

Using Pre-Election Polls to Check the Validity of the Final Exit Polls

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It is now well known that the final exit polls from the November 2 Presidential contest between George W. Bush and John Kerry were adjusted (weighted) once actual vote tallies arrived in order to match the reported vote. This paper will first demonstrate that the weighting process was invalid. In other words, it is mathematically impossible to match the exit polls to the reported results of the popular vote. Then this paper will compare exit poll results to pre-election poll trends over the last month leading up to the election and then provide some other clues regarding which states may have fraudulent results.

Weighting of the Exit Poll Is Impossible

The final fixed exit poll shows how the electorate of 2004 broke down compared to the voting in the 2000 election. And what it reveals is that in order for Bush to win, a virtually impossible thing happened: every single Bush voter from 2000 also went out and again voted in 2004. That is, no Bush voter passed away from 2000 to 2004 or for whatever reason, could not vote in 2004. It is perhaps the greatest electoral miracle that Karl Rove has ever performed!

A very large number of people voted – 122.6 million. The 'fixed' exit poll says that of these, 43 percent voted for Bush in 2000, 37 percent voted for Gore in 2000, 3 percent voted for Nader/Other in 2000, and 17 percent did not vote in 2000.

Translating this into numbers this means that of the 122.6 million voters in 2004, 52.6 million voted for Bush in 2000, 45.4 million voted for Gore in 2000, 3.7 million voted for Nader/Other in 2000, and 20.8 million did not vote in 2000. Really?

In 2000, Bush received only 50,456,169 votes. So 104 percent of Bush's 2000 base returned to polls, compared to 89 percent of Kerry's base. This is impossible! And this is important, because the exit polls show that Kerry won new voters, Kerry won voters who did not vote in 2000 (54 to 45), and Kerry overwhelmingly won voters who voted for Nader or someone else in 2000 (71 to 21). Also, the exit poll shows that Bush and Kerry swapped about an equal number of voters in 2004 -- ten percent of Gore voters went for Bush in 2004 while nine percent of Bush (2000) voters went for Kerry in 2004.

So the only way that Bush won the election in 2004, was by having a better turnout of his base. His turnout was so good, that it was mathematically impossible! First, obviously some Bush voters passed away from 2000 to 2004. Let's be conservative and say that only 2 percent of Bush's 2000 voters died between 2000 and 2004 - that is, just over 1,000,000. That leaves us with at most 49,450,000 potential Bush-2000 voters. This means that even if every single Bush voter from 2000 returned to the polls in 2004, it could only be 40.3 percent of the electorate, not 43%. And even that assumption is highly unlikely.

The fixed exit polls are trying to convince us of a Bush win based on a mathematical impossibility.

Equally important, once you change the weighting of the poll, the whole thing, all the questions, need to be re-weighted. This can not be explained by the margin of error. Once you do the re-weighting, the reported results will be outside the margin of error of the exit poll. In other words, the national popular vote total is impossible. It is far outside the possible margin of error of the national exit poll survey.

Let's say that at most, 97 percent of Bush voters from 2000 returned to the polls in 2004, due to 2 percent passing away and another 1 percent who could/did not vote for some reason. This would mean that at most, 40.0% of the 2004 electorate were folks who voted for Bush in 2000, rather than the 43% used in the national weighting. This is a significant difference and means that the entire exit poll needs to be re-

weighed. It would throw off all the questions, such as 'Are you a liberal, moderate, conservative?', are you a 'Republican', 'Democrat', or 'Independent?', etc.

And what does it do to the question of how folks voted in 2000? Let's split the 3.5% subtracted from the Bush-2000 voter portion of the electorate, placing an additional 1.4 percent in the new voter category (those who didn't vote in 2000), an additional 1.5% in the Gore-2000 category, and 0.1 percent in the Other category. (This seems like a conservative adjustment favoring Bush). Then we have the following, looking only at the Bush and Kerry portions:

Table 1: How Did You Vote in 2000 by 2004 Vote, National Exit Poll (Adjusted by Author)

2000 Vote	Portion of Electorate	Bush %	Kerry %	Bush Partile	Kerry Partile
Did Not Vote	18.4%	45%	54%	.083	.099
Gore	38.5%	10%	90%	.039	.347
Bush	40.0%	91%	9%	.364	.036
Other	3.1%	21%	71%	.007	.022
Sum of Partiles				49.2%	50.4%

So even in the best-case scenario for Bush, where he gets 97 percent of his 2000 voters to return to the polls in 2004 (but loses 9% to Kerry), he loses by more than 1 percent to Kerry in the popular vote. With a margin of error of 1%, this would produce an expected range of results from a 0.2% victory for Bush to a 1.8% victory for Kerry.

