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DESCRIPTION:Monday July 25, 2022 Dockers Rebellion and Betrayal, The Lessons For Today 
 of the Liverpool Dockers 
 Strike\n\nhttps://laborfest.net/event/dockers-rebellion-and-betrayal-the-lessons-for-today-of-the-liverpool-dockers-strike/\n\nLink:\nhttps://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSed-Pj-AR7ITjCIoSwSQVkC3mdp6HMmqnxppuSuccDaDWAwCw/viewform\nMonday 
 July 25 @ 10:00 am - 12:00 pm PDT \nFREE UK 6:00 PM\n\n(10:00 am PDT/6:00 
 pm UK)\nThis panel discussion will center on the historic, international 
 struggle of the Liverpool, England dockers (1995-1998). \nA new 
 book,Liverpool Dockers: A History of Rebellion and Betrayal written by Mike 
 Carden, a former steward of the Transport and General Workers Union and one 
 of the dockers’ leaders, was posthumously published recently. \nCarden, a 
 militant syndicalist, has written a sharp critique of the TGWU leadership, 
 the Trade Union Congress and the British Labour Party for not supporting 
 the Liverpool dockers. The book offers seminal lessons for today’s union 
 activists and organizers. \nPANELISTS will include: \nGreg Dropkin, 
 webmaster for the locked out dockers, who will lead with a brief review of 
 Carden’s book. \nDoreen McNally, firebrand head of the Women of the 
 Waterfront\nJohn Carden, the son of Mike Carden\nJack Heyman, 
 representative of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) 
 during much of the 2 1/2 year dispute.\nInformation links:\nLiverpool 
 Dockers: A History of Rebellion and Betrayal\nSolidarity Has No Borders:The 
 Journey Of The Neptune Jade\nThe Liverpool Dockers’ Strike\nThe 1972 
 Dockers Strike by Cinema Action\nLiverpool Dockers: A History of Rebellion 
 and Betrayal\nhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d4HeTugExys\nSolidarity Has 
 No Borders:The Journey Of The Neptune 
 Jade\nhttps://youtu.be/F3Wva4XbMVs\nThe Liverpool Dockers' 
 Strike\nhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r10FJTNtCEo\nThe 1972 Dockers 
 Strike by Cinema 
 Action\nhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qQGnKf58fkg\n\nLiverpool's Dockers 
 and the Globalization of Class 
 Struggle\n\nhttp://www.labournet.net/docks2/9708/CANLIV1.HTM\nThe Liverpool 
 dockers' dispute began in September 1995 in the Mersey Docks and went on to 
 become a key focal point of the class struggle world-wide. The dispute 
 started when five dockworkers were fired by a firm linked to the Mersey 
 Docks and Harbour Company (MDHC) in an overtime dispute provoked by their 
 supervisors. Eighty of their co-workers responded by setting up a picket 
 line to protest the dismissals. The dispute intensified when 400 dockers 
 employed by the MDHC refused to cross the picket line and were fired en 
 masse.\n\nThe MDHC was able to take advantage of Britain's Thatcherite 
 labour laws designed to prohibit traditional forms of working class 
 resistance such as secondary strikes. These labour laws made it possible 
 for the MDHC to fire the dockers without any right of redress and to 
 replace them with casual scab labour. These labour laws also went hand in 
 hand with legislation pertaining to the dock industry enacted by the 
 Thatcher government in 1989.\n\nIt was designed to privatize, de-regulate 
 and de-unionize virtually all of Britain's ports. Liverpool became one of 
 only two unionized ports in Britain as a result of these developments. The 
 1989 dock legislation also facilitated efforts to restructure both port 
 operations and the composition of the workforces employed at them.\n\nThe 
 restructuring of Britain's dock workforces was far-reaching and entirely 
 predictable in the context of the changes taking place across the globe in 
 the way work is organized. British port employers engaged in a concerted 
 drive to employ workforces that would be fully utilized, low cost and 
 available on a just-in-time or "as needed" basis. They wanted to employ 
 only atomized workers who were isolated from each other, competed with each 
 other for work and could be called to the docks on short notice at the 
 employers' discretion to load or unload a ship that was still en route. In 
 other words, the dock bosses most definitely did not want to continue to 
 employ a full time, unionized and class conscious workforce that would pass 
 their traditions and attitudes on to the next generation of dockers. A 
 workforce like this is completely incompatible with the kind of workplaces 
 the dock bosses desired.\n\nLean Production Enters the 
 Docks\n\nSignificantly, the aims of employers like the MDHC are consistent 
 with the aims of employers throughout the global transportation industry - 
