Bleak Horizons After Operation Defensive Wall

(Mouin Rabbani is director of the Palestinian-American Research Center in
Ramallah.)

On April 28, both Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian leader
Yasser Arafat accepted an American proposal whereby US and British security
personnel will be dispatched to Jericho to supervise the imprisonment of six
Palestinians besieged with Arafat in what remains of the Ramallah
governorate. Barring last-minute surprises, the end of what is arguably
Israel's most extensive military campaign on Palestinian soil since the 1948
war is finally in sight. Resolution of Israel's siege of Bethlehem's Church
of the Nativity is expected in the coming days. Nevertheless, the broader
ramifications of Israel's Operation Defensive Wall -- coupled with the
virtual certainty that it will continue in different guise in the weeks
ahead -- underline Israel's determination to alter fundamentally the various
Israeli-Palestinian arrangements produced by the Oslo agreements and
eventually eliminate them altogether.

PRELUDE

The March 27 Hamas suicide bombing at Netanya's Park Hotel, which killed 28
Israelis celebrating Passover and injured many more, was cited by Israel as
the casus belli for its military operation. But Operation Defensive Wall was
neither a direct response nor a foregone conclusion: the intention to
deliver a devastating blow to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the various
Palestinian paramilitary organizations is at least as old as the current
Israeli government. Moreover, Israel has during the past year consistently
pursued a twin policy of military escalation and political immobilism
vis-a-vis the Palestinians all but designed to create the appropriate
conditions for such an offensive. As widely reported, detailed planning for
Defensive Wall was completed well before the Netanya bombing -- itself the
culmination of an unprecedented level of Palestinian attacks in March which
were the predictable harvest of Israel's first major offensive earlier that
month.

Was the offensive inevitable in the wake of the Netanya bloodbath? On March
28, US envoy Gen. Anthony Zinni informed Arafat that Israel would refrain
from its anticipated action if the Palestinians accepted his proposals for
the implementation of the June 2001 Tenet work plan. The Zinni proposals,
which dealt almost exclusively with Israel's security concerns, were viewed
by the PA as a serious distortion of the CIA director's plan, which had
itself been formulated to accommodate Israeli objections to the May 2001
Mitchell report. At a hastily arranged press conference that night, Arafat
reaffirmed Palestinian acceptance of both Tenet and Mitchell (neither of
which have been formally ratified by the Israeli government), and called for
their immediate implementation without further amendment or negotiation.
Within hours, large columns of tanks and armored personnel carriers poured
into Ramallah and al-Bireh from every direction. By April 4, Israel had
reconquered all of the autonomous Palestinian enclaves in the West Bank with
the exception of Jericho and Hebron.

OCCUPATION

Operation Defensive Wall was quantitatively as well as qualitatively
different from anything which had preceded it. The army's attempt to
eliminate paramilitary organizations such as the Fatah-affiliated al-Aqsa
Martyrs' Brigades, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas and others
which have spearheaded the armed uprising formed only part of a much broader
campaign. Most visibly, Israeli troops physically occupied all but a small
section of the PA compound in Ramallah to further "isolate" Arafat, and
Sharon and others began to speak openly of Arafat's expulsion and
replacement. Palestinian security facilities were systematically destroyed
in every Palestinian town and village occupied, and security personnel were
disarmed and detained en masse.

PA ministries and civil agencies were ransacked, vandalized and sometimes
looted as well. Private property, public facilities, commercial
establishments, non-governmental organizations and offices maintained by the
various Palestinian political factions sustained extensive damage, and were
in many cases looted or destroyed altogether. Such actions typically
occurred not in the course of armed conflict, but well after the military
established control.

As confirmed by Israeli soldiers in newspaper reports, Palestinian
non-combatants were pressed into service as human shields, forced to knock
on doors, open suspicious packages and even deployed in combat operations.
Residents of occupied towns and villages were placed under strict,
round-the-clock curfew for the duration of the Israeli military presence,
with virtually no exceptions made for urgent humanitarian cases -- whether
resulting from conflict-related injuries or otherwise. Those venturing
outdoors (including women, children and the elderly) risked being shot
without warning by snipers. In Ramallah, the curfew was lifted for several
hours every fourth day -- though many essential items and the money
necessary to buy them were in increasingly short supply. In Nablus and
Jenin, the curfew was maintained for almost the entire duration of the
occupation, with water and electricity to most residents severed.

Israeli forces prevented both Palestinian and international medical and
rescue services from operation through the threat and use of violence,
leading to an unknown number of deaths from otherwise treatable wounds and
regular medical conditions. Troops also invaded hospitals and clinics, in
several cases arresting patients from their beds and ransacking the
premises.

