Discontents at Rome: 63 B.C.

Class Struggle and Social Praxis
in Republican Rome

By E. H. Campbell
To Dr. Paul Dixon
Away from these he adds also the abodes of Hell,

   The high gates of Dis, the penalties of sin,

And thee, Catiline, hanging on a frowning cliff,

   And trembling at the faces of the Furies;

Far apart, the good, and Cato giving them laws.

_Aeneid 8.666-670._
If it were possible to present the same subject matter in one form and in no other, one might have reason to think it gratuitous to weary one’s hearers by speaking again in the same manner as his predecessors; but since oratory is of such a nature that it is possible to discourse on the same subject matter in many different ways—to represent the great as lowly or invest the little with grandeur, to recount the things of old in a new manner or set forth events of recent date in an old fashion—it follows that one must not shun subjects upon which others have spoken before, but must try to speak better than they. For the deeds of the past are, indeed, an inheritance common to us all; but the ability to make proper use of them at the appropriate time, to conceive the right sentiments about them in each instance, and set them forth in finished phrase, is the peculiar gift of the wise.

*Panegyricus* 7-10.
Chronology

Foundation of Rome (753 B.C.)
Lucius Junius Brutus (509 B.C.)
Thucydides (460-455 B.C. to 400 B.C.)
Plato (427 BC-347 BC)

First Servile War (135-132 B.C.)
Second Servile War (104 -103 B.C.)
The Social War (91-88 B.C.)
Proscriptions of Sulla (81 B.C.)
Third Servile War (73 -71 B.C.)
Cicero elected consul (64 B.C.)
Bellum Catilinae (63- Jan. 62 B.C.)

Catiline (87-62 B.C.)
Cicero (106 to 43 B.C.)
Sallust (86 to 35 B.C.)
Varro (136 to 27 B. C.)
Diodorus Siculus (80-20 B.C.)
Pollio (76/75 B.C. to A.D. 5)
Livy (59 B.C. to A.D. 17)
Elder Seneca (54 B.C. to A.D. 39)
Quintilian (35-95)
Martial (38–41 to 103-102)
Tacitus (56–117)
Plutarch (46- 127)
Suetonius (75 to160)
Appian (95 to 165)
Cassius Dio (155 to 229)
St. Jerome (340-420)
St. Augustine (354-430)
Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People (1416)
Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy (1531)
Ben Jonson, Catiline: His Conspiracy (1611)
Voltaire, Rome Sauvée (1754)
G.W.F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (1807)
Henrik Ibsen, Catiline (1850, revised 1875)
Theodor Mommsen, A History of Rome (1854-56)
Karl Marx, Capital (1867)
Aleksandr Blok, Catiline: A Page from the History of World Revolution (1918)
Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (1929)
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I. Prologue

The reputation of the once archetypical villain, Catiline, has undergone a complete transformation over the past 150 years. Once considered the epitome of political villainy, Lucius Sergius Catiline has been rehabilitated within the western canon; transformed, as it were, from a villain to a hero. While on the one hand, the verdict rendered by ancient authors against Catiline is universal, those held by the majority of our contemporary scholars such as Henrik Ibsen, Aleksandr Blok, Ann Thomas Wilkins, Lester Hutchinson, E. G. Hardy, C. MacDonald and Judith Kalb, tend to admire him. There are those opinions about Sallust which are almost as bad; especially for those who follow the opinions of pseudo-Cicero or Cassius Dio. The trend in contemporary scholarship is to discredit Sallust’s scholarship as opposed to the mere traduction of his character as Asinius Pollio did. Many more important scholars, particularly his contemporaries, and the Renaissance humanists inspired by them, have praised Sallust as a historian par excellence. The history of the Bellum Catilinae has been handed down by two of Catiline’s bitterest enemies, Cicero and Sallust, who had a mutual dislike for each other; and although they hated one another, they were united in hating Catiline. The history of Catiline’s conspiracy, and his putsch against the Roman republic, was transmitted to us, more or less, authentically from the classical authors to the Renaissance humanists. The authentic transmission ended, however, with Voltaire’s dramatic piece Rome Sauvée (1754). Ibsen’s dramatization of the event, Catiline (1850), marked a new beginning. Once the historical persona Catiline was removed from what was considered the pinnacle of classical historical scholarship, and transmitted into the dramatic arts, the
history of the event itself began to change until the historical persona, Catiline, had undergone a complete historical revision, from villain to hero.

Aleksandr Blok’s opinion of Catiline is the first ostensibly dialectical and historical materialist interpretation of the Catilinarian conspiracy. Blok’s commentary is an important one and cannot be ignored. Aside from being a gifted poet, he was also a classicist who could read Latin, and was generally aware of contemporary philological trends in the classics, especially in relation to the Catiline affair. It is clear that he has pondered this matter very deeply. As he put it, “Scholars of the new era think that the life of Catiline has yet to receive a just evaluation. We shall examine whether or not they are correct.” (World Revolution 293) I will examine whether or not Blok’s treatment is itself adequate.

Non mediocres enim tenebrae in silva ubi haec captanda neque eo quo pervenire volumus semitae tritae, neque non in tramitibus quaedam obiecta quae euntem retinere possent.

For there is no ordinary darkness in the forest where these things are to be caught and no worn paths to there where we wish to arrive, nor are there not certain obstacles in the paths can keep back the traveler. (De Lingua Latina 5.5)

Eighty-two years after Blok’s Catiline, Judith E. Kalb, in her commentary on Blok’s commentary, A Roman Bolshevik (2000), seems to complete a historical revision of the Catilinarian conspiracy which began with Ibsen; a marked departure from Ben Jonson’s interpretation dramatic piece Catiline: His Conspiracy (1611). Ibsen’s work departed not only from all his predecessors, and historical authorities before him, but even from his own principal mentor from afar, Voltaire. Voltaire’s Rome Sauvée followed
the historical tradition and presented Catiline as a villain. Voltaire himself opposed
tyanny, but Ibsen, in his apologetic for Catiline, actually supported a would-be tyrant,
Catiline. Ironically as well, Voltaire, as opposed to Ibsen, not only loved Cicero, but had
reportedly produced the play *Rome Sauvée*: “To make Cicero known to the young people
who attend the spectacles.” He would even play the role of Cicero when the drama was
presented in Paris in 1750 where he reportedly exclaimed during a moment of inspired
acting:

*Romains, j’aime la gloire et ne veux point m’en taire!*

Romans, I love the glory and don’t conceal any of it from me!

(Rome Sauvée 154)

For Ibsen, who hated Cicero, Catiline would appeal to him, but not because of his
propensity for revolutionary violence, but because Ibsen had suffered a social decline
resembled Catiline’s, from riches to rags. Ben Jonson’s play preserved the traditional
legend of Catiline and transmitted it to us in the post-reformation Elizabethan English
vernacular, during the wars of religion. Jonson’s study of Catiline comes at a critical time
between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. His work has been praised both its
adherence to the texts of Sallust and Cicero and for his many allusions to other classical
Roman authors, particularly Seneca Minor, but also for his knowledge and skill as a Latin
grammariam and translator of Roman classics. Jonson too contemplated the whole affair.
But it was with Ibsen’s work that the historical persona of Catiline was transformed from
an archetypical villain into a hero for the modern bourgeoisie. Blok seized upon this
shift and tried to transform Catiline into a symbol of revolutionary violence, and failed.
Indeed it appears that Blok’s *Catiline* was intended to be smear on Lenin’s reputation and
after Blok’s interpretation it appears that a bone fide movement of historical revision was undertaken which has attempted to rehabilitate the historical persona Catiline within the western cannon, with tragic results.

_Quis male deorum Tantalo visas domos ostendit iterum?_

Which bad device of the gods once again presents Tantalus haunting homes?

_(Thyestes 1.3-4)_

Henrik Ibsen’s interpretation of Catiline was the decisive turning point in the history of the event for it is here that a diametrical change in the interpretation is to be found. It is with Judith Kalb’s interpretation; however, what is quintessentially bad and good, according to all classical authorities, is transposed, good becomes bad and bad becomes good.

_Ξυνον δὲ μοι ἐστιν ὅποθεν αρξωθεν αρξὼμαι· τοθὶ γὰρ παλιν ἱξομαι αὔθις._

But to me it’s all the same place from whence I began; for there once again I shall return. *(Parmenides 5)*

For the transposition of the meanings of these words as well their significance when properly ascribed is a central to my argument. Thus the transmission of the history of the *Bellum Catilinae* may be divided into two periods: (a) Voltaire and before, and (b) Ibsen and after.

My work is a history of the process of the historical revision of the *Bellum Catilinae*, a defense of Sallust’s history, and a vindication of classical scholarship. Because by Hegel’s methodological schemata my history is neither an original history, because I do not discuss deeds which were held before my own eyes in a time when I shared the same spirit of the principle actors, nor is it reflective history because my
history only treats a single *episode* of a great history and does not apply a forensic methodology to the *criticism* of the sources for this episode in history, it is the *thoughtful consideration of this episode* in history because it considers the *meaning* of the events, and the meaning of the implicit change in the interpretation of those events, with the aim that people learn from this history and act according to it. Thus it is in general a *philosophical history*, μετα λογού, of the *Bellum Catilinae*, but it is in its particular aspect *ethical philosophy* derived from historical examples. Thus this document understood in so far as it tells of history it relates the *perfective*, yet in terms of the ethics derived therefrom it transmits the *progressive*. In other words, its *being*, ens, has dual *aspect*. It is both critical and exegetical. My methodology is that of both *forensic* rhetoric, for it both defends and accuses individuals for past acts; and *deliberative* rhetoric, for it is concerned with what is honorable and thus both exhorts and dissuades future actions; and it is *epideictic* because concerns itself with both vice and virtue and lays both praise and blame on my contemporaries. It is rhetoric, but it is not imitative of any particular classical form of rhetoric. Though it is conditioned by classical thought, it is rhetoric which shares in the spirit of these times. And though it is presented in a written form, it is, because of this, also oratory. “In rhetoric one who acts in accordance with sound argument, and one who acts in accordance with moral purpose, are both called rhetoricians.” (*Rhetoric* 1.1.19-20) The textual criticism is presented here is a form of narrative *intextus*, πεπλεγμένοι; the interweaving of the many extant narrative threads showing as many parallels as possible while at the same time noting as many departures as I find. I also suppose that readers will involve themselves in the study of these texts
and will at the very least familiarize themselves with Sallust’s narrative. All foreign words and block quoted passages in Latin and Greek have been translated by myself.

II. Sources

The *Chronicles of Jerome* records the life of C. Sallustius Crispus between 87 B.C. and 36 B.C. The textual critic J. T. Ramsey ascribes to these dates. The textual critic P. McGushin said, on the other hand, “There is no absolute certainty about the standard dates, since Jerome can be convicted of carelessness and inaccuracy in other particulars of literary history.” (McGushin 1) Thus by McGushin’s dates, Gaius Sallustius Crispus was born in 85 B.C. at Amiternum and died in 35 B.C. McGushin contradicts Ramsey. While Ramsey relied on R. Helm’s codex of Jerome’s *Chronicle*, McGushin relied on MS (O).


(2) ann. Abr. 1981 [=Ol. 185.4/186.1 = 36 B.C.] p. 159 Sallustius diem obit quadriennio ante Actiacum bellum. (Ramsey 1)

Vis-à-vis:


His family was of plebian origin and of the equestrian order. The *ordo equester* were those who had met a property qualification and served on horseback in the Roman army.
They were not *senators* and were not members of the *ordo plebeius* either. Although they were not members of the patrician ruling class *per se*, their class contained the *publicani*—tax collectors and financiers. After 70 B.C. they would share the function of the juries along with the *senators*. “A *publicanus* was a farmer-general of the revenues, usually from the equestrian order.” (Ramsey 108)

Although the etymology—ετυμος, ‘true’ or ‘real’ + λογος ‘word,’ ‘account,’ or ‘reason;’ thus the true account of the word, or reason for the word—plebeian, *plebius*, is unknown, the plebeians were an intermediary class also of noble origin which would later become a division of the ruling class as distinct from both the patricians, *patricus* from *pater* ‘father,’ and *servi*, ‘slaves.’ The nobles of Rome were *sprung from the soil*, i.e., of noble birth, αυτοχθον. This nobility *per se* is to be distinguished from men of noble *deeds*, or men noble character, since men carry out deeds in accordance with their character. The noble *classes*, and therefore the so-called *nobility*, derived its *status*, class standing, from noble birth notwithstanding their actions. “The idea of noble birth refers to excellence of race that of noble character to degenerating from the family type, a quality not as a rule found in those of noble birth, most of whom are good for nothing.” *(Rhetoric* 2.15.3) This is of course to distinguish the Roman nobility from the *Aborigines* who were a native tribe inhabiting the region when the Trojan king, fleeing the destruction of Troy, Aeneas arrived.

*Arma virumque cano, Troiae qui primus ab oris Italiam fato profugus Lavinaque venit litora—multum ille et terries iactatus at alto vi superum, saevae memorem Iuonis ob iram, multa quoque et bello pasus, dum conderet urbem inferretque*
I sing of arms and a man, who first, exiled by Fate, came from the coast of Troy to Italy and the beaches of Lavinium—tossed about he was, many times on land and sea by the will of the gods on account of Juno’s unrelenting anger, suffering many things and a war until he founded a city and brought the gods to Latium—whence the Latin race, the Alban fathers, and the high walls of Rome. O Muse to me these things relate… (Aeneid 1.1)

The patricians were the descendents of the Italic kings of Latium, the Sabines, and the Trojan refugees who sailed to Italy after the sack of Troy and inter-married with them.
The city of Rome, as I have learned, was founded and initially held by Trojans, who, as exiles, were wandering about homeless and unsettled under the leadership of Aeneas, and along with them the Aborigines, a savage race of men, without laws, without government, free and unrestrained. How easily they united, with a disparate origin, a dissimilar language and one having a different way of life from the other, after they came together within the same walls, is unheard of in all memory: thus, after a short while, the great differences were smoothed out and harmony and citizenship was built. But after that, their civic affairs, the mores, with expanding domains, enough prosperity and sufficient power appeared, just as most mortal things have, jealousy out of opulence arose. Consequently, neighboring kings and peoples assailed them with war, few friends were to be of help; for the remainder, struck by fear, were absent from dangers. (*Bellum Catilinae* 6.1)

Thus the *patricians* could be understood as the *sons of the founding fathers* while the plebians made up the greater part of the commons. The plebeians were a bourgeoing class which was distinct from the patricians, the *proletarii*, ‘proletariat’ and the slave class. Between the patricians and the plebeians there was a class of equestrians, to which both Cicero and Sallust belonged. This class was a noble class between the plebians and the patricians carved out from those who had met a property qualification. The proletariat were citizens of the lowest freeborn class and who served the State not with their property but with their children; the *proletary*, from the word *proles* meaning *that which grows forth*; especially of human beings, *offspring, progeny, child, descendant; and collectively,*
descendants, race, progeny, posterity. Among the lowest levels of Roman society there were the libertini ‘libertines’ who were men who had won their freedom from servitude, by one means or another, but while making up a part of the proletariat, they were, nevertheless, distinct from the freeborn of the laboring class. Tacitus, in his Annals, briefly explained the early political developments of Rome from its foundation to the ascension of Augustus:

_Urbem Romam a principio reges habuere; libertatem et consulatum L. Brutus instituit. Dictatae ad tempus sumebantur…non Cinnae, non Sullae longa dominatio; et Pompei Crassique potentia cito in Caesarem, Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Augustum cessere._

From the beginning kings held the Roman city. Freedom and the consulship were established by Lucius Brutus. Dictatorships were held for a short period of time…Neither Cinna’s nor Sulla’s dominion was long; both the power of Pompey and Crassus quickly yielded to Caesar; and the arms of Lepidus and Antonius to Augustus. (1.1)

Lucius Brutus was the patrician revolutionary who is credited with running out the Etruscan kings in 509 B.C. and, thereby, establishing the Roman republic. Rome, until this time, had been ruled by the Etruscans, a foreign power. Unable to agree on who should rule, instead of appointing another king, or a tyrant, the ruling class decided to institute a political system similar to the Spartan regime by appointing two consuls, who ruled simultaneously, and thereby settled, at least for a time, how many should rule insofar as they agreed that it should not be one man alone, but should in fact be two men who simultaneously shared power and answered to a great body of noble men called the
Senate. The dual consulship that was instituted at the outset of the republic to ameliorate a factional fight actually precipitated one that had many aspects. First it was a factional fight between the patricians themselves, and then it split up into a factional fight between the patricians as the aristocracy and the plebeians as the bourgeoning class, the bourgeoisie. The equestrians class was an intermediary class between the bourgeoning class and the nobility, hence the middle term in the factional fight between those immediately above and below them. The dialectical interplay of social classes again splits up into a number of social wars, servile wars, proscriptions, an attempted putsch, two oligarchies, and finally the ascension of the first Roman king, Octavian. All of this is played out against the backdrop of a grand dialectic of national wars and imperialism.

The reader may wish to recall that Sparta had once been ruled by two kings. The Roman Republic was likewise ruled by two men called Consuls. Contra Homer’s advice:

Ουκ αγαθον πολυκοιρανια: ηεις κοιρανος εστο.

Not good a rule of the many: let one man be commander! (Iliad 2.204)

The Roman system of consulship was different from the Spartan system of dual kings, however, in that each consul had the right of veto, ‘I forbid, protest or reject,’ over the decisions of his co-consul and, in time of war, one consul would nominate the other to be dictator, ‘the one who gives orders,’ also known as the magister populi et peditum ‘master of the people and infantry,’ and the other consul became the magister equitium ‘master of the horse and cavalry’ and rendered aid to the dictator. “Our fathers did not appoint one on all occasions nor for a longer period than six months.” (Historiae Romanae 36.34.1) The decree passed by the Senate authorizing the dictatorship was called the senatus consultum ultimum, ‘final decree of the Senate,’ and conferred
imperium, ‘the power to command,’ upon the dictator and was only used in times of crisis. Both consuls were preceded wherever they went by 12 lictors, who functioned as bodyguards and carried the fasces and other emblems of Roman political authority like the silver eagle. The Latin word fasces is the plural of facio. A facio was a bundle of rods surrounding an axe carried by the lictors who preceded the dictator, the facio was both a symbol of state power and a symbol of the authority to administer the scourge. “The Romans took from the Etruscans the toga praetexta and the Phalera…the fasces, the lictors…and all other insignia of kings and magistrates” (History of the Florentine People 1.20). The contemporary word fascist was derived from this Latin word. The fact that Piso and Catiline sought to seize them tends to imply that they also intended to seize control of the government by an illegal means. In the early period of Rome, after a great victory soldiers would salute their general “Imperator” which was intended to signify that they considered him to be worthy to be their commander. (Civil Wars 2.7.44) Octavian, after ascending as Caesar Augustus (27 B.C.), changed the meaning of the word Imperator to mean ‘Emperor.’

At the time of Sallust, the Roman state was developing a distinct slave class, a proletariat, a bourgeoisie, and an aristocracy. The office of the dictatorship had fallen into disuse after the Third Punic War (146 B.C.). The patricians corresponded to the aristocracy and played a revolutionary role under the leadership of Lucius Junius Brutus—the historical founder of the Roman republic (509), sharing this distinction with Publicola. The plebians would assume their revolutionary role under the leadership of Tiberius Graccus Sempronius in what would become know as the Gracchi Rebellion (133 B.C.) It was to this legacy and the achievements of the plebians after the Gracchi, that
Cicero owed his status. His political essence was an allegiance to the achievements of the Gracchi.

*Imperium legitumum, nomen imperi regium habebant. Delecti, quibus corpus annis infirmum, ingenium sapientia validum erat, rei publicae consultabant; hi vel aetate vel curae similitudine patres appellabantur. Post, ubi regium imperium, quod initio conservandae libertatis atque augendae rei publicae fuerat, in superbiam dominationemque se convortit, inmutato more annua imperia binosque imperatores sibi fecere: eo modo minume posse putabant per licentiam insolescere animum humanum.*

They had lawful sovereignty, in name it was commanded by kings [a monarchy]. Chosen men whose body was weakened by years, whose character was strengthened by wisdom, held council for the Republic; these, whether by age or by similar diligence, were called Fathers. Afterwards, when the monarchy, which had been initiated to preserve liberty and develop the Republic, haughtiness and supremacy converted it, they changed its manner and created two dictators who ruled for a year: by this small measure to be able to prune the growth of the human soul to insolence due to license. (*Bellum Catilinae 6.6*)

G. W. F. Hegel said, “The relation of the patricians and the plebeians is that those who were poor, and consequently helpless, were compelled to attach themselves to the richer and more respectable, and to seek for their patrocinium—a protection, advocacy, defense, patronage—in this relation of protection on the part of the more wealthy, the protected are called clients—a freeman protected by a patron.” (*Philosophy of History 288*)

Marx obtained his patrocinium from the wealthy Engles. Virgil and Horace
received theirs from Gaius Maecenas. Without the *patrocinium* of Engles *Capital* would never have been written, without that of Maecenas “the greatest poem by the greatest poet” would likewise be non-extant. Although it was true that the plebeians were poor and made up the great mass of the commons at the time of the expulsion of the Etruscan king Lucius Tarquinius Superbus and for sometime after, the plebeians scaled the political hierarchy, as Hegel put it, “by degrees,” and, over time, a *proletarii* and a *servi* grew by degrees as well. By the time of the *Bellum Catilinae*, in 63 B.C., the patrician and the plebeians formed a dualistic “aristocracy of a rigid order.” (*Philosophy of History* 285)

Thus the plebeians were a burgeoning class, a class that grew outside itself, i.e., had outgrown its social position. Once upon a time having been completely subordinate to the patricians, they began to accumulate a great deal of wealth and through what are known as the succession movements and the civil wars, succeeded in obtaining a share of the government as Appian so eloquently described. “The rich, getting possession of the greater part of the undistributed lands…came to cultivate vast tracts instead of single estates, using slaves as laborers and herdsmen…The ownership of slaves brought them great gain from the multitude of the progeny, who increased because they were exempt from military service. Thus certain powerful men became extremely rich and the race of slaves multiplied throughout the country, while the Italian people dwindled in numbers and strength, being oppressed by penury, taxes, and military service. If they had any respite from these evils they passed their time in idleness, because the land was held by the rich, who employed slaves instead of freemen as cultivators.” (*Civil Wars* 1.7) These practices led to the civil wars by which a land reform law, the *Lincinian Law* (367 B.C.), which governed the size of land holdings was won.
Having followed the example of Thucydides, and imitating him, Sallust has been recognized as one of the greatest historians of all time. Like Thucydides, Sallust invented the speeches of his historical personae, a customary practice of the early historians, proving himself at once to be both a historian and an orator, while, at the same time, relying both on extant sources, such as eye witnesses and written documents, and remaining true to the character of the individual to which the oration was so ascribed. Hence it would best be described as indirect discourse, because it gives the main drift of a speech but not the exact words of it. Thucydides himself rationalized this practice in his History of the Peloponnesian War (c. 404 B.C.) as follows: “With reference to the speeches in this history, some were delivered before the war began, others while it was going on; some I heard myself, others I got from various quarters; it was in all cases difficult to carry them word for word in one’s memory, so my habit has been to make the speakers say what was in my opinion demanded of them by the various occasions, of course adhering as closely as possible to the general sense of what they really said. And with reference to the narrative of events, far from permitting myself to derive it from the first source that came to hand, I did not even trust my own impressions, but it rests partly on what I saw myself, partly on what others saw for me, the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible.” (1.22) On account of the fact that Sallust is silent on this question with respect to the production of his own history, it is presumed that Sallust followed a similar rationale as did Thucydides and of course as did Herodotus set the precedent even before him.

St. Jerome placed Sallust and Thucydides next to God in historical authority. In his jeremiad for Christian history, St. Jerome said: “If it came to telling this tale
adequately even Thucydides and Sallust would have no voice.” (Letters 60.16) In his *City of God*, St. Augustine said that Sallust was:

*Nobilitate veritatis historicus.*

A historian having been famous for truthfulness. (*Civitas Dei* 1.5)

Martial called him the foremost of the Roman historians.

*Hic erit, ut perhibent doctorum corda virorum,*

*primus Romana Crispus in historia.*

This will be Crispus, the hearts of learned men declare:

“First in Roman history.” (*Epigrams* 14.191)

Tacitus said that Sallust was:

*Rerum Romanarum florentissimus auctor.*

An author of Roman blossoms. (*Annals* 3.30)

And Horace wrote of him:

*Nullus argento color est avaris*

*abditio terries, inimice lamnae*

*Crispe Sallusti, nisi temperato*

*splendeat usu.*

There is no color to silver

Hidden by the greedy Earth;

Sallust, hostile to the thin flakes,

Unless in use they shine modestly. (*Odes* 2.2.1-4)

Plutarch, on the other hand, faulted Sallust for saying that Romans had never seen a camel until Lucullius defeated king Mithridates at a battle near the river Rhyndacus,
Bithynia, in Asia Minor. “Sallust says, to my amazement, that camels were seen by the Romans for the first time. He must have though that the soldiers of Scipo who conquered Antiochus before this, and those who had lately fought Archelaus at Orchomenus and Chaeroneia, were unacquainted with the camel.” (Lucullus 11.4) In the end, Sallust had both his flatterers and his critics. In general, however, he was highly praised and held in equal esteem as the Greek historian Thucydides. According to the elder Seneca, “Thucydides’ primary virtue is brevity, but Sallust has beaten him at it and defeated him on his own ground. The Greek epigram is certainly short, but there are words one can remove without harm to the sense; take out ‘hiding’ or ‘shading,’ take out ‘everybody’s’—and the sense will remain, not perhaps so pretty, but equally complete. But from Sallust’s epigram nothing can be removed without spoiling the sense.” (Controversarium 9.1.13) Quintilian preferred Livy to Sallust when teaching boys, because he believed that Livy was easier to understand. “For instance, when prescribing for boys, I should give Livy the preference over Sallust; for although the latter is the greater historian, one requires to be well-advanced in one’s studies to appreciate him properly.” (Institutio 2.5.19) Ausonius asserted that Sallust as a historian neither enlarged the events nor understated them, and was, therefore, the middle path between the jealous critic and obsequious opportunistic flatterer. “If I touch sparingly upon the graces of his character, I shall be thought to show signs of jealousy: if I duly enlarge upon them, I shall be next door to a flatterer. I will therefore copy Sallust in his rigid mode of giving evidence.” (Epistularum 18.3) Seutonius reported that the grammarian Asinius Pollio had criticized Sallust for his archaic language. “Asinius Pollio, too, in the book in which he criticizes the writing of Sallust, as marred by excessive effort for archaism, writes as
follows: ‘He was especially abetted in this by Ateius Praetextatus, a famous Latin grammarian, afterwards a critic and teacher of declamation, and finally self-styled Philologus.’ (De Grammaticis 10) The elder Seneca said that Livy was deeply jealous of Sallust. According to him, Livy intended to detract for Sallust by praising Sallust’s chief competitor Thucydides. “Livy, however, was unjust enough to Sallust to criticize him both for translating the epigram and for spoiling it in translation. He doesn’t prefer Thucydides out of any love for him; he is praising someone he does not fear, and thinks he may more easily overcome Sallust if Thucydides overcomes him first.” (Controversarium 9.1.14.)

Cassius Dio thought that Sallust was a dangerous hypocrite. He said, “Caesar, immediately after Juba’s flight, captured the palisade and caused great slaughter among all who came in the way of his troops, sparing not even those who came over to his side. Next he brought the rest of the cities to terms, meeting with no opposition; and taking over the Numidians, ‘Nomads,’ he reduced them to the status of subjects, and delivered them to Sallust, nominally to rule, but really to harry and plunder. At all events this officer took many bribes and confiscated much property, so that he was not only accursed but incurred the deepest disgrace, inasmuch as after writing such treatises as he had, and making many bitter remarks about those who fleeced others, he did not practice what he preached. Therefore, even if he was completely exonerated by Caesar, yet in his own history, as upon a tablet, the man himself had chiseled his own condemnation as well.” (Historiae Romanae 42.9.1-3) Aleksandr Blok said of Sallust, “Man is weak, and he can be forgiven everything except loutishness. Thus Sallust can, if you please, be forgiven his decadence, his corruption…One thing alone cannot be forgiven: the moral and
patriotic tone he adopted...Sallust’s voice cracks; and it is this cracking of his voice that is difficult to forgive the stylist and bribe-taker.” (World Revolution 296-7) Textual critics have disputed the authenticity of Cicero’s invective against Sallust, In Sallustium Crispum. The Invective’s vituperation of Sallust’s character is unparalleled and for that reason it has become suspect, since Cicero’s ability to traduce with greater eloquence is well known. The authenticity of Sallust’s invective against Cicero, In Ciceronem, has also been disputed, but the opinions of the textual critics tends to indicate that it is a genuine work of Sallust published by him as a political pamphlet and circulated anonymously. The In Sallustium Crispum however is believed to be the product of a rhetorical school, composed by a writer of small ability. (Bellum Catilinae xix-xx)

Cassius Dio was even less than kind to Cicero than he was to Sallust. “Toward Caesar, accordingly, the masses were well disposed, for the reasons given, but they were angry at Cicero for the death of the citizens, and displayed their enmity in many ways. Finally, when on the last day of his office he desired to present his account and defense of all that he had done in his consulship—for he certainly did take great pleasure not only in being praised by others but also in extolling himself—they made him keep silent and did not let him utter a word outside of his oath...Nevertheless, Cicero, doing his best to resist them, added to his oath the statement that he had saved the city; and for this he incurred much greater hatred.” (Historiae Romanae 37.38.1-2) Cicero, apparently, never ceased in praising himself both before, and after, the defeat of Catiline. The infuriating remarks referred to by Cassius Dio could have been nothing less than those Cicero himself published. “I have preserved the Republic, I ask nothing of you except that you remember this occasion and the whole of my consulship.” (4 In Catilinam 23) And even
before that Cicero said, “You and your descendants should hold in honor the man who has saved this same city...It is I who have quenched the fires...It is I who have thrust back the swords drawn against the Republic and have dashed away the daggers they held at your throats. It is through my efforts that these plots have been detected.” (3 In Catilinam 2)

The conspiracy of Catiline, a patrician, was an outgrowth of the dictatorship and the proscriptions of Sulla. Catiline was himself was among Sulla’s adherents and had profited by his service to him and had reportedly used the proscriptions of Sulla as a cover for the murder of his own brother-in-law and for killing a former praetor, Marius Gratidianus. He also greatly enriched himself under Sulla’s reign. “This man [Catiline], namely had killed his brother before the civil struggle was decided, and now asked Sulla to proscribe the man, as one still living; and he was proscribed. Then Catiline, returning the favor of Sulla’s, killed a certain Marcus Marius, one of the opposite faction, and brought his head to Sulla as he was sitting in the forum, and then going to the lustral water of Apollo which was near, washed the blood off his hands.” (Sulla 32.2) Hutchinson recounts this event in fine finished phrases that bear repeating. “Before decapitation, Gratidianus had his legs broken, his hands cut off and his eyes plucked out. It is said that Catiline then carried the bleeding head from the Janiculum through the streets to the temple of Apollo in the Palatine where Sulla was waiting. Having deposited his burden at the feet of the gratified dictator, Catiline, so Plutarch says, added sacrilege to murder by washing the blood off his hands in the water of a nearby fountain which was sacred to Apollo.” (The Conspiracy 39-40) The younger Seneca reported that “Marcus Marius, to whom the people erected statues in every street, whom they worshipped with
offerings of frankincense and wine--this man by the command of Lucius Sulla had his ankles broken, his eyes gouged out, his tongue and hands cut off and little by little and limb by limb Sulla tore him to pieces, just as if he could make him die as many times as he could maim him. And who was it who executed this command? Who but Catiline, already training his hands to every sort of crime?” (*On Anger* 3.18.1)

Lucius Cornelius Sulla Felix, having returned to Italy, landed at Brundisium in 83 B.C. after campaigning in Greece, Macedonia and Asia Minor against the king Mithridates. By 82 B.C. the Roman Senate conferred *imperium* on Sulla and he adopted the title of *dictator*, which for all intensive purposes had been abolished after the Hannibalic War. “Sulla, although nominally elected, became dictator for life by force and compulsion.” (*Civil Wars* 1.3) By choosing the title dictator as opposed to the title tyrant or king, Sulla tried to dissemble the significance of his true nature of his rule, that of a tyrant, because the leading men of the city would have taken offence to it. While Sulla wished to appear to be diminishing his power by adopting the title of dictator, in reality he was enlarging it. Although Sulla had indeed held the *imperium* before Cicero he only managed to acquire it through the force of arms. Thus we could say that Cicero was the first to *lawfully* hold the office of dictator after the *Third Hannibalic War*, since the senators who had elevated Sulla had been thoroughly intimidated. According to Mommsen, Sulla adopted the title of *dictator* in order to create the nuance of the old dictatorship, something more favorable to the ruling class at the time. In reality, Sulla’s dictatorship restored the old monarchy of the Tarquin’s in all but name. In fact, because the office had no heredity precepts, it would best be called Rome’s first tyranny. The word tyrant is not applied to hereditary sovereignties like kings, for the term regards the
irregular way in which the power was gained, than the way in which it was exercised, Tύραννος, an absolute sovereign, unlimited by law or constitution. Sulla’s contemporary apologists vindicated him under the slogan:

_Satius est uti regibus quam uti malis legibus._

It is more satisfying to profit one-self by means of kings than by bad laws.

_(Rhetorica ad Herennium 2.40)_

This slogan indicated both that one should not lament the loss of the constitution since kings are just as beneficial as bad laws and that Sulla was all but a king. At any rate, Sulla having reconstituted Rome and effectuated the _Leges Corneliae_, ascended as an absolute monarch and his first act was to annihilate his opposition by means of a list of the “proscribed,” called a _proscriptio_ from _proscribo_, to make public by writing, publish, proclaim, announce. The _proscriptio_ was a list of names posted by Sulla in the Forum. Anyone whose name appeared on this list could be killed by anyone else and, he who carried out the evil deed would receive a reward for having done so. In fact, one could even obtain a reward by indicating the hiding place of one so proscribed. The victim’s property was expropriated to the State to be disposed _subhastio_; colloquially _sub hasta_, i.e., at auction, with political disabilities vested on his children and grandchildren. By the end of Sulla’s reign, according to Valerius Maximus, an estimated 4700 people had been so proscribed. (The History of Rome 102) After Sulla, neither Catiline nor Crassus were required to return their ill gotten gains. “The man who had slain Lucretius at the instance of Sulla, and another who had slain many of the persons proscribed by him, were tried for the murders and punished, Julius Caesar being most instrumental in bringing this about. Thus changing circumstances often render very weak even those once exceedingly
powerful. This matter, then, turned out contrary to most people’s expectation, as did also
the case of Catiline, who, although charged with the same crimes as the others (for he,
too, had killed many of the proscribed), was acquitted. And from this very circumstance
he became far worse and even lost his life as a result.” (*Historiae Romanae* 37.10.2-3)

Sallust says,

*Sed postquam L. Sulla armis recepta re publica bonis initiis malos eventus habuit,
apere omnes, omnes trahere, domum alius, alius agros cupere, neque modum
neque modestiam victores habere, foeda crudeliaque in civis facinora facere.*

But after Sulla seized the Republic by means of arms, having made a bad end
from good beginning, all men robbed, all men pillaged, some desired houses,
others lands, the victors had neither limits nor moderation, committed filthy and
cruel deeds on the citizens. (*Bellum Catilinae* 11.4)

The story of the Catilinarian conspiracy preserved in the writings of the historians of the
late Roman Republic, the scribes of the Roman church, the writings of the Church fathers
and eventually transmitted to us the writings of the Renaissance humanists. After the
Renaissance humanists, however, the interpretation of the texts began to change until
Catiline was transformed from a villain of classical antiquity through Ibsen’s work into
the hero of the modern bourgeoisie.

Leonardo Bruni retells this story, in part, in his *History of the Florentine People*
(1416). According to him, Florence was first colonized by Sulla’s veterens. “Not many
years before Sulla’s dictatorship, there was a general rebellion among the peoples of Italy
against the Romans.” (1.2) What resulted was the *Social War*. Sulla quashed the
rebellion and areas adjacent to the ruins of Tuscany, Asculum, Faesulae were colonized
by his agents. He credits both Cicero and Sallust for recording these events and the existence of the colonies. “[They] built grandly and created great households, gave large and luxurious banquets with abandon, and soon were buried in debt. To free them from this burden, Sulla himself would have had to return from the dead...At this very time...Catiline in Rome was formenting revolt.” (1.4-1.7) Ben Jonson’s drama *Catiline: His Conspiracy* (1611) begins with Sulla’s ghost arisen which, after haunting Rome like a specter, enters “the darkest bosoms” of Rome, which happens to be Catiline’s at the time.

Dost thou not feel me, *Rome*? not yet?...