The reported popular vote margin of (-)2.46 percent in favor of Bush falls well outside of the expected range (-0.2% to +2.2%). In fact if the margin of error is 1 percent (two-tailed 95% level), then the reported popular vote has a T-score of 7.17 and a probability of 3.85×10^{-13} , or about a 1 in 2.6 trillion chance of occurring.

The only other explanation is that a significant number of voters lied when they said that they voted for Bush in 2000. While this is possible, the only way to test if this is by working with the raw exit poll data.

In all regions of the U.S., Bush's turnout is at least 102 percent, while Gore's never reaches above 90 percent.

Table 2: Bush 2000 Voter and Gore 2000 Voter Turnout in the 2004 Election by Region of the County

Region	Percent of Bush 2000 Voters Who Voted Again in 2004	Percent of Gore 2000 Voters Who Voted Again in 2004
Northeast	103%	88%
Midwest	102%	90%
South	109%	89%
West	102%	86%

But in all the regions, the 'fixed' exit poll results are based on a false premise - that 100% or more of Bush's 2000 voters returned to the polls in 2004, dead or alive.

Finding the Clues – Where Did Fraud Occur?

The exit polls were manipulated to produce at least three results. One is to get the exit polls to match the "actual" Bush margin of victory in key battleground states, the second is to match results in non-key

states where the reported vote did not match the initial exit poll in order to boost Bush's popular vote "mandate" and the third was to get the exit polls to show that there was not a major swing toward Kerry during the last 24 hours. The latter was necessary because if Kerry really had been winning 60 or 65 percent of the undecideds on election day (the people who made up their mind on the day of election), then it would be really hard to explain how Bush wound up winning both the popular vote and the electoral college. Instead, the exit polls were fixed to state that nationally Kerry won the voters who decided on the day of election by a scant margin of 52 to 45. The exit pollsters had a major challenge though – if they fixed the exit polls in the same way for all the states, it would be too obvious that something was amiss.

The first question is how legitimate are the results in the key battleground states that Bush ended up winning. According to the exit polls, the reason that Kerry lost Iowa, New Mexico, Ohio, Nevada, and Florida is not that he didn't close well but rather that he was coming from so far behind. For instance, among voters who made up their minds in the last week, we see that Kerry was winning the undecided vote quite well – anywhere from a low of a 56 to 43 margin in Iowa to a high of a 59 to 38 margin in New Mexico (Table 3).

State	Percentage of Voters Who Decided in the Last Week	Voted for Kerry	Voted for Bush
Iowa	14%	56%	43%
Nevada	15%	56%	42%
Florida	11%	57%	41%
Ohio	11%	60%	40%
New Mexico	17%	59%	38%

Clearly the problem was not the lack of a strong finish on Kerry's part. Rather, according to the fixed exit polls, the problem was that Kerry was too far behind and had too much ground to make up. Of voters who made up their minds more than one month before the election, Kerry lost big: He was so far behind by the time of the first debate on September 30, he could not make up the difference. According to the exit poll data, his deficit one month out ranged from seven points down in New Mexico to 12 points down in Florida.

State	Percentage of Voters Who Decided More Than 30 Days Before Election	Voted for Kerry	Voted for Bush
Iowa	74%	45%	54%
Nevada	72%	45%	54%
Florida	77%	44%	56%
Ohio	78%	45%	55%
New Mexico	71%	53%	46%

It is important to note that these voters make up the bulk of voters, so the margin of error for this item in the exit poll won't be much greater than the overall margin of error for the exit polls. We can conclude that, because of his strong finish in these states, if Kerry had only been behind by 2 to 5 percentage points with one month to go, he would have won most, if not all, of these five states.

