide
bombing attacks and data on the
victims of the past five years
The worst of the suicide bombing attacks:
the attack at the Passover Seder at the
Park Hotel in Netanya
Planning: Abbas al-Sa’id,
Hamas leader in Tulkarm
(serving a life term in Israel)
Responsibility: Hamas,
behind most of the suicide
bombing attacks during the
confrontation
Perpetrator: ‘Abd al-Basit
Odeh (Picture from his living
will)
Commemoration: A poster for the
suicide bomber
Weapon: Shrapnel
added to the explosive
to cause the worst
possible damage
Result: The Park dining room
after 29 dead and 155 wounded
had been removed
40
Overview
This section examines the 147 suicide bombing attacks carried out between
September 2000 and December 31, 2005. Each one was analyzed according to the
following categories: general description, detailed description of the event, basic
information about the victims and additional information where relevant (pictures of
the suicide bombers, posters, captured documents, etc.)
In assembling the basic information about the victims we used two main
databases: the number of those killed as they appear in an ISA document and details
and photos appearing on the National Health Insurance Internet site
(http://www.laad.bti.gov.il). In some instances we also used information appearing on the
Foreign Ministry Internet site (http://www.mfa.gov.il) or that received from One Family, an
association of those whose lives were touched by terrorism.35
It should be noted that in some instances the numbers of those killed as they
appear in the ISA document (on which we based this study) are different from those
of the National Insurance Institution or the Foreign Ministry. In our assessment the
differences were caused because critically wounded victims later died . In addition,
those killed who for a variety of reasons were not entitled to National Insurance
benefits (soldiers, foreign workers, tourists) were not listed by them.
35 The personal details of the victims are based on information obtained from the above sources. We
have no database of our own containing such information. We apologize in advance if a victim’s name
was omitted or if the data given are inexact.
41
General description
The taxi that brought the suicide bomber to the
Tulkarm roadblock (Photo courtesy of the Judea
and Samaria Rescue Service, “Yesha News”
Agency)
The attack
A suicide bomber (escorted by another terrorist) detonated an explosive device at
an IDF roadblock on the Shavei Shomron-Einav road (south of Tulkarm). The
roadblock was set up after the IDF received information that suicide bombers were
planning to carry out attacks in Israel. According to Reuters (December 29) the
terrorist who detonated the explosives was ‘Alaa Ibn al-Latif al-Sa’adi, 22 years
old, unmarried, who served on the Palestinian police force in Jenin. The other terrorist
was Sahib Ibrahim al-‘Ajami , 19, from the village of ‘Atil in the Tulkarm district.
A taxi arrived at the roadblock carrying three Palestinians. The IDF commander in
charge asked one of the Palestinians to open his coat. As he did, he detonated the
explosive belt he was wearing, and in the resulting explosion, which was powerful
Date: December 29, 2005
Event: A suicide bomber (one of two) blew himself up
at an IDF roadblock south of Tulkarm.
Casualties: 1 IDF soldier dead and 3 wounded
Organization responsible: PIJ
Suicide bombers: ‘Alaa Ibn al-Latif al-Sa’adi and Sahib
Ibrahim al-’Ajami
42
and contained nails and metal scraps, the commander was killed and three other
soldiers were wounded, one of the seriously. The two other Palestinians in the taxi
were also killed.
Apparently the explosion at the roadblock prevented a suicide bombing attack
planned for a supermarket in the city of Rosh Ha’ayin the Hanukkah holiday
vacation. The attack seems to have been planned and carried out by the PIJ terroristoperative
infrastructure in Samaria, which claimed responsibility in a video sent to various news agencies (Agence France-Presse, December 30).

The victim
Lieutenant Uri Binamo,
21, from Nesher
Survived by his parents and
three sisters.

