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US policy and the Palestinian cause
So far, Obama's Israel-Palestine policy appears indistinguishable from that of previous US administrations, writes Galal Nassar
A forecast of US policy towards the Palestinian cause in the Obama era requires not only an examination of the new administration's actions and positions so far but also a historical contextualisation in which regard specific consideration must be given to a certain prudence long- lacking in US policy on this issue and to the objective circumstances militating towards change.
In the statements issuing from Washington last week, two delivered by US Vice-President Joseph Biden draw our immediate attention. The first cautioned Iran that it would face international isolation if it refused to halt its nuclear refinement activities. One is nevertheless struck by the almost total absence of the language of intimidation and threat that characterised the Bush administration's rhetoric towards Iran. As I suggested last week in this column, Biden's remarks support the likelihood that the Iranian question will remain pending without being addressed face-on by the US administration for the next two years. Additional evidence to this effect is to be found in US Ambassador Ryan Crocker's remarks regarding his recent talks with Iranians. That his statement made no reference to Iranian nuclear activities also suggests that the subject has been shelved until further notice.
It could be that Tehran has concluded that the US is not all that serious about its activities, which is why it greeted that statement with a shrug of indifference. It may well have been the relative quiet over the Iranian nuclear question that encouraged some Iranian officials to strike bolder and more arrogant postures and not only insist that Iran will never hand back the Emirate islands it seized many years ago but also resume talking of Bahrain as an Iranian dependency. In addition to fuelling hatreds and sullying relations in the region, such statements constitute a potential threat to Arab national security and demand a collective response from Arab leaders.
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In the statements issuing from Washington last week, two delivered by US Vice-President Joseph Biden draw our immediate attention. The first cautioned Iran that it would face international isolation if it refused to halt its nuclear refinement activities. One is nevertheless struck by the almost total absence of the language of intimidation and threat that characterised the Bush administration's rhetoric towards Iran. As I suggested last week in this column, Biden's remarks support the likelihood that the Iranian question will remain pending without being addressed face-on by the US administration for the next two years. Additional evidence to this effect is to be found in US Ambassador Ryan Crocker's remarks regarding his recent talks with Iranians. That his statement made no reference to Iranian nuclear activities also suggests that the subject has been shelved until further notice.
It could be that Tehran has concluded that the US is not all that serious about its activities, which is why it greeted that statement with a shrug of indifference. It may well have been the relative quiet over the Iranian nuclear question that encouraged some Iranian officials to strike bolder and more arrogant postures and not only insist that Iran will never hand back the Emirate islands it seized many years ago but also resume talking of Bahrain as an Iranian dependency. In addition to fuelling hatreds and sullying relations in the region, such statements constitute a potential threat to Arab national security and demand a collective response from Arab leaders.
More
For more information:
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/936/op11.htm
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The recently completed Israeli elections and ongoing deliberations over the shape of the next government serve to demonstrate the profound divisions that exist in Israel and the dysfunctional state of its political system. As is widely known, the current governing coalition lost its mandate. The lead party, Kadima, led by Tzipi Livni, a centrist configuration (by Israeli calculations), was comprised of an amalgam of individuals spun-off from Likud and Labour. They declined from 29 to 28 seats. Kadima's coalition partner, Labour, dropped from 19 seats to 13. And Meretz, a more leftist party (not in the coalition but supportive of peace efforts), lost support, going from five to a mere three seats.
This gives the Zionist centre-left a total of 44 seats -- far short of the 61 needed to form a government. But this is only part of the story. Post- election analysis suggests that while Kadima was initially seen as "Likud-lite" -- after all its founder was Ariel Sharon -- it was viewed by voters in this election as a horse of a different colour. It is estimated that about 70 per cent of the last-minute support garnered by Livni's grouping came from Labour and Meretz voters hoping to block a Netanyahu victory. All this may be academic now, but is still useful to know in order to understand the constraints that this will impose on Livni and the strong push that will be made to merge Kadima and Labour as an opposition bloc.
The right won, to be sure, but not without complications of their own. Netanyahu's Likud won 27 seats, with some of his party's most extreme members in leadership roles. Next in line was Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beiteinu Party with 15 seats. Lieberman, a former Likudnik, launched Yisrael Beiteinu to exploit the resentments of Israel's sizable Russian immigrant community. Shas, a religious party of Sephardic Jews, garnered 11 seats, followed by a number of smaller groupings representing hardline nationalist and religious parties that will hold a combined 12 seats.
The Arab parties and Hadash -- a coalition of communists and Israeli-Arab leftist groups (the communists once serving as a substitute nationalist party for Israel's Arabs) -- garnered 11 seats.
Israel's problem is both political and demographic. The "Jewish state" isn't just Jewish, nor is it in agreement on what it means to be Jewish, with deep divisions between the ultra- orthodox current and the nationalists. And demographically speaking, with 20 per cent Arabs, 20 per cent Russians, and 20 per cent Orthodox, you have the makings of a dysfunctional brew.
So Netanyahu won, but what exactly did he win? And how does he govern, given the difficult choices he must face in forming a coalition?
Since right-wing parties hold 65 seats, it might appear easy to cobble together a government of the like-minded. But the religious-secular divide is deep and, at times, ugly. The Orthodox current will make demands for special consideration by the state that Lieberman and other ultra- nationalists will reject.
At the same time, Netanyahu, though a hardline nationalist, is a savvy (some say dissembling) political leader, keenly aware of Israel's international standing and image. He knows that the Obama administration has committed itself, as George Mitchell has recently noted, not to a "process" but to the realisation of a two-state solution, and so will not countenance obstructionist behaviour. Nor will the European Union. Netanyahu, therefore, might prefer a coalition with Yisrael Beiteinu and Kadima, choosing the latter for political cover in much the same manner that Ariel Sharon used Shimon Peres. Such a coalition would do little and be, itself, dysfunctional (though for different reasons), more than a coalition of the right.
No matter how you add it up, the numbers aren't going to yield a majority either for a clear direction or peace.
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http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/936/op2.htm