But was Kerry really that far behind with a month to go? In order to analyze this question, pre-election polling data was examined. Some caution is in order because the pre-election surveys are worded to tease out responses that may not be very solid. But at least a similar bias should be shown in all states. The polling data from the state-wide polls of likely voters carried out between Sept. 15 and Oct. 2 (one month to 7 weeks before the election) was examined and compared to the data above from the exit poll. The state-wide pre-election polls showed a virtual tie in New Mexico and a four point lead for Bush in Iowa and a five point lead for Bush in Ohio, Nevada, and Florida. More importantly, the November 2 exit poll data was underestimating Kerry's percentage one month out from the election by 4 to 7 points, with the highest totals being New Mexico and Florida. In the case of New Mexico there were only two surveys done, so the margin of error is higher, but in the case of Florida, there were five state-wide surveys, lowering the margin of error.

State	State-wide Pre-Election Polls Sept 15 to Oct 2				Exit Poll margin – voters who decided > one month	Difference
	Number of Polls	Bush average	Kerry average	Margin, Bush over Kerry		
Iowa	8	48.5%	44.6%	4%	9%	5%
New Mexico	2	45.5%	46.0%	0%	7%	7%
Ohio	10	49.3%	44.6%	5%	10%	5%
Nevada	3	49.0%	44.0%	5%	9%	4%
Florida	5	49.2%	44.6%	5%	12%	7%
Average	(total) 28	48.3%	44.8%	4%	9%	5%

Note: Only polls of likely voters are included (not leaners).

The state-wide pre-election polls conducted five to seven weeks before the election would suggest that the exit poll data is off – that it consistently was over-estimating the margin between Bush and Kerry among voters who decided more than one month before the election who they were going to vote for. In the three states with the most polls done – Iowa, Ohio, and Florida – the exit poll over-estimated the Bush lead by 4 to 7 percentage points. Most significantly, in Florida the exit poll gave Bush a margin of 56-44 among voters who decided at least 30 days out. Yet the pre-election polls conducted between Sept. 15 and Oct. 2 suggest that Bush had only a 4 or 5 point lead then.

One can argue that Bush voters who responded to the exit poll made up their minds earlier than Kerry voters, so that there is a built in bias in these polls. This argument would say that the difference in pre-election poll data and exit poll data simply reflects that a number of Kerry voters told pre-election pollsters in September that they were going to vote for Kerry but then (collectively) told exit pollsters on November 2 that they actually made up their minds sometime during the last month before the election. This is possible.

One way to test out this argument is to look at the five closest battleground states where Kerry won. How much bias was there in the pre-election polls in those states? The same methodology was used – gathering the data from all the state-wide polls of likely voters and finding the average for Bush and Kerry. On average there was no bias in the polls. Only one state, Michigan, had a bias similar to the five battleground states won by Bush, although the bias was smaller than in any of the five “red” states. On the other hand, Wisconsin showed the opposite bias. There either the pre-election polls were over-estimating the Bush lead 30 days out or the exit poll was over-estimating Kerry's support one month before the election.

Table 6: Exit Poll Compared to Pre-Election Polls – Greater Than One Month Out, Battleground States Won by Kerry

State	State-wide Pre-Election Polls Sept 15 to Oct 2				Exit Poll margin – voters who decided > one month	Difference
	Number of Polls	Bush average	Kerry average	Margin, Bush over Kerry		
Michigan	8	43.8%	47.0%	-3%	0%	3%
Minnesota	2	46.0%	46.5%	0%	-2%	-2%
Pennsylvania	11	46.7%	46.7%	0%	1%	1%
New Hampshire	5	46.8%	45.8%	1%	2%	1%
Wisconsin	7	49.3%	42.7%	7%	2%	-5%
Average	(total) 33	46.5%	45.7%	0.8%	1%	0%

This is worth repeating – in the five battleground states won by Kerry the November 2 exit poll data matched the pre-election polls regarding voters’ inclination more than one month before the election! This is true in three of these five states. But it is still not known if this is a coincidence or if something else is happening. So it is time to check out the national polls as well as the pre-election polls from other near-battleground-states.

The exit poll asked voters when they decided on their vote – more than one month before the election, more than one week before the election, during the last three days or ‘today’ (the day of the election). (Note: I’m not sure how this was handled with those respondents who voted early.) Using the responses to these questions, one can track the preference trend nationally and in each state for the month leading up to the election. This trend was then compared with the trend from the pre-election polls. The exit poll responses were slightly adjusted, by adding or subtracting a few tenths of a percent, in order to match the actual reported results.