Can SYLLA’S Ghost arise within thy walls,

Lesse threatening, then an earth-quake, the quick falls...

Thy darker bosome enter SYLLA’S spirit:

All that was mine, and bad, thy breast inherit...and I feele

A spirit, within me, chides my sluggish hands

And sayes, they haue beene innocent too long. (*His Conspiracy* 80-81)

Though many of Seneca’s tragedies are known to begin with specters and ghosts, Jonson’s apparition was undoubtedly taken from Cicero’s remarks to the effect that if Sulla’s veterans, who had squandered their wealth on luxuries, and now sought, through the Catilinarian conspiracy, to make a putsch on the consulship, wanted to be out of debt:

*Si salvi esse velint, Sulla sit eis ab in feris excitandus.*

If they wish to be saved, Sulla himself would have to arise from the dead.

(*2 In Catilinam* 20)

Jonson borrowed the phrase from Bruni who borrowed it from Cicero. Ibsen lost the thread. Though it has been said that Ibsen knew no dramatic works before he wrote...
Catiline (1850), he began with a similitude of Jonson’s ghost. Instead of Sulla’s ghost arisen entering “the darkest bosoms,” a voice speaks from the beginning to Catiline from within. This similitude is strange since although Ibsen repeats Jonson’s metaphor of a wicked soul entering Catiline, he fails to employ Sulla’s ghost as it was set forth in Cicero’s oration.

I must, I must a voice commands me thus

from my soul’s depths, and will follow it...

a secret nation smolders in my breast. (*Ibsen’s Catiline* 127-28)

Catiline is, in this instance, Ibsen himself, of course, speaking through the persona of Catiline. Ibsen, and the dramatic trend that followed him, took the historical persona of Catiline not as a *bona fide* character of history, but as merely an abstract character of literature which could be molded to suit their own rhetorical needs and used as a mouthpiece for their own political programs. Ibsen’s *Catiline* was written in 1850, just after the upheavals in of 1848, when he was only 21 years of age. Born in Skien, Norway, Ibsen’s father Knud was a member of the upper echelons of the merchant bourgeoisie who own a general store and an import business. According to a census taken at the time, Ibsen’s family was the 17th wealthiest in the town of 2000 people. Between 1834 and 1836 much of the Ibsen family’s business was shut down by authorities and Knud, having fallen deeply into debt, was forced to sell much of the family’s possessions and his business came to an end. This gave Henrik “the sense of having been cruelly deprived of his rightful place in life by an unjust fate.” Clearly, Henrik Ibsen had bound-up his ego with his nearly aristocratic early up-bringing for after
his social decline “he refused to accept as equals or develop any kind of friendship with the poorer children.”

Ibsen left school in 1843 when he was fifteen and became an apprentice to a pharmacist in the town of Grimstad where, five years later, he wrote *Catiline*. At sometime within this period he became acquainted with the writings of Voltaire and had gathered around him a small group of friends, Due and Schulerud, who wrote poetry, political pamphlets and read aloud together. Ibsen became an atheist and a republican under the influence of the writings of Voltaire and began to express his “bitter ill will” towards those with “empty brains with full purses.” In 1848 he became enthusiastic about the February Revolution in France and began to speak against all emperors, tyrants and kings and in favor of republicanism while the historical persona which would become the protagonist in his first play, and to whom Ibsen would soon identify himself, was the *criminis auctor* that destroyed the Roman republic and paved the way for the empire.

--Yes, freedom, it is freedom I’ll create,

as pure as one time in the bygone days. (*Ibid.* 181)

Ibsen’s understanding of the conspiracy of Catiline was not particularly deep. While still in Grimstad, Ibsen studied both Cicero’s invectives against Catiline and Sallust’s *Bellum Catilinae*. “He read these from the perspective formed by the political events of 1848 and his own financial and social circumstances, and developed a completely different view of Catiline from the one Sallust and Cicero sought to convey.” (*Ibid.* 4-8) Save Mommsen, the true Catiline became lost after this work of Ibsen.
III. Narrative

Sallust begins narrative:

*Omnis hominis, qui sese student praestare ceteris animalibus, summa ope nite
decet, ne vitam silentio transeant veluti pecora, quae natura pronas atque ventri
oboedientiam finxit.*

All men, who are themselves eager to surpass other animals, are fit to strive with
all their might, not pass life in silence just as cattle that have been made by nature
groveling and obeying the belly. (*Bellum Catilinae* 1.1)

But man is also a slave to the belly. Poverty hurts. Starvation compels man to satisfy the
demands of the belly. It is, in fact, only when man’s material needs have been satisfied
that man become free to excel the other animals. Sallust was not starving when he wrote
these lines. The opening remarks to the *Bellum Catilinae* are also a self-disclosure
indicating not to which social class he belongs, but to which social classes he does not
belong. He does not belong to the social class of the slaves nor to the class of free labor,
the proletariat. Though Sallust attributes subservience to the belly as being caused by
Nature, he neglects to mention the real cause for his own leisure. In truth, it is through
the high civilization that he lives in, by means of the class system, has satisfied his
material needs. The state that Sallust lived in was class stratified with slavery at its base.
Sallust himself was neither in the lowest class nor in the highest class, but was
somewhere in between them. Both the laboring class and the slave class toiled to satisfy
the immediate hunger pangs of the belly. They were subservient to it while Sallust was
not. Though it is true there were some exceptions to this, the *proletarii*, the *servi*, and the
libertinii were most likely illiterate. The historian Polybius was one exception to this rule. He was seized by the Romans during the *Third Macedonian War* (166 B.C.) and was transported to Rome where he, in a condition of servitude, was forced to remain in Rome and tutor the younger Scipio. After having been held 17 years he was allowed to return to Greece in 150 B.C. The vast majorities of the members of the lower classes oppressed by the nobility were illiterate and as such had no voice with which to narrate history. There are no extant slave narratives in either of the Greek or Latin tongues emanating from the Roman Empire. Even the Roman slave Polybius who wrote in Greek *The Histories*, covering the period from the *Second Punic War* to the conclusion of the *Third Punic War* (220-146 B.C.), made no mention of his own condition in servitude. We learn from Herodotus that the famous writer of fables, Aesop, was a slave to Iadmon at Samos. It is unknown who murdered him, but “when the Delphians, in obedience to the command of the oracle, made proclamation that if any one claimed compensation for the murder of Aesop he should receive it, the person who at last came forward was Iadmon, grandson of the former Iadom, and he received compensation.” (*The History* 2.134) Of course we know that Plato was once sold as a slave, but was redeemed by his wealthy friends who provided him with a *patrocinium* to found the Academy at Athens. On his first voyage to Sicily, he was raped by the tyrant Dionysius II (c. 397-343 BC)

‘Ότε καὶ Διονυσίους ὁ Ἐρμοκρατοὺς τυραννὸς ὄν ἠναγκάσεν ὥστε συμμιξαί αὐτῷ.

And on this occasion, when Dionysius son of Hermocrates, then tyrant, forced him to have intercourse with him. (*Plato* 3.18)
“But when Plato held forth on tyranny and maintained that the interest of the ruler alone was not the best end, unless he were also preeminent in virtue, he offended Dionysius, who in his anger exclaimed ‘You talk like an old dotard.’ ‘And you like a tyrant,’ rejoined Plato. At this the tyrant was furious and at first was bent on putting him to death; then, when he had been dissuaded from this by Dion and Aristomenes, he did not indeed go so far but handed him over to Pollis the Lacedaemonian...with orders to sell him into slavery. And Pollis took him to Aegina and there offered him for sale...Anniceris the Cyrenaic happened to be present and ransomed him for twenty minae—according to others thirty minae—and dispatched him to Athens to his friends, who immediately remitted the money.” (Plato 3.19-20)

Indeed Sallust uses many pretty words. He leads us to believe, to trust, that such words or moral rectitude could have only come from the most upright of men. He passed moral judgment on mankind and, at the same time, excused himself from scrutiny. Sallust as an author, and as a moral being, was beyond reproach. Like a god he lectures the reader on virtue. This cannot but help build trust between the author and the reader. With these remarks Sallust exalted himself and his work. The reader becomes a co-traveler with Sallust’s soaring virtue by affirming that Sallust himself is no animal. Though it may have been unintended, correspondences could be drawn between the actual social classes and Sallust’s metaphors: ‘gods’and ‘brutes. Sallust’s metaphor indicates that the ruling class corresponds to the linguistic signs, the analogy: god = mind = rulers and the proletariat corresponds to the analogy: body = brutes = workers.

Sed nostra omnis vis in animo et corpore sita est: animi imperio, corporis servitio magis utimur; alterum nobis cum dis, alterum cum beluis commune est. Quo mihi
rectius videtur ingeni quam virium opibus gloriam quae rere et, quoniam vita ipsa, qua fruimur, brevis est, memoriam nostrorum quam maxime longam efficere. Nam divitiarum et formae gloria fluxa atque fragilis est, virtus clara aeternaque habitur. Sed diu magnum inter mortalibus certamen fuit, vine corporis an virtute animi res militarum magis procederet. Nam et, prius quam incipias, consulto et, ubi consulueris, mature facto opus est. Ita utrumque per se indigens alterum alterius auxilio eget.

All our power is situated in the mind and the body: to a great degree we employ the soul to rule, the body to serve; one is common to us with the gods, the other with the beasts. Wherefore it seems correct to me to seek glory with the help of the intellect than by strength and, whereas life itself, which we might enjoy, is brief, to make our memory last long. For to have the glory of riches and of beauty is fleeting and fragile, but virtue brilliant and eternal. But long ago there was a great struggle among mortals, wherether the strength of the body or virtue of the soul would prosper greater in military affairs. For both you must plan before that which is first and when you have planned act when the deed is ripe. In this way each through itself needs the help of the other. (Bellum Catilinae 1.7)

He questions his own remarks: “Each of these [mind and body] is incomplete in itself.” (Ibid. 1.7) Sallust develops this dichotomy as a kind of historical dualism. “In the beginning kings took different courses, some training their minds and others their bodies.” (Ibid. 2.1) In so doing, he admitted that the rulers, who by nature correspond to the mind, virtue and god, could, as individuals, correspond to either mind, body, or vice. This is a somewhat contradictory metaphorical mixture by his previous tenets and,
nevertheless, shows Aristotle’s influence on his thinking. “The soul rules the body with the sort of authority of a master: mind rules the appetite with the sort of authority of a statesman or a monarch.” (The Politics 1254b)

Freud, on the other hand, said that there are three basic types of human personality: the erotic personality, the narcissist personality and the ‘man of action’ personality. “The man who is primarily erotic will choose emotional relationships with others above all else; the narcissistic type, who is more self-sufficient, will seek his essential satisfactions in the inner working of his own soul; the man of action will never abandon the external world in which he can assay his power.” (Civilization and Its Discontents 40) Thus, according to Freud’s psychoanalysis, the mindful are narcissistic and the brutes are men of action. Naturally the erotic are somewhere in between them, but each personality type is, by itself, a mixture of all these traits with but one trait overwhelming all the others. Sallust himself was, clearly, a narcissist, though he denies it, but Catiline, on the other hand, was a man of action—a brute.

Ceterum ex aliis negotiis, quae ingenio exercentur, in primis magno usui est memoria rerum gestarum. Cuius de virtute quia multi dixere, praetereundum puto, simul ne per insolentiam quis existimet memet studium meum laudando extollere.

This one out of the other occupations, which are pursued by the intellect, in the first place the producing of things of history is of great use. Of whose virtues I presume to pass over since many have spoken of them, at the same time, that someone not suppose that I through insolence extol my study.

(Bellum Jugurtha 4.1-2)
Ironically, though Cicero was too a narcissist, in the end of the Catiline affair he begins to praise himself as a man of action, proving the unity of these traits in the personality. “My conduct of this whole matter may be thought to display both foresight and action.” (3 In Catilinam 18) Since by what means a man makes choices in life, according to Freud, is guided by pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain; it would seem that he and Aristotle could agree. “For pleasure and pain extend throughout the whole life, and are of great moment and influence for virtue and happiness; since men choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful.” (Nichomachean Ethics 10.1.1) For the narcissist, pleasure is obtained and pain avoided, through intellectual pursuits, the “men of action” through the vain pursuit of many useless things of the material world, ‘the dunya’. What the erotic pursue goes without explanation, but Catiline represented a fusion of the “man of action” and the erotic personality. The fact that Catiline left no written works, assayed his power imprudently, and committed many nefarious crimes compelled by lust testifies to this fact. Though Cicero would later be praised as “a man of action,” he manifests this through oratory in the political arena, a quintessentially narcissistic activity. Meanwhile Blok along with Ibsen would appear to fuse the erotic with the narcissistic.

Although Sallust was the primary historian of the Bellum Catilinae, it is important to understand that Cassius Dio, in his time, may have had access to texts which are non-extant today. We cannot dismiss his work or presume that his narrative is corrupt on the grounds that it differs from Sallust or that it merely comes after Sallust. Indeed just as Greece was the conscience of all of Latium, and Greek historians are the lie detectors and reality-testers of contemporaneous Roman historians, they all together make-up, in the
process, the scientific history of the period. Just as Rome cast a backward glance on
Greece as its own antecedent, and the study of Livy casts a backward glance on Polybius;
Cassius Dio looks back on Sallust, Cicero, Plutarch, et al, summing-up the entire period.
Greek historians not only made-up the basis and the prototype for the Roman historians;
they also checked their progress along the way, summing it up again at the very moment
their own culture faded. Rome would go on. Just as Greek culture made Roman culture
possible in the first place, later they made it possible for us to learn of it and understand
it. Our debt to Cassius Dio, then, is immense; and we could say as much for Plutarch.
Appian’s history too must be consulted not so much for the history of the Bellum
Catilinae itself, but for what led up to it and for what followed it, both for its causes and
its consequences. We cannot, therefore, just take Sallust’s version as the primary history
and be done with it. We need Cassius Dio, and Plutarch, to capture the high ground, to
gain perspective. Polybius stands as something to which Livy must be compared; Sallust
too must be compared to Plutarch and Cassius Dio. Cicero is a primary source for the
history of the Bellum Catilinae, but we must also keep in mind that Cicero had numerous
vested against Catiline’s conspiracy. Both his social position and his personality
contended directly with those of Catiline and become the principal bones of contention
for those who wish to dispute the veracity of the history as it has been handed down.
Nevertheless, Cicero is the primary source for the history, Sallust is the primary historian.
“History is thus the believing someone else when he says that he remembers something.
The believer is the historian; the person believed is called his authority.” (The Idea of
History 235) According to Sallust, after Sulla gained control of the state by means of
arms and brought everything to a bad end from a good beginning, avarice controlled the people.

*Sed primo magis ambitio quam avaritia animos hominum exercebat, quod tamen vitium propius virtutem erat. Nam gloriam, honorem, imperium bonus et ignavus aeque sibi exoptant; sed ille vera via nititur, huic quia bonae artes desunt, dolis atque fallaciis contendit. Avaritia pecuniae studium habet, quam nemo sapiens concupivit: ea quasi venenis malis imbuta corpus animumque virilem effeminat, semper infinita, insatiabilis est, neque copia neque inopia minuitur. Postquam divitiae honori esse coepere et eas gloria, imperium, potentia sequebatur, hebescere virtus, paupertas probro haberi, innocentia pro malivolentia duci coepit.*

But, at first, great ambition, rather than greed, occupied the minds of men, which was, nevertheless, a vice nearer to a virtue. For glory, honor, power the good and the cowardly equally desire; but the one strives by way of the truth, the other destitute of the good arts, by fraud and deceit contends. Greed has money as its object, which no wise man has desired: it, as if imbued by a deadly poison, feminizes the manliness of the body and soul, it is always infinite and insatiable, diminished neither abundance nor indigence. As soon as riches came to be honors and themselves a glory, dominion, and power followed, virtue became blunt, poverty was held shameful, innocence began to be taken for malevolence.

*(Bellum Catilinae 11-12)*

Men like Catiline pillaged and squandered. “To such men their riches seemed to me to have been but a plaything; for while they might have enjoyed them honorably, they made
haste to squander them shamefully…they slept before they needed to sleep; they did not await the coming of hunger or thirst, of cold or of weariness, but all these things their self-indulgence anticipated.” (Ibid. 13.2) In his lamentation for the virtue of bygone days, Sallust said of men like Catiline:

\[ Quibus profecto contra naturam corpus voluptati, anima oneri fuit. \]

For whom, truly, contrary to nature, the body was an enjoyment, the soul a burden. (Ibid. 2.8)

The ancients had a theory of a golden age which was a period of time wherein it was believed that all was right with the world which was followed by a period of social decline. Many of the Latin historians begin their *operae* with a description of this golden age and the social decline ending their preface with a few remarks on just how bad things had really become by the time anyone got around to writing about it. And when they had, the description of the contemporary horrors flows forth with such eloquence, wisdom and foresight that we today dismiss *their* golden age as *arcadianism* and irrelevant childish reverie. We ourselves ascribe instead the period of the writing of Latin history as *the* golden age which, according to our own schemata didn’t even begin until the writing of Sallust’s *Bellum Catilinae* (43 B.C.)—for the most ancient of the Roman historians Quintus Fabius Pictor (c. 254 B.C.) wrote in Greek, not Latin, and Livy’s monumental work *Ab Urbe Condita* was not begun until after 27 B.C. (Dating Livy’s First Decade 209) The oldest extant Latin text is Cato major’s *De Agricultura* (c. 150 B.C.) and was considered archaic by the time Sallust composed his *Bellum Catilinae* and is, nevertheless, not history *per se*. Thus there is 710 A.U.C. intervening years between the founding of Rome and the appearance of Rome’s first Latin historian. Although the
publication of Caesar’s *Commentarii de Bello Gallico* (50 B.C.) preceded that of the *Bellum Catilinae,* Caesar was a noted dissembler and a sophist, as Appian pointed out: “Caesar, who was a master of dissimulation, made speeches in the Senate.” (*Civil Wars* 2.10) Because of that fact and since his works are merely autobiographical, Caesar’s works are merely a source for history but not the work of a historian *per se.* Sallust then was not only the *first* Roman historian in the sense that he was the *best* Roman historian, but was also, incidentally, *chronologically* first in Roman history. On account of his epic poem the *Annals,* which purportedly related the events intervening between the Fall of Troy to the death of Romulus, some may hold Quintus Ennius (239-169 B.C.) as having been first Latin historian. Indeed though nominally historical his style was epic and, surviving in fragments and related to us through the works of other authors, he himself would be best described as a poet and a playwright. Though interest has declined in recent years, today many pedagogues of Latin and of Roman history have made the study of the *Bellum Catilinae* primary, but not on account of it being first in any way. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it seems that Sallust was taught either first, or very nearly so, for his *moral import* which for some reason was regarded important at the time.

The so-called golden age the Latin authors wrote about would have been in Rome’s earliest period, certainly before Romulus, or even Aeneas. If it ever existed, it would have been the time of the *Aborigines,* *ab* ‘from’ + *origio* ‘origin, source, beginning’ hence ‘from the origins or beginnings,’ thus *γεγενος*—*born of the earth* and hence not truly Roman, but Native. At any rate, according to Sallust, *inter alios,* there was a golden age of the ancient past before the time of Jupiter when Saturn ruled the
world. Men at that time were viewed as having been truly virtuous which was followed by a period social decline. It was a time to which all contemporaneous men and social institutions ought to be compared. In his *Georgics*, Virgil described it:

Ante Jovem nulli subigebant arva coloni;
ne signare quidem aut partiri limite campum
fas erat: in medium quaerebant, ipsaque tellus
omnia liberius nullo poscente, ferebat.

Before Jupiter, no farmers subdued the land.
It was the law not even to designate a field or to divide it with a path:
They sought out for the common good (sought out for the middle)
and the Earth yielded all things freely when no one demanded.

After man’s fall from grace:

Labor omnia vicit;
inprobus et duris urgens in rebus egestas.

Labor conquered everything;
necessity and hardship press urgently in man’s affairs. (1.145)

Indeed as Varro has it:


The first gods were Sky and Earth. These gods are the same as those who in Egypt are called Serapis and Isis…The same first gods were in Latium called Saturn and Ops. The Earth is Ops, because in this there is all work and from this
work comes life; and for that reason it is said Ops is mother, because the earth is mother. *(De Lingua Latina 5.57)*

But this of course is another way of saying that earth is property, since property is *ops*. Varro connects the Sky to Saturn from the word *satus* ‘sowing,’ *Ab satu est dictus Saturnus*, but Kent doubts this etymology. “*Saturn*; according to the myth, the most ancient king of Latium, who came to Italy in the reign of *Janus*; afterwards honored as the god of agriculture and of civilization in general; hence early identified with the *Kronos* of the Greeks.” *(Lewis and Short)* In his *Annals*, Tacitus, echoing Sallust, narrated along these lines.

> *Vetustissimi mortalium, nulla adhuc mala libido, sine probro, scelere eoque sine poena aut coercionibus agebant. neque praemiis opus erat cum honesta suo tempore ingenio peterentur; et ubi nihil contra morem cuperent, nihil per metum vetabantur. At postquam exuia aequalitas et pro modestia ac pudore ambitio et uis incedebat, prouenere dominationes multosque apud populos aeternum mansere.*

In the earliest days of the mortals, no one heretofore lived by evil desire, without shameful act or sin, conducted himself without punishment or compulsions. And work was done with honor not for rewards it would be sought after for its own sake, and when nothing was desired against custom, nothing through fear was prohibited. But, as soon as equality proceeded to be put off and, in the face of moderation and decency, ambition and strength was advanced, tyrannies arose and remained among many peoples. *(3.26.1)*

Just as Sallust before him had noted:
Igitur, initio, reges, nam in terris nomen imperi id primum fuit, divorsi pars ingenium, alii corpus exercebant: etiam tum vita hominum sine cupiditate agitabatur; sua cuique satis placebant. Postea vero, quam in Asia Cyrus, in Graecia Lacedaemonii et Athenienses coepere urbis atque nationes subigere, lubidinem dominandi causam belli habere, maxumam gloriam in maxumo imperio putare, tum demum periculo atque negotiis compertum est in bello plurumum ingenium posse.

Then, in the beginning, kings, for that was the first name of sovereignty in the lands, applied themselves differently; part the mind, others the body: still, in those times, the life of men was urged along without cupidity, everyone was satisfied with their own. But truly after Cyrus in Asia, in Greece the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians began to subdue cities and nations, to have desire for dominion a cause of war, to consider the greatest glory in the greatest Empire. Then the inhabitants by means of experiment, as well as affairs, were learning to be able to multiply natural abilities in war. (*Bellum Catilinae* 2.2)

Because of this, so says Tacitus, the peoples of the world required codes of law.

*Quidam statim aut postquam regum pertaesum leges maluerunt. Hae primo rudibus hominum animis simplices erant.*

Some at once, or after tiring of kings, preferred laws. These at first were for rough men of simple minds. (*Annals* 3.26.2)

What we find is that within each fledgling city-state arose a lawgiver. Tacitus notes Minos of the Cretans, Lycurgus of the Spartans, Solon of the Athenians, but we might as easily add Moses, or Draco. Zoroaster is the reputed lawgiver of Persia in its earliest
time. Mohammed was the lawgiver to the Muslims. There have been many lawgivers in the history of the world. Servius Tullius was the lawgiver of Rome:


Romulus ruled us as he pleased: then Numa united the people by means of religion and divine justice, somewhat refined by Tullius and Ancus. But Servius Tullius was primary lawgiver whom even kings were obedient. (Annals 3.26.3)

By the time of the Bellum Catilinae

Verum ubi pro labore desidia, pro continentia et aequitate lubido atque superbia invasere, fortuna simul cum moribus inmutatur.

Things were truly inverted: before labor, idleness, before continence and equity, desire and arrogance, fortune changed with morals. (Bellum Catilinae 2.6)

Even Livy noted, “Of late, riches have brought avarice, and excessive pleasures, the longing to carry wantonness and licence to the point of ruin for oneself and of universal destruction.”

Adeo quanto rerum minus, tanto minus cupiditatis erat.

By the same degree, the fewer one’s things, the less was his desire. (Ab Urbe Condita 1.1.12)

On account of these developments, Catiline, a product of sloth, greed, and ambition, gathered about him a number of young men to whom he taught the habits and techniques of the criminal mind. In addition to these men, Catiline enlisted the aid of a number of Sulla’s veterans, like himself. (Bellum Catilinae 16.1-4) Plutarch confirms
this. “It was the old soldiers of Sulla, however, who were most of all urging Catiline on to action.” (Cicero 14.2) According to Bruni, “Absorbed in their luxurious way of life…colonists lived, as Cicero tells us, without thought of the future…Meanwhile Sulla…not only left the dictatorship but passed out of this world. So, partly because of their poverty and partly because they were accustomed to getting rewards, they looked forward to some disturbance. Soldiers and men used civil war, they had no idea how to live in peacetime. Their thoughts ran ever to new dictatorships and new booty.” (History of the Florentine People 1.6)

In his second invective against Catiline, Cicero lays out the six types of men who supported Catiline. The first group were those “who have heavy debts and possess estates more than large enough to pay them…These men have the most respectable outward appearance—for they are wealthy—but their intentions and attitudes are quite unscrupulous…The second group consists of those overwhelmed by debt but still enjoy absolute power. They want to gain control of the government and think that revolution, perturbata or disturbance, can bring them offices of which they have no hope in times of peace…The third group…are men from those colonies which Sulla founded…who have used their sudden and unexpected wealth to give a display of luxury to which they were quite unaccustomed and which was beyond their means…they have run so deeply into debt that they would have to raise Sulla from the dead if they wanted to be in the clear…The fourth group is a motley assortment of trouble makers…These men, I would say, are not so much eager soldiers as reluctant defaulters…The fifth group is composed of parricides, assassins and every sort of criminal…The last group is…Catiline’s very own; his special choice…his most intimate friends. These men are the men you see with
their carefully combed hair, dripping with oil, some smooth as girls, others with shaggy beards…wearing frocks not togas…their waking hours are devoted to banquets that last till dawn…all the gamblers, all the adulterers, all the filthy minded lechers…boys so dainty and effeminate, have learnt not only to love and be loved, not only to dance and sing, but also to brandish daggers and sow poison.” (2 In Catilinam 18-23)

According to Mommsen, “the gangrene of a slave-proletariat gnawed at the vitals of the states of antiquity,” including that of Rome. It was especially coming to a head in 66 B. C. when, in addition to the robbing and squandering, the rural population was falling into debt, losing their property and crowding into the cities. Machiavelli said that Rome was a free state, because it had free origins. For, although Rome had been founded by foreigners, it was not founded as a colony of another republic or by a prince who sought to glorify his own name and hence had free origins. “The builders of cities are free when any people, either under a prince or on its own, are forced by disease, famine, or war to abandon its native land and seek a new home.” He credits Aeneas with having achieved this. (Discourses 19-20) Hegel disagrees. With respect to the founding of Rome and the events that occurred at the end of the Republic and the ascension of Julius Caesar to the imperium: “A state which had first to form itself, and which is based on force, must be held together with force. It is not a moral, liberal connection, but a compulsory condition of subordination, that results from such an origin.” (Philosophy of History 287) The argumentum ad baculum became his final argument against the Republic.

In 66 B. C., when Catiline returned to Rome, he was already the subject of charges leveled against him by the envoys from Africa based on atrocities he had committed there where he was propraetor in 67-66. Even before that, in 73, he was
accused of adultery with the Vestal Virgin Fabia. Quintus Latatius Catalus, consul in 78 and leader of the *Optimates*, testified in Catiline’s favor and he was acquitted. Furthermore, L. Annius Bellienus and L. Luscius, who had slain men during the proscriptions of Sulla, were tried for murder and convicted at the insistence of Julius Caesar. Catiline faced the same charges and was acquitted. Notwithstanding Cicero’s remarks to the effect that Catiline had been charged and acquitted at least twice (*Letters to Atticus* 59), Hardy says that the majority of the charges against Catiline “depended on mere rumor, had never been judicially investigated and were given inconsistently by other authorities.” Perhaps his remarks on this issue understate Catiline’s political power and the great amount of fear he instilled in the Senate and his propensity to dissemble effectively. Hutchinson says, “These accusations against Catiline lack conviction.” (*The Conspiracy* 35) Mommsen disagreed, because, according to him, Catiline was “accustomed to impose on his cowardly opponents by his audacious insolence…neither private persons nor officials ventured to lay hands on the dangerous man.” (*The History of Rome* 477-78) According to Plutarch, “even the heavenly powers seemed, by earthquakes and thunderbolts and apparitions, to foreshow what was coming to pass. And there were also human testimonies which were true, indeed, but not sufficient for the conviction of a man of reputation and great power like Catiline.” (*Cicero* 14.4) Cicero himself related a great number of portents, and a vision, which guided him through the whole affair. Herodotus said: “It mostly happens that there is some warning when great misfortunes are about to befall a state or a nation.” (*The History* 6.27)

C. MacDonald surmised the charges made against Catiline by ancient authors: “In his speech *in toga candida*, delivered in the summer of 64, Cicero alleges a series of
crimes committed over the past two decades. He says that at the time of the Sullan proscriptions Catiline had cut off the head of Marcus Marius Gratidianus and carried it through the streets of Rome, and that he had murdered Quintus Caecilius, Marcus Volumnnius and Lucius Tanusius; that he had been discreditably involved with the Vestal Fabia… that he had entered into an incestuous marriage with his daughter, whose name, Aurelia Orestilla, is supplied for us by Sallust. In the first speech against Catiline he adds the further allegation that after getting rid of his previous wife he committed another crime, the murder of his son. Two other writers add to this list. The author of he electioneering handbook, *commentariolum petitionis*, alleges that Catiline did away with his brother-in-law, a knight by the name of Quintus Caecilius, during the proscriptions. Plutarch relates that he killed his own brother and committed incest with his daughter.” (1 *In Catilinam* 3-7)

C. MacDonald faults Cicero for not including the urban plebs in his list of *criminis auctores*, but there is no evidence that the urban plebs, as a class supported him, or that any class in particular supported him; rather Catiline’s supporters were, in fact, divided along the lines to which Cicero spoke. MacDonald says that the Roman masses, at first, supported him, but his own annotations prove this to be incorrect. Indeed, Sallust records a total of eight social groups gripped by Catiline’s insanity. According to him, the first group was “the whole body of the commons through desire for change.” (*Bellum Catilinae* 37.1-11) Here, since Sallust himself uses the word “plebs,” it could be argued, then, that Catiline was indeed supported by them, at least for a moment, but it is clear that his feelings were not mutual in this regard, because Catiline was a *sophist* not an orator. “For what makes the sophist is not the faculty [of speech] but [his] moral purpose.”
(Rhetoric 1.1.14) Since, as it has already been established, Catiline was positively amoral; the body of the commons could have been persuaded to support Catiline but this in no way implies that Catiline had any love for them in return. “Let loving be defined as wishing for anyone the things which we believe to be good, for his sake and not our own…Wherefore one who wishes for another what he wishes for himself seems to be the other’s friend.” (Ibid. 2.4.1-4) Cicero says Catiline collected about him “a huge crowd of desperate men” (2 In Catilinam 8) not the entire class of the plebians. A crowd of desperate men is not a social class. In his first invective against Catiline, ad hominem, Cicero said: “What mark of family scandal is there not branded upon your life? What deplorable episode in your personal affairs does not help form your reputation? What lust has never shone in your eyes, what crime has never stained your hands, what shameful deed has never fouled your entire body? What young man that you ensnared with your allurements of your seduction have you not provided with a weapon for his crime or a torch for his passion?” (1 In Catilinam 13) Mommsen declared: “Catiline especially was one of the most wicked men in that wicked age. His villainies belong to the records of crime, not to history.” (The History of Rome 465)

Cicero had been an ally of Pompey’s, and an enemy of Sulla’s, since the time he served under Pompey in the war against the Marsians (B.C. 90-88). Plutarch says, incorrectly, that Cicero had served under Sulla when it was Pompey who had served under him (Cf. Cicero 3.2n1). Furthermore, on account of the fact that Cicero’s first defense was in favor of Roscius, one to whom his father had been proscribed by Sulla, Cicero fled to Greece for a number of years out of fear of Sulla. (Cf., Pro Roscio) It was there, in Athens, that Cicero cultivated his skills as an orator. After Cicero learned of
Sulla’s death, having first consulted the oracle at Delphi who urged him to follow his own nature and not the opinion of the multitude, he returned to Rome in 77 B.C. (Cicero 3.4-5.2) In 75 B.C. he was appointed *quaestor* and won many friends defending the Sicilians. (Ibid. 6.1-3) 66 he was appointed *praetor* and convicted a man close to Crassus named Licinius Macer. (Ibid. 9.2) Two or three days before the expiration of his praetorship he set a trial date for Manilius, a friend of Pompey’s, in such a way that Cicero could defend him on his last day in office. The tribunes were enraged and summoned Cicero to the rostra. (Ibid. 9.4-7)

In the 66 election for the consulship of 65, Autronius Paetus and Cornelius Sulla—a nephew of the great Sulla—were disqualified for bribery. They joined a secret league of men formed from the highest ranks of Roman society who sought to obtain power by any means necessary. It seems that Catiline also violated Machiavelli’s laws of conspiracy in several ways. The whole plot was fractured with fatal flaws from the very beginning due to Catiline’s disordered thinking and his tangled web of lies. According to Machiavelli it is difficult to develop a conspiracy beyond three or four persons in number. (Discourses 262) At Catiline’s first meeting at the home of Procius Laeca: “There were present from the senatorial order Publius Lentus Sura, Publius Autronius, Lucius Cassius Longinus, Gaius Cethegus, Publius and Servius Sulla, sons of Servius, Lucius Vargunteius, Quintus Annius, Marcus Procius Laeca, Lucius Bestia, Quintus Curius; also of the equestrian order, Marcus Fulvius Nobitor, Lucius Statilius, Publius Gabinius Capito, Gaius Cornelius; besides these there were many men from the colonies and free towns who were of noble rank at home.” (Bellum Catilinae 17.3-5)
Lucius Cotta and Lucius Torquatus ascended to the high office in 65 (Historiae Romanae 36.44.3) followed by Lucius Caesar and Gaius Figulus in 64. (Bellum Catilinae 17.1) Piso and Catiline were the principal actors in a plot to assail the Senate with armed men in the *putsch* of Jan. 1, 65 B.C. The newly elected consuls were to be put to death, Sulla and Paetus reinstated; Crassus was to be acclaimed dictator and Caesar the Master of the Horse. According to this sinister plan, Catiline was to await a signal to be given by Caesar upon a hint from Crassus, but Crassus was absent. (The History of Rome 466) Since this plot failed, they decided to postpone the action until Feb. 5th. Under the revised plan, they decided to murder not only the consuls but a number of senators as well. The conspiracy came to naught because Catiline gave the signal for the attack too early. The armed conspirators had not yet assembled in sufficient number to follow through with the plan, but Piso’s intentions became known to all. (Bellum Catilinae 18.1-8) “On that day the most dreadful crime since the founding of the city of Rome would have been perpetrated,” (Ibid. 18.8) Piso was defended by Crassus. “The Senate, however, had been quite willing to give him the province, wishing to remove this shameless fellow to a distance from the seat of government.” (Ibid. 19.1) Cassius Dio says that a decree would have been passed against the conspirators but the tribunes had opposed it thinking that a conviction against Piso would have caused a riot. Piso was sent on to Spain where he met his death. (Historiae Romanae 36.44.5)

At the time of the Bellum Catilinae, Pompey was absent from Rome, in the east, waging war on the kings of Pontus and Armenia. In 64, “Catiline wished to obtain first a strong base of operation, and therefore sued for the consulship” sued for the consulship hoping that he might share the office with Antonius, Marc Antony. The populace, having
recognized Antonius as a weak leader, who, as consul, would only add strength to the man next to him, chose Cicero over Catiline. (*Cicero* 11.1-3) During this time, the tribunes were introducing legislation that would have appointed a commission of ten men, a *decemvirate*, with unlimited power to rule Rome and all its territories. Antonius was one of those who favored the legislation. Pompey, so says Cassius Dio, returned to Rome in 63 where he was granted, at the insistence of Caesar and against the recommendation of Cato, the “trophy of the inhabited world” in honor of all his wars. “He did not, however, add any other title to his name, but was satisfied with that of Magnus alone, which he had gained even before these achievements. Nor did he contrive to receive any other extravagant honor.” (*Historiae Romanae* 37.20.4.-21.4)

In July of 63 B.C. Catiline again announced his candidacy, this time it was a cover for his *putsch* against the consulship, Cicero, and *res publica*. “According to Plutarch, Cicero postponed the day of the elections and summoned Catiline to the Senate to question him about his activities. Catiline reportedly made a spectacle of himself with remarks to the effect: “‘What dreadful thing, pray,’ said he, ‘am I doing, if when there are two bodies, one lean and wasted, but with a head, and the other headless, but strong and large, I myself become a head for this?’” (*Cicero* 14.6-7) Catiline’s parable was intended to signify the meaning that Catiline was the head of a body politic that was *lean and wasted*, due to its political poverty, and that the Roman republic, being *strong and large*, was headless with Cicero, or anyone besides Catiline, at its helm. Because of Catiline’s remarks in the Senate, Cicero became seriously alarmed and began wearing a breastplate under his tunic which he showed to the commons by loosing the tunic from his shoulders form time to time. (*Ibid.* 14.7-8) “When the day of the elections came and neither
Catiline’s suit nor the plots which he had made against the consuls in the Campus Martius were successful, he resolved to take the field and dare the utmost, since his covert attempts had resulted in disappointment and disgrace.” (Bellum Catilinae 26.5) “He again suffered defeat, this time at the hands of Decimus Junius Silanus and Lucius Licinius Murena…The highest office in the State…was not to be his by constitutional means, and it was the realization of this fact that turned Catiline into an active revolutionary…This was the only path now left open to him.” (1 In Catilinam 5-6)

Mommsen says that Catiline and Piso were the political tools of Crassus and Caesar. (The History of Rome 468) “[Cicero], in later years, when he had no reason to disguise the truth…expressly named Caesar among the accomplices.” (Ibid. 486) “In the affair of Catiline, which was very serious, and almost subversive to Rome, some suspicion attached itself to Crassus, and a man publicly named him as one of the conspirators, but nobody believed him. The conspirator Lucius Tarquinius confirmed the testimony of Volturcius and then implicated Crassus. (Bellum Catilinae 48.3-9) “Nevertheless, in one of his orations [non-extant] plainly inculpated Crassus and Caesar. This oration, it is true, was not published until both were dead; but in his treatise upon his consulship [non-extant], Cicero says that Crassus came to him by night with a letter which gave details of the affair of Catiline, and felt that he was at last establishing the fact of a conspiracy.” (Crassus 13.2) Machiavelli said about Caesar’s character, “Anyone who wishes to know what writers, when free, would say about him should see what they say about Catiline.” (Discourses 48) Mommsen said, “Anyone who impartially considers the course of the conspiracy will not be able to resist the suspicion that during all this time Catiline was backed by more powerful men.” (The History of Rome 488)
Having been defeated in all legal but not in all illegal means of securing a consulship for himself, Catiline redoubled his efforts. He drew together his band of conspirators and harangued them about the nature of the government to the effect that the wealth and power of the state were in the hands of the few and urged them to action. (*Bellum Catilinae* 20.1-17) In his speech to his conspirators Catiline denied in advance what he had already planned to do. “We have taken up arms, not against our fatherland not to bring danger upon others, but to protect our own persons against outrage.” (*Ibid.* 33.1) This is contradictory to the known fact that he, *inter alia*, intended to burn the city. “Catiline believed that he could tempt the city slaves to his side and set fire to Rome.” (*Ibid.* 24.4) He went on to blame the moneylenders for their ruin. This may at least in part be true. It is, after all, well known fact that usury was out of control in the Roman republic and that many had been ruined by falling into debt. Usury, *τὸ δανείζειν*, was illegal in Rome during the early period. According to Appian, “An old law distinctly forbade lending on interest and imposed a penalty upon any one doing so. It seems that the ancient Romans, like the Greeks, abhorred the taking of interest on loans as something knavish, and hard on the poor, and leading to contention and enmity. But since time had sanctioned the practice of taking interest, the creditors demanded it according to custom. The debtors, on the other hand, put off their payments on the plea of war and civil commotion. Some indeed threatened to exact the legal penalty from the interest-takers.” (*Civil Wars* 1.54) After the *Social War* the practice of usury was fought to a standstill in the courts. The usurers, in order to breach the logjam killed the praetor Asellio while he was making sacrifice to the god Castor. “The Senate offer a reward of money to any free citizen, freedom to any slave, impunity to any accomplice, who should
give testimony leading to the conviction of the murderers of Asellio, but nobody gave any
information. The money-lenders covered up everything.” (Ibid) Herodotus reported that
usury was also forbidden amongst contemporaneous Persians, “The most disgraceful
thing in the world, they think, is to tell a lie; the next worst, to owe a debt: because,
among other reasons, the debtor is obliged to tell lies. “ (The History 1.139) Aristotle
noted: “of all the modes of acquisition, usury is the most unnatural.” (The Politics 1258b)
Though the Greek would also add *hubris*, ‘υβρις, among the great breeches of social
decorum, something of which Catiline very much had.