Thousands of males aged 15-45 were detained in tents without food, water,
toilet facilities or blankets. Many reported toture and abuse in detention.
Most were eventually released, but some 1,500 have been incarcerated without
charge or trial for an initial six-month period or pending formal charges.
In early April, Israel announced it was reopening the notorious Ansar 3
(Ketziot) military prison in the Negev Desert, which had been closed at the
conclusion of the 1987-1993 uprising.

WHAT HAPPENED IN JENIN

With the exception of Nablus, Jenin and to a lesser extent the area around
the Ramallah governorate, Palestinian resistance was light and poorly
organized. Although militants ensconced in the Nablus casbah fought
fiercely, the Israeli military used air power and armored vehicles to
conclude what it predicted would be its most difficult battle at relatively
low cost. Palestinians paid a significantly higher price, with numerous
civilians among the approximately 75 dead and some of the casbah's most
venerable sites, including a soap factory and Turkish bath house, reduced to
rubble.

The Jenin refugee camp held out for nine days under increasingly desperate
conditions, and inflicted more than twice as many Israeli casualties as were
sustained in other Palestinian cities combined. This notwithstanding, the
toll of at least dozens of Palestinian military and civilian dead -- which
Amnesty International forensic pathologist Derrick Pounder characterized as
"mass killings" -- cannot be ascribed to ferocious combat alone. Evidence
collected by journalists and human rights organizations has demonstrated
that in Jenin, Israel systematically violated the laws of war and
international humanitarian law, and resorted to indiscriminate violence and
wanton destruction on a wide scale -- including summary executions and the
razing of entire neighborhoods -- in many cases for purely punitive purposes
well after the cessation of hostilities.

The blunt instruments used, including helicopter gunships and bulldozers,
exclude the possibility that a massacre in the sense of a slaughter of
dozens of individually selected civilians was perpetrated. That war crimes
of equivalent severity and legal consequence were committed is nevertheless
clear to the Sharon-Peres government as well as human rights workers on the
ground. A prime condition Israel has so far placed upon its cooperation with
the UN Security Council fact-finding commission is that the commission agree
in advance not to draw conclusions which could lead to the prosecution of
Israeli soldiers and officials. The confusion and unfounded allegations that
initially swirled around what happened in Jenin came largely from Israel's
refusal of access for the media and human rights monitors to the camp.

GREEN LIGHT...

The unconditional US support for Israel's offensive led many in the region
to wonder if Israel had merely secured a green light from Washington or was
in fact doing its bidding. With an escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict
increasingly frustrating US plans to attack Iraq, and the Bush
administration firmly opposed to exerting pressure upon Israel to end the
occupation, a massive military blow could have been the preferred
alternative of some in the White House to obtain quiet in one part of the
region in order to stir things up in another.

Initially, at least, the prospects of eliminating Arafat, dismantling the
PA, routing the paramilitary organizations and breaking the will of the
Palestinian population seemed promising. In Israeli calculations (shared by
Israel's supporters in Washington), Arafat would either surrender to save
his skin, or be quietly removed with the assistance of lieutenants who have
been cultivated over the years by Washington and Tel Aviv. Yet Arafat's very
pronounced and public defiance during a moment of acute crisis not only
prevented the collapse of the Palestinian leadership, but also served to
rally the Palestinians to his side -- overwhelmingly so.

WITH A RED LINE

Confronted with the Israeli assault on the Palestinians and the abject
humiliation of their leader, in a manner so obviously assisted by US and
international complicity and official Arab silence, Arabs took to the
streets throughout the region in the most widespread demonstrations seen in
decades. They were joined eventually by demonstrators throughout the world.

Fearing for the region's stability, Arab and European governments began
pleading with the US to intervene, eventually producing the Powell mission.
Designed to allow Israel to continue its offensive while placating Arab and
international opinion, the Secretary of State's visit achieved only the
former. Nevertheless, the US did make clear to Sharon that it would not at
this stage tolerate a permanent Israeli reoccupation of the Palestinian
enclaves, and that Arafat remains a relevant political actor for the time
being. The several dozen international solidarity activists who formed a
human shield of a very different sort in the Ramallah governorate certainly
complicated any plans to remove or harm its Palestinian occupants.