What can be seen from the national opinion polls is that the responses to this series of exit poll questions do match the trend of the pre-election polls. Generally, the exit poll was over-estimating Bush’s support by one to two percentage points, with the greatest over-estimation occurring during the last three days. The national pre-election polls suggested that Kerry gained about 2.6 points on Bush from October 28 to November 1. Yet the exit poll data showed a Kerry increase of only 0.6 points, as well as an additional Kerry bump of 0.6 points on the day of the election. The large Bush drop in the pre-election polls of the first week of October is a product of the first Presidential debate. The exit poll question only looked at one week out and one month out, so the difference between those two points was averaged over the three and a half weeks in-between, whereas the pre-election polls suggest a Kerry bump during the first week of October and then a rather flat trend for the second and third weeks of October.

The pre-election polls taken from October 29 to November 1 had an average margin in favor of Bush of 1.2 percent. If this is accurate, then a trend among voters who decided on the final day favoring Kerry by 14 points, such as 56 to 42, would have resulted in a tie between Kerry and Bush.

The national exit poll data showed a steady increase in support for Kerry throughout October, with a flat period from October 21 to 28 and then bump on November 2. The increase in support for Kerry was even greater in the “red” states, the states that Bush won on November 2. Among the red battleground states, Kerry’s support increased by 2.6 percent from September 30 to November 2, including 0.5 percent on the day of November 2. Among the remainder of states won by Bush, Kerry’s support increased by 3.1 percent from September 30 to November 2, including a last day boost of 0.7 percent, according to exit poll data aggregated from each state.

Figure 7






Figure 8



For some reason, this trend did not hold among states won by Kerry, according to the exit poll. In states where Kerry won handily, his support was basically flat from September 30 on, including an amazing drop in support on election day of 0.3 percent. In blue battleground states, Kerry's support was flat from October 21 on, including a minimal gain of 0.1 percent on the day of the election. It is difficult to believe that Kerry's support was rising in late October in red states but remaining steady or dropping in the blue states.

Figure 9



The pre-election polls (solid lines, below) indicated that Bush did gain slightly on Kerry, in fact, throughout October in both red and blue battleground states, after an initial boost for Kerry during the first week in of October. Among the battleground states won by Kerry, the pre-election polls matched the exit poll data within one percent at all four of the data points (Sept. 30, Oct. 21, Oct. 28 and Nov. 1). But for some reason, the same was not true in the battleground states won by Bush. The exit poll was off by over 7 points on Sept. 30, four points on Oct. 21 and 28, and three points on Nov. 1. Why were the polling companies able to very accurately gauge the will of the voters in the blue battleground states but not in the red battleground states? Was there some collective psychology at play in the states narrowly won by Bush that was not at play in the states narrowly won by Kerry? Is that somehow more plausible than to suggest that the exit poll data was manipulated in the red battleground states to match reported vote totals that seemed out of touch with reality – both the unfixed exit polls and the pre-election polls?

Figure 10





Figure 11




Perhaps the best state to examine is the one that was polled the most – Florida. With so many pre-election polls, the margin of error should be quite small, in deed. Yet here the pre-election polls were not even close to matching the exit poll data. The polls conducted during the weeks of September 30 and October 21 were off by more than 6 points and the Oct. 30 to Nov. 1 polls were off by over 4 points. The seven polls conducted then had an average margin in favor of Bush of 0.9 percent. Yet Kerry lost by 5.0 percent in spite of the 0.8 percent boost that Kerry received on election day according to the exit poll.

Even more stark than the example of Florida is the comparison of the exit poll data in Wisconsin and Iowa – two neighboring states with similar demographics and very similar voting results, albeit with a different candidate garnering the respective electoral votes. The solid lines in the chart below show that the pre-election polls indicated not only that Iowa and Wisconsin had similar voting preferences but that the voting preference trends were very similar. According to these polls, Wisconsin started more in Bush's camp than Iowa in September but then both moved to a virtual tie by the first week of October, with Wisconsin slightly more in Kerry's favor than Iowa. Then during the last four days, the surveys showed a surge toward Kerry in Iowa, with a gain of 1.5 points. The exit poll data showed a similar Kerry surge of 1.1 points and an additional gain of 0.6 points on election day.