The principal contradictory statement in Catiline’s speech to the conspirators,
however, was his reliance on the *succession* movements of the plebeians against the
patricians for Catiline was, after all, himself a patrician. The term succession, moreover,
implied that Catiline looked forward to a separation with Rome, as if to leave to found a
new city. It was through the *First Succession* movement (494 B.C.) that the *Tribunate of
the Plebs* was created. After this a *Tribunnus Plebis* was elected annually and is
considered to have been the first step toward democracy between the members of the
ruling classes. Catiline, obviously, intended nothing of the sort. As a supporter off Sulla
he could not have, since Sulla had abolished the tribunes and removed the juries from the
equestrian order and they were not restored until 70 B.C. by the consuls Pompey and
Crassus.

Catiline, in his speech, went on to contrast the wealth of his enemies with the
poverty of his friends. “We have destitution at home, debt without, present misery and a
still more hopeless future…Lo, here, before your eyes, is the freedom for which you have
longed, and with it riches, honor, and glory; Fortune offers all these things as prizes to the
victors. (*Bellum Catilinae* 20.2-17) Whereupon, Catiline promised his friends the abolition of their debts and the *proscription* of the rich. Here Catiline’s use of the word proscription shows he was still genetically tied to the politics of Sulla. In light of this, it would be difficult to articulate an argument to the effect that Catiline actually stood for something else besides Sulla’s political program. Clearly Catiline sought to imitate the proscriptions of Sulla. He was not a reformer, then, but a reactionary.

Not only that, but, Catiline’s belief that riches ought obtained by means of force, *ad baculum*, is diametrically opposed to the behavior Sallust, or any wise man, would recommend to his students. Sallust said:

[1] *Falso queritur de natura sua genus humanum, quod inbecilla atque aevi brevis forte potius quam virtute regatur. Nam contra reputando neque maius aliud neque praestabilius invenias magisque naturae industriam hominum quam vim aut tempus deesse. Sed dux atque imperator vitae mortalium animus est. Qui ubi ad glori am virtutis via grassatur, abunde pollens potensque et clarus est neque fortuna eget, quippe quae probitatem, industriam aliasque artis bonas neque dare neque eripere cuiquam potest. Sin captus pravis cupidinibus ad inertiam et voluptates corporis pessum datus est, perniciosa libidine paulisper usus, ubi per socordiam vires tempus ingenium diffuxere, naturae infermitas accusatur: suam quisque culpam auctores ad negotia transferunt. Quod si hominibus bonarum rerum tanta cura esset, quanto studio aliena ac nihil profutura multaque etiam periculos a ac perniciosa petunt, neque regerentur magis quam regerent casus et eo magnitudinis procederent, ubi pro mortalibus gloria aeterni fierent.*
On account of capability being governed by chance, rather than intellectual power, men bemoan the nature of their race in vain. For, on the contrary, you would find, by means of reflection, nothing greater, and nothing more excellent; and that the industry of human nature, rather than virtue, or time, to be lacking. But, the leader and master of life of the mortals is the soul. Which, when goes to glory by means of the path of excellence, is sufficiently powerful and capable and it is clearly not needing luck, which obviously is able to give neither probity, industry, or any other goods of the arts, nor to take them away. If on the contrary, it has been seized by by crooked desires for laziness and pleasures of the body it has been given to the bottom, serving itself a little while by pernicious desire, whence through indolence, time, strength, and constitution have passed away, weakness in nature is accused: the actors who are themselves to blame transfer it to circumstances. If, however, care for good things were as important to men, as fondness for the useless, as well as striving for things useless, and many dangerous and even destructive things, he would not be governed by circumstances more than he would govern them and from there would advance to greatness, where, instead of being mortal they would be made immortal by glory.

[2] *Nam uti genus hominum compositum ex corpore et anima est, ita res cuncta studiaque omnia nostra corporis alia, alia animi naturam secuntur. Igitur praecelara facies, magnae divitiae, ad hoc vis corporis et alia omnia huiusce modi brevi dilabuntur; at ingeni egregia facinora sicuti anima immortalia sunt. Postremo corporis et fortunae honorum ut initium sic finis est, omniaque orta occidunt et aucta senescunt: animus incorruptus, aeternus, rector humani generis*
agit atque habet cuncta neque ipse habetur. Quo magis pravitas eorum admiranda est, qui, dediti corporis gaudiis, per luxum et ignaviam aetatem agunt, ceterum ingenium, quo neque melius neque amplius aliud in natura mortalium est, incultu atque socordia torpescere sinunt, cum praesertim tam multae variaeque sint artes animi, quibus summa claritudo paratur.

For just as the race of man is composed of body and mind, in this way all our concerns and endeavors, some by nature would follow the body others the soul. Accordingly, beautiful appearance, great wealth, and to this bodily strength and everything of this kind after a short time pass away. Finally, of things of the body and of good fortune, whereas there is a beginning thus there is an end, all things rise and fall and things flourishing, decay: the uncorrupted soul, eternal, is the captain steering the human race; it holds all things together, but is itself held not held. Wherefore the great depravity of men is to be wondered at, who, having devoted themselves to the delights of the body, lead a life by means of luxury and indolence, with respect to the rest of their character [i.e. the mind], whither nothing better and nothing is greater in anything of mortal birth, they allow to grow stiff through neglect and negligence, especially when there are so many varieties of mental skills by means of which the highest reputation is obtained.

3 Verum ex iis magistratus et imperia, postremo omnis cura rerum publicarum minime mihi hac tempestate cupienda videntur, quoniam neque virtuti honor datur neque illi, quibus per fraudem iis fuit uti, tuti aut eo magis honesti sunt. Nam vi quidem regere patriam aut parentis, quamquam et possis et delicta corrigas, tamen importunum est, cum praesertim omnes rerum mutationes
caedem, fugam aliaque hostilia portendant. Frustra autem niti neque aliud se 
fatigando nisi odium quae rere extre mae dementiae est; nisi forte quem in honesta 
et perniciosa libido tenet potentiae paucorum decus atque libertatem suam 
gratificari.

Truly out of these things are magistrates and and dominions, and finally care of 
public affairs appear to me, at the present time, least of all desirable, since neither 
honor is given on account of virtue nor are those, who were benefit from them 
through fraud, safe or he more greatly respected. For indeed to rule our fatherland 
or our parents by force, although you may have the ability and in correcting 
wrongdoing, is, nevertheless, unsuitable, particularly changing the affairs [of 
State] through bloodshed [i.e. the cutting down of men], exile, and other things of 
the enemy, would be a monstrosity. But to press on in vain fatiguing oneself, and 
not the other, seeking nothing but hatred is extreme of madness unless a strong 
man gets pleasure, power out of poverty, honor, and also freedom, gratifying 
himself against one who is dishonest and dangerous. (Bellum Jugurtha 1-3)

With these remarks Sallust shows himself to be decidedly stoical. He is taking up 
a negative attitude towards the lord and bondsman relationship, but only in a way that 
avoided a trial by strength and the possibility of death; as had happened to both Cicero, 
Cato and many others before them, and after. “Stoicism is the freedom which always 
comes directly out of bondage and returns into the pure universality of thought. As a 
universal form of the World-Spirit, Stoicism could only appear on the scene in a time of 
universal fear and bondage.” (Phenomenology of Spirit §199) His ability, however, to 
withdraw from civic affairs was conditioned by his class standing. He could have only
withdrawn from the class struggle, the struggle in the Forum and at the Rostra, because he had some place to withdraw to, which, incidentally wasn’t merely into his own mind, but to an estate. His personal estate was made famous as the *Horti Sallustiani*, ‘gardens of Sallust.’ In contradistinction to this, we should note that was very much not the state of affairs for Sparticus, or the *servi* and the *proletarii* that he represented. “This trial by death, however, does away with the truth which was supposed to issue from it.” (Ibid. §188) At any rate, we have no doubt been repeatedly admonished by the wise sages of antiquity through their numerous *gnomae*, γνομαι, to pursue wisdom not wealth, for this it is said to be not only the path of the righteous, but also that of true happiness. “Sel-consciousness learns that life is essential to it.” (Ibid. §189) According to Seneca Minor hunger should be no obstacle and the question of death at the hands of the lord is to be resolved through retreat.

*Non est quod nos paupertas a philosophia revocet, ne egestas quidem. Toleranda est enim ad hoc properantibus vel fames...Dubitabit aliquis ferre paupertatem, ut animum furoribus liberet?*

There is no reason poverty should call us away from philosophy, not even indigence. In fact, when hastening to this we endure even hunger...Will anyone hesitate to bear modest means that he may liberate his mind from madness?

*(Epistolae 17.6)*

After all, it would take nothing less than a fool to fall in love with riches at the expense of wisdom.

*Kαι ως κεφαλαίω, ανοητον ευδαιμόνος ηθος πλουτου εστιν.*
And thus the ethos of the rich is the thought of success in the head of the senseless. (*Rhetoric* 2.16.3)

Though it does appear that Seneca did not practice what he preached since he was wealthy, at least he died well.

*Vitae est avidus quisquis non vult*

*Mundo secum pereunte mori.*

Greedy of life is he who when

the world dies is not willing to die with it. (*Thyestes* 883-4)

It is interesting to note however his use of the word *paupertas* which indicates a man of *small means* as opposed to the word he might have used, *inops*, which would have indicated a man without resources or is *needy*, literally *in*, without + *ops*, help: thus a man without help, but in need of it. “*Pauperis* from *paulus lar* ‘scantily equipped home’…*Dives* ‘rich’ is from *divus* ‘godlike person,’ who, as being a *dues* ‘god,’ seems to lack nothing. *Opulentus* ‘wealthy’ is from *ops* ‘property,’ said of one who has it in abundance; from the same, *inops*, ‘destitute’ is said of him who lacks *ops*, and from the same source *copis* ‘well supplied’ and *copiosus* ‘abundantly furnished.’” (*De Lingua Latina* 5.92) And we learn elsewhere from Varro that the alteration of words can “come about by the loss or the addition of single letters and on account of the transposition or the change of them.” (*Ibid*. 5.6) Thus we could deduce that *ops* might have been related to *pos* ‘having power’ by way of transposition of the vowel, thus *inpos* ‘lacking power.’ (*Ibid*. 5.4) “The mere making of sounds serves to indicate pleasure and pain, and is thus a faculty that belongs to animals in general: their nature enables them to attain the point at which they have perceptions of pleasure and pain, and can signify those perceptions to
one another. But language serves to declare what is advantageous and what is the reverse, and it therefore serves to declare what is just and what is unjust.” (*The Politics* 1253a) We have learned from history that a man of small means possessed of literacy carries a voice with which to narrate it while those in need but without help have been scarcely possessed literacy and historically therefore have had no voice, were silenced. “For it is impossible, or at least not easy, to play a noble part unless furnished with the necessary equipment. For many noble actions require instruments for their performance, in the shape of friends or wealth or political power; also there are certain external advantages, the lack of which sullies supreme felicity, such as good birth, satisfactory children, and personal beauty: a man of very ugly appearance or low birth, or childless and alone in the world, is not our idea of a happy man, and still less so perhaps is one who has children or friends that are worthless, or who has had good ones but lost them by death.” (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1.8.15-16) With the coming of modernity, as opposed to antiquity, and with modernity the bourgeois revolution, and with the bourgeois revolution the welfare state, the historically *inopes* have for the most part been enabled at least to obtain a marginal level of literacy and thus enabled have become not wholly silent if they could find the means, ποιησις. “If he is too poor to provide himself with tools and other things he needs for his craft, his work will be worse.” (*Republic* 4.421d) Catiline, a man of means, chose not the course of wisdom and philosophy for he left no written works.

Catiline continued: “Thereupon he heaped maledictions upon all good citizens, lauded each of his own followers by name; he reminded one of his poverty, another of his ambition, several of their danger or disgrace, many of the victory of Sulla, which they had found a source of booty.” (*Bellum Catilinae* 21.2-5) In short, Catiline claiming the
advantage of the stronger promised to benefit his friends, harm his enemies, and see that justice be done. In Plato’s *Republic*, Simonides says that justice is giving each person his due, “friends owe it to friends to do them some good and no evil… owing from an enemy to an enemy what also is proper for him, some evil…To do good to friends and evil to enemies.” (*Republic* 331e-332d) Later on, Thrasyphrakos claims: “The just is nothing else than the advantage of the stronger.” (*Ibid.* 1.338) By lauding each man by name, Catiline also addressed each man’s particular problem and promised to ameliorate that particular condition. This is decidedly different then promising to satisfy a single want shared by members of a single class; such as freeing the slaves and proscribing the rich, for instance. Indeed, since Catiline did not represent any particular social class, he could do nothing less than promise a particular benefit to each and every particular friend. After that, Catiline bound his criminals to the future crime with a crime. “[He] compelled the participants in his crime to take an oath, he passed around bowls of human blood mixed with wine.” (*Bellum Catilinae* 22.1-2)

*Vina mutato fluunt cruenta.*

Wine changed flowing into blood. (*Thyestes* 700-1)

Cassius Dio’s narration depicts the gravity of the crime. According to him, Gaius Antonius, a participant in the 1st conspiracy of 66 (*Ibid.* 21.3) who was co-consul along with Cicero, “Sacrificed a boy, and after administering the oath over his vitals, ate these in company with the others.” (*Historiae Romanae* 37.30.3) Although the extant historical narratives do not tell us which of the victim’s vital organs, besides the blood, were eaten, Hegel noted that to the ancients the bodily organs corresponded to certain gods and supernatural powers. “Plato even assigns the liver something still higher, something
which is even regarded by some as the highest function of all, viz. prophesying, or the gift of speaking of holy and eternal things in a non-rational manner.” (Phenomenology §326)

About this human sacrifice Florus would say: “Human blood, which they handed round in bowls and drank, was used as a pledge to bind the conspirators together—in itself an act of the utmost wickedness, were not the object for which they drank it still more wicked.” (Epitome 2.12.4) Although human sacrifice was outlawed in Rome and its territories in 97 B.C. (Cf. Reid 35), Polydore Virgil in his De Inventoribus Rerum (1499) said: “Those who conspire to commit some great crime do the same today.” (2.15.7-8)

Next, Catiline “himself was busy at Rome with many attempts at once, laying traps for the consul, planning fires, posting armed men in commanding places. He went armed himself, bade others to do the same, conjured them to be always alert and ready, kept on the move night and day...Finally, when his manifold attempts met with no success, again in the dead of night he summoned the ringleaders of the conspiracy.” (Bellum Catilinae 27.2-3) Quintus Curius was the weakest link. Unable to keep a secret, he revealed the whole plan to his mistress Fulvia who told a number of people. “All these facts, while they were still secret, were communicated to Cicero by Fulvia, a woman of quality. Her lover, Quintus Curius, who had been expelled from the Senate for many deeds of shame and was thought fit to share in this plot of Catiline’s, told his mistress in a vain and boastful way that he would soon be in a position of power. By now, too, a rumor of what was transpiring in Italy was getting about.” (Civil Wars 2.3) Naturally, the bad news eventually fell upon the ears of Cicero; and he began to regularly use Fulvia as an informant about Catiline’s criminal mechanizations. (Bellum Catilinae 23.1-4) Later, in 63 when Catiline again ran for consul, Cicero persuaded Quintus Curius to
reveal Catiline’s plan and immediately countered Catiline’s plot by first paying off Gaius Antonius and surrounded himself with a bodyguard. \(\text{Ibid. 26.3-4}\) According to Diodorus Siculus, Quintus Curius, after having been slighted by Fulvia, told her that within a few days she would be in his power and later, when they were drinking, she persuaded him to tell her what he had meant by that remark “and he, wishing in his infatuation to please her, disclosed the whole truth. She pretended to have taken what was said sympathetically and joyfully, and held her peace, but on the morrow went to the wife of Cicero the consul, and speaking privately with her about the matter reported what the young man had said.” \((\text{Library of History 12.40.5.1})\) According to Plutarch, while Catiline’s soldiers were assembling in Etruria, Crassus, Marcus Marcellus, and Scipio Metellus came to Cicero’s home on the night of Oct. 18 and, after having dined with him, an unidentified man brought Crassus some letters which were addressed to a number of different persons. One of those letters lacked a signature, but was addressed to Crassus, which he read. This letter reportedly warned Crassus of the bloodshed to come at the hands of Catiline and advised him to flee the city. In order to deflect suspicion from himself, so says Plutarch, Crassus handed over the letters to Cicero who convened the Senate at dawn. Cicero delivered these letters to the persons to whom they had been addressed and compelled each of them to read his letter aloud. All the letters told of the plot.

The Senate passed a decree Oct. 20 that placed charge of the state in the hands of the two consuls, Cicero and Antonius. Thus a decree of \textit{imperium} was conferred; Cicero was appointed \textit{dictator}; Antonius the \textit{master of the horse}. “The power which according to Roman usage is thus conferred upon a magistrate by the Senate is supreme, allowing
him to raise an army, wage war, exert any kind of compulsion upon allies and citizens, and exercise unlimited command and jurisdiction at home and in the field; otherwise the consul has none of these privileges except by order of the people.” (Bellum Catilinae 29.3) Such a decree of imperium had not been pronounced by the Senate at Rome since the Third Punic War (146 B.C.). The consuls, having been so empowered, were entrusted with all the power and the responsibility to save the city. Cicero surrounded himself with a bodyguard and began appointing officials to carry out his commands. (Cicero 15.1-16.1) Catiline, having learned of this, prepared to join Manlius in Etruria. Manlius took the field with a large army on the 27th of October (Bellum Catilinae 30.1) and began to inflame Etruria where many had lost their lands during the proscriptions of Sulla. The expropriated land had been settled by Sulla’s veterans. (Ibid. 28.1-4) Faesulae, in Etruria, was a Sullan stronghold, but many who had lost their lands during the proscriptions were also ready for war. (Ibid. 28.4) On Nov. 6, in the dead of night, Catiline, once again, summoned the leaders of the conspiracy to the house of Porcius Laeca where he suborned two knights, Gaius Cornelius and Lucius Vargunteius, into a plot to murder Cicero at his home. The informant Curius told Fulvia who told Cicero (Ibid. 27.4-28.2) who surrounded his home with a great many men. “Then, at the house of Laeca on that night, Catiline; you allocated the regions of Italy, you decided where you wanted each man to go, you chose those whom you were leaving in Rome and those whom you were taking with you, you assigned the parts of the city to be burnt…Two Roman knights were found to…kill me in my bed…Your meeting had scarcely broken up when I learned all this.” (1 In Catilinam 9) Cicero brought the matter to the attention of the Senate and the Senate took heed.
Cicero summoned Catiline to the Senate, who presented himself in one, last, and final dissemblance. “Catiline at first welcomed this heartily, as if supported by a good conscience, and pretended to make ready for trial, even offering to surrender himself to Cicero…Cicero, however, refused to take charge of him, [and] he voluntarily took up residence at the house of Metellus the praetor, in order that he might be as free as possible from the suspicion of promoting a revolution until he should gain some additional strength from the conspirators there in the city. But he made no headway at all, since Antonius shrank back through fear and Lentulus was anything but energetic.” (Historiae Romanae 37.32.1-3) “When he took his seat, Catiline, prepared as he was to deny everything, with down cast eyes and pleading accents began to beg the fathers of the Senate not to believe any unfounded charge against him…they must not suppose that he, a patrician, who like his forefathers had rendered great service to the Roman people, would be benefited by the overthrow of the government, while its savior was Marcus Tullius, a resident alien.” (Bellum Catilinae 31.7) Although Cicero was born in Arpinum he possessed full Roman citizenship. Catiline supposed to traduce him by calling him “a “New Man,” on account of his obscure birth (for so they call those who achieve distinction by their own merits and not by those of their ancestors); and because he was born in the city he called him “The Lodger,” by which term they designate those who occupy houses belonging to others.” (Civil Wars 2.2) His very presence in the Senate caused a great deal of unease. It seemed to them that Catiline was up to something nefarious but many were uncertain, considering his position and the position of his chief adversary, as to what to do about it. “No senator, however, would sit with him, but all moved away from the bench where he was.” (Cicero 16.4) He claimed that he was the
victim of calumny. In the Senate on Nov. 8, Cicero delivered his first invective against Catiline. (*Bellum Catilinae* 31.6) Thus spoke Cicero:


How long, Catiline, will you continue to abuse our patience? How much longer will this madness of yours mock us? When will your unrestrained audacity be brought to an end? Is it nothing that by night the Palatine is guarded, there sentinels in the city, the terror of the people, the union of all good men, the fortification of the Senate, has not the look and countenance of these things moved you? Do you not sense that your plans are lain bare? …O the times, o the morals! …This man lives. He lives? (1 *In Catilinam* 1-2)

Instead of following through with his threat to have Catiline executed; Cicero said, “We have a decree of the Senate…but it is locked up with the records like a sword buried in its sheath; yet it is a decree which you, Catiline, ought to have been executed immediately,” (*Ibid.* 4) Cicero magnanimously granted Catiline the option to leave the city. “Catiline, finish the journey you have begun: at long last leave the city: the gates are open: be on your way…Take all your men with you or, if you cannot take them all, take as many as you can…You cannot remain among us any longer; I cannot, I will not, I must not permit it.” (*Ibid.* 10) Diodorus Siculus said that: “Catiline, on being openly accused to his face
declared that under no circumstances would he condemn himself to voluntary exile without a trial. Cicero put the question to the senators, whether it was their wish to banish Catiline from the city. When the majority, abashed by the man’s presence remained silent, Cicero, wishing as it were to probe their sentiments exactly, turned the question and asked the senators next whether they would order him to banish Quintus Catulus from Rome. When with one voice they all shouted their disapproval and showed their displeasure at what was said, Cicero, reverting to Catiline, remarked that when they considered a man not deserving of banishment they shouted with all their might; hence it was evident that by silence they were agreeing to his banishment. Catiline, after stating that he would think it over in private, withdrew.” (Library of History 12.40.5a.1) Qui tacebant consentire videntur. Thereafter, Catiline stormed from the Senate vowing along the way to put out the fire of his enemies with a general devastation. (Bellum Catilinae 31.9) “He gladly withdrew on this excuse, and went to Faesulae, where he took up war openly. Assuming the name and dress of the consuls, he proceeded to organize the men.” (Historiae Romanae 37.2) Theophrastus’ character analysis of the ironic man, the dissembler, describes Catiline perfectly in this instance. The ironic or dissembling man is one “who goes up to his enemies and is willing to chat with them…He admits to nothing that he is actually doing, but says he’s thinking it over.” (Characters 1)

Catiline left Rome under the pretext of going into voluntary exile at Marseilles in order to spare Rome the calamities of civil war, but he had no intention of doing this in earnest until he later learned of the death of the conspirators he left behind in Rome. “He rushed from the Senate-house and went home. There after thinking long upon the situation…he left for the camp of Manlius with a few followers in the dead of night.”
(Bellum Catilinae 32.1) Omens and portents along with rumors of war flooded the city. According to Livy, during the consulship of Marcus Cicero and Gaius Antonius several things were struck by lightening: “Bronze tablets containing laws were struck by lightening and the letters melted. With these portents the abominable conspiracy of Catiline began.” (Ab Urbe Condita 14.303) Cassius Dio also recorded the occurrence of many portents during the consulship of Antonius and Cicero, among them were thunderbolts, earthquakes, human apparitions, flashes of fire in the west. “Even a layman, was bound to know in advance what was signified by them.” (Historiae Romanae 37.25.2) A great many people were about to die. The Senate announced a reward for any information about the plot, the gladiators were quartered on Capua; Rome was at watch night and day. Gloom and apprehension replaced gaiety. (Bellum Catilinae 29.1-31.3) On Nov. 9, the next day Cicero addressed the people, delivering his second invective against Catiline, ad populum.

Nulla iam pernicies a monstro illo atque prodigio moenibus ipsis intra moena comparabitur...Palam iam cum hoste nullo impediente bellum iustum geremus.

No longer will the destruction of our very walls be prepared within the walls itself by that monstrous and reckless man thither...Now we will openly wage a just war without impediment against the enemy. (2 In Catilinam 1)

Cicero had outsmarted him militarily as well as politically. Catiline was no longer able to rely on the activities of ordinary citizens neither as a cover for his clandestine military activity nor was he able dissemble to, and confuse, the people directly. Once drawn out into the open field, as Cicero repeatedly said murus interest ‘a city wall is between us’ (2 In Catilinam 17 et passim), it was easier, both to the people, ad populum, and to the
Senate, *ad senatum*, to distinguish friend from foe and when it came to war the innocent would be spared.

As a delay tactic, Manlius sent an attaché, along entourage, to Marcius Rex declaring that Catiline’s men had not taken up arms against the fatherland, but to defend themselves from outrage. “We ask neither for power nor riches…but only for freedom.” (*Bellum Catilinae* 32.3-33.5) In addition to these letters, Catiline also sent letters to the consuls and many nobles “saying that he was the victim of false accusations and unable to cope with the intrigues of his person enemies, he bowed to fate and was on his way to exile at Massilia.” (*Ibid.* 34.2) In a different letter addressed to Quintus Catulus: “Maddened by wrongs and slights…I followed my usual custom and took up the general cause of the unfortunate.” (*Ibid.* 35.1-3) Although, in this letter to Catulus, Catiline claimed he had taken up the cause of the unfortunate, he had not actually done so, but distributed these documents to feign his victim hood, as he had been doing all along. One of those letters was in fact a ruse which was intended to signal the remaining conspirators to initiate the insurrection. On Nov. 17, the Senate had resolved to charge Catiline and Manlius with the *Plautian Law* which had been passed in 89 B.C. by M. Plautius Silvanus, tribune of the commons, and directed against acts of violence and breaches of the peace. (*Ibid.* 31.4-5, n. 4)

Plutarch said that one of the most dangerous criminals Catiline had left behind in Rome, in order to initiate the insurrection there at the appointed time, was Publius Cornelius Lentulus. This man was so shameless and arrogant that at one time, when he was under prosecution, he bribed the jury and, when acquitted by only two votes said “that what he had given to the second juror was wasted money, since it would have
sufficed if he had been acquitted by only one vote.” (Cicero 17.4) He was so utterly conceited that he went about Rome reciting forged oracles from the Sibyline books to the effect that Rome was fated to be ruled by three Corneliis. According to this urban legend Cinna and Sulla had been the first two and Publius, having the nomen ‘middle-name’ Cornelius was thereby destined to become the third. (Ibid. 17.5). “He also said that this was the year, the tenth after the acquittal of the Vestal Virgins and the twentieth after the burning of the Capitol, fated for the destruction of Rome and her empire.” (3 In Catilinam 9 et Bellum Catilinae 47.2) In order to effectuate this he conceived of a plan to kill all the senators and as many of the other citizens as he possibly could; while at the same time setting the city aflame and sparing only the children of Pompey whom he intended to hold hostage. The night of Saturnalia, December 19, was chosen for the insurrection; (3 In Catilinam 10) the weapons were quartered in the house of Cethegus, and a hundred armed men were stationed in strategic places around Rome ready to commit arson upon receiving the signal. Others were to stop the aqueducts and kill anyone who tried to bring water to extinguish the blazes (Cicero 18.1-3)

Meanwhile, two ambassadors of the Allobroges, a Celtic tribe oppressed by Rome and residing in Gaul, were intercepted by Lentulus and his gang who tried to persuade them to join the conspiracy and incite Gaul into revolt. (Ibid. 18.4-5). Sallust says it was Publius Umbrenus who sought them out. (Bellum Catilinae 40.1) At any rate, the Allobroges were outfitted with all sorts of letters to take to their Senate, which made all sorts of false promises regarding their freedom, and to Catiline which urged him to set the slaves free to march on Rome. (Cicero 18.6) Umbrenus reportedly said to them: “Why, I myself, if only you will show yourselves men, will disclose a plan which will enable you
to escape the great evils your are suffering.” And the Allobroges were overcome with vain hopes and replied that they would do anything if only the conspirators, when victorious, would abrogate their national debt. (*Bellum Catilinae* 40.3-4) And so the story goes, the Allobroges disclosed the plan to their national representative in Rome, Quintus Fabius Sanga, who told Cicero. (*Ibid.* 41.5)

The plot was rapidly unfolding. “Lucius Bestia, tribune of the commons, should convoke an assembly and denounce the conduct of Cicero…That was to be the signal for the rest of the band of conspirators to carry out their several enterprises…Statilius and Gabinius…were to kindle fires at twelve important points in the city…Cethegus was to beset Cicero’s door and assault him…The eldest sons of several families…were to slay their fathers. Then, when the whole city was stunned by the bloodshed and the fire, they were all to rush out and join Catiline.” (*Ibid.* 43.1-2) Cicero was hardly napping. He made arrangements with the Allobroges to visit Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, and Cassius to demand an oath from them which they could carry back with them to their countrymen in Gaul. They all complied except Cassius who promised to come to Gaul, but instead slipped away. (*Ibid.* 44.1-2) On account of the fact that many of the conspirators were licentious men who rarely met without wine, women and song, informants easily kept tack of their comings and goings and reported their findings to Cicero. Lentulus gave a letter to Titus Volturcius of Crotona and sent him along with the Allobroges who, on his way home, was to confirm to Catiline that an alliance had been made. An ambush set by Cicero’s men on Dec. 2, Lucius Valerius Flaccus and Gaius Pomptinus, captured Tius Volturcius at the Mulvian Bridge. (*Ibid.* 45.1) Cicero again convened the Senate the following day, Dec. 3, and tried the men. Volturcius, after having been granted a pardon
in exchange for his cooperation, gave details of the affair. (Bellum Catilinae 47.1 et 3 In Catilinam 8) The Senate read the letters and examined the informants who told of plots to kill three consuls and four praetors. Having been charged by the Senate with conducting an investigation, Caius Sulpicius, a praetor, discovered a huge cache of missiles, swords and knives at Cethegus’ house. Lentulus was convicted and resigned his office as praetor. (Cicero 18.6-19.4)

Cicero delivered his third invective against Catiline, to the people, Argumentum ad populum, explaining how the conspirators were caught. “Not to make a long story of it, citizens, we ordered the letter to be produced which each man was alleged to have given them [the Allobroges]. We first showed Cethegus his letter and he identified his seal. We cut the string and read the letter…Now, when his letter was read out, he stood paralyzed and smitten by his guilty conscience and suddenly fell silent…Statilius was brought in and identified his seal and handwriting. His letter was read out…He admitted writing it. Then I showed Lentulus his letter and asked whether he recognized the seal…There was read out the letter that he had written…I offered him the chance to say anything he wanted about its contents. At first he refused…Then, suddenly, his guilt made him lose his wits…Although he could have denied their statement, to everyone’s surprise he suddenly confessed.” (3 In Catilinam 10-11)

After Cicero explained all this to the throng outside the Senate, the people “who at first…had been so eager for war, faced about and denounced…Catiline, while they extolled Cicero to the skies, manifesting as much joy and exultation as if they had been rescued from slavery.” (Bellum Catilinae 48.1-2) The next day Lucius Tarquinius, who had been arrested while making his way to join Catiline, was brought back and upon a
pledge of immunity from the Senate confirmed the testimony of Volturcius and added that he had been sent by Crassus to advise Catiline not to be worried about the arrest of the conspirators but to return to the city to boost the morale of the rest, to return and free the captives. “Cicero learned of this beforehand and occupied the Capitol and the Forum by night with a garrison. At dawn he received some divine inspiration to hope for the best…Accordingly, he ordered the praetors to administer the oath of enlistment to the populace, in case there should be any need of soldiers.” (*Historiae Romanae* 37.35.3-4) Cicero’s vision is commonly referred to as his *Bona Dea* experience.

