MUSHARRAF’S FRAUD CONDONED BY WASHINGTON

On the last day of April Pakistan’s military ruler and self-appointed President, General Pervez Musharraf, has won a victory in the referendum to extend his “mandate” for a further five years. Pakistan’s Election Commission said General Musharraf had won with over 97 percent in favor of him staying in power, in a turnout of just over 56 percent. The outcome was a foregone conclusion, of course, but the event nevertheless has been marred by gross irregularities. The opposition—that is, all main political parties—estimated turnout at well below ten percent and boycotted the ritual as unconstitutional. Under Pakistan’s constitution, the president is chosen by the members of the national and provincial assemblies and the senate. However, the captive supreme court upheld General Musharraf's argument that the constitution justifies referendums “on matters of national importance”—although it fell short of endorsing it as a substitute for proper procedures.

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan says that irregularities “exceeded its worst fears,” and its chairman Afrasiab Khattak said that observers who were supposed to be neutral had been seen stamping ballots themselves. Voluntary turnout was very low, with millions of public sector workers being obliged to vote. Institutionalized rigging appeared to be deliberate, as no formal identification was required for voting and there were no constituency lists; some people boasted that they voted eight or even twelve times. The opposition was not allowed to canvass votes against the referendum. Huge sums of money were doled out to hire crowds for pro-Musharraf rallies before the referendum and for transporting friendly voters to the polling stations. The number of polling booths was increased tenfold. In brief, we have witnessed a replay of the farcical referendum held by General Zia ul-Haq in 1984.

Even had the referendum been properly conducted, and successful from Muharraf’s point of view, it would not have given the man and his regime the missing legitimacy. He has already resorted to legal alchemy with a provisional constitutional order retroactively legitimizing his 1999 military coup. On this form the general election to be held next October will also be fraudulent, and produce a rubber-stamp parliament of third-rate pro-Musharraf politicos but without the two mainstream parties led by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, who are now both in exile. The leaders of the opposition may feel emboldened by the referendum’s lack of credibility at home and abroad, but their successful campaign against an election under Musharraf’s own rules may prompt him to postpone the polling more or less indefinitely on the grounds of national security.

The prospects for Pakistan’s economic and political stability remain gloomy if Musharraf and the opposition parties do not agree on ground rules for the elections. Renewal of open-ended and institutionalized military rule in Pakistan is also unlikely to contribute to a long-term lowering of tensions along the volatile border with India, the scene of considerable tension last winter. Pakistan’s President is the same man who as a Chief of Army Staff bypassed his Prime Minister to launch a war on India. Today he is the most powerful military dictator Pakistan has ever spawned. And yet the United States continues to turn a blind eye to Musharraf’s shinenigans, apparently because it mistakenly believes that he serves U.S. interests in the region. The holding of a referendum, the release of many militants, backtracking over controlling the madrassahs and the unsatisfactory progress of the Daniel Pearl trial indicate that Musharraf is not as committed to “the war on terror” as Mr. Bush may hope, or the Americans and Europeans might wish. Musharraf himself reckons that he is safe from open criticism for as long as Pakistan is viewed as a key player in the “war against terrorism,” but if the Administration continues to back his military regime which is so obviously devoid of legitimacy and real support, it risks alienating the majority of Pakistanis.

The United States thus risks strengthening Islamic fundamentalists who know how to use populist democratic rhetoric. The ultimate paradox is that the U.S. policy of undue reliance on a Musharraf—a man lukewarm about clamping down on Islamic extremism—may force the secular parties to strike a deal with those same Muslim hard-liners to try to overthrow Musharraf. Until recently, the United States looked upon Musharraf as the ally who would reverse Pakistan's involvement with militant Islamic ideology in addition to making peace with India. But with his flawed referendum he has proven that he cannot or will not break from the tradition of Pakistani military leaders, most notably General Zia-ul-Haq. The U.S. policy needs to take into account the risks of giving Musharraf legitimacy and support: his referendum will make antiterrorism efforts in Pakistan even less likely than before, because terrorism springs from religious and political extremism nurtured by U.S.-protected autocrats.