Yet the exit poll showed Kerry far behind Bush in Iowa throughout October. It differed from the pre-election polls by over 4 points on September 30 and by about three points throughout late October. At the same time, the exit poll data matched the pre-election data for Wisconsin almost perfectly from October 7 on. Why is it that the Rasmussens and Zogbys of the world were so on with their surveys of Wisconsin but collectively off in Iowa? The closeness of the race in Iowa as indicated by the pre-election polls of Iowa, combined with the late surge toward Kerry in Iowa, indicated by both the pre-election polls and the election day exit poll, point toward a Kerry victory in Iowa.

Figure 12




A very similar phenomena happened in Ohio and Pennsylvania. The pre-election polls showed similar trends for these two neighboring states, with Bush having 2 to 3 more points of support in Ohio than in Pennsylvania from October 14 on. Kerry won Pennsylvania by 2.5 points. Yet the exit poll data consistently showed a 7 to 9 point difference in the support for Bush in Ohio and Pennsylvania. Again, the question arises, why did the pre-election pollsters accurately forecast the Republican groundswell that fell short in Pennsylvania but failed to forecast that same groundswell that carried Ohio for Bush?

Figure 13




Other battleground states and near-battleground states won by Bush were also examined. With the exception of Nevada, these states too showed a large discrepancy between the pre-election polls and the exit polls, with the largest gap in Arkansas, followed by Missouri, Colorado, New Mexico and Virginia.

Figure 14



What was happening in the other battleground states that went for Kerry? In Minnesota and Washington, the pre-election polls and exit polls match almost perfectly. Only New Hampshire and Michigan had a slight discrepancy in favor of Kerry in the pre-election polls. New Jersey actually had the opposite bias – the pre-election polls indicated more support for Bush than what was revealed in the exit poll and the reported results. (Note: The exit poll done in Oregon did not ask respondents when they decided who to vote for.)

Figure 15



It is not hard to conclude that the exit poll data was fixed in order to match the reported results and the way it was fixed in the battleground states that went to Bush was by overestimating the Bush margin over Kerry among voters who decided more than 30 days before the election. Therefore, according to this narrative, Kerry was closing fast in these battleground states but was simply too far behind and ran out of time. The pre-election polls suggest that the supposed large Bush lead 30 days out was nonsense, with the possible exception of Nevada. In three other states – Iowa, Ohio and Florida, Kerry was 4 to 5 points behind before the first debate, according to pre-election polls. The exit polls suggest that Kerry gained 6

to 7 points from September 30 to November 2 in each of these states. In New Mexico, Kerry was leading 30 days out, according to the polls.

Padding Bush’s Margin and Changing the Opinions of the Last-Minute Deciders

But the exit pollsters not only fixed the exit polls in the battleground states won by Bush. They also appear to have fixed the exit data in a whole different way among the blue states. After finding a way for it to look plausible for a Bush victory in Iowa and New Mexico and a wide victory in Florida and Ohio, they still had to find a way to make it look like Bush was nearly even with Kerry among voters who decided on the day of the election. All these battleground charts show a huge movement toward Kerry in the last days. But if this was true everywhere, it would be hard to explain how Bush hung on to win both the electoral college and the popular vote. This is where the blue states come in.

Bush won the last day deciding voters in only nine states, where the margin in greater than one point. And five of the nine states are blue states – Massachusetts, California, Hawaii, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania. The only red states where Bush won amongst voters deciding on the day of the election were Wyoming, Kansas, Alabama and West Virginia. Kerry won the last day deciders by a 71-26 margin in North Carolina, a 62-34 margin in Arizona, a 61-39 margin in Ohio and Oklahoma, and a 53-41 margin in South Dakota, but we are supposed to believe that he lost the election day deciding voters in Massachusetts and California?!

Table 16: Blue States Where Bush Won the Election Day Deciding Voters

	Final Kerry over Bush Margin	Voters Who Decided in Last Week	Voters Who Decided on Day of Election	Region
Massachusetts	62-37	46-47	43-50*	47-50
California	55-44	53-41	44-47	56-40
Hawaii	54-45	49-51	47-53	56-40
Rhode Island	59-39	59-38	44-52	47-50
All non-battleground Blue States	57-42	55-40	53-43	
All other States	45-55	52-45	54-43	

* Massachusetts is an estimate based on the polling of the voters who decided who to vote for in the last three days.