Many thought the charge made against Crassus was credible, “but thought that in such a crisis so powerful a man ought to be propitiated rather than exasperated.” (*Bellum Catilinae* 48.5) Many others, held in thrall to Crassus by economic means, condemned the charge and demanded that the matter be lain before the Senate and, upon a motion of Cicero, voted the testimony of Tarquinius to be false and demanded that he reveal the name of whom so ever had caused him to lie. Some said the charge was fabricated by Autronius, but others thought it was Cicero. Sallust himself testifies that Crassus told him personally, later on, that Cicero was behind the insult. (*Ibid.* 48.5-9) It has also been reported that Quintus Catulus and Gaius Piso, through bribes and political influence, tried to get Cicero to bring a false charge against Caesar to no avail. “Gaius Caesar was not free from suspicion of complicity with these men, but Cicero did not venture to bring into the controversy one so popular with the masses.” (*Civil Wars* 2.6) At any rate, the Senate resolved that the conspirators were guilty of treason. Decimus Junius Silanus, the consul-elect, suggested, at first, that the men be put to death, but later, he was persuaded by Caesar’s oration and changed his opinion and held thereafter that they should only
increase the guards to protect the city. According to Appian, Nero also spoke and he suggested that the men only be kept under guard until Catiline had been beaten in the field and that Cato openly suspected Caesar of involvement. (Civil Wars 2.5-6)

The matter was reopened for discussion. According to Sallust’s narrative, Caesar spoke first followed by the younger Cato. In his oration, Caesar urged the Senate not to be influenced by their emotions. “Kings and peoples under the influence of wrath or pity have made errors in judgment, he said.” (Bellum Catilinae 51.4) He went on by way of two examples derived from ancient sources: the first suggested that the Senate recall the experience of the Macedonian War against king Perses (168 B.C.) as a precedent where the elder Cato had persuaded the Romans not to retaliate against them for a wrong they had committed. The second example raised by him cited the numerous occasions that Rome had not immediately retaliated for great injustices committed against them by the Carthaginians during the Punic wars, but had, instead, first debated whether or not such a retaliatory action was consistent with Roman law. (Ibid. 51.5-6)

Caesar’s sophistical remarks: “If a punishment commensurate with their crimes can be found, I favor a departure from precedent; but if the enormity of their guilt surpasses all men’s imagination, I should advise limiting ourselves to such penalties as the law has established…If the humble, who pass their lives in obscurity, commit any offense through anger, it is known to few; their fame and fortune are alike. But the actions of those who hold great power, and pass their lives in a lofty station, are know to all the world.

Ita in maxuma fortuna minuma licentia est.

In this way, in great fortune is the least freedom. (Ibid. 51.8-14)
He then holds that the penalty initially suggested by Silanus, i.e., death, was foreign to the customs of Rome. Caesar’s sophism could be parsed thus:

(a) If a punishment equal to their crimes can be found, then

(b) depart from precedent.

(c) If the guilt of the conspirators surpasses all imagination, then

(d) punishment should be limited to what is allowed by law, and

(e) death is a relief from the woes of life, not a punishment.

Caesar maintained that the Senate must adhere both to precedent and to written law. Therefore, Caesar argued that no punishment equal to their crimes could be found and that the enormity of the guilt of their surpassed all men’s imagination. In short, death was too good for these people. He then went on to deploy a form of slippery slope argument by means of (a) digression on the history of the Peloponnesian war where Lacedaemonians instituted the rule of the Thirty Tyrants after defeating the Athenians, and (b) digression on Sulla:

Omni mala exempla ex rebus bonis orta sunt.

All bad precedents have originated in cases which were good. (Ibid. 51.27)

“It is possible that in another time, when someone else is consul, with this precedent before and is likewise in command of an army, some falsehood may be believed to be true. When the consul, with this precedent before him, shall draw the sword in obedience to the Senates decree, who shall limit or restrain him?”

In his digression on the Thirty Tyrants at Athens, he said: “They applied the scourge to citizens and inflicted the supreme penalty upon those found guilty. Afterwards the state reached maturity, and because of its large population factions prevailed; when
blamelessness began to be oppressed and other wrongs of the kind were perpetuated: then they devised the *Porcian Law* and other laws which allowed the condemned the alternative of exile. Do I recommend that the prisoners be allowed to depart and swell Catiline’s forces? By no means! This, rather, is my advice: that their goods be confiscated and that they themselves be kept imprisoned...further, that no one hereafter shall refer their case to the Senate or bring it before the people, under pain of being considered...to have designs against...the state.” (*Ibid.* 51.35-43) In view of the fact that Caesar was implicated in the plot, we ought to suspect that Caesar may have wished to free the suspects. If Caesar was indeed as powerful as many of the ancient sources claim, it is entirely possible that things could have been arranged so that the so-called ‘strongest of the free towns’ could have been induced to revolt. To this Cato replied in his speech that followed, “As if, indeed there were base criminal men only in our city and not all over Italy.” (*Ibid.* 52.15)

Caesar remarks to the effect that men of great power are less free than the downtrodden is reminiscent of the remarks made by Hiero, the tyrant of Syracuse (478-467 B.C.), to the poet Simonides. For example, “If it profits a man to hang himself, know what my finding is: a despot has the most to gain from it.” (*Hiero* 7.13) Caesar statement to the effect that life imprisonment in a strong city is a fate worse than death is an absurd contrary to fact remark, for, if this were true, the Roman people never would have enacted the *Sempronian Law*, which permitted the condemned the right of appeal to the people in capital cases, which was instituted to protect Roman citizens. Not only that, but the Roman religion, and therefore Roman custom, testifies to the pain of death and
the trials of the wicked condemned to Hell, as Virgil affirmed in his *Aeneid*. Seneca noted:

*Nulla avarita sine poena est.*

There is no avarice without punishment. (*Epistulae* 115.16)

Caesar falsely equated the propositions: ‘life is woe some’ with ‘death is relief,’ when clearly life is a relief from death and death is one of life’s woes. Anyone who sincerely believed Caesar’s argument would have killed himself immediately. We, however, hardly need Aristotle to remind us:

Φοβερωτατον δ’ ο θανατος

But death is the thing most feared. (*Nicomachean Ethics* 3.4.6)

Cato, who relied on the expedience of the cause toward justice, and his own moral character, spoke next: “The speakers appear to me to have dwelt upon the punishment of these men…but the situation warns us rather to take precautions against them than to argue about what we are to do with them…in the case of other offenses you may proceed against them after they have been committed; with this, unless you take measures to forestall it, vain will you appeal to the laws when once it has been consummated…nothing is left to the vanquished.

*Capta urbe nihil fit reliqui victis.*

One the city is seized, to the living nothing remains.

“I call upon you, who have always valued your houses, villas, statues, and paintings more highly than your country; if you wish to retain these treasures to which you cling, of whatsoever kind they may be…wake up at last and lay hold of the reigns of the state…Now…the question before us is not whether our morals are good or bad…but
whether all that we have, however we regard it, is to be ours, or with ourselves is to belong to the enemy…

*Iam pridem equidem nos vera vocabula rerum amissimus.*

Now we have indeed let slip true names of things long ago.

“It is precisely because squandering the goods of others is called generosity, and recklessness in wrong doing is called courage, that the republic is reduced to extremities.”

(*Bellum Catilinae* 52.4-12) Cato’s reference to the ‘true names of things’ is an allusion to a well known phrase belonging to Homer, as Plato recorded his *Cratylus*: “For the gods must clearly be supposed to call things by their right and natural names.” (391e) Thucydides noted that due to the dire necessities caused by the civil strife on account of the *Peloponnesian War*: “The ordinary acceptation of words in their relation to things was changed as men though fit.

*Ραον δ’ οι πολλοι καυργοι (οντες) δεξιοι κεκληνται
η αμαθεις αγαθοι·*

And therefore it was easier for the many bad people to be called clever than for the stupid to be called the good. (*Peloponnesian War* 3.82.7)

Truly Caesar’s rhetoric had the appearance of a well reasoned argument without having actually been so. His reasoning is unconvincing because we have all learned from Aristotle that “those things also are to be preferred, which men would rather possess in reality than in appearance, because they are nearer the truth.” (*Rhetoric* 1.7.38) Caesar created the semblance of truth with out actually reasoning out the truth. “In fine finished phrases did Gaius Caesar a moment ago before this body speak of life and death, regarding as false, I presume, the tales which are told of the Lower World, where they say
that the wicked take a different path from the good, and dwell in regions that are gloomy, desolate, unsightly, and full of fears,” Cato said. (*Bellum Catilinae* 52.13) Contrasting the virtues of their ancestors with the attitudes and habits of his contemporaries, Cato continued, “We have extravagance and greed, public poverty and private opulence. We extol wealth and foster idleness. We make no distinction between good men and bad.” (*Ibid.* 52.22) He also chastised Cicero because he “even let them go, taking their arms with them!” (*Ibid.* 52.27) As Aristotle said: “Since in the eyes of some people it is more profitable to seem wise than to be wise without seeming to be so (for the sophistic art consists in apparent and not real wisdom, and the sophist is one whom makes money from apparent and not real wisdom), it is clear that for these people it is essential to seem to perform the function of a wise man rather than actually to perform it without seeming to do so.” (*De Sophisticis Elenchis* 165a20) Caesar was one about whom we might say it was ‘more profitable to seem wise than to be wise,’ while of Cato we should remark that he was one who had found it profitable ‘to be wise without seeming to be so.’

Cato continued by way of example stressing the urgency of the decision because laws were of little use to people who are dead or a republic that no longer existed, and demanded that the conspirators be treated “after the manner of our forefathers.” (*Bellum Catilinae* 52.30-36) In this way, Cato relied on what Aristotle called the general law, “For it is evident that, if the written law is counter to our case, we must have recourse to the general law.” (*Rhetoric* 1.15.4) Aristotle himself cited Sophocles. “Antigone in Sophocles justifies herself for having buried Polynices contrary to the law of Creon, but not contrary to the unwritten law…and further, that justice is the real expedient.” (*Ibid.* 1.15.6) Having been thus persuaded, the Senate agreed that justice was indeed the real
expedient. “All the ex-consuls, as well as a great part of the other senators, praised the proposal and lauded his courage to the skies...Cato was hailed as great and noble, and a decree in the Senate was passed in accordance with his recommendation.” (Bellum Catilinae 53.1)

Cicero, who spoke last, delivered his fourth invective against Catiline to the Senate. “Their plan is that in the universal slaughter there should not survive a single individual even to mourn the name of the Roman people...informants have disclosed these facts, the accused men have confessed.” (4 In Catilinam 5) Cicero, in true democratic spirit, went on to refer the decision as to the fate of the conspirators to the Senate and revealed his true feelings on the matter. “If you adopt the motion of Gaius Caesar...I shall have less need to fear the attacks of the people because it is he who is proposing and advocating this motion; but if you adopt the alternative, I fear that more trouble may be brought down upon my head.” (4 In Catilinam 9) After noting Crassus’ absence from the proceeding he recognized Caesars concerns regarding the Sempronian Law, enacted by Tiberius Gracchus (123 B.C.) which gave Roman citizens the right to appeal to the people in capital cases, and then roundly declared: “an enemy ‘hostis’ of the Republic cannot in any respect be regarded as a citizen,” on the grounds that the author of the Sempronian Law himself paid the supreme penalty to the Republic without appeal to the people. (4 In Catilinam 10) On the authority of Marcianus: “The Law of the Twelve Tables ordains that he should have roused up a public enemy, or handed over a citizen to a public enemy, must suffer capital punishment.” (Duodecim Tabulae X) On the authority of Salvianus, the same table stated: “Putting to death...of any man whosoever he might be, un-convicted was forbidden by the decrees even of the Twelve Tables.” (Ibid.)
In this case however, it is not so much as question of whether or not the men were tried in accordance with the law of the *Twelve Tables*, but whether or not the Senate had the authority to try the men and whether or not they could be executed without appeal.

Cicero continued on to tell the Senate that he was indeed not motivated by cruelty, but “In my minds eye I see pitiful heaps of citizens lying unburied upon the grave of their fatherland; there passes before my eyes the sight of Cethegus as he prances upon your corpses in his frenzied revels…I have pictured Lentulus as potentate…Gabinius as his grand viser, and Catiline there with his army…this vision arouses in me such strong feelings of pity and anguish that I am acting with severity and vigor against against those who have wanted to perpetrate such horrors.” (4 *In Catilinam* 11-12)

…*Cruelis ubique*

*luctus, ubique pavor et plurima mortis imago.*

Everywhere bitter sorrow, everywhere

Terror and many images of death. (*Aeneid* 2.369)

After having made several examples he directed the Senate’s attention to the throngs of people outside awaiting the decision: “I cannot pretend to be deaf to what comes to my ears…Everyone is here—men of every order, every class and every age; the Forum is crowed, the temple around the Forum are crowded, all the approaches and grounds of this temple are crowded…the whole mass of freeborn citizens is here, even the poorest…All classes are united in purpose, will and voice to preserve the Republic. Beset by the brands and weapons of this vile conspiracy, the fatherland we all share extends to you [the Senate] the hands of a suppliant…You have a consul who will not shrink form obeying your decrees and, while he lives, from defending your decisions and answering
for them in person. (4 In Catilinam 14-24) With these concluding remarks, Cicero formally submitted the fate of the conspirators to the Senate who voted to condemn the men.

Sic ait dicto citius tumida aequora placat
Collectasque fugat nubes solemque reducit.

Thus speaking a command swelling waves are quickly calmed
And gathering clouds flee and the sun returns. (Aeneid 1.142-3)

Not wishing to give the enemies of Rome any advantage that might be obtained by hesitation or delay, Cicero ordered the triumvis to make the preparations for the executions and then he himself led Lentulus into the dungeon, where he, followed by the others, were strangled. “Thus that patrician, of illustrious stock of the Cornelii…ended his life in a manner befitting his character and his crimes.” (Bellum Catilinae 55.1-6) Cassius Dio said that others too, who had information lodged against themselves, were rounded up and called to account; that Aulus Fulvius, a senator, was murdered by his own father, a private person, and many others, not only consuls but private individuals as well, killed their sons for their involvement in the conspiracy of Catiline. Valerius Maximus (30 A.D.) observed that A. Fulvius, a man of senatorial rank recalled his son…[who] had misguidedly followed Catiline’s friendship…and put him to death first observing that he had not begotten him for Catiline against his country but for his country against Catiline.” (Memorable Doings and Sayings 5.8.5) Events to which Dio had remarked: “This was the course of affairs at that time.” (Historiae Romanae 36.3-4)

In a comment on these orations, Florus would later write, “When the question of punishment was discussed, Caesar expressed the opinion that the conspirators ought to be
spared on account of their position; Cato thought that they ought to be punished in accordance with their crime.” (Epitome 2.12.10) The position referred to by Florus was no doubt the conspirator’s positions as citizens and nobles. The question of the legality of trying these men in the Senate and executing them has been raised many times and by many authors and I do not propose to have a solution to the argument. Andrew Drummond has examined this case in relation to Roman law very thoroughly and I don’t purport to resolve the question of the legality of the issue, but only to caution the interpreters of these events not to succumb to presentism by projecting our understanding of the present law on to the past, for we must remember that the Roman senate at this time was not only chronologically closer to the opinions of Aristotle than to modern western law, but was also psychologically, culturally, morally and politically closer to him. Although the question of the legality of imposing the death penalty on citizens of Rome without appeal to the people, in accordance with the Sempronian Law, was raised in the Senate at the time, and plagued Cicero’s reputation for the rest of his life, the very fact that the trial both of Catiline, and the conspirators captured in Rome, did take place in the Senate without objection, and was not submitted to the juries, tends to suggest that this procedure was not as controversial as it may at first seem to the students of modern positive law. Furthermore, the suggestion that Cicero and Cato, inter alios, and hence the Senate, deviated from the rule of law perhaps misunderstands the office of the dictator. Cicero held imperium and it was his prerogative to submit this case to the Senate. Therefore the question would be properly framed by referring to the acts of the Senate, not to the acts of Cicero, since, in the end, the decision belonged wholly to the Senate. Whether or not the Senate adhered to the rule of law, its decision in this case was,
nevertheless, expedient with respect to the cause of justice. As Cicero had said to the people, “My consulship cannot cure these men but, if it removes them, then it will have prolonged the life of the Republic.” (2 In Catilinam 11) According to Plutarch, after the conspirators had been put to death, many of Catiline’s hangers-on, for they could not truly have been called supporters, continued to hang around the Forum unaware of the recent turn of events believing that the men might still be rescued. Cicero reportedly cried out to them: Vixere! ‘They lived.’ “Most of those who had flocked to the standard of Catiline, as soon as they learned the fate of Lentulus and Cethegus, deserted him and went away.” (Cicero 22.8) Appian inflects upon them cowardice and some sinister designs. “The crowd dispersed in alarm, congratulating themselves that they had not been found out.” (Civil Wars 2.1.6)

Meanwhile, Catiline was in Faesulae arranging his men in to two full legions of 5,000 men each, though Appian claims it was 20,000 men (Civil Wars 2.1.7). According to Sallust’s narration when Antonius marched upon him, Catiline withdrew into the mountains and gave the enemy ‘hostium’ no opportunity for battle while, at the same time refusing the aid of slaves who wished to join his army. Once news of the executions had reach Catiline’s army, his men began to desert. With the men that remained, Catiline pressed on though forced marches into the mountains near Pistoria, modern Pistoia, in the region of Tuscany. Metellus Celer with three legions approached from Picene. When Catiline realized that he was trapped between two Roman armies, and that his plans for insurrection in Rome had failed, and that all was hopeless, he harangued his troops and prepared to battle Antonius’ army. “Two hostile armies, one towards Rome, the other towards Gaul, block our way. We cannot remain longer where we are…Wherever we
decide to go, we must hew a path with the sword. Therefore I counsel you to be brave...If we win, complete security will be ours...You might have passed you life in exile and infamy...but since such conditions seemed base and intolerable to true men, you decided upon this course. If you wish to forsake it, you have need of boldness; none save the victor exchanges war for peace...But if Fortune frowns upon your bravery, take care not to die un-avenged. Do not be captured and slaughters like cattle, but fighting like heroes, leave the enemy a bloody and tearful victory.” After a moment of silence, the trumpets were sounded, the horses dispersed, and Catiline in the center, next to the silver eagle, prepared to do battle. Antonius having feigned illness, either out of cowardice or embarrassment, trusted his army to Marcus Petreius who gave the signal and began to advance slowly and the army of the enemy ‘hostis’ did the same. Once the distance had been closed enough for a skirmish, the two forces rushed upon each other. “When Catiline saw that his army was routed and that he was left with a mere handful of men, mindful of his birth and former rank he plunged into the thickest of the enemy ‘hostis’ and there fell fighting, his body pierced through and through.” (Bellum Catilinae 56.1-60.7) “[Marcus Petreius] joined battle with the rebels and in a very bloody contest cut down Catiline and three thousand others as they fought most bravely; for not one of them fled, but every man fell at his post.” (Historiae Romanae 37.40.1) For Rome it was indeed a bloody and tearful victory as Catiline had shown himself to be a mad man.

Catiline vero longe suis inter hostium cadavera repertus est, paululum etiam spirans ferociamque animi, quam habuerat vivos, in volu retinens.
Catiline was found truly far in advance of them among the corpses of the enemy, still breathing a little and not holding back fierce spirit in his face which he had in life. (*Bellum Catilinae* 61.4)

Flavio Biondo in his *Italy Illuminated* (1474) recalled the event “In the top corner of the large principal plain of Tuscany is the city of Pistoia, in whose territory Catiline’s army was defeated, as we learn from many ancient writers.” (1.2.25) Not a man of free birth left alive, Sallust declared that these men “had valued their own lives no more highly than those of their enemies ‘hostium’…But the army of the Roman people gained no joyful nor bloodless victory, for all the most valiant had either fallen in the fight or come off with severe wounds…turning over the bodies of the rebels ‘hostilia’ found now a friend, now a guest or kinsman; some also recognized their personal enemies. Thus the whole army was variously affected with sorrow and grief, rejoicing and lamentation.” (*Bellum Catilinae* 61.6-9) Antonius reportedly sent Catiline’s head to the city and he himself was acclaimed imperator for the victory. (*Historiae Romanae* 37.40.2) After this, Cicero himself became the subject of charges for the execution of the prisoners. “This charge, though technically brought against him, was really directed at the Senate. For its members were violently denounced before the populace…on the ground that they had no right to condemn any citizen to death without the consent of the people.” (*Ibid.* 37.42.2-3) This charge failed to bring any result as the Senate at the time had granted immunity to all who were involved. Cicero was later exiled for this very act, however, by Publius Clodius Pulcher in 58 B.C. and, after that, was himself executed in 43 B.C.

I will not weary the reader recounting the First Triumvirate and the events leading up to assassination of Caesar, or the story about Cato’s tragic suicide in Utica where
reportedly tore his own guts out with his bare hands, but, with respect to the proscription and murder of Cicero, it would be better to remain silent than to say to little. But since his reputation is diametrically opposed to, and contends directly with, that of Catiline’s, I find it necessary to digress on the topic at great length. The elder Seneca recorded a number of narrations of the events that took place after the ascension of the Second Triumvirate composed of Marcus Lepidus, Marcus Antonius and Octavius Caesar. Livy's history of the event is based on Seneca’s compendium of the Roman historians who commented on them. According to Livy, Cicero fled Rome shortly after the arrival of the triumvirate. He first fled to his rural estate in Tuscany and then to Formiae where he boarded a ship bound for Caieta. He set sail several times, but contrary winds and seasickness drove him back. Wearied from his futile endeavor, he returned to his home where he reportedly said:

_Moriar in patria saepe servata._

I shall die in the fatherland I often saved. (*Suasoriae 6.17*)

After the assassination of Caesar, Marcus Lepidus, Marcus Antonius and Octavius Caesar “came together on a small island in the midst of a river, and there held conference for three days. All other matters were easily agreed upon and they divided up the whole empire among themselves as through it were an ancestral inheritance.” (*Antony 19*) According to Appian’s narrative the three men met on a islet in the river Lavinius near the city of Mutina where they negotiated day and night for two days concluding that Octavian should resign the consulship and that Ventidius should take his place who should use his position to enact a law establishing a magistrate with consular powers to protect the government from civil disturbances and that this magistrate should be headed
by Lepidus, Antony, and Octavian, who together were to rule for five years and, furthermore that a distribution of the Roman provinces ought be made. Antony acquired the length and breadth of Gaul except for the lands adjacent to the Pyrenees Mountains which was called Old Gaul. Old Gaul along with Spain was allotted to Lepidus and Octavian acquired Africa, Sardinia, Sicily and a number of other islands in the vicinity. This new government was called the *Second Triumvirate*. The Roman provinces east of the Adriatic were as yet still held by Cassius and Brutus, against whom Lepidus and Octavian pledged to wage war. (*Civil Wars* 4.2-3) Cassius Dio continued: “After forming this compact and taking oaths they hastened to Rome, giving the impression that they were all going to rule on equal terms, but each having the intention of getting the entire power himself.” (*Historiae Romanae* 47.1.1) Numerous portents were said to follow the summit of these most powerful men. Dogs howled continuously like wolves. Cattle spoke in human voices. A new born infant spoke and statutes were said to sweat blood. The Senate sent for soothsayers from Etruria and one of them proclaimed that the kingdom of the past was returning and that all present would be made slaves save he himself alone, whereupon he held his own breath until he died. (*Civil Wars* 4.4) Not to make a long story of it the triumvirate forthwith initiated new proscriptions reminiscent of those actuated by Sulla but on a grander and more sinister scale. “Not only the men’s enemies or the rich were being killed, but also their best friends, incredible as it may seem.” (*Historiae Romanae* 47.5.3) The first man executed, Salvius, was one of Cicero’s accomplices. (*Civil Wars* 4.17) Appian related the story how Cicero fled Rome and even claimed to visit Cicero’s country home near Caieta “to gain knowledge of this lamentable affair…and here he [Cicero] remained quite. While the searchers were
approaching...ravens flew into his chamber and awakened him from sleep by their croaking, and pulled off his bead-covering, until his servants, diving that this was a warning from one of the gods, put him in a litter and again conveyed him toward the sea, going cautiously through a dense thicket. Many soldiers were hurrying around in squads inquiring if Cicero had been seen anywhere. Some people, moved by good-will and pity, said that he had already put to sea; but a shoemaker, a client of Clodius, who had been the most bitter enemy of Cicero, pointed out the path to Laena, the centurion, who was pursuing with a small force. The latter ran after him, and seeing slaves mustering a defense in much larger number than the force under his own command, he called out by way of stratagem, ‘Centurions in the rear, to the front!’ Thereupon the slaves, thinking that more soldiers were coming, were terror stricken, and Laena, although he had been once saved by Cicero when under trial, drew his head out of the litter and cut it off, striking three times, or rather sawing it off by reason of his inexperience...Antony was delighted beyond measure. He crowned the centurion and gave him 250,000 Attic drachmas in addition to the stipulated reward...The head and hand of Cicero were suspended for a long time from the rostra in the forum where formerly he had been accustomed to make public speeches...It is said that even at his meals Antony placed the head and hand of Cicero before his table, until he became satiated with the horrid sight. Thus was Cicero, a man famous even yet for his eloquence, and one who had rendered the greatest service to his country when he held the office of consul, slain, and insulted after his death.” (Civil Wars 4.19-20)

Cicero's slaves, unlike the slaves of many other nobles at the time, were ready to fight to the death to defend him, but Cicero ordered them to set down the litter upon
which they bore him and offered his neck to his would be assassins. Appian graphically described the chaos that descended on Rome after the first names were published. “Straightway, through city and country, wherever each one happened to be found, there were sudden arrests and murder in various forms, decapitations for the sake of the rewards when the head should be shown, and undignified flights in disguises which strangely contrasted with former splendor. Some descended into wells, others into filthy sewers. Some took refuge in chimneys. Others crouched in the deepest silence under the thickly-packed tiles of their roofs. For some were not less fearful of their wives and ill-disposed children than of the murderers, while others feared their freedmen and their slaves; creditors feared their debtors and neighbors feared neighbors who coveted their lands. There was a sudden outburst of previously smoldering hates and a shocking change in the condition of senators, consulars, praetors, tribunes...who threw themselves with lamentations at the feet of their own slaves.” (Ibid. 4.13) In the end Livy, giving credit where due, eulogized him thus: “None of his adversities did he bear in the manner of a gentleman except his death...However, if one balances his faults against his virtues, he was a man of greatness, energy, and distinction.” (Fragmenta 50) The elder Seneca, relying on a lost work of Livy, said, “There is no doubt that his slaves bravely and loyally showed readiness to make a fight of it; and that it was Cicero himself who ordered them to put down the litter and suffer calmly the compulsions of a harsh fate. He leaned from where he sat, and offered his neck without a tremor; his head was struck off. The soldiers in their stupid cruelty, were not satisfied. They cut off the hands, too, cursing them for having written attacks on Antony. The head was taken back to Antony, and, on his orders, placed between the two hands on the rostra, where as consul, and often as ex-
consul, and in that very year attacking Antony...The Romans could scarcely bear to lift eyes wet with tears to look on his mutilated body.” *(Suasoriae 6.17)* Thus Cicero, unlike Catiline, met his death as a brave man would, showing no fear in accordance with his own remarks:

> Nam neque turpis mors forti viro potest accidere neque immature consulari nec misera sapienti.

For death is neither ugly for the brave, early for the consul nor wretched to the wise. *(4 In Catilinam 3)*

Appian, Plutarch and Dio say that only Cicero’s head and right hand were cut off and displayed on the rostra. Antony’s wife Fulvia at one time “took the head into her hands before it was removed, and after abusing it spitefully and spitting upon it, set on her knees, opened the mouth, and pulled out the tongue, which she pierced with pins that she used for her hair, at the same time uttering many brutal jests.” *(Historiae Romanae 47.8.4)* According to Seneca: “All concede that Cicero was neither coward enough to plead with Anthony, nor stupid enough to think that Antony could be won over: all, that is, except Asinius Pollio, who remained the most implacable enemy of Cicero's reputation.” *(Suasoriae 6.14 et Institutio 12.1.22)* Seneca recorded the narration of Cremutius Cordus: “*Quibus vivis laetus Antonius* he was now raised, limb by limb, to be viewed by his fellow countrymen in a new state, blood spattered over his lips and lolling head. Shortly before, he had been leader of the senate, glory of the Roman name: now he was merely a source of profit to his killer.” *(Suasoriae 6.19)*

Bruttedius Niger had reported:
Nulla non pars fori aliquot actionis inclutae signate vestigo erat; nemo non aliquod eius in se meritum fatebatur.

The assembled people did not as is customary, hear the biography of the body on the rostra, but they [themselves] narrated it.

“Every part of the forum was marked by the memory of some glorious pleading; everyone had a benefit done him by Cicero to proclaim. There was no doubt of at least one service to Rome: he had put off that miserable servitude from the time of Catiline to that of Antony.” (Ibid. 6.21) The elder Seneca also said, “None of all these eloquent men lamented the death of Cicero more finely than Cornelius Severus:

Conticuit Latiae tristis facundia linguae.

The eloquence of the Latin tongue was dumb-struck by grief. (Ibid. 6.26)

Cornelius Nepos eulogized him thus:

Ille enim fuit unus qui potuerit et etiam debuerit historiam digna voce pronuntiare...ex quo dubito, interitu eius utrum res publica an historia magis doleat.

He truly was the only one who could have, and indeed gave, a dignified voice to narrate history...on account of that, I question whether his death pains the republic or history greater. (De Historicis Latinis 2.1)

And Velleius Paterculus said, “When Cicero was beheaded the voice of the people was severed...You did not rob him of his fame, the glory of his deeds and words, nay you enhanced them...He lives and will continue to live in the memory of the ages, and so long as this universe shall endure.
IV. The Argument

In a manifestly uncritical way, Aleksandr Blok took Catiline not as a revolutionary archetype, but as a symbol of violence against the state abstracted from its motive force. (A Roman Bolshevik 414) For him, it was analogous that if Catiline attacked the powers that be, and Lenin attacked the powers that be, then Catiline must have been a revolutionary, since Lenin was one. Remarkably, Kalb said Catiline was running for consul on a “populist platform.” (A Roman Bolshevik 416) When it was Tiberius Gracchus in an earlier period who ought to be credited with that. “By asserting this familiarity Blok aims in ‘Catiline’ to situate the Bolshevik revolution in a momentous lineage.” (A Roman Bolshevik 416) In truth, however, it was Cato who would rightly be described as the leader of the commons. “Cato belonged to the family of the Porcii and emulated the great Cato, except that he had enjoyed a better Greek education than the former. He diligently promoted the interest of the plebs, and admired no man, but was thoroughly devoted to the commonweal. Suspicious of unlimited power, he hated anyone who had grown above his fellows, but loved anyone of the common people through pity for his weakness. He was becoming the friend of the people such as no one else, and indulged in outspokenness in behalf of the right, even when it involved danger.” (Historiae Romanae 37.22.1-4) Everyone has praised Cato’s virtues. After him, it was

Tuum in eum factum exerabitur citiusque e mundo genus hominum quam (Ciceronis) nomen cedet.

Your deed against him will call forth a curse and the race of man will more quickly depart from the world than his name. (2 Compendium 66.2-5)
Caesar who captivated the masses. Sallust compared Cato and Caesar’s virtues, “In birth then, in years and in eloquence, they were about equal…Caesar was held great because of his benefactions and lavish generosity, Cato for the uprightness of his life…Caesar gained glory by giving, helping, and forgiving; Cato by never stooping to bribery. One a refuge for the unfortunate, the other a scourge for the wicked…[Caesar] longed for great power, an army, a new war to give scope to his brilliant merit. Cato, on the contrary, cultivated self-control, propriety, but above all austerity. He did not vie with the rich in riches nor in intrigue with the intriguer…He preferred to be, rather than to seem virtuous.” (Bellum Catilinae 54.1-6) In short, Caesar bribed people with gifts, Cato stood as a role model.

Blok impetuously compared Catiline to Tacitus. “A few decades after Christ it fell to the lot of Tacitus…A few decades before Christ, it had fallen to the lot of poor Catiline.” (World Revolution 294) Blok said, “Sulla was a free and easy-going man.” (Ibid. 296) And “that Catiline was a lover of the people or dreamed of universal equality, there can, of course, be no question.” (Ibid. 300) Blok complained that Cicero drowned Catiline in a flood of lawyer’s oratory, but what Catiline heard was nothing compared to Cicero’s panegyrics delivered to the people and to the Senate which he did not hear. Oratory such as this:

*Ex hac enim parte pudor pugnat, illinc petulantia;*

*Hinc pudicitia, illinc stuprum;*

*Hinc constantia, illinc furor;*

*Hinc honestas, illinc turpitudo;*

*Hinc continentia, illinc libido;*

*Hinc denique aequitas, temperantia, fortitude, prudential*
For from this part fights decency, over there wantonness;
Hence modesty, thence defilement;
Hence constancy, thence madness;
Hence honor, thence turpitude;
Hence continence, thence lust;
and finally, from hence fairness, temperance, fortitude, prudence, all virtues, contend with inequality, luxury, laziness, thoughtlessness, against all vices; in the end abundance fights indigence, and finally, good wishes against all things hopeless. (2 In Catilinam 25).

For him, Sallust was actually the real criminal, “He left a very bad memory. He managed to squeeze all the juice out of a rich country through bribes and extortion.” (World Revolution 295) There’s no arguing with someone who maintains the most absurd positions in the face of all evidence to the contrary. For Blok, Catiline is Christ arisen, followed by the real Christ arisen, followed by the V. I. Lenin, and again, Christ arisen! The fact that Blok was no follower of Lenin’s seriously undermines his argument. Not being Bolsheviks, both Blok and Kalb are hard pressed to vindicate Catiline by drawing correspondences between Catiline and Lenin. In his poem The Twelve (1918), which Bloc claimed had been written in support of the revolution, he wrote:

Our sons have gone

to serve the Reds
to serve the Reds

to risk their heads! …

So they march with sovereign tread …

Behind them limps the hungry dog,

and wrapped in wild snow at their head

carrying a blood-red flag…

ahead of them goes Jesus Christ.

Though Blok says, “Catiline was a revolutionary with all his spirit and all his being.” (World Revolution 300) But even Leon Trotsky disputed that Blok could understand this. In his critique of Blok’s poem The Twelve, Trotsky said, “Blok was not a poet of the revolution…Throughout all his changes, Blok remained a true decadent, if one were to take his word in a large historic sense, in the sense of the contrast between decadent individualism and the individualism of the rising bourgeoisie…‘The Twelve’ does not sing the Revolution, but Russia, in spite of the Revolution…To be sure, Blok is not one of ours, but he reached toward us. And in doing so, he broke down.” (Literature and Revolution 118) After The Twelve, Aleksandr Blok never published again.

Sallust’s voice didn’t crack, Blok’s voice did. In his Catiline, Blok claims that Catiline underwent a ‘metamorphosis.’ “Such a person is a madman, a maniac, possessed.” (World Revolution 300) Just as Sallust himself recorded, “His guilt-stained soul, at odds with gods and men, could find rest neither waking nor sleeping, so cruelly did conscience ravage his overwrought mind. Hence his pallid complexions, his bloodshot eyes, his gait now fast now slow; in short, his face and his every glance showed the madman.” (Bellum Catilinae 15.4-5) Sallust, Blok and Freud can, at least for the
moment, agree: “Unbridled gratification of all desires forces itself into the foreground as the most alluring guiding principle of life.” (Civilization and Its Discontents 29) Once accustomed to the high life, Catiline now deprived of it “was found [to have] become neurotic because [he could not] tolerate the degree of privation that society imposes on [him].” (Ibid. 46) Catiline became neurotic because he had lost a luxurious lifestyle he had been accustomed too. Not only that, he had also accustomed himself to self-gratification through violence. As a commentary upon a commentary, Kalb’s analysis of Blok’s essay, and consequently of the Catiline affair and the Bolshevik revolution, is in a precarious position. Since Kalb is neither a Latinist, nor a Marxist, her ability to contribute a meaningful commentary on the Bellum Catilinae and to draw correspondences between it and the Bolshevik revolution, is dubious. Indeed she sought to explain Blok, not Catiline. Although she compared Catiline both to Christ and to Bolshevism; she never mentioned Lenin or Marx by name and made no annotations to any classical text, save Ovid’s Metamorphoses. Although Kalb does cite Ovid, he said nothing on the Catiline affair. Kalb’s argument that Catiline was a calumniated man and, “a precursor to Jesus Christ,” is absurd. Catiline could not have been a Bolshevik because any class analysis would place him in the category of the nobles of Rome. According to Karl Marx, “The wage-laborer lives only by the sale of his labor-power.” (Capital vol. II 33) He was a discontent, but he was not motivated by any class consciousness. “What makes men morally discontented...is that they do not find the present adapted to the realization of aims which they hold to be right and just.” (Philosophy of History 169) For Catiline it was not merely the nobility whom he believed ought to rule, but of those of the stronger. He was not the leader of a proletarian vanguard
political party. These were men who had lost all they had through riotous living and attempted to steal back what they had just finished throwing away. After the exhaustion of all legal means, they withdrew from Rome and hurled themselves against it and, being annihilated, as it were, to the very last man. It would be difficult to elaborate a completely dialectical and historical materialist interpretation of Catiline himself. He is of the noble class it is true, but he is not the vanguard of any class and has no political principles to speak of and does not articulate any particular political program besides placing himself at the helm of state and benefiting his friends and harming his enemies. Catiline is not a reformer; he does not motivate the oppressed to rise in arms as a social movement of their entire class in the way Spartacus did, but instead conspired among his personal associates, formed a cabal, and attempted a putsch. Furthermore the biography of Lenin does not correspond to that of Catiline. After serving 15 months in prison, Lenin and his family were exiled to Siberia in 1897 for his brother, Alex’s, involvement in the plot to murder the Tsar Alexander III. Lenin became a revolutionary while in exile. There is no evidence that Lenin had ever undergone a neurotic metamorphosis, nor is there any that he had committed any of the crimes Catiline had. This whole question as applied to Christ is absurd. Hegel thought Christ was revolutionary on account of a single paragraph in the Gospel of Matthew.