General description
The attack
On December 5, at about 11:30 AM, a suicide bomber blew himself up near
the entrance of the Hasharon mall in Netanya. As a result, four civilians were
killed on the spot (the fifth died of his injuries in the hospital) and some 40
were injured. It was the second terrorist attack perpetrated at the Hasharon mall
during the lull in the fighting and the third since the beginning of the violent
confrontation.
Before the suicide bomber detonated the charge he was carrying, he had
been identified as a suspect by passers-by as he was walking slowly towards
the Hasharon mall. The suicide bomber, whose hair was painted in a bright
color (to make it easier for him, perhaps, to blend in with the Jewish crowd),
was wearing a dark coat and carrying a large bag on his shoulder. Some
civilians notified nearby police officers and the mall’s security guards, but they
were still unable to prevent the suicide bomber from blowing himself up near
the entrance to the mall.
Date: December 5, 2005
Event: A suicide bomber blew himself up at the
entrance of the Hasharon mall in Netanya
Casualties: 2 killed and some 40 wounded
Organization responsible: The Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Suicide bomber: Lutfi Amin Abd al-Latif Abu Sa’ada
44
The suicide bomber, as photographed
before departing for the terrorist attack
(Al-Jazeera Television, December 5)
The scene of the terrorist attack near the Hasharon mall in Netanya (Al-
Jazeera, December 5)
Andrei, mourning the death of his mother, Alexandra Gramitzky
(Reuters, photo: Gil Cohen)
45
The victims
Alexandra Garmitzky,
65, from Netanya.
Survived by a husband
and a son.
Haim Amram, 26,
from Netanya.
Survived by a family.
Keinan Tsuami, 19,
from Petah Tikva.
Survived by parents and
two brothers.
Elia Rosen, 39, from
Bat Hefer. Survived by a
husband and three
children.
Daniel (Dani) Golani, 45,
from Nahariya. Survived
by a wife and two
daughters.
46
General description
The suicide bomber reading his will, as recorded
before leaving for the terrorist attack (Al-Jazeera
Television, October 27, 2005)
The attack
On Wednesday, October 26, at about 4:00 PM, a suicide bomber arrived at
a junction in Hadera near a local market, and set off a charge weighing some
10 lbs. near a falafel stand. As a result of the explosion, 5 civilians were killed
and over 30 were injured (five of them sustained serious injuries).
The suicide bomber was Hassan Ahmed Hassan Abu Zeid, 20, married,
from the town of Qabatia (a town south of Jenin, known as a place from which
suicide bombers have departed for their attacks). Abu Zeid had been released
from the Israeli prison several weeks before perpetrating the suicide bombing
attack. In a video tape that captured Abu Zeid before leaving for the attack, he
stated that the attack was a revenge for the killing of Luai Sa’adi, head of the
Date: October 26, 2005
Event: A suicide bomber blew himself up near a market
in Hadera
Casualties: 6 dead and some 30 wounded
Organization responsible: The Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Suicide bombers: Hassan Ahmed Hassan Abu Zeid

Read more


http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/pdf/suicide_terrorism_ae.pdf

Hmm, let's see what the zio killer 'bots have been up to lately

http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/demograhics.html

http://concert4palestine.org/warcrimes/s.html

Last update - 23:03 17/02/2006

Pakistani cleric offers reward for killing those who published the cartoons
PESHAWAR, Pakistan - A Pakistani cleric announced Friday a $ 200 bounty for killing each of those who published the cartoons of Prophet Muhammad.

Police confined the former leader of an Islamic militant group to his home to prevent him from addressing supporters over the cartoons, amid fears he could incite violence, after riots this week killed five people.

Qureshi said the mosque and his religious school would give 1.5 million rupees ($25,000) and a car, while a local jewelers' association would give another $1 million. No representative of the association was available to confirm it had made the offer.

"This is a unanimous decision by all imams (prayer leaders) of Islam that whoever insults the prophet deserves to be killed and whoever will take the insulting people to his end, will get this prize," Qureshi said.

More

http://english.aljazeeera.net/NR/exeres/7713AD84-AA68-4C84-A00A-63EA3DBF2CE3.htm

How many years has that "concertpalestine" site been up, and still no concert?

Let me guess -- it's because Thuh Zionists (*wink wink*) control the recording industry.

@%<