 to realize a workforce tailored to the use of just-in-time transportation 
 systems where work has become increasingly individualized, closely 
 monitored through the use of information technology and is tightly 
 controlled. They wanted a workforce fully adapted to standardized work 
 procedures.\n\nSimply stated, the global transportation industry has been 
 widely applying the principles of the lean system of production. This 
 international trend explains why the dock bosses relentlessly sought to 
 break down lines of demarcation between job classifications, create the 
 most flexible work scheduling possible, and promote the use of "kaizen" or 
 continuous improvement in their operations. It also explains why the dock 
 bosses sought to replace industry-wide national dockworking agreements with 
 separate agreements between individual employers and their respective 
 workforces. Like bosses everywhere they fully understood that ending 
 national, industry-wide agreements is critical to developing a lean 
 workforce that identifies their interests with the well-being of their 
 immediate employer and not with their fellow workers employed by other 
 firms in the same industry. In other words, they realized that 
 industry-wide agreements help to sustain working class 
 consciousness.\n\nThese developments define the context for the current 
 dispute. They explain why the dispute in Liverpool is focused squarely on 
 the issue of atomized part-time or casual labour and why the struggle in 
 Liverpool has struck a chord with dockers around the world. These 
 developments also explain why the struggle in Liverpool is critically 
 important to workers everywhere at this particular juncture in the 
 development of capitalism in which the lean system has become the dominant 
 system of production on a global scale.\n\nA Perfect Pretext\n\nDockers 
 everywhere face the threat of "casualisation", as the Liverpool dockers 
 call it. It is widely understood that the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company 
 saw the dockers' refusal to cross a picket line as the perfect pretext for 
 hiring exactly the type of totally flexible, contingent workforce that is 
 compatible with lean production and which they desired. Likewise, the 
 dockworkers' refusal to cross a picket line provided the company with an 
 opportunity to fire one of the last remaining full-time, unionized and 
 deeply class conscious dock workforces in Britain. Effectively, it meant 
 the Liverpool dock bosses could level the competitive playing field with 
 Britain's non-union dock firms and run the Port of Liverpool as they 
 pleased.\n\nThe MDHC started this dispute with a lot going for them. 
 Britain's labour laws were loaded in their favour. These labour laws have 
 allowed the company to operate with a scab workforce while legally 
 prohibiting secondary strike action within Britain in support of the fired 
 dockers. These laws have also insured that the leadership of the dockers' 
 union, the Transport and General Workers (T&GWU), would distance themselves 
 from the Liverpool dockers' struggle because the union could be sued for 
 authorizing secondary strike action if it officially became involved. 
 Furthermore, the MDHC undoubtedly knew that it could count both on a 
 compliant British Trades Union Congress leadership to sit on the sidelines 
 and on tacit support from the leadership of Britain's Labour Party. Labour 
 Party leader Tony Blair has been steadfast in his determination to leave 
 Thatcher's labour laws in tact, the trade unions be damned. Consequently, 
 in September 1995, the fired Liverpool dockers found themselves locked in 
 an unofficial dispute centred on the issue of casual labour in a country 
 where viciously anti-union labour laws have all but crippled the labour 
 movement. \n\nYet both the unofficial and illegal nature of this dispute 
 and the universal resonance of the issues have proven to be sources of both 
 the strength and resilience of the dockworkers' struggle. Specifically, the 
 absence of official involvement by their union, the T&GWU, has made this an 
 essentially self-managed struggle. It is directed by the dockers' shop 
 stewards and is fully accountable to the decisions of weekly mass meetings 
 involving the fired workers, the dockers wives and partners' support group 
 (Women of the Waterfront) and, to a limited extent, their supporters. 
 Furthermore, the fact that other British unions were not prepared to defy 
 the law prohibiting secondary strike actions and the fact that the Mersey 
 Docks have so many entrances that sustained mass picketing is not possible 
 meant that the fired workers were compelled to look for support elsewhere. 