\textit{Nolite arbitrari quia venerim mittere pacem in terram non veni pacem mittere sed gladium.}

Wish not to believe that I have come to bring peace on the Earth. I have not come to bring peace, but the sword. (10.34)
To this Hegel said: “Nowhere are to be found such revolutionary utterances as in the Gospels.” (Philosophy of History 308) This may of course be true and Kalb seems to take her departure from here, but she should not have forgotten Jesus’ earlier statement:

_Ecce ego mitto vos sicut oves in medio luporum estote ergo prudentes sicut serpentes et simplices sicut columbae._

Lo, I am sending you out like sheep among wolves, therefore be as wary as serpents and as simple as doves. (Matthew 10.16)

Though it would be difficult to characterize Cicero as either a serpent or a dove, the populace could indeed have been called sheep and if it were not for sword of Cicero, the wolf Catiline should devour us. Indeed Jesus represented a movement of the oppressed. Since in his case criticism came from below we may conclude that his movement was indeed revolutionary, an ascendancy from the lower to the higher. Of course this metaphor was itself prefigured by Herodotus: “But as Theras’ son would not sail with him, his father said that he would leave him behind as a sheep among wolves; after which saying the boy got the nickname of Oeolycus.” (4.149) To return to my point of departure, it was incumbent upon Ciero to deploy the argumentum ad baculum against a criminal like Catiline for, as Tacitus noted:

_Inter inpotentes et validos faslo quiescas: ubi manu agitur, modestia ac probitas nomina superioris sunt._

Among the powerless and the powerful you would find peacefulness vain: where a strong hand commands, moderation and honesty are the appellations of the stronger. (Germania 36.1)
One could take the view that Catiline, having already lost his great fortune, had descended in class to the *proletarii*. Hutchinson takes the position that Catiline was a revolutionary who intended to “strike at the heart of Roman capitalism.” (*The Conspiracy* 15) He continued: “It is clear that Catiline was proposing not merely a change in government and policy but a social and economic revolution.” (*The Conspiracy* 56-57) But this was clearly not the case, for, although he was financially ruined, he suffered no political disability on account of this and ran for consul twice, in 64 and again in 63. Catiline promised to cancel the debts of certain members of the ruling class and to confiscate the property of others, but he makes no mention of abolishing *capitalism*—if he even perceived of it. Sulla’s expropriations of land and property followed by disposal of that property *sub hasta* were fraudulent. The auctions were rigged and the profits were channeled back to Sulla and his agents. The populace benefited little from these enterprises. Hutchinson represents a nostalgic leftist malaise, which, having already been smeared with the reputation of Catiline, seek to embrace it, co-opt it, and revise it in order to give it a more palatable interpretation. Vindicating Catiline is, nevertheless, utterly pathological; παθος ‘a suffering of the soul.’ Though some may feel somehow vindicated by Hutchinson’s interpretation of the *Bellum Catilinae*; Catiline was no doubt a scandalous creature and anyone compared to him should consider his reputation smeared. He was a supporter of Sulla and his proscriptions and benefited from them. He was also a cannibal. “After the domination of Lucius Sulla the man had been seized with a mighty desire of getting control of the government, recking little by what manner he should achieve it, provided he made himself supreme.” (*Bellum Catilinae* 5.6) His actions would be best described as an attempted *putsch*, not a revolution. A revolution is
progressive by its very nature. It seeks to overturn an old oppressive order and replace it with a new freer order. Catiline sought to re-establish an old and hated political regime. Catiline’s program didn’t intend to benefit even his own class in its entirety, but only himself and his conspirators. He, furthermore, made no allusion to any bone fide theory of justice, sacred moral, or commonly held value. Blok’s analogy between the conspirators of the Bellum Catilinae to the revolutionaries of the Bolshevik revolution proves that Blok was beyond the pale of the Russian working class. He was a dilettante to the very end. He sang bleary eyed of the old Russia, and it ruined him. The Bellum Catilinae was an outgrowth of Catiline’s conspiracy. The Bolshevik revolution was not a conspiracy, but a mass movement of the truly oppressed transformed into a civil war whereby the oppressed class as a whole supplanted the ruling class as a whole. Catiline was no V. I. Lenin, but he was no Spartacus either. In truth, Judith Kalb, as Blok did before her, thinks she may more easily overcome Lenin if Catiline overcomes him first. It is a well known sophistical technique to smear the reputation of a good man by continually comparing that man to a bad one. “Irony is to say something and pretend you are not saying it, or else to call things by the names of their contraries.” (Rhetoric to Alexander 21.1) There are no bone fide comparisons between the life of Lenin and that of Catiline. Lenin did not undergo a neurotic metamorphosis as Catiline had. He had committed neither rape, nor incest, nor cannibalism, nor murder and no one says he did.

Wilkins’ monograph is an attempted deconstruction, so popular within academia these days. For instance, she seeks to prove that if Sallust’s antistrophe, the word hostis ‘enemy,’ was to describe Catiline and Catiline used the same word to refer to the Roman government, then Sallust was guilty or blurring the distinction between right and wrong.
The word *hostis* in its original meaning, however, signified *a stranger* in a time when any stranger might be an *enemy*. (Latin 121) “Many words indicate one thing now, but formerly meant something else, as is the case with *hostis* ‘enemy’: for in olden times by this word they meant a foreigner from another country independent of Roman laws, but now they give the name to him whom they then called *perduellis* ‘enemy.’” (De Lingua Latina 5.3) Through the use of ambiguous speech, Sallust, then, indicated that Catiline had become like a foreigner since his actions indicated that he no longer considered himself a subject to Roman law. And Sallust, noted for his archaisms, signified through this antithesis that these men, though citizens of the same πολις, had become *strangers* to each other.

*Cum unius cuiusque verbui naturae sint duae,*

*a qua re et in qua re vocabulum sit impositum.*

Each and every word has a dual nature, that thing from which and that thing to which a name is imposed. (De Lingua Latina 5.2)

Thus Sallust’s acceptation of the word *hostis* as taken from the actions of Catiline, or by way of etymology, was as a *stranger* while that same acceptation as applied to him by way of semantics was enemy.

The central argument of Wilikins’ work is an apparent error in Sallust’s chronology, though she denies it after suggesting it. The central precept of her methodology, however, is to functionally deny that Sallust was a historian and affirm that history can be discovered somewhere outside him as an extant source. She goes on and on using phrases to the effect that Sallust intended to “depict” or “portray” Catiline this way or that way. In so doing, however, Wilkins actually depicts and portrays Sallust as
an author who disregarded historical veracity as means of justifying her praise for
Catiline. Her revisionist operation revolves primarily around her excessive preoccupation
with forensic philological concerns while at the same time denying Sallust’s objectivity
which she initially impugned by his chronological mistake. Not that there is anything
wrong with forensic philology per se, but Wilkins uses it to assert that Sallust invented
both the first conspiracy and the infamous oath. Wilkins, furthermore, does not vet the
many extant codices of the *Bellum Catilinae*, discuss any of Sallust’s other works, or
examine any other extant sources, but asserts that Sallust needed to invent the first
conspiracy in order to justify a later passage where Catiline departed Rome “with the
fasces and other emblems of authority.” (*Bellum Catilinae* 36.1) By denying objectivity
to Sallust and simultaneously discovering *real* history through pinpoint philological
parsing; Wilkins supposes to induce the reader into believing that objectivity actually
does exist, and, not only that, it resides with her; and that it can be found in her work and
by her methodology, but she remains hard pressed to find history from within written
sources which she denied veracity to at the outset. If Sallust’s monograph is a fictive
work, on the grounds that he intentionally included events that never took place, then all
extrapolated evidence must likewise be held in doubt because the all the facts have been
drawn from the same *poison well*. “We question why, since Catiline had the chance of
being elected to the consulship, he was reduced to revolutionary action.” (*Villain or Hero
7*) I question whether or not Catiline’s actions could properly be called “revolutionary.”
Wilkins’ primary fault as a historian is not her use of forensic philology, but her
positivistic methodology. She treats Sallust’s text as an object of a *natural science*, not as
an object of history. She failed to understand that in interpreting the *Bellum Catilinae* the
historian does not start with a hypothesis and then attempt to falsify that hypothesis by gathering pieces of evidence which become data plugged into one or the other of two columns of data which either supports or refutes the hypothesis Catiline was a villain. Since the events of the Bellum Catilinae are of the past, they are not falsifiable because they cannot be re-enacted. But this fact is neither here nor there. Whether or not Catiline was an actual villain or merely a calumniated man is not essential to the historian, because whether or not he was an actual villain he was believed to be one. It is inconsequential if Catiline was an actual villain because the object of study for the historian is not who or what Catiline actually was, but is how man in general has become who he is. The Bellum Catilinae has influenced who we are today. The proper object of study for the historian is to compare who we are as a civilization to Catiline’s reputation for whom he was, not an inquiry as to whether or not the actual Catiline corresponds 1:1 with his reputation, unless inquiry happens to be a study of whether or not a historian has lied. But Wilikins’ monograph is not an inquiry into whether or not Sallust as a historian is a liar, but whether or not Catiline was a villain or a hero. Determining whether or not Catiline was a villain is based on whether or not the crimes alleged against him are still crimes, not whether or not he actually committed them because we cannot re-try him for those alleged crimes. The question as to whether or not Catiline was guilty of those crimes is a moot case.

It is clear from the several narratives that Catiline intended to become not only consul, but dictator by whatever means. It would have been best for him if he could have attained this by being elected to the position, but he intended to seize the fasces by any means, including that of violence. The fact that when Catiline finally did withdraw, at
Cicero’s indulgence, and assumed the outward symbols of a consul, proves that he was a pretender to the office. By having himself preceded by lictors bearing the fasces, he tried to appear as if he were the consul elect, nay, the dictator self-appointed! By so doing, Catiline insinuated that he had somehow been illegitimately deprived of a political position that would have been rightly his and would brook no contenders. But he had not been unjustly deprived of a lawful office. Catiline had not been elected he had been defeated. Thus Catiline, in fact, behaved highly undemocratically, indeed autocratically. By assuming the outward symbols of an office that was not rightly his, Catiline broke the law. “I knew that the arms, the axes, the fasces, the trumpets, the military standards, that silver eagle for which he had even built a shrine in his own home had been sent on ahead.” (2 In Catilinam 13) Hook or by crook, Catiline intended to be not only consul, but dictator. Whether by election or putsch, he himself presumed to decide the election by and for his own self. Catiline was also a dissembler. As Plato tells us, “The height of injustice is to seem just without being so.” (Republic 2.361a) And so it went with Catiline deploying the argumentum ad misericordiam through his pleading accents and his repetitive assertions that he only sought justice. This behavior, then, is not so remarkable for if one is “unjust and have procured [the] reputation for justice a godlike life is promised.” (Ibid. 2:365b) A dissembler attempts to create a discrepancy between appearance and reality. Catiline tried to appear to be both just and wise, though in reality he was neither. His dissemblance, however, must have been somewhat effective, since he had attracted a number of followers, and indeed still attracts apologists. The error that was made by the dramatist Ibsen in relating the story of Catiline was through his inappropriate use of poetic license. In Harris’ introduction to Jonson’s play she cites
Jonson’s own remark, “We should enjoy the same license or free power to illustrate and
heighten our invention as the ancients did.” *(His Conspiracy xliii)* Ben Jonson applied
his artistic license appropriately. He developed his invention within the parameters that
scholarship ought to allow by staying close to the extant sources and attempting to
illustrate upon them. Ibsen, however, applied his poetic license inappropriately by
treating the historical persona as a mouthpiece for the views of the author. “A poet,
whether he is writing epic, lyric or drama, surely ought always to represent the divine
nature as it really is.” *(Republic 2.378)* Not just the divine however, but all
representations of beings ought to correspond to that actual being. The literary criticism
that grew out of the Enlightenment wrongly took the legends of antiquity to be mere
myths when the legends in many cases grew up around the facts of history. They also
wrongly supposed that the authors who related these legends were prone to fictionalize
the events, when this tendency would truly best be ascribed to the moderns not to the
ancients. On account of a dream Astyages which had been interpreted to indicate that his
daughter Mandane would bear a son that would rule in his stead he attempted to murder
her first born son, the infant child Cyrus. Astyages summoned his servant Harpagus and
commanded him to kill the child. Harpagus was at first overcome with pity and on
account of the fact that his wife had refused to become a party to the crime, and that he
furthermore reasoned that not only was the boy his kin, and, moreover, he reasoned that if
the crown passed from Astyages to his daughter Mandane he could but live in fear of
revenge from her for murdering her child. Thus, Harpagus reasoned: “For my own safety,
indeed, the child must die.” *(The History 1.109)* Harpagus then decided to give the child
to a herdsman named Mitradates, but since Mitradates’ wife Cyno had just given birth to
a still born child they decided to switch the children, leaving their dead infant exposed on a mountainside and to raise the newborn Cyrus as their own. After a period of ten years, and by a fortuitous circumstance, the identity of Cyrus was discovered by Astyages who was secretly enraged that Harpagus had defied his orders. Upon hearing an account of the events, Astyages calmly told Harpagus, “Send thy son to be with the new comer, and tonight, as I mean to sacrifice thank-offerings for the child’s safety to the gods to who such honor is due, I look to have thee a guest at the banquet.” (The History 1.118) Harpagus did as bidden and sent his own son to Astyages who murdered the child, boiled his flesh, and served him for dinner to his own father. “On the table of Harpagus, nothing was placed except the flesh of his own son. This was all put before him, except the hands and feet and head, which were laid by themselves in a covered basket. When Harpagus seemed to have eaten his fill, Astyages called out to him to know how he had enjoyed the repast. On his reply that he had enjoyed it excessively, they whose business it was brought him the basket, in which were the hands and feet and head of his son, and bade him open it, and take out what he pleased.” (The History 1.119) On account of the fact that the distinguished and virtuous Herodotus recorded this, that it happened there can of course be no question. But a similar legend recorded by Pindar preceded this one. According to him Tantalus, son of Zeus and Pluto, and king of Sipylus in either Phrygia or Lydia, murdered his own son Pelops and served him to the gods for dinner. “Your father invited the gods to a very well-ordered banquet at his own dear Sipylus, in return for the meals he had enjoyed… But when you disappeared, and people did not bring you back to your mother, for all their searching, right away some envious neighbor whispered that they cut you limb from limb with a knife into the water's rolling boil over the fire.
and among the tables at the last course they divided and ate your flesh. For me it is impossible to call one of the blessed gods a glutton. I stand back from it. Often the lot of evil-speakers is profitlessness. If indeed the watchers of Olympus ever honored a mortal man, that man was Tantalus. But he was not able to digest his great prosperity, and for his greed he gained overpowering ruin, which the Father hung over him: a mighty stone. Always longing to cast it away from his head, he wanders far from the joy of festivity. He has this helpless life of never-ending labor, a fourth toil after three others, because he stole from the gods nectar and ambrosia, with which they had made him immortal, and gave them to his drinking companions. If any man expects that what he does escapes the notice of a god, he is wrong. Because of that the immortals sent the son of Tantalus back again to the swift-doomed race of men.” (1 Olympian Ode 35-65) The fact that these legends exist and were mythologized is not to say that the events stated in them are purely the product of imagination, but to the pervasiveness of the practice of human sacrifice and cannibalism, the repugnance of the practice to the best of men in ancient times. It representation in poetic and dramatic works of art depicts an ethical struggle within the civilization. A human sacrifice is not a mythical create, a Scylla nor a Charybdis, but an ancient practice which is known to have existed both in criminal conspiracy and, so it would seem, before battle to save the father land. Plutarch relates the story of how a man from Thebes named Pelopidas had a vision in a dream before the Battle of Leuctra (371 B.C.) in which he saw the daughters of Scedasus, the Leuctridae, young women who had slain themselves out of shame, for they had been raped by the Spartans, weeping over their tomb whereupon their father fell on his own sword after seeking redress, and receiving none, at Sparta. On account of these tragic events it was widely believed that a
curse prevailed there as oracles and prophesies warned against the wrath of the *Leuctridae*. At any rate, before the battle, Pelopidas had a dream that he saw these maidens invoking curses weeping and of Scedasus urging him to sacrifice a virgin with auburn hair if he wished to obtain victory of the Lacedaemonians. “The injunction seemed a lawless and dreadful one to him, but he rose up and made it known to the seers and the commanders. Some of these would not hear of the injunction being neglected or disobeyed, adducing as examples of such sacrifice among the ancients, Menoeceus, son of Creon, Macaria, daughter of Heracles; and in latter times, Pherecydes the wise man, who was put to death by the Lacedaemonians, and whose skin was preserved by their kings, in accordance with some oracle; and Leonidas, who, in obedience to the oracle sacrificed himself (Cf. *The History* 7.220) as it were to save Greece; and still further, the youths who were sacrificed by Themistocles to Dionysus Carnivorous before the *Battle of Salamis* (Cf. *Themistocles* 13.2); for the successes which followed these sacrifices proved them acceptable to the gods. Moreover, when Agesilaus, who was setting out on an expedition from the same place as Agamemnon did, and against the same enemies, was asked by the goddess for his daughter in sacrifice, and had this vision as he lay asleep at Aulis, he was too tender hearted to give her, and thereby brought his expedition to an unsuccessful and inglorious ending. Others, on the contrary, argued against it, declaring that such a lawless and barbarous sacrifice was not acceptable to any one of the superior beings above us, for it was not the fabled typhons (Cf. *Iliad* 2.782 & *Theogony* 869, 306) and giants who governed the world, but the father of all gods and men; even to believe in the existence of divine beings who take delight in the slaughter and blood of men was perhaps folly, but if such beings existed, they must be disregarded, as having no power;
for only weakness and depravity of soul could produce or harbor such unnatural and cruel desires.” (Pelopidas 20.3-21.4) While debating all this amongst themselves, a filly broke away from the heard, whereupon, having taken this as a sign which resolved the dispute: “Theocrites the seer, after taking thought, cried out to Pelopidas: ‘Thy sacrificial victim is come, good man; so let us not wait for any other virgin, but do thou accept and use the one which Heaven offers thee.” (Pelopidas 22.2) We could deduce from this, then, that after 371 B.C., in the Greco-Roman tradition, a trend towards the substitution of an animal victim for a human victim was developing. This is echoed in Genesis though instead of a seer pointing out the sacrificial victim in the Bible it is an “angel of God” who is said to have pointed out the appropriate victim and prevented Abraham from sacrificing his son Isaac.

Quae postquam gesta sunt temptavit Deus Abraham et dixit ad eum Abraham ille respondit adsum. Ait ei tolle filium tuum unigenitum quem diligis Isaac et vade in terram Visionis atque offer eum ibi holocaustum super unum montium quem monstravero tibi. Igitur Abraham de nocte consurgens stravit asinum suum ducens secum duos iuvenes et Isaac filium suum cumque concidisset ligna in holocaustum abiit ad locum quem praeceperat ei Deus. Die autem tertio elevatis oculis vidit locum procul. Dixitque ad pueros suos expectate hic cum asino ego et puer illuc usque properantes postquam adoraverimus revertemur ad vos. Tulit quoque ligna holocausti et inposuit super Isaac filium suum ipse vero portabat in manibus ignem et gladium cumque duo pergerent simul. Dixit Isaac patri suo pater mi at ille respondit quid vis fili ecce inquit ignis et ligna ubi est victima

After which there are these things, God tempted Abraham and said to him: “Abraham” and he responded “I am here.” He said to him, “Make off with your only begotten son whom you love and hurry into the land of Visions and offer him there as a holocaust [Lat. holocaustum; Gr. ὅλοκαυστος: ‘burnt-offering’] upon a mountain of the mountain range which I shall make known to you. Accordingly Abraham arising by night saddled his ass and leading with him two young men and his son Isaac and cut up firewood for the holocaust and went to the place which God had told him. On the third day, raising up his eyes, he saw the place in the distance. And he said to his boys”Wait here with the ass, I and the boy are going yonder without delay and after we have worshiped we shall return to you. And he took the firewood for the holocaust and placed it upon Isaac his son
himself truly carried in his hand the fire and the sword and the two pressed on together. Isaac said to his father: “My father?” And he responded to him: “What do you want son?” “Lo,” he said, “Fire and firewood, where is the victim for the holocaust?” Abraham said: “God will provide you as victim for the holocaust my son.” Therefore they pressed on as before. And the came to the place which God had shown him in which he built an altar and there upon placed the firewood and bound Isaac his son and placed him on the altar upon the heap of firewood. And he extended his hand and drew his sword and was immolating [sprinkling with a sacrificial meal] his son. And behold an angel of God from the sky called out, saying: “Abraham, Abraham!” Who responded, “I am here.” And he said to him, “Do not extend your hand over the boy. Do not make anything of him now I understand because you fear and you would have not spared your only begotten son from me. Abraham lifted his eyes and he saw behind his back a ram among the brambles caught by the horns which he offered as a holocaust for his son. And he called the place by the name of the Lord he saw, and to this day it is said: “On the mountain of the Lord, he shall see.” (22.1-14)

Abraham was ready to sacrifice his own son for a cause which was purportedly good, Catiline to bind his conspirators to a crime with a crime. Is this so difficult to believe?

The tendency to lie through art is a modern invention, as Ibsen’s Catiline, for instance shows us. Moreover with respect to an ethical dilemma the principle and the representation ought to remain true. Ibsen boldly disregarded the extant historical sources and in so doing altered the public’s perception of the events surrounding the Bellum Catilinae. In his introduction to his 1875 edition of the play Ibsen’s statement, “There
nevertheless must have been a good deal that was great or significant about the man
whom the majority’s indefatigable advocate, Cicero, did not find expedient to tackle until
things had taken such a turn that there was no longer any danger connected with the
attack,” are offered without foundation. (Ibid. 246) Ibsen doesn’t even deny that Catiline
raped the Vestal Virgin, and, in fact, gleefully incorporated the event into his play.

For all the revisionists have to say with respect to the Catiline affair, the fact that
none have successfully escaped the narration of Catiline’s crimes against morality
suggests a motive on their part.

_ieiunia expel, mixtus in Bacchum cruor…potetur_

Expel your hunger, drink the blood mixed with wine. (Thyestes 65)

Not only is it a project of drama in general, but of deconstructionism as a whole, to
challenge the mores of society, but do any of these authors sincerely suggest that a man
who committed a human sacrifice, raped women and boys, a _bone fide_ cannibal, can be a
hero of history? One thing deconstructionists always fail to do is deconstruct them
selves. Some simply deny the events took place; others simply refuse to reconcile the
event. Sallust says that Catiline and his conspirators passed bowls of human blood and
that they drank from these in the presence of others. Where do bowls of human blood
come from, if not from a human sacrifice? Its true Polydore Virgil notes that the
Scythians drank from clay cups their own blood, along with the blood of those with
whom the made a treaty, mixed with wine in order to ratify a treaty. This he, of course,
learned from Herodotus. (Cf., The History 4.70) But Catiline and his conspirators were
far too disrespectful to use any blood of their own. Besides that, Cassius Dio says the
blood came from a human sacrifice, is that not enough? To insinuate that Sallust
invented this is also to declare the *Bellum Catilinae* to be a work of fiction. It denies Sallust his role as a historian; only a scribbler of monographs I suppose? The fact that Wilkins purports to vindicate Catiline in the beginning of her monograph and then admits at the end that Sallust presented a complex character (*Villain or Hero* 137) is hardly surprising since Cicero himself had already noted this very fact. “No I do not believe that there has ever existed on earth so strange a portent, such a fusion of natural tastes and desires that were contradictory, divergent, and at war amongst themselves...at the very time when he gathered round him every wicked and reckless man from every land, still held fast many good men and true by a kind of semblance of pretend virtue,” Cicero said. (*Pro Caelio* 5.12-14)

G.W.F Hegel’s master-slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) may elucidate the dialectical struggle of Catiline among those of his own class, but he is not the Roman spirit. The history of the *Bellum Catilinae* is not a universal history of Rome. His movement could not be considered a national movement, an actualization of the national spirit, because it is not a qualitatively better development. It was positively a development for the worse. Rome united around Lucius Brutus, the founder of the Roman Republic, the man who ran out the Tarquinius Etruscan kings. Brutus was a revolutionary. Rome hailed him. This was not so with Catiline. The first decree of the Senate which added ten years banishment to the penalties established for bribery, which Dio Cassius says was instituted on the insistence of Cicero, may have been the chain placed around Catiline’s neck which held him in thrall. “Catiline, accordingly, believed that this decree had been passed on his account, as was indeed the case.” (*Historiae Romanae* 37.29.1) But it was Catiline’s bad acts which caused Cicero to make a motion
for this law and for the Senate to approve it. And even if this did happen, there’s no reason Catiline could not have withdrawn and accepted this as his punishment. He was still quite young, waiting another ten years to attain a great honor, legally, should not have been a problem for him. But it was his arrogance that drove him onward until the point of no return had been reached. Clearly the problem of bribery in the Roman government and was in fact the very reason the courts had been transferred from the Senate to the equestrian order in 124 B.C. by the Gaius Gracchus the younger brother of Tiberius. “He transferred the courts of justice, which had become discredited by reason of bribery, from the senators to the knights...The Senate was extremely ashamed of these things and yielded to the law, and the people ratified it...So it shortly came about that the political mastery was turned upside down, the power being in the hands of the knights, and the honor only remaining in the Senate...The knights indeed went so far that they not only held power over the senators, but openly flouted them beyond their right. They also became addicted to bribe-taking, and when they too had tasted these enormous gains, they indulged in them even more basely and immoderately than the senators had done. They suborned accusers against the rich and did away with prosecutions for bribe-taking altogether.” (Civil Wars 1.3.22) Corruption of the Roman government by means of bribery was endemic. Cicero, an equestrian, was lording his power, in this case, over Catiline—a patrician. Thus by the dialectical moments of history on the question of bribery the equestrian and the patricians had changed places and become each others opposite not once, but twice. The patricians having once been the bribe-takers were supplanted by the equestrians who suddenly became the opposite of what the once were. In the next moment, Cicero being an equestrian prosecuting a patrician for bribe-taking
had once again reversed the social praxis. Catiline must have found this turn of events nothing less than infuriating.

Τὴς δὲ Δικης ἥροθος ἑλκομενῆς ἡ κ’ ἀνδρες αγωσι δωροφαγοι, σκολιῆς δὲ δίκης κρινωσι θεμιστας’

But there is roar of Justice when being dragged away and to this men devouring presents are carrying her, but give sentence to twisted judgments. (Works and Days 220)

A psychoanalytic view may yield some insight into the character of Catiline. Catiline was a man of action man to be sure. Although he was accused of violating both his daughter and the Vestal and a number of other crimes, Hardy says: “As to the other crimes perhaps justly attributed to Catiline, many obviously depended on mere rumor, had never been judicially investigated and were given inconsistently by other authorities.” (A Re-Examination 8) Hutchinson noted: “There is no mention of the murder of Gratidianus in Sallust or in Cicero’s four orations against Catiline.” (The Conspiracy 41)

It does seem rather odd that two of Catiline’s contemporary enemies would have overlooked this murder if it indeed happened. According to Appian, “Nobody had ventured to lay hands on him, because facts were not yet accurately known.” (Civil Wars 2.3) Hutchinson noted, “He did not even deign to defend himself against charges of the greatest personal infamy.” Hutchinson went on to declare that it was a common practice in Rome to charge someone with imaginary crimes and that this was an outgrowth of the rhetorical schools who taught their pupils to speak with “Colors, a certain way of presenting the most insignificant facts, mixed with useful lies.” (31) Though this may be true of the rhetorical schools, Cicero was one who made many of these charges. Did
Hutchinson intend to suggest that either Cicero, or Sallust, were themselves pupils of those rhetorical schools, and not the teachers of them? If its true that Catiline was contemptuous of public opinion, as Hutchinson says, that could have only been because he was confident that the accusations would not have been believed by the Senate where the true power resided. Appian said, “Catiline was a person of not, by reason of his great celebrity, and high birth, but a madman, for it was believed that he killed his own son because of his own love for Aurelia Orestilla, who was not willing to marry a man who had a son.” (Civil Wars, 2.2) But even if we believe all the negative remarks made against Cicero, not one of them accuses him of bribery, rape, murder, cannibalism, et al?

Sallust himself became the victim of calumny. On account of the fact that Sallust wrote that Pompey had “an honest face but a shameless character,” Lenaeus remarked in a satire that Sallust was “a debauchee, a gormandizer, a spendthrift, and a tippler, a man whose life and writing were monstrous, and who was besides being an ignorant pilferer of the language of the ancients and of Cato in particular.” (De Grammaticis 15) Cicero and countless others fell victim to these kinds of remarks. Philiscus said of Cicero, “Surely you would not prefer to have joined Catiline…to have performed none of the duties laid upon you…and thus remain at home as the reward for your wickedness, instead of saving your country and being exiled.” (Historiae Romanae 38) But there are no declamations against Catiline only judicial charges made against him.

Even Lynn Harold Harris chimed in with her missives. Accusing Ben Jonson of getting the facts all wrong on account of “living in an uncritical age” she said, “Not only the evil that men do lives after them, but much that they never even thought of doing. Catiline had the misfortune to have two prejudiced biographers, and has suffered unjustly
in consequence.” (His Conspiracy xxvii) But where is the proof that Catiline suffered unjustly? There is as much proof of injustice against Catiline as there is for Harris’ remarks that Catiline employed the slaves in his rebellion. “The slaves were to rise” (Ibid. xxvi) vis-à-vis Sallust: “He refused to enroll slaves, a great number whom flocked to him at first, because he had confidence in the strength of the conspiracy and at the same time thought it inconsistent with his designs to appear to have given runaway slaves a share in a citizens’ cause.” (Bellum Catilinae 56.4-5) Lynn Harold Harris said that insofar as Ben Jonson’s Catiline: “follows sources it is not in the main true to history.” (xxiii) Is it possible to be true to history by rejecting them? “To say that historical narratives relate events that cannot have happened is to say that we have some criterion, other than the narratives which reach us, by which to judge what could have happened.” (The Idea of History 60) Harris subtly contradicts her self by maintaining that Jonson’s play was is not a tragedy because, according to Aristotle’s definition, the tragic hero must somehow be respectable, or virtuous. With this remark, Harris confirms Calitine’s villainous reputation while at the same time denying the truth Sallust’s interpretation of him. Harris says, “Sallust’s account was undoubtedly considered beyond reproach then, especially as Plutarch, Cassius Dio, Appian, Florus, and the other authorities agree substantially with it. But to us of today that very agreement is suspicious. As Merimée points out, the accounts as so painstakingly alike that the conjecture at once arises that they have all been drawn in the main from one source.” (Ibid. xxiii)

It is not enough to say that the historians that came after Sallust simply followed his work. If this were true then why would Sallust say that Antonius could not meet Catiline on the battle field because he was sick with gout, while Cassius Dio said that
Antonius only feigned illness because he didn’t wish to fight his comrade? If Sallust produced the primary history of *Bellum Catilinae*, and all historians relied on him, and Cicero in addition to him, then how is it that C. MacDonald was able to discover eight different accounts of the charges made against Catiline? Harris says the charges were too consistent, Hardy says not consistent enough. The *law of the excluded middle* dictates that a statement must be either true or false. Catiline was either a criminal or he was not. This kind of sophistical attack erases not only Sallust’s testimony, but the testimony of all the other ancient sources as well. Since neither Harris, Hardy, nor Hutchinson’s assertions could be true, then Sallust’s assertions must be true, rather, advancing the *principle of generosity*, all the ancient sources must be considered true and of philosophical and historical value insofar as all the apologists for Catiline are all wrong. The only ancient source that could be even remotely construed to cast Catiline in a favorable light would be Lucan’s (39-65 A.D.) remarks in his poem *De Bello Civili Pharsalia Sive De Bello Civili*.

\begin{verbatim}
Cunctorum uoces Romani maximus auctor
Tullius eloquii, cuius sub iure togaque
pacificas saeuos tremuit Catilina securis,
pertulit iratus bellis, cum rostra forumque
optaret passus tam longa silentia miles.
\end{verbatim}

Tullius, the great writer of speeches,
[was] the whole voice of Rome
under whose justice and consulship
the peacemaking axes shook the savage Catiline
who, on account of wars, suffered violent outbursts

when he longed for Rostra and the Forum

after suffering in silence so long as a soldier. (Pharsalia 7.62-66)

But that could only be held true if one were to take the phrase “suffering in silence,” or “suffered violent outbursts on account of wars,” as reasons to pity him. Even still, Cicero could only be understood as “the voice of the Roman people.” Catiline did not, however, articulate his claim to the consulship on account of having been a soldier suffering in silence so long, but on account of his noble birth and his long line of ancestors who had held that position. Harris, relying of Shakespeare’s phrase, supposes to “Give the devil his due,” insofar as Catiline was the “logical product of his age.” (Ibid. xxiv-xxvi) In Shakespeare’s play Edward Poins and Henry the Prince of Wales discussed Sir John Falstaff’s supposed deal with the devil.

\[ \text{Poins:} \] Jack, how agrees the devil and thee about thy soul that thou soldest him on Good Friday last, for a cup of Madeira and a cold capon’s leg?

\[ \text{Prince:} \] Sir John stands to his word, the devil shall have his bargain, for he was never yet a breaker of proverbs. He will give the devil his due.

\[ \text{Poins:} \] Then thou art damn’d for keeping thy word with the devil.

\[ \text{Prince:} \] Else he had been damn’d for cozening [cheating] the devil. (1 Henry IV 1.2)

By way of Harris’ allegory we might conclude that Catiline, being the devil, received Harris’ soul which she had pledged to deliver to him, or that perhaps Harris pledged herself to Catiline who had pledged himself to the devil. But this allegory does little to exculpate Catiline from his bad reputation. Cicero, Cato, and Sallust, nay, all the
classical authors, in agreement on the criminality of Catiline, were the logical products of their age too. To Harris I reply in the words of Francesco Petrarca: “You act as if people who live together must share everything, when in fact inter bonos pessimi, inter pessimos boni habitant.” (In Magni Hominem 31) Harris bestowed her praise on a bad man, Livy on the good.

Ibsen held that “there nevertheless must have been a good deal that was great.” But even a broken clock is right twice per day. Catiline was great at being bad, but this is not the proper use of the term “great” since, for applied to Catiline “great” would mean despicable. Ibsen’s application of the word great here is false by equivocation, for it equivocates the great with the bad where great would properly correspond to laudable and bad to contemptible. C. MacDonald says that “he was no more dangerous or important than a number of other men.” Indeed, it appears that Caesar and Crassus may have been more dangerous than Catiline, since Catiline, it had been suggested, was working upon their orders. Or take this guy Lentulus for example; or Cethegus who “constantly complained of the inaction of his associates.” (Bellum Catilinae 43.3) Cicero said, “Catiline was the only one out of all these men to be feared and he only so as he was within the walls of Rome.” (3 In Catilinam 16) Catiline was indeed the most important criminal in Rome at the time. He was the sine qua non of the coup d’etat. Caesar and Crassus, if they were indeed backing him, could not have acted against the republic without him and Cicero asserts that it was imperative that Catiline be removed from the seat of the government. C. MacDonald and Cassius Dio do agree, however, that the importance of the conspiracy was exaggerated. “He [Catiline] gained a greater name than his deeds deserved.” (Historiae Romanae 37.42.1) The history of this affair did not
survive the ages by accident, but through its importance. His reputation exceeded his deeds because his intentions had been thwarted. If Catiline had succeeded, then, his deeds, I suppose, may have equaled his reputation if there was anyone left to report them. In the last analysis, however, the apologists for Catiline are the patrons of a scoundrel, φιλοπονηρος ‘love of the base,’ for they “seek out the losers in court…and imagine that with their friendship [they] will become more experienced and formidable…[they] admit the truth of the rest of what is said about him by people, but some points [they] do not believe.” (Characters 29) For Catiline’s apologists, it is just as Homer said:

Νυν μεν δὴ μαλα παγχυ κακος κακον ηγηλαζει
ως αιει τον ομοιον αγει θεος ως τον ομοιον’

Now, on the one hand, in its entirety, bad guides the bad, thus always God leads like to like. (Odyssey 17.218)

Furthermore, “the friendship of inferior people is evil, for they take part together in inferior pursuits and by becoming like each other are made positively evil. But friendship of the good is good and grows with their intercourse...

Εσθλον μεν γαρ αρ’ εσθα’

For, good things from good men. (Nicomachean Ethics 9.12.3)

The charges made against Catiline were more than rhetorical quips. Many thoroughly substantiated charges were made against him; but Catiline was not an ordinary subversive, he was a noble. He was a man of extraordinary political power and had not surrounded himself with what Harris referred to as “a motley crowd,” but with senators and knights.

Quod Antonius umbram suam metuit,
hic ne leges quidem.

