The action ostensibly meets one of the main benchmarks that the Bush administration demanded of the Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The benchmarks were drawn up in Washington with the aim of providing a place in the US client state for the predominantly Sunni Arab ruling elite of the former regime and offering incentives for ending its support for the anti-occupation insurgency.

De-Baathification is a clear obstacle to this agenda. The policy was enacted by the US proconsul in Iraq, Paul Bremer, on May 16, 2003 and was a major factor in the development of armed resistance in the months following the invasion. It is widely regarded in Washington now as ill-conceived.

Bremer decreed that no member of the ex-ruling party’s top four ranks could hold any position in the public service or state bureaucracy. The party had seven tiers of membership, with the vast majority of the estimated 1.5 million members in the lower fifth, sixth and seventh categories. He also denied the top four ranks the right to a state pension and directed that they be investigated for “criminal conduct”.

Bremer also ordered the dismissal and investigation of lesser-ranking Baath Party members who held senior management positions in state-owned corporations and affiliated institutions such as universities, schools and hospitals. On May 23, 2003, Bremer dissolved the Iraqi Army—an action which stripped the predominantly Sunni officer caste of its position, as well as an estimated 400,000 soldiers of their jobs.

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