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What the 9/11 commission report ignores: the CIA-Al Qaeda connection
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WSWS : News & Analysis : North America What the 9/11 commission report ignores: the CIA-Al Qaeda connection By the editorial board 24 July 2004 Use this version to print | Send this link by email | Email the author The report of the national commission investigating the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, released July 22, is a lengthy document that deserves careful study. It will be the subject of extended analysis on the World Socialist Web Site. But it is already possible, on the basis of the commission’s composition, the scope of the investigation, and the media coverage surrounding the release of the report, to draw certain definite conclusions. On the most basic level, the 9/11 report is a whitewash. The 567-page document is filled with criticisms of the Bush and Clinton administrations and the performance of the government agencies responsible for intelligence, national security and emergency response. But the commission attributes all of these failures to incompetence, mismanagement, or “failure of imagination.” The fundamental premise of its investigation is that the CIA, the FBI, the US military and the Bush White House all acted in good faith. The 9/11 report thus excludes, a priori, the most important question raised by the events of September 11, 2001: did US government agencies deliberately permit—or actively assist—the carrying out of this terrorist atrocity, in order to provide the Bush administration with the necessary pretext to carry out its program of war in Central Asia and the Middle East and a huge buildup of the forces of state repression at home. The commission concedes, as is well documented, that the Bush administration came into office focused on overthrowing Saddam Hussein, and that operational planning for a war with Iraq began within days of September 11, despite the absence of any connection between the Baghdad regime and the terrorist attacks, and the longstanding enmity between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. The commission heard testimony, from former Clinton and Bush counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke, that the Bush administration stalled on taking action against Al Qaeda during its first eight months in office, despite increasingly strident warnings from Clarke, CIA Director George Tenet, and other intelligence officials that a major Al Qaeda strike against the United States was in the offing. Bush himself received the now-notorious August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Brief from the CIA, which was entitled, “Bin Laden Determined to Strike Within the United States.” But the president told the commission he could not recall taking any action as a result. (He continued his vacation at his Texas ranch for another four weeks). The 9/11 report lists 10 separate occasions where US government agencies let slip what it called “operational opportunities” to detect and potentially disrupt the September 11 plot. These involved far more than a failure to “connect the dots.” Intelligence officials took actions that served to facilitate the 9/11 plot—in effect, running interference for Al Qaeda. The CIA, for instance, failed to notify domestic police agencies after two known Al Qaeda associates—and future 9/11 hijackers—arrived in Los Angeles. The two men, Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, who were on a CIA watch list, were at one point listed in the San Diego phone book. They traveled freely during the summer of 2001, when the intelligence suggesting a major Al Qaeda attack reportedly peaked. One of them left the US and reentered without hindrance, while the other renewed his visa.