Whereas Antony is afraid of his own shadow,

this guy [Catiline] not even the laws. (Handbook on Electioneering 9)

Cato, during his speech against the conspirators captured in Rome, said: “Citizens of the highest rank have conspired to fire their native city.” (Bellum Catilinae 52.24) Catiline relied on the difficulty of combating conspiracy hatched within ones own native city: in this case, the challenge was to Cicero as the leading man of the πολις, to prove a conspiracy and cause the powers that be to act upon it. “Conspiracies planned against one’s native city are less dangerous for those who plan them …In organizing them there are not many dangers, for a citizen can make preparations to acquire power…It should be understood that this occurs in a republic where some corruption already exists…Everyone has read about the conspiracy of Catiline described by Sallust and knows how, after the conspiracy was discovered, Catiline not only remained in Rome but came to the Senate and said insulting things both to the Senate and to the consul.” (Discourses 273) Though Cicero was dictator, by no means was he ruling by dicta. Convincing the Senate that a conspiracy was afoot was a difficult task.

Whoever Cicero was; no matter what class or party he belonged to, he was the defender of the republic. By all authorities defending the republic at this time was a thing of virtue. “Cicero, who had been hitherto distinguished only for eloquence, was now in everybody’s mouth as a man of action and was considered unquestionably the savior of his country on the eve of its destruction, for which reason the thanks of the assembly were bestowed upon him, amid general acclamations. At the instance of Cato the people saluted him as Father of his country” (Civil Wars 2.7). The republic was a qualitatively
better development over the monarchy that had preceded it. The dictatorships of Cinna and Sulla had threatened its very existence. It was right to defend it. “Go over with me, please, the events of the night before last. You will appreciate now that my concern for the safety of the Republic is much deeper than is yours for its destruction.” (1 In. Cat. 8) Thus Cicero makes plain his true vested interests which were to defend the republic. The Roman Empire was bad. No one disputes that it should have fallen, but whether or not it fell soon enough. Understanding this is the key to understanding why Catiline has become a negative archetype in the history of western civilizations. He is an arch villain not only of history, but of drama and poetry as well. Catiline had not yet passed the prime of his life, although he was rapidly approaching it. In many ways he still retained the character of a very young man who is “passionate, hot tempered and carried away by impulse…owing to [his] ambition.” (Rhetoric 2.12.3) He was careless with his money to “which he [attached] only the slightest value because [he] had never experienced want.” (Ibid 2.12.6) According to Aristotle, young men “are more courageous, for they are full of passion and hope…are high-minded, for they have not yet been humbled by life nor have they experienced the force of necessity; further there is high-mindedness in thinking oneself worthy of great things…they prefer the noble to the useful; their life is guided by their character ηθος rather than by calculation…and do everything to excess.” (Ibid 2.12.9-11)

For instance, although Wilkins asserts that Catiline “performs admirably, but for an ignoble cause,” he was not brave. Although Aristotle says that the noblest form of death is death in battle, and that the courageous man fearlessly confronts a noble death, as Catiline seemed to do, Catiline was not courageous man, but a mad man. “Of characters
that run to excess...he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name...but we should call a mad man.” (Nicomachean Ethics 3.6.8-3.7.7) During his defeat at Pistoria, Catiline showed no fear “for it is a necessary incentive to fear that there should remain some hope of being saved.” (Rhetoric 2.5.14) Since Catiline's cause was clearly hopeless, it was for him just as Aristotle said it would be for a man who is being beaten to death, as Catiline was about to be at the time he exhorted his comrades, who would have no fear since he necessarily had already lost all hope. Thus Catiline was neither courageous nor noble, because, although he died in battle, he did not do so fearlessly, but out of the sense of having lost all hope. Catiline, rather, was not a fearless man, but a man to be feared since he was a man of injustice possessed of power. “Injustice is all the graver when it is armed injustice.” (The Politics 1253a1) Cicero and Cato were the real heroes for preventing Catiline for gaining state power and for preserving the Republic.

V. Conclusion

The moral of the story that was handed down to us through the ages then was the correct one and attempt to alter its conclusions is love of the base. “From the sages who have sat in council with us during this discussion, we have acquired this much.” (Mataphysics 987a) Furthermore, one who “performs admirably for an ignoble cause” is thoroughly corrupt, since the good adheres to the good and the bad to the bad. The good is just and does well to the profit of virtue. He who performs well in the interest of injustice perpetuates vice and is therefore condemned as completely bad. We, as authors, whether of oratory, or history, of poetry, or drama, must endeavor to call things by their right and proper names, to strive to maintain the integrity of our words, ideas, and mental
constructs; distinguishing between the good and the bad and to teach this, for this is justice. “Our fathers, in time past, distinguished right and wrong plainly enough, and it is our wisdom to submit to be taught by them.” (The History 1.8) In the contest between Cicero and Catiline we must:

Apprends à distinguer e’ ambitieux du traître.

Learn to distinguish the ambitious from the traitor. (Rome Sauvée 5.3)

And to teach this not making a muddle of right and wrong. History is the memory of humanity. History as it is and was recorded and preserved in books is not actual social memory, but only the potential for it.

Historia vero testis temporum, lux veritas, vita memoriae, magistra vitae, nuntia vertustatis.

History is the true test of time, light of truth, life of memory, teacher of life, messenger of antiquity.” (De Oratore 2.9.36)

History properly used is the active social memory of humanity for “the only clue to what man can do is what man has done.” (The Idea of History 10) And furthermore the power of man to control his own destiny is limited by his knowledge; or is rather greatly limited by his ignorance. Ignorance is not strength. Books as concrete objects do not constitute the memory of humanity, but only the potential for social memory. For, “men have no more ready corrective of conduct than knowledge of the past.” (The Histories of Polybius 1.1) Like the archaeological remains of Rome in Freud's metaphor that the memory in man is like an archeological site, for what ever goes into it potentially remains in it. “Now let us make the fantastic supposition that Rome were not a human dwelling place, but a mental entity with just as long and varied a past history: that is, in which nothing
once constructed had perished, and all the earlier stages of development had survived alongside the latest.” (Civilization and Its Discontents 17) Books on a shelf however, like the layers of an archeological site, only lay side-by-side. Not only must the books themselves be preserved, as an archeological site must, the books themselves must be studied again and again in order for the men of the past to communicate themselves to the living, in order to fulfill their function, since we have it on the most excellent authority that not only is it most wise to γνώθι σεαυτόν ‘know thyself’ but also that repetitio mater memoriae. “Without some knowledge of himself, his knowledge of other things is imperfect: for to know something without knowing that one knows it is only a half-knowing, and to know that one knows is to know oneself.” (The Idea of History 205)

The world is evermore filling itself with books. More information accumulates everyday and we must choose which ones to study, in whole or in part, when to read fast, when slow. We must separate the good from the bad, the relevant from the irrelevant. The ancients transmitted this story to us as a means of teaching by bad example and we must respect that, diminishing neither their reputations as scholars nor the importance of their teachings. Polybius said: “The surest method of learning how to bear bravely the vicissitudes of fortune, is to recall the calamities of others.” (The Histories of Polybius 1.2) The very fact that these works survived and are the topic of debates even today testifies to their enduring importance. They may not be easily dismissed. Their teachings not easily negated. For, “to accord praise which genius of a bad man bribes us into bestowing is to sin against the sacred character of history.” (The History of Rome 110) Rehabilitating Catiline with the historical canon, then, is an assault on the integrity of history, on the memory of humanity. The historical process is a great responsibility, as
Cicero noted. On the responsibilities of the historian, Cicero said, “History’s first law is that an author must not dare to tell anything but the truth. And it’s second that he must make bold to tell the whole truth.” (*De Oratore* 2.14.62) Today, without overturning Cicero’s maxims, we recognize that there is more to history in that we must apply both our scientific capability and our rational faculty to study of history. Understanding our great social responsibility as historians we have developed theories of history so that we may best apply the lessons of the past, that the mistakes of the past be not repeated. “What chiefly makes the study of history wholesome and profitable is this, that you behold the lessons of every kind of experience set forth as on a conspicuous monument; from these you may choose for yourself and for your own state what to imitate, from these mark for avoidance what is shameful in the conception and shameful in the result.” (*Ab Urbe Condita* 1.10-11) We also have the responsibility to transmit to the youth the moral tale, ever urging them on to be “loving what is noble and hating what is base.” (*Nicomachean Ethics* 10.9.8) With respect to the Catiline affair we must not adopt the viewpoint of the historical revisionists for “we would not have our [future] Guardians grow up among representations of moral deformity, as in some fouls pasture where, day after day, feeding on every poisonous weed they would, little by little, gather insensibly a mass of corruption in their very souls.” (*Republic* 3.401)

Though Bolsheviks did promise, and effectuate, an economic leveling, it was the social relations of the class system which they sought to transform. For the final aim of communism is *to end the exploitation of man by man*; or at least to end the private exploitation of man since it seems the State it seems would still be permitted to exact labor from the individual, but only for the common good. It is the social relations of the
class system that hold the proletariat in bondage today, as it did then. None but the boldest sycophant would suggest that the proletariat has made itself oppressed, then or now, through robbing and squandering, loose morals and disordered thinking. “Inferiors become revolutionaries in order to be equals, and equals in order to be superiors.” (The Politics 1302a3) Though I would call Spartacus a revolutionary, I would name Catiline a reactionary. Plato’s assertion to the effect that justice in the state is maintained through temperance supposes that dissemblance can somehow be overcome and that under ideal circumstances at state could be constructed wherein virtue could not be faked, but he never succeeded in proving, even in theory, that this could actually be done. Indeed Hegel agreed with Plato that “nations are what their deeds are.” (Philosophy of History 187) But he also said that “good for its own sake” had no place in living reality (Ibid. 166) Thrasymachus’ position related what constituted the actual social praxis in Plato’s time. It is indeed the social praxis to wit, for all forms of state are predicated on violence. For the argumentum ad baculum, it should be noted, appears on the first page of Plato’s Republic. “The secret being that where force can be used, law is not needed.” (The Peloponnesian War 1.77)

Since incest, rape, murder, adultery, human sacrifice, and cannibalism are wrong everywhere, and not just in our state but also in Rome at the time of the Bellum Catiline; it was vice, not virtue, his class standing and the social relations between members of his own class and from his class to the other classes, that made Catiline who he was. In a general sense, he could not have acted differently than he did. Hegel’s assertion that: “What experience and history teach is this--that peoples and governments never have learned anything from history” (Ibid. 155) is wrong since it can be proven through the
historical record that laws and customs have indeed changed. We should note that there have been civilizations wherein each of the aforementioned crimes were in fact not crimes but were customs and that these civilizations no longer exist. Indeed man did learn from history and through this learning Rome itself determined that certain practices such as rape, murder, and human sacrifice ought to have been prohibited on the grounds that a moment of pleasure for a man like Catiline was repugnant to the whole people. Catiline, then, must be historically situated and tried by the laws of his own time.

He was a product of the social relations of his time. He was the material product of his age to be sure, but it was his class standing which determined how he reacted within it. “Every historical character in every historical situation thinks and acts as rationally as that person in that situation can think and act, and nobody can do more.” (The Idea of History 116) It was the patrician class that had accustomed itself to assailing the Roman government as if it were a prize. “A characteristic of noble birth is that he who possesses it is more ambitious.” (Rhetoric 2.15.2) Though we all hold out hope that a character such as Catiline will at some time reverse course, he did not reverse it. “The developments that take place in history are never accidental, they are necessary.” (The Idea of History 117) Entertaining the possibility any further would be counterfactual historiography. His was not a moment of revolution, but of reaction. His was a movement in the opposite direction, from progress to reaction. The patrician class, having first supplanted the monarchy, had itself tumbled. Having at one time granted concessions to the plebeians, the patricians began to lose even more power. Cinna, Sulla and Catiline, all patricians, sought to restore the supremacy of the patrician class but could only do so through the establishment of a quasi-monarchy, a tyranny. It was Cicero
and Cato who held the middle ground. They represented the progressive wing of the ruling classes. Catiline did not. As a historical movement worthy of Rome’s national spirit it was for the servi and the proletarii to rise and overturn the old order, both the patricians and the plebeians. That would have been a progressive historical development. The national spirit of a nation is the struggle for freedom. Rome’s national spirit could only have been actualized through the success of the class struggle which gnawed at its vitals. Rome underwent a historical development when the aristocrats through off chains of the monarchy and again when the bourgeoisie, the plebs, won the right to share power with the patricians, but the struggles of the slave class and the proletariat had failed. The Catilinarian conspiracy was not a moment in the process of class struggle on the part of the oppressed classes, but was, indeed, a moment in the process of the development of reaction on the part of the oppressors. Catiline represented the nobility attempting to reassert itself against the bourgeoisie hence Catiline’s repeated assertions that Cicero was a new man and a lodger (Cf. Civil Wars 2.1.2) for the nobility presumed to obtain high standing by means of the merits of their ancestors while the bourgeoisie sought to obtain status through their own noble deeds. The world was changing. Opposing social classes were struggling against each other not only at the rostra and on the battle fields, but through the language creating an ambiguity over the meaning of the word noble. The process of the ascension of reaction, the ascension of the Roman tyrants, the emperors, was embryonic at the time of the Bellum Catiline, but would come to the fore later with the ascension of Octavian as Augustus Caesar (27 B.C.). Cicero’s actions were in accord with the historical momentum of the plebian class united with the equestrians. By way of analogy the bourgeoisie, in an attempt to affirm the new social order and everything that
went along with it including the rise of the orators in contest at the rostra, the rule of law, and the belief that the good were those of noble character, not men of noble birth. Catiline’s actions were in accord with the historical momentum of the patrician class, the aristocracy, in an attempt to reassert the old order and everything that went along with it which was kingship, tyranny, the commands of the king and the deference of the masses to the caprice of the nobility, and the belief that the good were men of noble birth, not men of noble deeds. “One side holds that justice is a relation of mutual goodwill…the otherside holds that the rule of the surperior is in itself, and by itself, justice…neither view has any cogency, or even plausibility, against the view that the superior in goodness ought to rule over, and be the master of, his inferiors.” (The Politics 1255a) Since the idea of justice is fundamentally ineffable; the social praxis of it at the end of the Roman republic was arbitrarily applied by the aristocracy with the aim of the happiness of the few not the many, indeed the king stood above the law. In the end, the nobility succeeded in reasserting itself. Those of noble birth, having won out against those of noble character, at long last established the Pax Romana under a man, Octavian, who would be acclaimed the first Roman king. It was precisely because the bourgeoisie was unable to keep the peace that its government remained unstable and became vulnerable both to revolution from below and reaction from above.

The decisive historical moment in turning the progressive the grand historical moment into a moment of reaction was the defeat of Spartacus at the river Silarus (71 B.C.). For those who do not know this story, take note it was Appian who preserved the tale. Spartacus was a Greek slave from Thrace who had once served in the Roman army, but was later taken prisoner and sold for a gladiator. While he was imprisoned in the
gladiatorial school at Capua he persuaded about seventy of his comrades into revolt (73 B.C.).

Agitare inter se mala servitutis, conferre iniurias et interpretando accendere:
nihil profici patientia nisi ut graviora tamquam ex facili tolerantibus imperentur.

They agitated among themselves on the evils of slavery, to and to compare their injuries, arguing that: Nothing is to be accomplished by patiently enduring commands except greater burdens placed upon those who willingly bear them. 

(Agricola 15.1-2)

After overcoming the guards, they escaped and armed themselves with clubs and daggers that they had stolen from travelers along the road until they made their way to Mount Vesuvius where they took refuge for a short time. Fugitive slaves and freemen alike flocked to him and his two subordinate officers, Oenomaus and Crixus, who at once commenced in plundering the countryside in the vicinity. Rome at first sent Varinius Glaber and later Publius Valerius after them, but they were so quickly and very badly beaten that Spartacus rode away on Varinius’ horse. After this, a great many more joined Spartacus' league until, according to Appian, his army surpassed 70,000 men who, now preparing to face two Roman legions, began to manufacture their own weapons. Crixus was overcome near Mount Garganus and Spartacus fled seeking to make his way through the Apennines and across the Alps into Gaul, but one of the Roman legions cut him off from the front while another harassed his rear. Spartacus defeated one and then the other, who scattered in confusion and disorder, whereupon, Spartacus sacrificed 300 Roman soldiers to the memory of Crixus and marched on Rome with 120,000 unencumbered infantry. Along the way, Spartacus defeated another Roman army at Picenum. After this,
Spartacus changed his mind believing that he was ill prepared to attack Rome itself since no cities had joined him. Thence he withdrew to the mountains near Thurii and captured the city there. He would not allow his men to acquire any gold or silver, but only brass and iron and would only permit merchants who dealt in these commodities. His men acquired an abundance of this material and fashioned plenty of arms which they used to defeat the Romans once again. Upon the new year, and three years into the war, Licinius Crassus, having just been praetor, marched upon him with six legions who were joined by two more, but he punished and decimated his own men for losing too many battles. Appian says that Crassus may have killed up to 4,000 of them. Having demonstrated to the army that he as a general was more dangerous to the soldiers than the enemy, the Romans finally won a battle against a detachment of 10,000 and, having first killed two-thirds of Spartacus’ men, he then marched on Spartacus himself and, after having his forces decimated; Spartacus tried unsuccessfully to cross into Sicily. Crassus surrounded him and enclosed his forces with a ditch, a wall, and a paling. Spartacus attempted to break through Crassus’ encirclement and lost another 6,000 men. According to Appian: “Only three of the Roman army were killed and seven wounded, so great was the improvement in their morale inspired by [Crassus’] recent punishment.” Evidently, Spartacus was expecting reinforcements and therefore only fought Crassus by harassment and even crucified a Roman prisoner between the two armies in order to demonstrate to his own men what fate awaited them if they were to lose. In order to put an end to their disgrace, Rome sent Pompey, who had just arrived from Spain, and his army against him. Crassus, therefore, sought to bring the conflict to a decision as quickly as possible before Pompey arrived so that he would not reap the glory of a victory. Spartacus, having
perceived, Crassus’ anxiety sought to come to terms with him. When his proposals were rebuffed with scorn, Spartacus dashed through the enemies lines and pushed on to Brundusium with Crassus in pursuit. Unfortunately for Spartacus, Lucullus had just arrived in Brundusium after his victory over king Mithridates. Spartacus and the Romans fought a long a bloody battle. “Spartacus was wounded in the thigh with a spear and sank upon his knee, holding his shield in front of him and contending in this way against his assailants until he and a great mass of those with him were surrounded and slain. The reminder of his army was thrown into confusion and butchered in crowds...the body of Spartacus was not found.” According to Appian, the remainder of his men divided themselves into four parts having fled into the mountains, with Crassus on their rear, and they continued to fight until they all had perished except for about 6000 who were captured and crucified along the road from Capua to Rome. (Civil Wars 1.116-120) Through the Sparticus Rebellion the servi sought to transcend thing hood. The servi as a social class had become self-conscious by challenging death. Catiline as an actor on the world stage on behalf of the nobility did not obtain class consciousness through the Bellum Catilinae, for as a social class the patricians already had it. His actions in fact demonstrated that the nobility had become conscious of the fact that as a class it was no longer the Master holding the other classes in thrall, but was in fact a social class in decline. Its mastery had been replaced by the mastery of the plebeians. The most advanced elements of the patrician class; Caesar, Crassus and Catiline, having recognized this historic development reasserted themselves as representatives of their class. Though the Roman republic did continue after the defeat of Spartacus, the exile of Cicero signaled that the Republic had come to an end. Not long after the Bellum Catilinae,
Pompey, Crassus and Caesar “pooled their interests” ascended as the *First Triumvirate* (60 B.C.-53 B.C.) which was gained through reliance on their reputations of their *glorious* conquests abroad and some demagoguery whereby the people were bought off with land distributions, threats of violence and the ejection of Cato from the forum. In 59 B.C. Clodius was appointed *tribune* by Caesar “although [he] had been suspected of an intrigue with the wife of Caesar himself during a religious ceremony of women. Caesar, however, did not bring him to trial owing to his popularity with the masses, but divorced his wife. Others prosecuted Clodius for impiety at the sacred rites, and Cicero was the counsel for the prosecution. When Caesar was called as a witness he refused to testify against Clodius, but even raised him to the tribuneship as a foil to Cicero, who was already decrying the triumvirate as tending toward monarchy. Thus Caesar...benefited one enemy in order to revenge himself on another.” (*Civil Wars* 2.14) In 58 B.C. Clodius prosecuted Cicero for putting Lentulus and Cethagus, *inter alios*, to death without a trial. “Cicero, who had exhibited the highest courage in that transaction, became utterly unnerved at his trial.” (*Ibid.* 2.15) Cicero reportedly threw himself into a number of public histrionics. Dressing himself in rags and covering himself in filth he implored people in the streets. “When Clodius interrupted Cicero’s supplications on the streets with contumely, he gave way to despair and, like Demosthenes, went into voluntary exile.” (*Ibid.*) Sixteen months later he was recalled to Rome at the urging of Pompey who hoped that Cicero would no longer speak against the triumvirate but would instead attack Clodius. “He was received magnificently at the city gates, and it is said that a whole day was consumed by the greetings extended to him, as was the case with Demosthenes when he returned.” (*Ibid* 2.16) Cassius Dio says that Cicero “discarded his
senatorial dress and went about in the garb of the knights, paying court meanwhile, as he
went the rounds, day and night alike, to all who had any influence, not only of his friends
but also of his opponents, and especially Pompey and even Caesar, inasmuch as the latter
concealed his enmity toward him.” (Historiae Romanae 38.14.7) This is not so far
fetched as Appian’s account of the events since Cicero was an equestrian, which means
knight. At any rate, Cicero cast himself as a persona in a tragic drama understanding well
the portent of charges dutifully entertained against a former consul who had immunity. In
his staged triumphal return Cicero vaingloriously and wrongly believed that the idea of
the republic had won out against the idea of tyranny. This is Cicero consciously
demonstrating to the people through real life drama, or life tricked out as a drama. His
histriions were in fact calculated pedagogy through drama intended to impress upon the
people at the time as it impresses upon us now the great historic importance of these
events. Cicero covers his face with the tragic mask of Demosthenes and speaks through
the opening; as if to say: ‘Hello! It’s me, Cicero. Remember me? I saved the republic.
It is I who dashed away the daggers once held at your throats. Servate me! Servate me!
Now save me, and through me, the republic.’

The reason that this event is so significant is that it showed that patrician
demagogy once again carried the day in Rome. Strictly speaking, the political process
was no longer functioning as it once had. The removal Cato from the forum was the first
sign that Rome had new masters. It was as yet a mere oligarchy, but the historical
momentum was toward the return of the monarchy; this time not foreign but domestic.
The historical precession must have somehow continued unfold in this direction but it
was obstructed by the fact that Rome had banished the foreign monarchy and therefore
lacked a legitimate basis for the coronation of a king, hence the precession from monarchy back to monarchy was mediated through the republic. If a monarchy were to ascend in England today, we see the precedents for it in the royal family which claims precedence to the throne. If a monarchy were to ascent in American, however, we see that it lacks and precedents. That is not say that it would be impossible for a king to rule America, but it would be difficult to settle the issue of precedence to the throne because America has no domestic heritage from monarchy but to a foreign monarchy expelled as Rome did. The historical process in Rome was settling this issue. None of the men of the first triumvirate qualified as a true king and none of these men would allow any of the others to ascend as a tyrant, hence the first tricaranus followed by the second. It was not the assassination of Caesar, the proscription of Cicero, or the ascension of Octavian, which sealed Rome’s fate as a culture in decline. It was in fact exile of Cicero which played the pivotal role. It was the exile of Cicero that truly demonstrated that democracy in Rome had come to an end. The not only had the rule of law been banished, but politics through oratory had been thereby outlawed. There was no more respect for the citizen statesman. Rome had a de facto oligarchy ruling it. Octavian would finally make the case for establishing a neo-monarchy by narrating a divine heritage through his adoptive father Julius. Though it wasn’t called a monarchy, but a pinceps, or ‘pincipate’ or a State ruled by the ‘leading man.’

Non regno tamen neque dictatura sed principis nomine constitutam rem publicam.

Nevertheless, the Republic had been constituted as neither a kingdom nor a dictatorship but by the name of Pincipate. (The Annals 1.9)
Octavian’s argument for the re-institution of the monarchy might be compared to the events that took place among the Medes after they freed themselves from the oppression of the Assyrians.

According to Herodotus there was a certain Mede named Deioces who achieved sovereign power in Media over the Busae, the Paretaceni, the Struchates, the Arizanti, the Budii, and the Magi by means of demagoguery. Since there was great lawlessness in the land on account of the fact that Media lacked a central authority, Deioces applied himself to the practice of justice and acquired a reputation for being a equitable judge. He soon collected a large following of people who greatly enlarged his case load. Once Deioces saw that the people had come to rely on him for giving dispensation and force to law he suddenly quit his job causing robbery and lawlessness to reappear. In wont of justice and Despairing at the state of affairs, the accomplices and provocateurs of Deioces gathered the Medes together and declared: “We cannot possibly...go on living in this country if things continue as they now are; let us therefore set a king over us, that so the land may be well governed.” (*The History* 1.95-101) If the difference between tyranny and monarchy is the difference between how power is exercised, with the consent of the people versus without the consent of the people, and not a debate over how that power is obtained, then, because of the *Pax Romana*, Octavian succeeded not only in re-establishing the monarchy but also in making that monarchy Roman. But there can be little doubt that the dialectical development of Roman history for the time of the expulsion of Tarquinius to the ascension of Octavian was from monarchy to monarchy mediated through the republic which in the end gave back to Rome what a foreign power had once held.
Though it may not at first glance appear to be particularly germane to the matter at hand, in the process of passing moral judgment upon the crimes of Catiline we first looked to his sacrilege against the Roman religion but in this process we must also look at our own theological presuppositions for it is from here that we pass judgment upon him. Our theology is primarily Paltonic passed through the lens of Semitic dogma. We could only do this because our own civilization has derived its ethical compendium from the Bible and from theological thought derived from it. We as a civilization have negated the Roman religion; we have pronounced an ethical judgment against it. We do not criticize it be drawing the Roman religion in relation to the Greek religion because western civilization has rejected it as *paganism*. We cannot however truly even speak of western theology as Semitic except as a dialectical development of Platonic philosophy; the development being from Plato to Mohammed. On account of his remarks in *Timaeus* (c. 360 B.C.), Plato has been recognized as the origin of monotheism. According to him: “Everything which becomes must of necessity become owing to some Cause…Now to discover the Maker and Father of this Universe were a task indeed…Let us now state the Cause wherefore He that constructed it constructed Becoming and the All. He was good, and in him that is good no envy ariseth ever concerning anything and being devoid of envy. He desired that all should be, so far as possible, like unto Himself…For God desired that, so far as possible, all things should be good and nothing evil.” (*Timaeus* 28A-30A) Before this Plato has already speculated in the *Republic*: “Suppose there are no gods.” (2.365) In other words, suppose there are no *gods* but one God; ﻻ إِلَى ﷲ. Humanist philosopher Marcilio Ficino (1433-1499) said, “Plato, the father of the philosophers, realizing that our minds bear the same relationship to God as our sight to
the light of the Sun, and therefore they can never understand anything without the light of God, consider it just and pious that as the human mind receives everything from God, so it should restore everything to God. And that is why he has been considered indisputably divine and his teaching called “theology” among all peoples. For whatever subject he deals with, be it ethics, dialectic, mathematics or physics, he quickly brings it round, in a spirit of utmost piety to the contemplation and worship of God.” (Platonic Theology, Proem 1-2) At any rate, there were no Jews, or even Hebrews, in the time of Herodotus. Herodotus is well known for having narrated the histories of the dozens of obscure people’s inhabiting the regions of North Africa, Arabia, Asia Minor, Central Asia and Europe. It seems to be rather impossible that he would have ignored the noble exploits of the Jewish people if they had indeed existed in his time or before. Tacitus said: “Some say that the Jews were fugitives from the island of Crete, who settled on the nearest coast of Africa about the time when Saturn was driven from his throne by the power of Jupiter.” (Historiae 5.2) And that they may have emigrated from Egypt under the leadership of a man named Moses. “Most writers, however, agree in stating that once a disease, which horribly disfigured the body, broke out over Egypt; that king Bocchoris, seeking a remedy, consulted the oracle of Hammon, and was bidden to cleanse his realm, and to convey into some foreign land this race detested by the gods. The people, who had been collected after diligent search, finding themselves left in a desert, sat for the most part in a stupor of grief, till one of the exiles, Moyses by name, warned them not to look for any relief from God or man, forsaken as they were of both, but to trust to themselves, taking for their heaven-sent leader that man who should first help them to be quit of their present misery…Moyses, wishing to secure for the future his authority over the nation,
gave them a novel form of worship, opposed to all that is practiced by other men. Things sacred with us, with them have no sanctity, while they allow what with us is forbidden. In their holy place they have consecrated an image of the animal by whose guidance they found deliverance from their long and thirsty wanderings…They abstain from swine's flesh, in consideration of what they suffered when they were infected by the leprosy to which this animal is liable…This worship, however introduced, is upheld by its antiquity; all their other customs, which are at once perverse and disgusting, owe their strength to their very badness. The most degraded out of other races…among themselves they are inflexibly honest and ever ready to show compassion, though they regard the rest of mankind with all the hatred of enemies…as a nation, they are singularly prone to lust, they abstain from intercourse with foreign women; among themselves nothing is unlawful. Circumcision was adopted by them as a mark of difference from other men. Those who come over to their religion adopt the practice, and have this lesson first instilled into them, to despise all gods, to disown their country, and set at naught parents, children, and brethren…They hold that the souls of all who perish in battle or by the hands of the executioner are immortal. Hence a passion for propagating their race and a contempt for death. They are wont to bury rather than to burn their dead, following in this the Egyptian custom; they bestow the same care on the dead, and they hold the same belief about the lower world. Quite different is their faith about things divine. The Egyptians worship many animals and images of monstrous form; the Jews have purely mental conceptions of Deity, as one in essence. They call those profane who make representations of God in human shape out of perishable materials. They believe that Being to be supreme and eternal, neither capable of representation, nor of decay. They
therefore do not allow any images to stand in their cities; much less in their temples…the Jewish religion is tasteless and mean.” (Ibid. 5.3-5) It appears that over the years little has changed except for the invention of the Torah scroll which makes up the center piece of their Temples today and has become an object of worship for them for according to Tacitus: “Cneius Pompeius was the first of our countrymen to subdue the Jews. Availing himself of the right of conquest, he entered the temple. Thus it became commonly known that the place stood empty with no similitude of gods within, and that the shrine had nothing to reveal.” (Ibid. 5.9)

According to Herodotus, however, it was the Egyptians who first designated the pig as an unclean animal, not the Jews. “The pig is regarded among them as an unclean animal, so much so that if a man in passing accidentally touches a pig, he instantly hurried to the river and plunges in with all his clothes on. Hence too, the swineherds…are forbidden to enter into any temples…and further, no one will give his daughter in marriage to a swineherd, or take a wife from among them, so that the swineherds are forced to intermarry among themselves.” (2.47) Of course the pig was considered despicable even in the Greek world. The Elder Clisthenes, having conquered the Sicyonians, after appointing his own tribe the Archelaï ‘Rulers he renamed the remaining tribes: Hyatae ‘Pig-folk,’ Oneatae ‘Ass-folk,’ and the Choereatae “Swine-folk’ as an insult to them.

He also says that the Egyptians were related black Africans. For the “Colchians are an Egyptian race. Before I heard any mention of the fact from others, I had remarked it myself. After the thought had struck me, I made inquiries on the subject both in Colchis and in Egypt, and I found that the Colchians had a more distinct recollection of
the Egyptians, than the Egyptians had of them…they are black-skinned and have wooly hair.” (2.104) In addition to this, Herodotus noted that the Colchians, Egyptians and the Ethiopians were the nations which originally practiced circumcision. “The Phoenicians and the Syrians of Palestine themselves confess that they learnt the custom from the Egyptians.” (Ibid.) In addition to this it appears that the Pelastoi were the original inhabitants of the land “in the part of Syria called Palestine.” (2.106) The land we now call Palestine. Syria is a Greek name. The original name of the region was Cappadocia. The people residing there were thus known as “the Cappadocians, whom we Greeks know by the name Syrians.” (The History 5.49) And that the Egyptians “were also the first to broach the opinion that the soul of man is immortal.” (2.123) The Torah was based on the writings of Josephus (c. 37 – c. 100 A.D.); and because of that it was first written in Greek not in Hebrew. If it was ever written in Hebrew there are no parchments or any historical evidence to substantiate that fact. Indeed the oldest extant text of the Torah is in Latin (100 A.D.) which is widely believed to be a translation of a non-extant Greek version for which the Greek Septuagint (1000 A.D.) serves as a substitute. If we rely on what the historical evidence shows us, the Septuagint is not an ancient Greek translation of the Hebrew Scriptures. Some scholars in fact hold that the Hebrew language is derived from Greek and we can easily see the correspondences between the Latin, Greek, Hebrew and Arabic alphabets, from the Greek αλφάβητος, ‘alpha + beta.’ Latin: A, B, C, D, E; Greek: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta, Epsilon…Lambda, Mu, Nu; Hebrew: Alef, Bet, Gimmel, Dalet…Lamed, Mim, Nun; Arabic: Alif, Ba, Ta, Gim, Ha, Dal…Lam, Mim, Nun. Some etymologists wrongly presume the Greek alphabet to be from the Phoenician-Hebrew, but for lack of evidence of this, I hold to what this
information shows to me on its face as opposed to making hyperbolic presumptions which evidently have a political subtext since certain unscrupulous individuals, seeking to posit themselves as the origin of everything good, deny the Greek origin of western theology and Plato’s pivotal role in the development of it. Assertions to the effect that the Greek alphabet or that Greek thought, particularly Plato’s thought, was derived from Judaism is absurd. This is not to say that Plato himself was a monotheist, but that monotheism was built upon his cosmology in the *Timaeus*. (Cf. *Plato’s Cosmology* 34-35) The contemporary Hebrew Scriptures are in fact the translation of the Greek *Septuagint*; Josephus having been the principle author of them. It really neither here nor there except to individuals who hope to establish some primacy over humanity, but he seems to be wiser who would predicate his theological genealogy upon the last development, as opposed to its first, since the last development of an upward spiral would be the most advanced. Indeed then it appears that monotheism is the result of a long and varied historical development. Those who would later be called the Jews didn’t exist until after Plato. The space here would be insufficient to do justice to the topic. “It is equally unreasonable to accept merely probable conclusions from a mathematician and to demand strict demonstrations from an orator.” (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1.3.4)

If they did exist in either Egypt or elsewhere, the historical record is silent about them until c. 100 A.D. The point being that the ethics of western civilization were summed up in the *Torah*, the *Ten Commandments*, but as substantive morals they could not be adequately define, due the structure and phenomenological development of the human mind, hence the development of the *Talmud* as a body of law to interpret the Law; justice itself becoming ever more distant and it interpretation evermore corrupt.
Non addestis ad verbum quod vobis loquor neque auferetis ex eo.

You shall not add to the Word which I speak to you nor remove from it.

*(Deuteronomy 4.2)*

Though Josephus tells us that the *Torah* was originally a mere *ten words*, which he refused to reveal, it was expanded to 613 *commandments* and then later greatly expanded into many thousands, indeed innumerable, *Halakah*, demonstrating the imperfection of the work. “It is usually said of successful works that it is impossible to take anything from them or add anything to them.” *(Nicomachean Ethics 2.5)* Hence it was originally conceived that the *Torah* pronounced by Moses was sufficient, but it was later declared by its own adherents to be insufficient.

On account of the great corruption of Jewish law, a new Prophet came and gave humanity a *New Covenant*. The Torah was replaced by the *Gospels* and the writings of the Church Fathers. The theology of Saint Paul (A.D 3–14 - 62–69), the Gospels, eventually gave way to *القرآن*, the *Qur'an* (c. 632 A.D.), the recitation of the Prophet Mohammed. This represented a positive upward development in terms of substantive ethics for the western world, the ascendency of western theology, unfolding through dialectical struggle in an upward spiral; an ascendency from the lower to the higher. But as history continues to unfold, the morals propounded within these documents, as substantive ethics, becomes ever more out of step with the need of humanity, they become dated as it were. Thus as contemporary historians, our interpretation of Catiline’s crimes cannot be completely understood in terms of Roman paganism for our concept of Holy law has been conditioned by what would properly be called Platonic theology having developed through the lens of Semitic history and then transmitted to us through
the history of the later Roman Empire as Christianity. Thus it could not be truly said
either that there are two distinct sources for western thought, or that the three principal
monotheistic religions, are truly Semetic because they in fact have a Greek origin.