 They quickly found it among dockers in other countries who have proven to 
 be ready, willing and able to engage secondary actions because they 
 identify so strongly with the struggle in Liverpool.\n\nConsequently, 
 within a month of the start of the dispute, the Maritime Union of Australia 
 learned about the events in Liverpool on the internet. This was the first 
 example of how the internet would be employed throughout this dispute with 
 great effect and that it would directly facilitate the globalization of the 
 dockworkers' struggle by allowing dockworkers from across the world to see 
 the similarity of their respective struggles.\n\nBy February of 1996, 
 Liverpool boats were being "blacked" or blacklisted and an all-out 
 international effort to boycott the Port of Liverpool was starting to take 
 shape. In addition, in the same month the fired dockworkers organized an 
 international conference of dockworkers in Liverpool to formulate a 
 coordinated strategy to around the casualisation issue. Further meetings 
 were subsequently held in France and Liverpool. One observer noted that the 
 dispute in Liverpool was becoming "a full scale international fighting 
 campaign"(1). In addition to the conferences, this dynamic was fueled by 
 seemingly endless trips overseas by the fired dockers and members of their 
 wives and partners support group who both heightened the awareness of the 
 workers they visited and their own about the similarity of their 
 struggles.\n\nMeanwhile, back in Britain, the leaders of the T&GWU 
 fruitlessly tried to conduct negotiations with the MDHC without the 
 involvement of the fired Liverpool dockers' shop stewards. Dockworkers 
 elsewhere in Britain persisted in their hands-off stance, as did 
 strategically important workers such as lorry drivers who routinely crossed 
 the picket lines maintained by the fired workers. Nonetheless, public 
 support continued to grow. Public meetings in support of the fired dockers 
 were being held all over Britain. Millions of pounds were also being raised 
 for them. Furthermore, autonomous support groups were being formed on a 
 broad scale.\n\nBut one thing was especially notable about the dockers' 
 strategy of globalizing their struggle. It was a timely response to a 
 critical work reorganization issues linked to new technology (ie. 
 casualization and containerization in shipping industry) that had 
 encouraged employers to promote new work practices and demand greater 
 flexibility. Significantly, British labour organizations had generally 
 failed to address such issues and they had failed badly. Furthermore, this 
 response arose from the base of Britain's labour movement and contrary to 
 the wishes of its leadership.\n\nInternational Day of Action\n\nThis brings 
 us to the events during the week of January 20, 1997 when the globalization 
 of this struggle really bore fruit. January 20 was designated as a day of 
 international action in solidarity with the fired Liverpool 
 dockworkers.\n\nDuring the course of that day and the days that immediately 
 followed it, dockworkers in no less than 27 countries and in 105 ports and 
 cities around the\n\nworld staged solidarity actions, including illegal 
 work stoppages. The actions were a stunning success. The Los Angeles Times, 
 for example, reported at the time that the ports along the entire U.S. West 
 Coast came to a standstill during the protests. (2)\n\nIn the wake of the 
 stunning success of these actions, another conference followed in late May 
 in Montreal that brought together dockworkers and their leaders from 17 
 countries and five continents. The discussion at this conference focused on 
 privatization, deregulation and casualisation throughout industry on a 
 global scale. One delegate remarked that, "all these port workers find 
 themselves under similar industrial and political attacks as those faced by 
 the Liverpool dockers twenty-one months ago." (3) It is noteworthy that the 
 international body representing these workers, the International Transport 
 Federation, declined to participate. It views the delegates gathered at 
 such conferences as members of a "counterorganization".\n\nPlans were also 
 set for further international work stoppages. But what is truly significant 
 is the simple fact that conferences like this show that the Liverpool 
 dockers have given birth to an international dockers movement united in 
 opposition to the capitalist restructuring of their industry.\n\nBy way of 