With Washington seemingly unperturbed by unrest in the Arab world, Saudi
Crown Prince Abdallah travelled to Texas for what was a frank exchange by
all accounts. While the Saudi effort induced the US to defuse the immediate
crisis in Arafat's compound, the prospects for a viable political resolution
of the conflict remain minimal. Bush has all but adopted Sharon's war on the
Palestinians as an integral part of his own war against al-Qaeda. Leading
elements of the administration share very hawkish views on the Middle East
or are openly identified with Sharon's Likud party, and the powerful
alliance of evangelical Christians and pro-Israel lobbyists is exerting
maximum pressure on both Congress and the White House during an election
year. Few would consider the spectacle of CIA agents watching over jailed
Palestinian militants in occupied territory a particularly auspicious
beginning for sustained US engagement.

BEN ELIEZER'S MISSION IMPOSSIBLE

In the meantime, as demonstrated by repeated Israeli incursions into
Qalqilya and Tulkarm since the occupation was replaced by a tight and
armored siege in early April, Sharon has eliminated the concept of territory
under full Palestinian security control (Area A). His government has also
taken initial steps to revive the "civil administration," an army-staffed
apparatus established in 1981 to administer the Palestinian population in
the Occupied Territories. (The apparatus was abolished in 1995 with the
establishment of the PA.) In Tulkarm, land located on the town's outskirts
was requisitioned by military order until 2006.

Palestinian paramilitary formations have doubtless been dealt serious blows
by the assassinations, combat deaths, arrests and weapons finds which
attended Operation Defensive Wall. But the paramilitaries' losses are less
severe than those of the PA security forces, as they require neither
functioning facilities nor extensive arsenals to operate effectively. A high
proportion of their most experienced cadres and specialists volunteered or
were recruited after the beginning of the current uprising, and will be
replaced without great difficulty. Senior Israeli politicians and military
officers now warn that the offensive will have only a temporary effect
unless accompanied by either a political resolution or even more drastic
measures. Defense Minister Binyamin Ben Eliezer underlined the point in a
blunt statement on April 29: "It is impossible to eradicate the terrorist
infrastructure." The various militias are expected to resume their
operations in one form or another sooner rather than later, and will before
long achieve their previous capacity to disrupt the normal functioning of
Israeli society.

LAST CHANCE FOR ARAFAT

In the immediate term, it appears that Arafat is to be given one more
opportunity -- presumably his last -- to demonstrate his willingness and
ability to crush the Palestinian uprising. Absent a viable political
settlement, he is bound to either refuse or fail. As a result of Defensive
Wall, the PA's capacity for policing is vastly diminished. The militants
operate more clandestinely, with less accountability to political leaders --
whether their own or those of the PA -- than before. They are also more
determined to fight.

In the militants' view, renewed attacks against Israel will clearly reveal
the conceptual flaws upon which Israel's approach to the conflict is based:
massive shows of military force cannot bring security and will in fact
undermine it. But thus far their attacks have led Sharon to conclude that
his only failure has been insufficient force, and provided him with renewed
impetus and opportunity in his mission to resolve the unfinished business of
1982. In repeated statements excluding the possibility of a political
settlement with the current Palestinian leadership, rejecting the removal of
a single settlement outpost and advocating a "long-term interim agreement,"
Sharon has proven that the political horizon of the current Israeli
government does not extend beyond the status quo.

Arafat's apparent willingness to cut deals which divide rather than
strengthen the Palestinians will also spell trouble, if sustained. Criticism
of his bargain to end his house arrest in Ramallah has so far been muted,
due to the scant options available when he accepted it, but many
Palestinians view the deal as a highly dangerous precedent. If the coming
weeks prove this arrangement to be a way of introducing the Zinni proposals
through the back door, the relationship between the PA and the factions will
quickly revert to the pattern of increasing mutual suspicion and tension
which obtained on the eve of Arafat's "isolation" in December 2001. If
reports that the US will reward Israel for the Ramallah deal by rendering
useless the UN fact-finding commission for Jenin are confirmed, those
tensions will deepen.

While Sharon's infrastructure of terror is a complicated affair requiring
runways, spare parts and the mobilization of reserves, those confronting him
need little more than several volunteers, a few pipes, a number of
commercially available products and willpower to keep theirs operational.
Only the most extreme of counter-insurgency measures, such as mass
deportations, can render suicide bombing ineffective. Israel could find
itself facing bleak choices indeed as a result of its determination to
perpetuate the occupation.

(When quoting from this PIN, please cite MERIP Press Information Note 93,
"Bleak Horizons After Operation Defensive Wall," by Mouin Rabbani, April 30,
2002.)

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For more on the US role in the crisis, see MERIP Press Information Note 91:
The "Do More" Chorus in Washington:
http://www.merip.org/pins/pin91.html

See also MERIP Press Information Note 88: In Ramallah, Grueling Reoccupation
Grinds On:
http://www.merip.org/pins/pin88.html