According to western ethics and western culture *paganism* is false because as a
source of ethical principles it cannot survive the tests of contemporary logic which seized
upon the development of Semitic theology, in American, principally, as Christianity. But
truly, the development of Platonic theology ended with the Prophet Mohammed, not with
Moses or Jesus, hence the second part of the مُحَمَّدُ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ ‘shahadah:’
Mohammed is the Messenger of God.’ This was the final historical development of
western theology regardless of whether or not anyone chooses to ascribe to this doctrine.
It is with the *Qur’an* that the Semites, Arabs, declared that there could be no further
ethical development in history along this path. The *Qur’an* is the final substantive moral
doctrine from this source. Mohammed was the last and final messenger. The whole of
the ethical and historical development of the Platonic religion was ultimately lain down
as a substantive doctrine in the *Qur’an*. It is a moral datum. It is the moral yardstick for
all ethical activity from those who ascribe to it and the end result of western religion. The
Jews were displaced from their position as the bearers of God’s ethics by the Christians
and the Christians by the Muslims. According to Islam, Judaism was too strict,
Christianity was not strict enough. Both had become theologically corrupt by any test of
logic. Islam became a middle path between the two extremes and is known as the straight
path لَمَّا سَلَبَهُ. Not the only path as it were, according to it doctrine, but the straight path.

All who follow it a guaranteed eternal life after death in paradise جَنَّة. At length
however, the theology of Islam fell into the same morass as its predecessors in attempting to legislate from a moral substantive purportedly revealed through divine agency to positive law. The more it pursued the idea of absolute justice the further it became from actually achieving it. This isn’t to say that the whole body of theological thought is worthless, but to point out its limitations which have resulted from the fact that while history develops and therefore mankind’s idea of the ethical develops, moral substantives do not. The whole purpose of this rather lengthy and tiresome digression being to point out that western ethics is marked by a dualism between the theological and the secular humanistic. Indeed there were two principle developments in early Greek philosophy: (α) Ionic and (β) Italot. The western academy, as a result of the Enlightenment, has taken a course which is decidedly Ionic. Whosoever should wish to understand western ethics must understand both of these developments. I might also be worthwhile to note that after secular humanism over took the western academy, the faculty became what would correspond to the ancient priest class. It has become their responsibility to impart the values of this civilization. This of course is to no avail for: “The masses are the victims of the deception of a priesthood which, in its envious conceit, holds itself to be the sole possessor of insight and pursues its other selfish ends as well. At the same time it conspires with despotism which, as the synthetic, non-notional unity of the real and this ideal realm—a curiously inconsistent entity—stands above the bad insight of the multitude and the bad intentions of the priests, and yet unites both within itself. From the stupidity and confusion of the people brought about by this trickery of preistcraft, despotism, which despises both, draws for itself the advantage of undisturbed domination
and the fulfillment of its desires and caprices, but is itself at the same time this same dullness on insight, the same superstition and error.” (*Phenomenology of Spirit* §542)

If as Hegel remarked that the state rests on religion, we could also conclude that as for the Roman Empire that it was the ربا ‘riba,’ the دنیا ‘dunya,’ the شرک ‘shirk,’ and the کبر ‘kibr’ that had destroyed it. “Religion is the sphere in which a nation gives itself the definition of that which it regards as true...the conception of God, therefore, constitutes the general basis of a people’s character.” (*Philosophy of History* 176) Thus I compare the personality traits of the villainous Catiline to four great sins: ربا ‘riba’ or ‘usury,’ the دنیا ‘dunya’ or ‘the quest for earthly possessions,’ the شرک ‘shirk’ or ‘idol worship’, and the کبر ‘kibr’ or ‘υβρις, insolence and arrogance. Catiline himself was possessed of these vices: usury, avarice, polytheism, and insolent outrages before God. He was going broke because the usury, on the money he borrowed to purchase useless things of the material world, the dunya. Men like Catiline and the Roman emperors that followed him saw themselves reflected in the Roman Pantheon. The gods of the Romans were too much like men, shirk. Hegel citing Schiller said: “While the gods remained more human, the men more divine.” (*Ibid*) The concept of the Hero, which the Romans allegedly acquired from the Greeks, suggested that the great men of Rome could become like the heroes of antiquity. Through this idea the great men believed that they could challenge the gods themselves, کبیر or ‘υβρις, insolence and arrogance. The fact that Octavian would be later acclaimed Caesar Augustus, the divine Caesar, proves this. As a man’s objective greatness grew, and his power and dominion over not only things but over men as things
grew. The state’s subjective content passed through the lens of the state’s leading man first approached the idea of the Great Man as hero and later approached the idea of the Great Man as a god.

*Nihil deorum honoribus relictum cum se templis et effigie numinum per flamines et sacerdotes coli vellet.*

No honor was left to the gods when Augustus wished himself to be worshiped like a god with temples and effigies, by priests and priestesses. *(The Annals 1.10)*

The Roman emperors became like the pharaohs of Egypt, the ruler as god on Earth. The fact that Catiline so boldly desecrated the fountain of Apollo demonstrated not only his *hubris* but his madness. Herodotus said that the fact that the Persian king Cambyses opened ancient sepulchers in Memphis and examined the bodies inside and that later the fact that he mocked and desecrated the images of Vulcan and the Cabiri was proof that he was mad. “For if one were to offer men to choose out of all the customs in the world such as seemed to them the best, they would examine the whole number, and end by preferring their own...Unless, therefore, a man was mad, it is not likely that he would make sport of such matters.” Herodotus continued by way of a parable based on the life of Darius. According to him, Darius summoned some Greeks and asked them what he should have to pay them in order to cause them to eat the bodies of their fathers after they had died. The Greeks replied that there was no sum of money so great that could cause them to commit such a sacrifice. Darius then summoned some Indians called the Callatians, whom were known to eat their fathers after they had died, and asked them what sum of money he should have to give them to cause them to follow the Greek custom and burn the bodies of their fathers after they had died. The Callatians replied
that there was no sum of money so great that they would even hear the suggestion.

Whereupon Herodotus concluded in the words of the Greek poet Pindar:

Ορθος μοι δοκεει Πινδαρος ποιησαι νομον παντον βασιλεα φησας ειναι.

In my opinion Pindar does right when he declares: “Law is to be king over all.”

(The History 3.38)

Cambyses committed outrages similar to the ones Catiline had. For in addition to sacrilege, it reported that Cambyses murdered his brother Smerdis and later married one of his other sisters after first marrying and then murdering the younger of the two. Hardy presumed to exculpate Catiline from the charges made against him on the grounds that they are related to us differently by several authorities, but Herodotus himself relates two different accounts of the murder of Smerdis and two more different accounts of Cambyses’ murder of his sister. His practice of narrating multiple accounts of the same story is used throughout his works. Should we convict Cambyses for both these crimes on account of the fact that only one historian has told us about his crimes and be unable to convict Catiline on account of the fact that his crimes were narrated not by one but several? Or could we dispute Cicero’s authority to banish Catiline, vanquish him with an army raised by the state, and to execute the conspirators knowing well that the punishment for the crimes by which they were charged, at that time, was death in accordance with the rule of law? Irrespective of a positive conviction in a court of law, those guilty of aforesaid crimes were owed the ultimate punishment. The fact that they received it demonstrated that νομος ‘law’ was the king over men, not men the king over law. But strictly speaking it was not the positive law in direct correspondence to these men in this case that was vindicated by the law that established the Republic. Irrespective
of his dissemblance and his conspiracy, Catiline, and the men behind him, could not have, and should not have, made themselves supreme.

Δική δ’ ὑπὲρ Ὑβριός ἰσχεὶ εἰς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα

But Justice overcomes Hubris when it comes to the end. (Works and Days 217)

Thus, Cicero affirmed the rule of law and that a man is not a god. And that Catiline as a full participant in the mechanisms of the Roman government was bound by law to uphold the Republic. He was not above the law but was subject to law; in general the law that established the Republic, and in this instance the Plautian Law in particular.

“They must do what is best for the community, never forgetting it or allowing themselves to be either forced or bewitched into throwing it over.” (Republic 10.3.413) The moral principle regarding revolution against the state is different for those who have no power, for the national spirit in every state is to strive for freedom. The many having no power believe that it is just that they should have it. No one disputes the right of the people to overthrow a monarchy, but the right to re-establish one is denied by all. “Injustice has this effect of implanting hatred wherever it exists.” (Republic 1.351) Whosoever should attempt to do so is roundly condemned as an oppressor and a tyrant.

Catiline was the oppressor. He was an instrument of the oppressor class, which having been displaced from its social position sought to reassert itself. If class struggle is taken as the motive force in the process of the development of the national spirit, the patrician class supplanting the monarchy was the first moment of historic justice within the Roman state. “The rich citizens ‘populus crassus’ now excluded the nobility from power...the patrician nobility which supplanted the feudal aristocracy, deprived the common people of all share in the conduct of the state, and thus proved itself no less
oppressive than the original noblesse.” (Philosophy of History 336) The plebian class supplanting the patrician class was the second moment of historic justice. The re-assertion of the patrician class was a moment of historic injustice when justice is taken to be a condition of the state which brings happiness, in both a qualitative and quantitative sense, to the greatest number of people. The Pax Romana was good for a while, but most would agree that the Roman people suffered greatly under the Empire. The patrician class under the aegis Catiline did not play the historic role of the liberator. As the embodiment of injustice in a moment of reaction the patrician class became the oppressive class operating through Catiline as an instrument of that class. Catiline became the enforcer of the will of the oppressors, hence an oppressor himself. Punishing the oppressor in accordance with the rule of law isn’t called oppression. It’s called justice. “It seems almost an act of justice that a man should suffer wrong such as he had been accustomed to make others suffer.” (Rhetoric 1.12.26) Through the process, then, of the examination and re-examination of the evidence, an evil man once lain low and later invested with grandeur, Catiline, once again, assumes his proper place in history, as a villain, not a hero.

‘Οι γ’ αυτω κακα τευχει ανηρ αλλο κακα τευχων,
‘η δε κακη βουλη τοι βουλευσαντι κακιστη’

At any rate, a man plans bad things for himself when he plans bad things for another, but the bad plan is most bad to he who planned. (Works and Days 267)

Thus Catiline received what was owed to him, which was justice. In this case justice was harm to the bad man who was he who had plotted the bad thing in the first instance. Catiline and his conspirators, then, did not become better by the receiving of
justice; they became very much worse for it. “One who pays a just penalty must not be called miserable, and his misery laid at heaven’s door.” (*Republic* 2.380b) In punishing the criminal here, it was not the individual which was improved, but the state which had improved itself. The idea of the state, the rule of law, and Rome’s national spirit was strengthened by his defeat. *Rome Sauvée!* Rome was saved, at least for a time. Cicero had saved it. There’s no denying that. Catiline would have ruined it and there’s no denying that either unless one holds that monarchy is better that democracy. For the republicans among us, justice was served; and for the very same Judith Kalb has tampered with the social memory of humanity. She slipped on the *Ring of Gyges* in order to crown Catiline with the *Helmet of Hades*. To rehabilitate Catiline’s reputation first at the expense of Cicero’s, and next at the expense of Lenin, and afterwards at the expense of Christ is not only to suggest that justice of the state be found in monarchy, not in democracy, and that the poor are rabble, it transposes the common acceptation of the words *the good* and *the bad* within today’s republic.

Kalb is as much an ironist as Catiline was. Her activity would not be called a virtuous action or the one who does it good. “For ‘activity in conformity with virtue’ involves virtue….But virtue in active exercise cannot be inoperative—it will of necessity act, and act well….The man who does not enjoy doing noble actions is not a good man at all: no one would call a man just if he did not like acting justly, nor liberal if he did not likedoing liberal things, and similarly with the other virtues.” (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1098b1-1099a1) The student of dialectical and historical materialism would say that whether or not one views Catiline as a criminal is conditioned by one’s class standing. Thus those who have sought to vindicate Catiline, being of the bourgeois class and not of
the aristocracy, only find a little “something great” in him. Their vindication of him is qualified by saying Catiline was at least not as bad as he was made out to be, but in the end of their discourse must either also condemn him as the ancients did, or leave the matter hanging by neither wholly condemning him nor wholly vindicating him, for the imperium of the bourgeoisie is a mere middle term between progress and reaction. For all the virtues of the historical revisionists, if Catiline is to Christ then Kalb is to Myrrah.

_Scelus est odisse parentem:_

_hic amor est odio maius scelus…_

_Illa quidem sentit foedoque repugnat amori_

_et secum…_

_“di, precor, et pietas sacrataque iura parentum,_

_hoc prohibete nefas scelerique resistite nostro,_

_si tamen hoc scelus est._

_Sed enim damnare negatur_

_hanc venerem pietas, coeuntque animalia nullo_

_cetera delicto. Nec habetur turpe iuvenae_

_ferre patrem tergo, fit equo sua filia coniunx,_

_quasque creavit init pecudes caper, ipsaque, cuius_

_semine concepta est, ex illo concipit ales._

_Felices, quibus ista licent! Humana malignas_

_cura dedit leges, et quod natura remittit,_

_invida iura negant. Gentes tamen esse feruntur,_

_in quibus et nato genetrix et nata parenti_
Iungitur, [ut] pietas geminato crescat amore.

Me miseram, quod non nasci mihi contigit illic,

fortunaque loci laedor! – Quid in ista revolvor?

Spes interdictae discedite! Dignus amari

ille, sed ut pater, est. – Ergo si filia magni

non essem Cinyrae, Cinyrae concumbere possem;

nunc quia iam meus est, non est meus, ipsaque damno

est mihi proximitas: aliena potentior essem.

Ire libet procul hinc patriaeque relinquere fines,

dum scelus effugiam. Retinet malus ardor amantem,

ut praesens spectem Cinyram tangamque loquarque

osculaque admoveam, si nil conceditur ultra.

Ultra autem spectare aliquid potes, impia virgo?

Et quot confundas et iura et nomina, sentis!

Tune eris et matris paex et adultua patris? tune soror nati genetrixque

vocabere fratiris?... Mors placet.

A filthy passion indeed she feels this and against it fights.

And to herself she does say…

“It is a sin to have hated a parent,

A great sin too is this kind love by means of a jealous hatred...

O god please, I beg you,

with utter devotion and the rites sacred of parents.

Keep us from us this sin, and from this crime away.
If indeed it is a sin?

Venus herself would not truly condemn this great sign:

That animals breed with family others:

It is not repulsive for a bull to mount his heifer,

a stud to mount his daughter; and

the he-goat goes among the band he begat,

from those whose very semen conceived the same birds do mate.

Happiness is to those whom this is lawful!

Spite to laws with great pains mankind gives;

What nature allows, they deny;

And with jealous oaths they do condemn

the races of men are there who breed at home;

those to whom both mother and son

father and daughter

mate.

Doubling love but magnifies devotion.

O’ woe is me, not being born there,

by fortune, in this place, I am oppressed!

Who am I to be dwelling on this?

I hope to give up by talking to myself!

Worthy to be loved is he,

but only as a father.

If I were not the daughter
of this great man Cinyras,
to lay with him now I might be able.
But as it stands he is both mine and not mine,
and if near me I myself to him forbid:
Much stronger I would be as a stranger.
Far far away I wish to go
this native land to leave behind
to escape this sin at the ends of the Earth.
But a wicked lust me detains,
In person that Cinyras I may behold
to touch and speak and to him give
only a kiss, and nothing else would come to pass.
At last what else do you appear to be,
but an impious virgin?
And think of how many words
and promises you do you confound!
Thou shalt not be a both adulterer of your mother.
A concubine to your father?
Thou shalt not be called sister and mother
of your brother?"
In the end, she pleased Death. (Metamorphoses 10.314-378)
Myrrah’s justification for her passion by way of making an analogy between the breeding habits of animals and her incestuous passion for her father serves as proof to her
irrationality, and by analogy Catiline’s. Since man is not merely the political animal but also the rational animal the apologists for Catiline seek to approach the morality of animals. Man’s self-consciousness, his being for another, as an individual perhaps may be found in political discourse, but mankind’s self-consciousness, not solely as national consciousness, or national spirit, or even class consciousness, but in its totality as the human race on a single Earth, is experienced through the thoughtful consideration of the development of history in so far as working history is the summation of human experience obtained through the interpretation of the social res gestae produced through self-conscious social relations recorded in books and transmitted by the old to the young. The summation of the res gestae is not merely a catalog of ‘things done,’ but an understanding of the social praxis of the time. The institution of the principles discovered is called politics. Man through the study of history and the institution of learned principals seeks to institute a qualitatively better State. History thus employed is partially a self-creating teleological because it has as its final aim the greatest degree happiness for the greatest number of people. As historians the beginning and end of history have been posited by our own selves. History then has an internal teleology. “The final cause of the world at large, we allege to be the consciousness of its own freedom.” (Philosophy of History 161) Moreover, “happiness then is the activity of the soul in accordance with reason.” (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.8) Since the State is the summation of individual happiness the activity of the State in accordance with the principle of reason would be the best State. Historians have not only a duty but the rational capability to discourse on social problems and make recommendations as to the best course of action. “If we want to abolish capitalism or war, and in doing so not only to destroy them but to
bring into existence something better, we must begin by understanding them.” (The Idea of History 334) This intention of the historian to create a better world is no longer confined to the idea of the mere nation state but now embraces the whole world. This is a development over the scientific history of modernity which is presently named post-modern since no one has as yet defined it as an idea but hold it as a mere concept. The post-modernists are however the merely skeptical; caught up in “the dizziness of perpetually self-engendered disorder…At one time it recognizes that its freedom lies in rising above all the confusion and contingency of existence, and at another time equally admits to a relapse of occupying itself with what is unessential…Its deeds and its words always belie one another and equally it has itself the doubly contradictory consciousness of unchangeableness and sameness, and of utter contingency and non-identity with itself…Point out likeness or identity to it, and it will point out unlikeness or non-identity; and when it is now confronted with what it has just asserted, it turns round and points out likeness or identity.” (Phenomenology of Spirit §205)

What the current tend in philosophy knows for certain it that the present historical moment is different from, but analogous to, what had preceded it. With increasing rationality and self directedness, mankind has increasingly differentiated itself from the animal kingdom. By way of ancient thought man has becomes more human than animal, but there has been a rebellion against this. The coming of modernity was marked with the trend: philosophical reductionism, positivism, and behaviorism. Those who followed this trend saw poverty in the realm of the human spirit and reduced man and human society to a mere machine; a body with no soul—and hence an animal with an excessively large brain—and exaggerated sense organ or stimulus and response mechanism, and no more.
Our understanding of whom and what is man has become uncertain; and as our self-consciousness became unstable our ideas of morality has been called into question. If there is no God and man is merely and animal and the Universe is but a machine then how does one know that it is wrong to kill? For an animal the Commandment: “Thou shalt not kill” has no moral force.

But even if man rejects the divine as lawgiver it is still possible, indeed it is necessary, to discover moral principles through the study of history. In fact the so-called divine lawgiver is actually a product of history. Unfortunately, due to the positivism that grew out of the Enlightenment socialists tried to situate the idea of dialectical and historical materialism as a philosophical branch of natural science when in fact it is a human science. With respect to religion: “What Enlightenment declares to be an error and a fiction is the same thing as Enlightenment itself is.” (Phenomenology of Spirit §549) The methodology that grew from this trend was Comte’s sociology (1822), and the best that could be achieved for the benefit of mankind through that methodology, was social engineering. Is it any wonder that Eisentstein’s Battleship Potemkin, with all its images of churning maggots and ant-like images of man, has become a Trotskyite favorite, a socialist farce. But who would follow a man who derived his theory of social praxis from watching an ant farm?

Not only was man thought to be a machine, but social practice was thought to be a mere social mechanism. Hence the conflict within the academy as to whether or not the department of history ought to be included under the rubric of the humanities or under the rubric of the social sciences. This dialectical struggle is exhibited in the language of the academy as well. Should one in explaining social praxis refer to man in society or should
one refer to mankind in its totality as *humanity*. Hence the trend in dialectical materialism diverged as either socialism understood as *atheism* or socialism understood as *secular humanism*. Socialism is really *secular humanism*, not atheism.

The socialist needs to understand that since the methodology of natural science does not apply to the study of history. No amount of studying Freud, Comte, or Darwin will ever produce the result sought after. For the resolution of the contradiction posed by the exploitation of man by man is by its very nature a humanistic question. Socialism must impact the social relations of the state. The methodology of natural science can only impact material production, but no amount of production will ever transform the social praxis, only ethical judgments can do that. But who ever should adopt *atheism*, as a product of scientific *naturalism*, as opposed to *humanism*, necessarily discards all moral parameters. Naturalism rejects the ethical for the ethical comes from the *humane*. By the same token those who presumed to make the “world work for everyone” through natural science have failed miserably for the question of developing any social praxis to actually do so. It is, then, not a question of merely inventing new things nor one of channeling the youth into math and science for the question of solving the world’s problems can only be made by impacting the social relations which is as much an ethical problem as it is a question of who and how many should rule. Who will make ethical pronouncements that will be satisfactory to all, who will enforce them? Making science primary in education implies that the mission of education remains the process of studying the world as a collection of things. “The consciousness that observes in this way means, and indeed says, that it wants to learn, not about itself but on the contrary, about the essence of things *qua* things.” (*Phenomenology of Spirit* §242) Yet without knowing itself the culture
knows neither what it has done nor why it has done it. As a whole the Culture lacks the level of self-consciousness necessary at the level of the State. Education that preoccupies itself with the mere observation of nature as the practice of science also perpetuates the production of graduates who have only been trained in the regular use of first order thinking, not second. “Even if Reason digs into the very entrails of things and opens every vein in them so that it may gush forth to meet itself, it will not attain this joy; it must have completed itself inwardly before it can experience the consummation of itself.” (Ibid §241)

The correct understanding of theology according to dialectical and historical materialism to wit is that: History is a branch of Ethics and Theology is a branch of History; both are subordinate to Logic. Since history develops, our idea of the ethical must develop and has developed. A Prophet is an individual who has summed up the ethics of his or her civilization up to that particular period of time when he or she makes their pronouncement. To return to the principal thread of my argument, the Idea of God, then, is a division of the conscious mind. Mind posits the Idea of God and proceeds to have this mental construct narrate the Law. The Absolute Ethical Principle is posited as a ‘This,’ but the ‘This’ is not God but a mediated representation of God or an ‘other than God,’ hence merely the Idea of God—an abstract universal. The conscious mind does this in order to affirm that its own idea of the ethical is not only true it is also perfect because it comes from Omniscient and Almighty God, i.e., that the ethical postulates pronounced by the Holy Prophet have absolute moral force and that it is a unitary entity hence ﷲ or al ‘the’ + illa ‘God,’ or ‘The God.’ “Fear of the lord is indeed the beginning of wisdom.”
The fact that mind posits the Idea of God, however, does not prove that God does not exist, for the relation of the material world to the mind is a mediated world. And not only that, Reality is itself marked by a dualism between Mind and Material to ask what is beyond Representation is also to ask what is beyond Reality. But since the mind cannot experience the material world directly, but only in a mediated way, it cannot say for certain either what the material world truly is, where it came from, or what is beyond it if anything. The Idea of God is the idea of the ethical and the ultimate source for Law. The dialectical interplay between the Self and the Material World is the beginning of what we call Reality. The beginning Reality had two parts: the Self and the Material World. The Self and the Material World then are at the outset of life dialectical counterparts. The consciousness itself at the very moment it perceives the Material World immediately splits up into two parts. At the beginning of our dialectic, then, the Self is a unity counter-posed to another unity called the Material World which appears to be an other for it. In the process of perceiving the Material world the conscious mind must divide itself into two parts. This is because the Material World can only be known to the Self by means of sense perception. The Material World then is only perceptible to the Self for instance through touch, or through sight, or smell, or hearing—through the unity of five senses working in consort.

The sense organs themselves, however, merely transmit this information to the brain in the form of electrical impulses. The brain receiving this information must create a representation in the mind of what its sense organs have told it and cast the totality of what it has been perceived onto the ‘big screen’ of the conscious mind; but not just as a three dimensional picture of reality but as a total picture of experience which includes all
of the information that the sense organs have told it through the five senses. The mind’s understanding of an event, then, only takes place inside the mind itself. The mind, or the Self, then, must split itself up into two parts: one of the parts is a representation of the Material World in its totality—its sights, sounds, and sensations—and the other part called the Self. Thus the Self which was at the beginning of its emergence into the Material World was unity immediately ends up with dialectical counterpart inside itself and its perception of the Material World is mediated through this representation. Where at once there was the dialectical counterpart of the Material World, Reality immediately becomes three terms instead of only two: the Material World, the Self and the self’s Representation of the Material world. This is called the first dialectical trope of the conscious mind. It is also called consciousness of the first degree.

The methodology of empirical science is the perception of the events of the Material World, but the perception of the events of the material world are mediated through the self’s Representation of the Material World. The scientist, then, doesn’t directly study the Material World itself but in fact studies a Representation of the Material World which exists in the mind of the scientist. The mere observation of phenomena in the material world such as measuring the speed of light or in computing the length of the hypotenuse of a triangle, \( a^2 + b^2 = c^2 \), is an activity of consciousness in the first degree. Thus there are three phenomenological terms in consciousness of the first degree which forms up the foundation of scientific methodology—the Material World, the Representation of the Material World, and the Self. The naturalist can then begin, for instance counting and measuring things. This is mere consciousness, but it is not Self-Consciousness. In order to attain Self-Consciousness the Self must split itself up
again into a Self and Self-Consciousness. Thus the dialectical development of Self-Consciousness has *four terms*: the Self, the Material World which is external to the Self, the material world as posited by the Self called the Representation of the Material World, and the Self-Consciousness. This is called the *second dialectical trope of the conscious mind*. It is also called consciousness of the *second degree* and is in fact *self-consciousness*. Just as the Self posited the Representation of the Material World; the Self, which has become self-conscious, posits *another self* which could be called a Representation of the Self. Just as the Self posits the Representation of the Material World in order to understand the Material World by mediating it through a representation of it held in the mind, the Self posits the Representation of the Self in order to understand the Self by mediating it through a representation of itself. Once the Self has posited a Representation of the Self, it begins a dialectical interplay with itself. This is called thinking and the Self in its totality is called Mind.

The conscious activity of the first degree, the Self examining the Material World through a Representation of the Material World, is the principle activity of *natural science*. The conscious activity of the second degree, the Self examining its own itself through a Representation of the Self, is the activity of *human science*. While both of these kinds of study are called a *science* they proceed by different methodologies. Psychology as a science proceeds by means of thought of the first degree because it studies the mind by means of the methods of natural science. The psychologist studies the mind with the same methodology that a biologist studies life. “Psychology is thought of the first degree; it treats mind in just the same way in which biology treats life. It does not deal with the relation between thought and its object, it deals directly with thought as
something quite separate from its object, something that simply happens in the world, as a special kind of phenomenon, one that can be discussed by itself. Philosophy is never concerned with thought by itself; it is always concerned with its relation to its object, and is therefore concerned with the object just as much as with the thought.” (The Idea of History 2) However, when one reflects on the meaning of science and begins to frame general laws it must also climb out of the first level of thinking and into the level of the second degree. It must go beyond mere classification and experimentation and develop, for instance, the theory of relativity. The scientist must use the methodology of philosophy. For the natural scientist consciousness of the first degree is primary, for the activity of the scientist primarily relates to gathering data and experimentation. Consciousness of the second degree, in relation to natural science, or the philosophy of science, is secondary. For human science, on the other hand, the roles of the orders of consciousness are reversed; second degree thought, or philosophy, is primary.

Just as the Material World upon examination splits up into a multitude of parts, a number of different sciences which study the Material world, e.g., Biology, Geology, Psychology, Astronomy, Physics, et al, come into being. Just as each of these sciences have interrelationships with each other, which correspond the multitude of real interrelations between the many parts of the material world, the individual Mind is not alone in the world but is counter-posed to a great number of other Minds, other people. These other minds have undergone the same dialectical development as the Self did, but are only known to the individual mind because they really exist in the Material World. Thus the Mind becomes conscious of other people because they exist in the Material World, but the Mind only comes into dialectical interplay with them insofar as they are
mediated through the Self’s Representation of the Material World. Thus each individual person has a number of self-conscious Minds interacting with it through its Representation of the Material World which has been posited in its own Mind. The Self may wish to study these other Minds as if they were the objects of natural science, but it is compelled to relate to them in a humanistic way. This is called social relations. Social relations are the way different Minds relate to one another, how people interact. The many different Minds, being self-conscious thinking beings, begin to apply a human science to their interactions. Although a house has no choice about whether it will be ruined by a tree falling on it, for the results are governed by natural laws, humanity, being a collection of different Minds seeks to control the contradictions between people by creating human law to govern their interactions; for with consciousness comes choice. Human social relations are not governed by the blind determinism of the material world. Now, insofar as human beings are material products of the material world certain aspects of their lives are governed by natural laws; but insofar as human beings are Minds interacting with each other, most aspects of their lives are governed by social relations not by natural laws but human law which is derived from human nature. The study of human nature is a conscious activity of the second degree and its methodology is not the methodology of natural science, but of History which has no natural laws. Human law is derived from Ethics which is derived from History. As Collingwood asserted, Ethics are derived from the development and study of history and that as history changes our idea of ethics also changes.

Substantialism in this context does not refer a physical substance but to an object form of thought. Epistemologically speaking philosophical substantialism claims that
only the unchanging in knowable. Since times arrow points in one direction, nothing that has ever happened can ever be repeated. Thus Santayana’s proposition that “those who remain ignorant of history are doomed to repeat it” must be a fallacy. Philosophical substantialism was the chief drawback of Greco-Roman philosophy. Since what is historical is also transitory. Dialectical and historical materialism, though it has been dogmatized, is not an ideology but is a methodology for historical inquiry. Collingwood is correct. History is a branch of ethics and we reject the possibility of the existence of any substantive moral or substantive ethical principle then the pursuit of justice, or any ethical ideal, is an unending process of historical development. The aim of communism is the end of the exploitation of man by man. The socialist posits this idea as a substantive moral principle with the understanding that the social praxis of justice cannot be a static sort of thing but must continue to develop alongside the Idea of Freedom. The aim of Communism, then, is freedom. But freedom as a substantive ethical principle is impossible to define. It is something aimed at but never fully achieved except through unending process of historical development. As Friedrich Engels once remarked: “For dialectical philosophy nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher.” (Ludwig Feuerbach 8)

The Greeks and Romans, however, had developed another system of lawgiving whereby a Lawgiver was elected. Thus they introduced a humanistic element to ethical theory whereas the Semitic tradition relied wholly on a divine substance which was supposed to reveal Himself through a human oracle, a Prophet. The Greeks and Romans,
however, used both a human and divine source for ethical judgments. The process of recognizing the human ability to propound ethical judgments signified the process of Logic coming into play. The process of recognizing the use of logic in forming ethical judgments, however, is a process of the development of historical inquiry. Hence the first history book was indeed called ‘The Inquiry.’

At any rate, as History develops the imperfections of the ethical as posited by the conscious mind whether they be derived from a concept of the divine, or from the logic of a philosopher, begin to run up against their own limitations since the morals posited by the Prophet, or the philosopher, or a lawgiver are substantive morals. As substantive morals they do not change. But History and hence our idea of the ethical does change. Hence the theologian always appears to be behind the times and as time goes on he or she becomes even more so. Hence the historical development of the Prophets: Moses, Jesus, Mohammed. Attacking religion, then, is essentially attacking a person’s concept of what is ethical. The proper position then of the dialectical and historical materialist is to derive ethics from the study of history, while at the same time understanding that theology is statement of just that. According to Greco-Roman historiography at least one principle must be taken as an axiom and all moral questions must be considered in the light of it. What Collingwood called substantialism, and noted its defects. (Cf. The Idea of History 42-5) For Aristotle the datum from which to measure moral truth was the good which for man meant happiness. Freud reduced this concept of happiness to the experience of mere pleasure; hence he developed the idea of the pleasure principle. But the best of men would strongly disagree that happiness is the result of mere pleasure. “To judge from men's lives, the more or less reasoned conceptions of the Good or Happiness that seem to
prevail are the following. On the one hand the generality of men and the most vulgar identify the Good with pleasure, and accordingly are content with the Life of Enjoyment--for there are three specially prominent Lives, the one just mentioned, the Life of Politics, and thirdly, the Life of Contemplation. The generality of mankind then show themselves to be utterly slavish, by preferring what is only a life for cattle.” (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1095b1-3)

Bertrand Russell once said: “There is much pleasure to be gained from useless knowledge.” As a member of the realist school of thought he held that “history, which is mind’s knowledge of itself, is ruled out as impossible” (*The Idea of History* 142) To us, History proven itself to be very useful. Indeed it is used all the time in courts of law to establish *mens rea*, or to determine *ancient claim*, but has done a great deal more that remains unrecognized. It has molded the ethical foundations of our civilization. Our understanding of what something *is* in the political world is usually based on knowing what it *was*--the philosophical principles and historical facts which make it up. What has gone before is routinely compared to what is now in all kinds of decision making processes; for it is generally held that *natural laws* do not change and, though historian makes no claim to be able to predict the future, by inference we hold that the reality tomorrow will be very much the same as the reality today. “History *must* end with the present, because nothing else has happened.” (*The Idea of History* 120) But historians “should show itself to be alive, or in its thinking should grasp the living world as a system of thought.” (*Phenomenology of Spirit* §200) The historian must give content to history and bring history into relation with the living world. A principle fault of historical epistemology then is that the historical principal derived from the study of history cannot
apply to the present *de facto* material reality in the same way that it applied to the historical model because the world is *flux*.

Ποταοισι τοισιν αυτοισιν εμβαινουσιν

‘ετερα και ‘ετερα ‘υδατα επιρρει'

To step into same river is different,

for different waters flow. (Heraclitus 12)

For the post-modernists, taking happiness to mean pleasure, the source of creativity must lie in the unleashing of the libido; the unbridled gratification of desire, hence the advantage of the stronger. I say it’s the opposite. But it seems rather absurd to suggest that a moral principle could be distilled from the experience of pleasure or pain; or from a record of this experience or from its opposite. Indeed Freud is hardly original here since Aristotle had already recorded and refuted the ideas of Eudoxus who “held that the goodness of pleasure was equally manifest from the converse: pain is intrinsically an object of avoidance to all, therefore its opposite must be intrinsically an object of desire to all.” (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1172b) The deconstructionists under the pretext of questioning the ‘holy moral legislator’ actually seek to destabilize the moral principles held by our civilization because they disagree with those principles themselves not because they seek the truth *per se*; but because they dissemble the truth. Just as Catiline posited two diametrically opposed courses of action, to go into exile or follow through with the *putsch*, his apologists simultaneously hold that he was both guilty and not guilty. The dissembler by vindicating Catiline: “In so doing it confesses that, as a matter of fact, it is in earnest with neither of them.” (*Phenomenology of Spirit* §617) Just as Catiline was insincere about the two diametrically opposed courses of action that he posited, his
apologists are insincere about their two alternatives, but holds out each as a simple plan A
and a plan B; seeking the greatest opportunity for themselves they set each these in
dialectical struggle against each other to see which one will win out; and they themselves
stand ever ready to leap to the side of the victor. Who ever does this must hold the
advantage of the stronger to be a substantive moral principle and that the “just man
always has the worst of it.” (Republic 1.343) Making their first appearance as the
skeptical consciousness they immediately pass over to the unhappy consciousness, but
they have yet to attain the conscious mode of Reason for they continue to study the world
as if external things were the proper object of philosophy. Whoever posits a substantive
moral code, be the law of Moses, the code of Hammurabi, the Constitution of the United
States, the law of the Twelve Tables, or the Plautian Law, et al, makes this his Lord and
Master and he must serve it, though it may not always serve you. “Servitude is only in
relation to lordship...servitude has the lord for its essential reality; hence the truth for it is
the independent consciousness that is for itself.” (Penomenology of Spirit §194) It is not
always wrong to question moral principles or positive law, but undermining these
universal learned rational moral principles, which have made crimes like Catiline’s illegal
everywhere, brings man closer to the animals; which should be associated with an
increase in irrationality, un-cleanliness, self-indulgence, inequality, laziness, ignorance,
lawlessness, and disorder for those are the principle characteristics of the law of the
jungle with the principle characteristics of civilization being the exact opposite.

‘ωςπερ γαρ και τελεωθεν βελτιστον των ζωιων ὅ ανθρωπος εσιν,
‘ουτω και χωρισθείς νομον και δικης χειριστον παντων’

For just as man is best of the animals when perfected,
he is worst when separated from all law and justice.