The Rhode Island results are strange. Amongst voters deciding during the last week, Kerry won handily, 59 to 38 and amongst those deciding on the last three days (including the day of), Kerry won 57 to 41. Yet on the day of the election, this flip-flopped to a 52 to 44 Bush advantage. The Rhode Island and Massachusetts results seem to bolster the regional exit poll which had Bush winning the election day deciding voters 50 to 47 in the Northeast, the only region where this was the case. Yet Kerry won this portion of the voters in New York by a 64 to 34 margin. New York voters make up one-third of the voters in the Northeast. So in the Northeast minus New York, Bush would have had to have won these voters by a 19-point margin, in order to attain the 3-point margin in the region as a whole. His biggest margin was in Rhode Island, where as mentioned, he won by eight points. It appears that the exit pollsters were a little sloppy as they went about ‘fixing’ the exit poll data.

More sloppiness is show in the West Region. Kerry won the election-day deciding voters by a 56-40 margin in this region. Yet he lost these voters in California by a 47 to 44 margin. California makes up slightly less than half of the voters in the West region, so Kerry would have needed to win the remainder of the region by a margin of about 30 points in order for the 56-40 regional margin to be true. Another scenario would be a fix in the California exit poll in order to match an unexpected gain for Bush in the reported vote. This is supported by another inconsistency: Kerry was winning the voters who decided the day-before and two days before the election by a margin of 58 to 36, yet he lost the day-of voters by 3 points.

In Hawaii, according to exit poll data, Bush won the voters who decided 4 to 7 days out by a margin of 68 to 32, while Kerry won the voters who decided 1 to 3 days out (right when Cheney was there) by 67 to 33, and then Bush won the voters who decided on the day of the election 53 to 47. These swings are possible but point toward possible exit poll manipulation. Similarly, in Minnesota, Kerry won among voters deciding the two days before the election by a margin of 57 to 38 but lost closely amongst those deciding on the day of, 49 to 48. Pennsylvania was the same story: Kerry won among voters deciding the two days before the election by 19 points, but lost among the election day deciding voters, 51 to 46. Ditto Nevada, where Kerry won voters who decided 4 to 7 days out by 80 to 18, but narrowly lost among voters who decided on the day of the election, 49 to 48.

Other Clues that Point to Fixed Exit Polls

Other clues that point to where the exit poll data may have been fixed and therefore, where the vote totals may have been questionable include an examination of the internal inconsistencies in the exit poll. The results of various questions were used to calculate the projected Presidential margin. In one state, Tennessee and one reported regional results, the Northeast, there are major inconsistencies in the exit poll. In three other states, Oklahoma, Kansas and Iowa, there are minor inconsistencies that might be explained by a block of voters who tended to answer certain survey questions but refused to answer others.

Tennessee's reported vote had a 14-point margin for Bush. This was matched by the results using the gender question, where Bush had a 16-point margin among men and a 13-point margin among women. Yet, calculating the results based on the question of when people decided who to vote for, Bush's margin was only 6 points, a difference of 8 points from the gender vote. Bush won amongst the voters in Tennessee who decided at least one week before the election, 54 to 45, (88% of voters), yet Kerry won the other 12 percent who decided during the last week, 56 to 41. It is hard to see from those numbers how Bush won Tennessee by 14 points.

Similarly, in the East (Northeast) regional exit poll, Kerry won by 12 points using the gender question, yet when using the question whether or not the voter was a first-time voter, Kerry won by 17 points. It is worth noting that in all five examples in the table below, it is the gender vote that most closely matches the actual reported vote. This indicates that the exit pollsters were more careful when adjusting the exit polls so that the gender question would match the reported vote but less careful on other questions. If a true weighting of the data had occurred, this type of inconsistency would not be present in the various exit poll questions.

