The electoral outcome is largely, but not completely, predictable on the bases of the referendum of October 15 which exhibited remarkably disciplined voting on the part of the three main constituencies: Shi’ite Arab, Kurd, and Sunni Arab. (For the results see the website of the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq). Now of course there are more choices than a mere yes/no, and there is a very different electoral mechanism. Going into the election, the main unknown was how many Shi’ite and Sunni voters would vote for the Allawi party, The Iraqi National List (No. 731). To a lesser extent the votes of the Chalabi group, the Iraqi National Congress List (No. 569) and the Saleh al-Mutlah Sunni group, the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue List (No. 667) were also unknown, but these would have mattered paradoxically only if they were so small as to take away votes from their natural allies without earning seats on their own.

As to the electoral system, it is on the whole a passive one that will increase the seat:vote ratio of the bigger parties but only slightly. What is not obvious about this system of mainly but not exclusively provincial lists is that it remains in small part turnout dependent and this adds an element of uncertainty. The system is not turnout dependent in homogeneous provinces, but only in ethnically mixed ones in the sense that if one group turns out more heavily than an other, it will get a larger proportion of that provincial list than its demographic weight would indicate. And the national compensational list of 45 votes is explicitly turnout dependent, seeking first to compensate those who get no provincial seats, and secondly to bring provincial ratios of parties closer to the national vote of the parties, a figure that is based on the turnout.

With this said, turnout seems to have been high also in the Sunni areas. This was so not because the Sunnis are choosing ballots over bullets as widely said, but because the insurrection itself has chosen to use both ballots and bullets, as Patrick Cockburn recently remarked in a fine interview in New Left Review. Thus there was both high political encouragement for Sunni voters and little violence to deter them. In other words, turn out dependence can after all be discounted as a factor this time around. Accordingly, keeping in mind the possibility that the secular Allawi list can indeed take Sunni votes, the main Sunni coalition grouping, the Iraqi Accordance Front (List. No. 618) and the Mutlak list together could get as many as 20% of the seats (55 seats), but certainly 45-50 seats. Support for the latter would be an interesting indication of the strength of more radical Sunnis, but even if relatively high it would not effect the overall-all result . . .

With respect to the election of last January, the Kurds will go down most dramatically. Their numbers are very easy to estimate on the bases of the referendum results: the Kurdistan Coalition List (730) will get all of the seats of three provinces, plus the majority of Kirkuk (Ta'mim) and big minority of Nineveh, altogether 20% of the seats which is a 7 % drop with respect to last January. The biggest party, the Shi’ite United Iraqi Alliance (No.555) may have dropped seats, too, because of the Sunni share: 40-45% seems plausible . . . All these percentages should not add up to a hundred because smaller parties will get some seats, mainly through the national list, the provincial thresholds for a seat being too high. How many no one can predict, and the combined effect could be important, under some circumstances.

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http://www.juancole.com/2005/12/arato-guest-editorial-on-election.html