(The Politics 1.1253a1)

For who would call Cambyses happy when, aside from his other outrages, he marched against the Ethiopians, and before he had completed even 1/5th of the distance, his provisions failed “whereupon the men began to eat the sumpter beasts, which shortly failed also. If then…seeing what was happening, [he] had confessed himself in the wrong, and led his army back, he would have done the wisest thing…but as it was, he took no manner of heed, but continued to march forwards. So long as the earth gave them anything, the soldiers sustained life by eating the grass and herbs; but when they came to bare sand, a portion of them were guilty of a horrid deed: by tens they cast lots for a man, who was slain to be the food of the others.” (The History 3.25) By calling this deed horrid, Herodotus passed a historical judgment on these deeds. Or who could fail to condemn the failed civilization of the Massagetae among whom, “human life [did] not come to the usual close…but when a man grows very old, all his kinsfolk collect together and offer him up in sacrifice…After the sacrifice they boil the flesh and feast on it; and those who thus end their days are reckoned the happiest.” (The History 1.216) Who among us would admire the marriage rites of the ancient Babylonians? According to Herodotus they “have one most shameful custom. Every woman born in the country must once in her life go and sit down in the precinct of Venus, and there consort with a stranger…A woman who has once taken her seat is not allowed to return home till one of the strangers throws a silver coin into her lap, and takes her with him beyond the holy ground…The silver coin may be of any size; it cannot be refused, for that is forbidden by law, since once thrown it is sacred. The woman goes with the first man who throws her
money, and rejects no one...Such of the women as are tall and beautiful are soon released, but others who are ugly have to stay a long time...Some have waited three or four years in the precinct. A custom very much like this is found in certain parts of the island of Cyprus.” (The History 1.199) Whosoever may be repulsed by these customs ought to think hard about how it is that one has come to make the moral judgments that one has made; how we as a civilization have collectively judged against these kinds of practices. Our values are shared values.

Hegel noted that the ‘I’ that holds res gestae up to the absolute moral principle, to the lantern of rational thought, taking this as a substantive, puts the substantive principle outside itself. “Consciousness itself really places the object outside itself as a beyond of itself. But this object with an intrinsic being of its own is equally posited as being, not free from self-consciousness, but as existing in the interest of, and by means of, it.” (Phenomenology of Spirit §616) Thus the moral principle is actually posited by consciousness; for what is beyond it is unknowable. Mankind being endowed with speech is also endowed with reason.

Ev αρχη ην 'ο λογος και 'ο λογος ην προς τον θεον και θεος ην 'ο λογος·

In the beginning was Reason, and on account of God Reason was, and God was Reason. (John 1.1)

In the beginning of thought there was the Word which made up speech which caused man to reason and reason led to ethics and ethics to the Ethical Idea thus the Mind possessed of Reason posited the Idea of God which was Reason.

Dixitque Deus fiat lux et facta est lux.

And God said: “Let there be light.” And light there was. (Genesis 1.3)
And man having achieved consciousness began to name thing, to classify them, changing them from mere picture thoughts into fixed determinate thought objects.

Et ait faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram et praesit piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli et bestiis universaeque terrae omnique reptili quod movetur in terra et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam ad imaginem Dei creavit illum masculum et feminam creavit eos.

And He affirmed: “Let us make Mankind by Our image and likeness and let him rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the sky and the beasts and over the whole Earth and every reptile which moves on the Earth and God created Man in His own image by the image of God He created him; male and female He created them. (Genesis 1.26-27)

And man found himself confronted with object thought forms which had being-in-themselves in diametrical opposition to man himself. In recognizing the other-than-self, man created the Notion of himself. Thus man’s Reason was reflected back into itself as the ethical which Man in turn placed outside Himself. Thus Man created the Idea of God in the image of his own self and in the likeness of himself in order to examine himself and know himself and come to an Understanding with Himself. “In the divinity of the created mind, as in a mirror at the center of things.” (Platonic Theology, Proem 3) The wisest and most virtuous men came and narrated the Law which became the ethical substance of Civilization. And those men were called a Prophets. After this he externalized the source of his judgments about, and representations of, Reality as an image which He called that image ‘God.’ Subconsciously Man knows that He is the source of the divine. Thus the more a man gets into religion the more God looks like
himself, because God is himself just as every thought form is both by, with, and from, himself and also to and for himself as Langston Hughes showed in his *Black Nativity* (1961).

There’s Fire in the East,

There’s Fire in the West,

There’s fire among the Methodists.

Satan’s mad and I’m so glad

He missed the soul’d he thought he had

This year of Jubilee

The Lord has come to set us free. (Act 1)

And man saw that this was good and upon gazing upon his own thought and in examining it he said: *Cogito ergo sum et homo neque animal sed homo*. And God is with man because God is Man as the image of man. Through the practice of the Law man seeks to become virtue and maintain virtue, but it is something to which man approaches but never achieves.

Since the absolute moral substance must be complete in order to establish an absolute moral principle, and is in actuality incomplete because the consciousness which posited it is incomplete—i.e., unable to know the mind of God or to understand that which is beyond itself; what is posited as pure morality is in fact incomplete and therefore immoral since true morality must be perfect. Just as history develops by increments, man’s idea of morality and his collection of bone fide moral principles must develop by increments as well. Collingwood must have been right when he said: “The right way of investigating the mind is by the methods of history...the work which was to be done by
the science of human nature is actually done, and can only be done, but history.” (The Idea of History 209) That brings us to the question of why ancient history and the Greek and Roman classics as a source for history should the first substance of higher education. The analogy that the development of history from the classical authors to the present time, as an analog for the riddle of the Sphinx; that it represents the ‘three stages of a man’s life’—that he walks on all fours on the morning, two in the afternoon and three in the evening—would be wrong for there is nothing childlike in these texts. We are too often surprised both at their insights and their discourse, but the most striking thing is their resemblance to ourselves. Placing them outside us as an object of study is only possible because they are us. “The self is really the object of the self, or the object only has truth so far as it has the form of the self.” (Phenomenology §529) In studying them we study our own selves, but as a past underdeveloped self. In fact the Greeks give us grammar, syntax and elocution, the Romans dignity, refinement and res publica. The democracy we understand as democracy does not come from the Greek experience, but from the Roman experience of it. If we wish to understand our republic we must first understand theirs. In contemporary higher education, the student first has their mind structured by Plato and then restructured by Aristotle, if they get that far. It must be restructured again by Hegel and Marx. “If all modern treatment of the history of philosophy goes back to Hegel as the great modern master of the subject, all modern treatment of economic history goes back in the same sense to Marx.” (The Idea of History 126) The genealogy of contemporary thought presumes: if there was no Plato there would have been no Aristotle: no Aristotle, no Hegel: no Hegel, no Marx. All this is of course passed through a great lens of history, philosophy and culture. After Marx there is
a dearth of philosophical greatness until Collingwood raised the study of history from a mere backwater of a social science to the philosophy, the logic, of human nature but not merely human nature as it is in the individual but of human thought becoming *universal judgments* concerning human social relations. But the Romans somehow get left out, and this is not without reason. There is a gaping hole in the study of the classics at the university level where Roman civilization ought to be which must somehow be explained. The Romans didn’t get included in the study of the classics by accident and they haven’t recently been left out of that study by accident either.

Too often the Greeks and the Romans are presented to students as somehow being competition with one other; the Greeks are presented as the *original*, the Romans as the *counterfeit* and not without reason, but the true reason for the nuance of combativeness between the two cultures has been misunderstood. Thucydides in his opening remarks regarding the outbreak of the *Peloponnesian War* incorrectly noted: “Indeed this was the greatest movement yet known in history.” There was one war which had already taken place which was greater; if not in extent, then in importance—the *Trojan War*. The calamity of the *Trojan War* was known far and wide.

*Quicumque regno fidit et magna potens*

*dominatur aula nec leues metuit deos*

*animumque rebus credulum laetis dedit*

*me uideat et te, Troia: non umquam tuit*

*documenta fors maiora, quam fragili loco*

*starent superbi. Columnen euersum occidit*

*pollentis Asiae, caelitum egreguis labor.*
Whosoever relies upon being king, and in great power
Lords himself in royal court, and fears not the gods
And happily gives his soul to doubtful things,
Let him, I and thou, O Troy, behold.
For never has Fortune shown such great proof
What fragile place the most high stand.
Sweeping away that which rose above,
It destroyed the power of Asia, a work of heaven.  (Troades 1-7)

According to the Aeneid the events of the Trojan War were recorded in pictographs on the walls of Carthage even before Aeneas arrived there. The “New Troy” at the Tiber was but a twinkle in his eye; and Rome itself had not yet even been conceived. The Greeks had their say about the war through the epics of Homer. The Aeneid was the belated Roman answer to that, but that answer was there in Roman culture before Virgil wrote of it. It was recorded by Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, inter alios.

Fuimus Troes, fuit Ilium et ingens

gloria Teucorum.

We Trojans have been, Ilium and

The glory of the Teucrians, was. (Aeneid 2.325)

The Romans are in part the descendents of the Trojans who fled Ilium after the sack of Troy. At the time of Homer there were no Greeks or Romans pre se. It was long after the fall of Troy that the Greeks became Greeks and the Romans became Romans. Indeed Homer never used the word ‘Greeks.’ “He does not even use the term barbarian,
probably because the Hellenes had not yet been marked off from the rest of the world by one distinctive appellation.” (The Peloponnesian War 1.3.3-4) Their national identities emerged synchronously. Thus the Greeks and the Romans to each other could be understood as same cultural _ordo_; while the Greeks to themselves were of the same _familia_; designated by Homer as under the _tribus_: Achaeans, Argives, and Danaans; not Hellenes. They were different from but analogous to one another. Their cultural destinies were tied together by what they understood as Fate; what we call _cultural analogues_, bound by time, language, culture and geography. Both were also related to the Pelasgi. Having very ancient cultural ties to one another--both through their mutual relations with the _sea peoples_ and through the Indo-European tongue, all of which preceded the _Trojan War_—the Romans had a filial admiration for the Greeks which was qualified by a duality because of the atrocity of the _Trojan War_, this admiration was layered with anger and contempt. While the Romans studied the Greek philosophers, they enslaved the Greek people. Those who choose sides between the Greeks and the Romans within the Classics Department live out this struggle vicariously through their students; each pedagogue tries to pull the student to their side, but to claim that the Romans were mere counterfeits of the Greeks is both dishonest and mean. The golden age of Greek literature, it’s true, chronologically preceded the golden age of Roman literature, but philosophy came from _Miletus_, in the Troad, not from Athens. “The Athenians originally had a royal government. It was when Ion came to dwell with them that they were first called Ionians.” (The Athenian Constitution Fr. 1) In the last analysis then the study of the classics is not a contest between Greeks and Romans. As students of western civilization, we must have both the Greeks and the Romans: first for their
linguistic structure which has ordered our minds on the most fundamental level, next for their philosophy which gave us the mental tools to examine our own thought and finally for their historiography which taught us to discourse on thought and experience in a socially meaningful way.

The Greeks gave us the rustic, the Romans the urbane. Of course there is much more to both of these than this since the Romans are famous for their georgics and the Greeks for their polis. The Greeks perhaps prefigured everything Roman but it all remained underdeveloped. Even the Greek language is rough around the edges. Perhaps the difference is better stated thus: the Romans were pastoral the Greeks were bucolic. Greek words were first translated into Latin before they were transmitted to us in English. Heidegger said that the translation of the Greek words into Latin estranged Western thought from its essence. “The process begins with the appropriation of Greek words by Roman-Latin thought. Hypokeimenon becomes subiectum; hypostasis becomes substantia; symbebêkos becomes accidens. However, this translation of Greek names into Latin is in no way the innocent process it is considered to this day. Beneath the seemingly literal and faithful translation there is concealed, rather, a translation of Greek experience into a different way of thinking. Roman thought takes over the Greek words without a corresponding, equally original experience of what they say, without the Greek word. The rootlessness of Western thought begins with this translation.” (Basic Writings 149) Thus both idioms are needed for without knowledge of the Greek, on the one hand, the student is estranged from essential thought but with out the Latin, on the other hand, the student is estranged from Western thought; rootless as it is. But, Latin thought, however, is not the mere counterfeit, or an inauthentic representation, of essential Greek
thinking because the Destiny [Μοιρα] of these two civilizations was bound together in an earlier period. For the Greek and Latin civilizations differed not in essential thinking, but in modes of thought for the wellspring of Greek philosophy was Ionian whereas the wellspring of Latin philosophy was Italiote personified by Anaximander and Pythagoras respectively the former scientific, the latter mystical. Hence the development of these two branches of western ethics. (Cf. From Religion to Philosophy v-vi) The repetitive motif of the Shepherd, Νομης, shows this in an elemental way, for to the reasoning mind of the Greeks the Νομης is the Lawgiver (Νομοθετες), Solon, but in the Romanization of this idea is nuanced as the divine, hence a priest in the Roman religion is called Pastor which means Shepherd. Though all shepherds have not been good, nor has every lawgiver. The repetition of the motif in western culture suggest, however, if they were not always good they were at least always necessary. Hegel reference to the founders of Rome as “predatory shepherds” misses the mark entirely. (Cf. Philosophy of History 287) Here he clashes unhappily with Sallust’s narration: “How easily they united…within the same walls, is unheard of in all memory.” Though Plato indeed has it that shepherds only fatten their sheep while looking forward to the slaughter and Polyphemus was a notoriously savage lawgiver. “Thence we sailed on, grieved at heart, and we came to the land of the Cyclopes, an overweening and lawless folk, who, trusting in the immortal gods, plant nothing with their hands nor plough; but all these things spring up for them without sowing or plowing, wheat, and barley, and vines, which bear the rich clusters of wine, and the rain of Zeus gives them increase. Neither assemblies for council have they, nor appointed laws, but they dwell on the peaks of lofty mountains in hollow caves, and each one is lawgiver to his children and his wives, and they reck nothing one of another.”
Thus one could conclude that with respect to the question of the lawgiver, it is not the office but the moral purpose of the office holder that one should question.

Hegel said that the Roman civilization was marked by it dualism. “The city of Rome had besides its proper name another secret one, known only to a few. It is believed by some to have been Valentia, the Latin translation of Roma; others think it was Amor (Roma read backwards). Romulus, the founder of the state, had also another sacred name—Quirinus—by which title he was worshiped: the Romans too were also called Quiritres.” (Philosophy of History 290) According to Varro, “The Quirites were named from the Curenses ‘men of Cures.’” But the Greeks also had a similar dualistic sort of naming as Plato recorded in his Cratylus. On account of the fact that the Romans had this, however, Hegel said that “the Romans, on the contrary, remained satisfied with a dull, stupid subjectivity.” (Ibid) On account of the fact that Hegel said this, I say Hegel is dull, stupid and subjective. The whole study of the classics is tainted with this kind of dull, stupid and subjective prejudice. What the students of Greece and Rome need to see however is not this prejudice, or even the dualism, but the dynamic and dialectical interplay between these two civilizations that was the motive force behind the historical development of the western world; western civilization unfolding itself in a spiral.

For the contemporary academy the dualism between Greek and Roman culture is taken as a substantive dualism, not a dialectical one. Marx and Hegel moved the study of history beyond the substantive dual and gave it flux through dialectics. At best Greece is perceived within the classics department as a unitary entity which somehow gives birth to Rome through a form of cultural mitosis. But Greece was not a unitary cultural entity at
the time Rome was born. Since the Roman Republic was established in 510 B.C. and the advent of democracy in Athens was in 505 B.C. it might be suggested that the Greeks acquired the democratic spirit from the Romans. But, it is at any rate a fallacy of sources to suppose that because two nations have a similar idea or institution that one must have learnt it from the other. \textit{(The Idea of History 69)} Even if one considers the Greeks to prefigure everything Roman, it is important to understand the dialectical interplay between these two civilizations over the course of time and that one of these nations cannot be the substantive origin of the other. Each of these, Greece and Rome, existed by and for its own self. Each one gained certainty of itself by first positing and then observing the other; first by recognizing the other as objective and later realizing that what it was observing was its own self; the subject and object through dialectical development change places with each become the others opposite. Hence, Rome could not have dull stupid subjectivity unless Greece also had it.

In many ways the Greeks and the Romans were actually the same people; in many other ways they are diametrical opposites. In the end at any rate it is not what Greece or Rome was in a positivistic sense that out to interest us, but what we believe about them that we ought to find interesting and is the proper object for historical examination. Thus the classics department is in itself an underdeveloped treatment of the Greco-Roman tradition because it studies the classics for its own sake and not for what can come from it. One who would pursue a particular study of history, for example the classics, for its own sake is not a historian, but really only an antiquitarian who gazes in fascination at the variegated scenes of his own imagination. To him a historical fact, or even a narrative, is a mere curio; a collectible thing gathering dust on the shelf of memory and which was
originally horded away of a perceived intrinsic value that it may one day have. But the antiquititarian is as far from realizing the value of his thought objects as he ever was, perhaps even further away from it than he has ever been. “The past cut off from the present, converted into a mere spectacle, can have no value at all.” (The Idea of History 170) Since the study of the classics through the classics department draws no correspondences between the object of study, the thought of the ancients and its relation to the contemporary world, the study of the classics as classics is merely taking pleasure in the knowledge of useless facts. The whole department is inebriated with a pathological eroticism. Hence the latest trend there is to interpret every text as a justification for repressed sexual predilections. The classics however are the proper objects of study for the historian, not the classicist, because classics only find their proper use in so far as they give us knowledge about ourselves.

The current trend is to pigeon-hole the classics department in a backwater of the department of foreign languages and literatures. This treatment of the topic supposes that the classics are best understood as a symbolic system. Whatever math is to say physics, Greek and Latin is to the classics. But a foreign language isn’t even a bone fide department, or a study, through itself, but is an ancillary to a study. The Greek and Latin languages are only instruments, tools, for a study which is necessarily a historical study which is a branch of philosophy called ethics. The classics department is, then, a sub-branch of History which is a branch of Ethics which is a branch of Logic which itself breaks down into humanism and naturalism with mathematics being the symbolic system ancillary to naturalism, or natural science. There are two fundamental phenomenological worlds, the world of the mind, which is human world, and the world of material, which is
the natural world. Thus reality at the outset is marked by a subjective dualism. These
two worlds are not completely separate, but maintain a constant and complicated
interaction, but the material world is, nonetheless, mediated through the mind. Man has
dominion over the material, since all ethical judgments over the material world are
formed by him.

_Benedixitque illis Deus et ait crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram et
subicite eam et dominamini piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli et universis
animantibus quae moventur super terram._

And God blessed them, and He said: spring forth and increase and replenish the
Earth and you subject them and and you yourselves be Lord to the fish of the sea
and the birds of the sky and to all the animals which move over the Earth.

_(Genesis 1.28)_

Ethical judgments as applied by man to the material world are different than those applied
to the human world, for man has primacy, or dominion, over the Earth. Thus Ethics is a
branch of Logic, History is a branch of Ethics, and the Classics are a branch of History.
According to Aristotle, Politics is a branch of Ethics. If this is true then Politics is the
study of human social praxis, or ethics in action. The purpose of the study of the classics,
then, is to understand how the ethical judgments of western civilization have been made
and to make these and object for a critique.

In the process of objectifying and critiquing the Greek and Latin library, the
student develops a critique of themselves hence hence western civilization. This is
decidedly different than the pure eroticism that dominates the study today, for as the study
of ethics the classics are subordinate to logic whereas eroticism is a mere opiate of the
masses. Without calling itself this, the study the classics under the current system turns itself into the process of acquiring simple pleasure. Whatever is understood as the ‘foundations of western society’ is a mere feeling, a notion, but not an object form of thought. The study of the classics raises many uncomfortable issues and the powers that be may not wish to grapple with those issues but at the same time obliged as it were to introduce them in a limited way, but not to draw the thought of the ancients into relation with any particular contemporary social praxis and not to pass judgment on that. The study of history then is the acquisition of self-knowledge of our ethical past. This self-knowledge in enabling us to understand our present situation to the greatest possible degree serves as our oracle in helping us determine how we should act in any given circumstance. “For a man about to act, the situation is his master, his oracle, his god. Whether his action is to prove successful or not depends on whether he grasps the situation rightly or not. If he is a wise man, it is not until he has consulted his oracle, done everything in his power to find out what the situation is, that he will make even the most trivial plan. And if he neglects the situation, the situation will not neglect him. It is not one of those gods that leave an insult unpunished.” (The Idea of History 316)

Thus the study of Greece cannot be separated from the study of Rome because it is not merely an essential link in the chain of history that leads us to the present. Just as the historical thought of the Greece and Rome of classical antiquity had a dialectical interplay, with each understanding itself by understanding the other, contemporary historians have a dialectical interplay with the classics themselves, or classical antiquity as a whole, for by studying them we study ourselves because we come from there. As a thinking being the contemporary historian by means of studying antiquity sees his own
self for we are them. “The peculiarity of an historical or spiritual process is that since the mind is that which knows itself, the historical process which is the life of the mind is a self-knowing process which understands itself, values itself, and so forth.” (The Idea of History 175)

Though displaced from them by time, our thought comes from them. We are different from but analogous to them. By studying Greek and Roman thought our thought becomes an object for us, or, rather, we become an object for ourselves. Just as the Greeks and Romans passed logical ethical judgments, developed their own idea of the ethical, on civilizations before theirs and on each other, we have passed judgment on them. But more importantly, it is through the study of the Roman Empire that we obtain the best explanation the contemporary state of the world and America’s hegemony over it; for the Roman Empire is the historical analogue of contemporary America.

Ψευσομαι η ετυμον ερεω; κελεται δε με θυμος.

Shall I dissemble or speak the truth? But my soul urges me, speak.

( Odyssey 4.140)

And for this reason, the study of Rome in America is suppressed. The powers that be seek neither to know themselves, nor an academic movement of self-knowing to develop. Or when this self-knowing is allowed it is a somehow preconditioned knowing, a kind of knowing which is intended to impart certain beliefs, determinate thought forms, and not others. For if the historical judgments against the Roman Empire were drawn into relation to contemporary America certain contemporary historical developments would likely be condemned as they once were.
Auferre trucidare rapere falsis nominibus imperium, atque ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.

To rape, to pillage, to slaughter are falsely called ‘government,’ where they make desolation, they declare peace. (Agricola 30.6)

For indeed in America today even poverty is seen as a disgrace; the poor are the disgraceful.

Προς γαρ Διος εισιν ἀπαντες
Ξεινοι τε πτωχοι τε, δοσις δ’ ολιγη τε φιλη τε·
Άλλα δοτ’…ξεινωι βρωσιν τε ποσιν τε,
Λουσατε τ’ εν ποταμω, ‘οθ’ επι σκεπας εστ’ ανεμιοι·

For from God are all strangers and beggars,
And a gift though small is welcome.
And always give…the stranger meat and drink,
Wash him in the river,
Shelter him from the wind. (The Odyssey 6.208-10)

Riches have become honors and in and of themselves a glory to he who has them, virtue has become blunt, poverty is held shameful, innocence is taken for malevolence, and smart people are called stupid.

Hospitalitatatem nolite oblivisci per hanc enim latuerunt quidam angelis hospitio receptis.

Don’t forget hospitality; for through this some unknowingly with a hospitable thing receive angles. (Hebrews 13.2)
The so-called ‘non-western’ movement within academia is both not truly non-western, because it studies social objects, civilizations, already tainted by contact with western civilization and they themselves are studied through the western historical lens historical thought prefigured by judgments on Greece and Rome. Who ever posits the non-western attempts to find a new basis for this civilization, but they cannot since in articulating the virtues if the so-called non-western they must themselves adopt western historical methods. History itself is western. Whoever embarks upon an historical inquiry, ‘ιστορια, embarks upon the path of western thought. The process of situating the non-western within the western canon must also be the process of vindicating the prehistoric; and in many cases the vindication of the preliterate. The whole idea of the non-western academy would be barbaric, βαρβαρος, if it were not already impossible, because western historical thought has already universalized itself. βαρβαρος means ‘foreign’ hence the ‘non-western’ is foreign. But it also means barbaric, for the ethics of the foreign, which first clashed with the Greek idea of the ethical, now it clashes with our own. “Among the barbarians, however, (contrary to the order of nature), the female and the slave occupy the same position—the reason being that no naturally ruling element exists among them, and conjugal union thus comes to be a union of a female who is a slave with a male who is also a slave.” (The Politics 1.1252b) It is often supposed that in Homer’s time the word ‘barbarian’ meant a man of “rough of speech,” on account of his use of the word βαρβαροφωνον (Iliad 2.867). The idea that barbarian meant, or came to mean, foreigner was taken from the context of that usage of the word. But in light of that word’s connection to speech and reason’s connection to speech the term βαρβαρος could be taken to mean men perceived to be possessed of disordered thinking and what would
be perceived by the Greeks as having been irrational. Perhaps boarish or surly, about whom one might say.

Ακουσαι ουκ επισταμένοι ουδ’ εἰπέιν

ωι μαλιστα διηνέκεος ομιλουσι’

Not knowing how to listen, neither can they speak.

Above all they continuously disturb the company. (Heraclitus 50)

Heraclitus seems to indicate that on account of their diminished capacity to reason, their perceptions and understanding, and hence judgment, was regarded as unreliable:

Κακοι μαρτυρες ανθρωποισιν οφθαλμοι και ωτα

βαβαρους ψυχας εχοντων

Eyes and ears are bad witnesses

For men with the soul of a barbarian. (Ibid. 107)

In short, barbarians were ultimately men who held foreign thought forms, ethical values which clashed with the cultural values of the Greeks. That they held to customs repugnant to the Greeks. Apart from any real or implied prejudice that may be indicted by these remarks, it is clear that the Greeks did not designate any other people’s to be barbaric except insofar as there was a conflict between their ethics which was apprehended through a perception of their speech, hence Aristotle’s affirmation of Euripides’ remarks:

Βαρβαρων δ’ Ηελληνας αρχει εικος, αλλ’ ου βαβαρους,

μητερ, Ηελληνων: το μεν γαρ δουλον, ‘οι δ’ ελευθεροι

It is fair, mother,
For Barbarians to be ruled by Greeks
But not the Greeks by the barbarous:
For, on the one hand, that is a slave,
But these men are the free. *(Iphigenia in Aulis* 1400)

The attempt to find a new basis for western civilization by undermining its ethical
tenets is the activity of *post-civilizationism*. It is therefore an absurdity, for there is
nothing beyond civilization unless it would be *anarchy* which is a return to barbarism.
No sane man would want this for it means becoming *like* an animal which is *irrational*.
Any attempt to overturn western historical judgments, western ethics, appears to be a
trend away from civilization. The neo-misanthrope, a postmodern savage, confounded by
the irrationality and hypocrisy of the world unfolds himself into “an extreme pathological
form of spiritual withdrawal in which consciousness, unable to disengage itself from
irrational particularity, simply identifies itself with the latter, and is then led to extrude
the rational universality which is its true self into a mystical, unattainable Beyond.”
*(Phenomenology of Spirit* xvii) Condemning civilization and mankind along with it the
new barbarian tears off the rational attire of Western Civilization and rushes headlong
into *wilderness studies*. He can no longer live among the people for they according to
him are very thing that is wrong with the world. Indeed, according to *him*, it is only
animals that *should* have rights! *Architecture* is a *holocaust* of trees and of God’s green
Earth! Civilization must itself be the enemy. The post-civilizationists have gathered
together into a brand new Indian tribe they call the ‘*rainbow people*.’ And as a brand new
‘chosen people’ they are simultaneously a brand new ‘God’s gift to humanity.’ But since
Mind positis God whoever supposes themselves to be the Chosen People by necessity
chooses themselves. Their new mission is to fulfill ‘God’s plan’ by preventing the
destruction of His work, which according to them is Nature itself. In order to do this they
must destroy humanity before humanity destroys itself and creation along with it. Indeed
they believe that only they, as the new chosen ones, should even be allowed to live.

Αφρητωρ αθεμιστος ανεστιος·

Homeless, lawless, and friendless is he. (*The Politics* 1.1253a1)

The so-called ‘non-western studies’ is then western civilization attempting to
observe what little remains beyond it which is nothing but barbarism and chaos. A
withdrawal into either environmentalism or animal rights is an absurdity embraced by
those who have given up on humanity. Heraclitus was one of these. “Finally, he became
a hater of his kind and wandered on the mountains, and there he continued to live, making
his diet of grass and herbs. However, when this gave him dropsy, he made his way back
to the city and put this riddle to the physicians, whether they were competent to create a
drought after heavy rain. They could make nothing of this, whereupon he buried himself
in a cowshed, expecting that the noxious damp humour would be drawn out of him by the
warmth of the manure. But, as even this was of no avail, he died at the age of sixty.”
(*Heraclitus* 10.3) Their movement is in fact very much the opposite of *theism* for
Darwin is their prophet. Just as the civilized posited the Idea of God and propounded the
laws of morality, the neo-misanthrope negates the divine and ethics along with it. They
seek to return to the ‘community of animals’ and its *law of the jungle* which is envisioned
as the return to the *real* Garden of Eden, but what they really promise is a planet of the
apes. The solution to the crisis of modern man, however, is not a trend away from
civilization, but towards a greater civilization. “Humanity cannot shrink and return into
the womb and revert to as yet unfertilized ova.” (Synergetics 311.03) Thus the trend is not toward less civilization but towards more of it. The non-western, first being posited by the western scholar, forms ethical judgments about it, but does not become it. The western student, who studies the non-western then, does not himself become non-western but westernizes it. Non-western studies, then, elevates its object, but does not become like it. He is the unwitting agent universalizing western culture believing all the while that he does to opposite.

The study of the Greek and Roman classics is indeed vindicated, but not in the way we first supposed it would. The study of the classics is first and foremost a historical study. It is man forming ethical judgments about the social relations of the past. The difference from where we began from where we have arrived being that whereas we first supposed that the study of the classics was good in and for its own self and later understood it as a substantive datum for our understanding of the ethical from which we measured the moral structure of the world of the past against the world of the present; now we understand it as the study of the history of contemporary thought by which we achieve self-knowledge. It is an oracle which we ought to consult before acting. Holding as it were that it is best to begin at the beginning, we begin with classical studies because the classics are the origin of our own thought. “If accordingly, we begin at the beginning, and consider things in the process of their growth, we shall best be able, in this as in other fields, to attain scientific conclusions by the method we employ.” (The Politics 1252a) Some say that the origin of our thought is with Homer. But the way Homer is taught is as if we were eating pudding and that we should consume his work for the mere pleasure that we get from it. As if the understanding of the Greeks could be obtained through a
mere eating, i.e., by getting a taste of things the student whets their appetite for the next course. In classical studies, however, we do not seek an understanding of the Greeks, but an understanding of ourselves. The current methodology, however, is not only the wrong approach to the study of classics as a whole, but is in fact the wrong place to begin. We ought to begin with Herodotus which is where the student learns not that the Greeks believe in certain things but have become conscious of the fact that they believe certain things. That these beliefs should not merely be recorded but should also become the objects of examination; not only to record what men have done but also to try to understand why they have done it. It is impossible to understand the Greeks by reading Homer; or even a great list such as: Homer, Sophocles, and Plato. The student having done so is very likely more confused than enlightened, because he or she would know neither what the Greeks thought, how they came to think it, for we cannot truly understand the Greeks as Greeks, but can only understand ourselves by coming into relation to them. “The manner of study in ancient times differed from that of modern age in that the former was the proper and complete formation of the natural consciousness. Putting itself to the test at every point of its existence, and philosophizing about everything it came across, it made itself into a universality that was active through and through. In modern times, however, the individual finds the abstract form ready-made.” (Phenomenology of Spirit §33) Wherever the students may begin, to coin a phrase by Ezra Pound, what is most important is that they get around the topic and see it from all sides. “It doesn’t, in our contemporary world, so much matter where you begin the examination of a subject, so long as you keep on until you got around again to your starting point. As it were, you start on a sphere, or a cube; you must keep on until you
have seen it from all sides.” (ABC of Reading 29) We study them in order to understand how we have come to think as we do. The object of study situated in the distant past not drawn in relation to the present is a lifeless determinate. Our historical relation to the Greeks and the Romans has imparted to us certain thought forms. In studying the past we examine the thought form of the past and draw them into relation with our contemporary thought forms to ask: How are they the same, or different? The Greeks and Romans passed a number of ethical judgments against, for instance, cannibalism. This ethical judgment made in the past has been placed into our minds by our teachers as a particular thought form. Whoever has challenged this judgment will run up against a fundamental presupposition of Western Civilization and they have placed them self in opposition to it. In so doing, the challenger has sought to destroy a particular ethical principle and to replace it with another. “It may thus be said that historical inquiry reveals to the historian the powers of his own mind…his coming to know them shows him that his mind is able…to think in these ways…whenever he finds certain historical matters unintelligible, he discovered the limitation of his own mind…It is the historian himself who stands at the bar of judgment, and reveals his own mind in its strengths and weaknesses, its virtues and vices.” (The Idea of History 218-19)

In studying the works in the Greek and Latin library we maintain our ethical link to this past. If we are unable, however, to agree with the ethical judgments of the classical authors over any events, say the Catiline affair, it would indicated that those ethics that had condemned him had somehow become estranged from present scholarship. We posit them, but we can only do so in so far as they have already become us. “The self is really the object of the self, or the object only has truth so far as it has the form of the
self.” (Phenomenology of Spirit §529) History begins with Herodotus. Our understanding of the present begins here in Herodotus: hic Rhodes hic salta. Whosoever believes that one can take a flying leap at the study of any historical event, as Kalb did with her remarks on the Bellum Catiline, would be well advised to consider the perils of leaping before looking; and the even greater perils of pretending to know what one clearly does not know and still worse the preceding an abysmal plunge with the brandishing credentials, for her credentials would now appear to be a mere symbol of knowledge but not an actual mode of recognition for knowledge is one of those things we would rather to possess in reality than in appearance.

Insignis eorum est error qui malunt quae nesciunt docere quam discere quae ignorant.

He who wanders in error is distinguished among all men for preferring to teach that which he does not know rather than to learn that of which he is ignorant.

(De Lingua Latina 9.1)

Alas we come to rhetoric, where the ethics of philosophy meets the material world in the form of politics actuated through speech. Oratory is not the area of the barbarian, but if the wise. “Rhetoric is as it were an offshoot of Dialectic and of the science of Ethics, which may be reasonably called Politics.” (Rhetoric 1.2.7) It is through rhetoric that Ethics meets the material word for it is here that it affects the social praxis of the State through the power of speech. Rhetoric, then, is the ethics of History finding its proper use. The historian, who is also a philosopher, must draw his body of knowledge in relation to the material world. Rhetoric is a tool which is used to persuade. Used in accordance with virtue it imparts the ethical thought forms of civilization and wrongful
use has the opposite effect. This document must itself pass over and become not mere Subject but also the Predicate of itself. This argument, then, cannot not remain mere argument without content—as pure Spirit and absolute freedom—but must also become a determinate negative which is positive content. As a persuasive element it achieves its particular aims through demonstrative argument. The argument, having refuted and destroyed its predicates, must now re-crystallize into a number of determinate thought forms.

In passing ethical judgment against one historical persona it vindicates the others. But who ever vindicates one set of moral beings and condemns the other has vindicated himself by drawing himself into moral relation with his heroes and distancing himself from his villains. The “I” that was subject, and took the Bellum Catinae as its predicate, must now pass over and predicate itself against this. Thus the argument doesn’t merely defend say Cicero, but the author of this very argument. And though it does defend Cicero, its association to Cicero, on account of Cicero’s hostility towards the slaves, must be short lived. Sparticus and Lenin are indeed the real heroes for moral predicates are conditioned by actual class standing as it was demonstrated that among contemporary scholars; the more ambitious the bourgeois element the greater the affinity for Catiline.

_ Tantali uocem excipe._

Oh, listen to the voice of Tantalus (_Thyestes_ 80)

That the attack could not have been made from inside the institution that the ‘I’ had to pass out of the institution in order to find a place to stand in order to launch his attack indicated that the institution cannot be criticized from within. It cannot contain its own critique. The author as a moment in the history of the interpretation of the _Bellum_
Catilinae could only think and act in the way that a person in that situation can think and act. The vindication of base desires comes historically from within the institution because those within it think and act the way people in those institutions think and act. If the critic were homeless, friendless or lawless it could only be because the academy is really a community of savages, not intellectuals. The real philosopher can’t even function in today’s academy if and when he’s even allowed into it, αἰτια or ‘motive.’ To understand how it was possible for this to take place we must recapitulate Plato’s theses that (α) that the just man always gets the worst of it, and (β) that one cannot merely be good, but must also have the reputation for it; and to tie these two principles back to the theory of dissemblance and to see how it operates to precipitate these results.

The thing-in-itself is covered by its representation which exists in the minds eye and is but a symbol for the thing. The dissembler dislodges the representation from the being and causes being and representation to live independently while at the same time tied together. The representation is a false being and cannot have a life of its own as long as the true being still exists since false representation could at any time be compared to ontological being which would prove the reputation ascribed to the thing was different from the actual being of the thing and thereby destroying the predicate. If, however, the thing-in-itself were to pass away from this world without making present to the world its true being, false reputation would persist as truth in posterity. Thus the dissembler must endeavor to advance falsehood while keeping the truth concealed. “What is meant, and purpose, are separated from truth…the ostensible meaning from the real meaning, from the true thing and intention.” (Phenomenology of Spirit §526) And that this is the pitfall
of a social praxis which traffics in the mere symbols of things and not in the things themselves. Or, moreover, it is a natural consequence of the dualistic nature of reality.
VI. Works Cited