	Based on Male/ Female Vote	Based on Those Deciding within Last Week	Based on Level of Agreement with Iraq War	Based on 1 st Time Voters	Actual Reported Vote
Tennessee	56-42 (B)	52-46 (B)	53-41 (B)		57-43 (B)
Oklahoma	65-35 (B)	66-34 (B)	62-34 (B)		66-34 (B)
Kansas	63-36 (B)	62-37 (B)	60-36 (B)		62-37 (B)
Iowa	50-49 (B)	52-48 (B)		50-49 (B)	50-49 (B)
East - Region	55-43 (K)			58-41 (K)	55-44 (K)

- Another clue of exit poll manipulation is the states where Bush did better or close to better among women than men. Generally, Bush did 3 to 6 points better than Kerry among men than women. The five states are:
 - ✓ Texas (3 point difference)
 - ✓ Montana (2 point difference)
 - ✓ Missouri (2 point difference)
 - ✓ West Virginia (0.5 point difference)
 - ✓ Mississippi (even)

- Another category of voters went heavily toward Kerry nationally and that was first-time voters. So the states where Kerry did bad among these voters is another possible clue of exit poll manipulation. States where first-time voters went for or almost went for Bush over Kerry were:
 - ✓ South Dakota, by 13 points
 - ✓ Arizona, by 8 points
 - ✓ Iowa (almost), Bush lost by 1 point
 - ✓ New Mexico (almost), Bush lost by 2 points

In terms of demographics, the final exit poll appears to be most manipulated within the urban vote, especially large cities. The national exit poll states that Bush gained 13 points over his 2000 performance among big city voters and 9 points over his 2000 performance among smaller city voters (population 50,000 to 500,000). Here are a number of examples of how the urban polling data was skewed:

- Columbus. The Ohio exit poll showed Bush winning the city of Columbus 53 to 43. ('Big Cities' in the exit poll are defined as cities with over 500,000 people.) Yet in the Hamilton County portion of Columbus, Kerry won 63 to 37. Adding the small portions of Columbus in neighboring counties may leave Kerry with a 62 to 38 percent advantage. So the exit poll was off by 34 points. The Ohio exit poll further states that among the 94 percent of Ohio that is not 'big city' Columbus, Bush led Kerry by 1.5 percent. When you add in the actual Columbus numbers (isn't this what the exit pollsters did?), then Bush's advantage narrows to 0.1 percent, which is far less than the number of voters suppressed in Columbus.
- The exit poll for the South Region claims that Bush won the Big City vote over Kerry by a margin of 59 to 40 percent. Yet, a quick review shows that this is blatantly impossible. There are nine cities in the South with over 500,000 people. And in only one of the nine did Bush win the county where the big city was located by a margin as large as 19 percent, and that was Fort Worth, where the Tarrant County vote went 62 to 37 for Bush. It is worth noting that the voting data includes suburban regions, not just the core city like the exit poll data. In most cases the vote would favor Kerry more in the core city than the suburban portion of the counties. Here are the big city counties in the South, their actual results and the state exit poll for big cities:

✓ Tarrant (Fort Worth)	Bush 62 to 37	Texas, Bush 60-40 (impossible)
✓ Duval (Jacksonville)	Bush 58 to 42	Florida, Bush 67-33 (impossible)
✓ Bexar (San Antonio)	Bush 55 to 44	Texas, Bush 60-40 (impossible)
✓ Harris (Houston)	Bush 55 to 45	Texas, Bush 60-40 (impossible)
✓ Dallas (Dallas)	Bush 50 to 49	Texas, Bush 60-40 (impossible)
✓ Mecklenberg (Charlotte)	Kerry 52 to 48	North Carolina, Kerry 63-37 (OK)
✓ Davidson (Nashville)	Kerry 55 to 45	Tennessee, Kerry 54-45 (improbable)
✓ Travis (Austin)	Kerry 56 to 42	Texas, Bush 60-40 (impossible)
✓ Shelby (Memphis)	Kerry 58 to 42	Tennessee, Kerry 54-45 (improbable)

In three of the four southern states with big cities, the exit poll was off in favor of Bush. In two, Texas and Florida, the exit poll was off to an impossible extent. This is a sign of either exit poll manipulation or very bad survey sampling.

- Atlanta. The Georgia exit poll by region has a Kerry margin of victory in Atlanta of 66 to 33 over Bush. Yet the same poll has the 'Urban Vote' in Georgia going for Bush, 51 to 49. While the urban vote most likely includes some additional smaller cities, Atlanta would be the bulk of the urban vote, making it virtually impossible for these two tables to be consistent. Once again, it appears to be exit poll manipulation.

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