 conclusion, it can be said that the success of Britain's dock bosses in 
 applying features of the lean system of production to their operations and 
 in terminating industry-wide labour organization in Britain's dock industry 
 has, in a very profound sense, backfired. Their actions have, 
 unintentionally, given birth to an embryonic, industry-wide organization of 
 dockers on an international scale and raised the spectre of routine 
 industrial action capable of sabotaging global just-in-time transportation 
 systems, ie. the huge global transparks built in the U.S., Europe and Asia 
 (more specifically in North Carolina, eastern Germany and Thailand). These 
 bring together every means of transportation in one place so corporations 
 can ship anything anywhere in the world within 48 hours.\n\nIt seems that 
 the fired Liverpool dockers have directed the old Chinese curse "May you 
 live in interesting times" at those who sought to dispense with them and at 
 bosses everywhere for trying to subject workers to the rigors of 
 lean-inspired transportation systems.\n\nPostscript: Two final things 
 should be noted. One is that just last week South African dockers 
 represented by South Africa's T&GWU announced that they will block the 
 export of citrus fruit destined for the British port of Sheerness which is 
 wholly owned by the MDHC. Fresh produce accounts for over one third of the 
 activity at Sheerness. The other is that one of the remaining ship lines 
 still using the Port of Liverpool is owned by Canadian Pacific. The fired 
 dockers believe that if Canadian Pacific's shipping line stopped using the 
 Port of Liverpool, their dispute could swiftly be brought to a satisfactory 
 conclusion. \n\n- Bruce Allen August 23, 1997\n\n \n\nFootnotes\n\n(1) Dave 
 Graham, "Liverpool Dockers' Strike March 8, 1996", Collective Action Notes 
 No. 11/12, p. 14.\n\n(2) Liverpool Dock Shop Stewards Committee, The 
 Balance Sheet, p. 1.\n\n(3) Liverpool Dock Shop Stewards Committee, "Common 
 Goal!", Dockers Charter No. 16 June 1997, p. 2.\n\n\nLIVERPOOL 
 DOCKERS\nhttps://www.liverpooldockers.com\n\nSolidarity, Global 
 Restructuring and Deregulation: The Liverpool Dockers’ Dispute 
 1995-98\n\nhttps://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/1137/1/thesis_MCL_2010.pdf 
 \n\n\nThe Liverpool dockworkers' strike 1995-98 and the Internet\n\nChris 
 Bailey - Internet Rights Bulgaria 
 \n\nhttps://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/63308415/Liverpool-Dockers-and-the-Internet20200514-10985-1vnt1l8.pdf?1589463703=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DThe_Liverpool_dockworkers_strike_1995_98.pdf&Expires=1604549442&Signature=gTGRRnL-u5RuR3JEnI5gAOGN3~aFK0pP4Pe-7G-qRVJPli9gb7fyChpOzaDELYEJLdoIsK1~9-u~BRCcLXR1KvZtgoPF0wkI2Woesu8e2cp9SD~rvNsX7NpThk-wc8-udCy7MaRe1o7w8H2ofwf0W2yMOTpJ4PszOixBTxurCy1fvVcidwbvsAOL3RDsAJUjaWBj4up6VWRkckMKtATUJPYNa4aSgt6axJJl7gUlPRmKoLRiN9xLCL6jHGazGc9w5ZO6CVfQ56VSI~cfaV0yVOvwBj7eERnnT02FeD7qLHZ7Bmk0a2jahUjPW~BHmUXEoOj05wPw2A3Fafg1p7E~rw__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA\n\nThis 
 paper/presentation examines how 500 Liverpool dockworkers, sacked for 
 refusing to cross a picket line, used the Internet very effectively to 
 organise widespread international action in their support. They did not 
 just act as isolated "labor militants". They used official union structures 
 where and when these gave them support, but bypassed them "as damage" when 
 they did not, and instead used a host of unofficial channels and structures 
 to build an extremely powerful network bringing about worldwide action in 
 their support. These actions brought them into growing conflict with the 
 existing official union structures over their use of the Internet to build 
 an international support network outside their control. Many union 
 officials saw this Internet-based networking as a threat to their dominant 
 position, based, as it is, largely on their control of channels of 
 information and command.\n\nThe Internet has been used extensively by new 
 social movements to create strong international networks that can be seen 
 as contributing towards the growth of a globalized form of civil society. 
 In contrast to this, a traditional social movement, organised labour, has 
 made little use of the Internet as an international organising tool. This 
 is despite the profound detrimental effect globalisation has had on 
 labour's ability to defend itself, and despite the fact that organised 
 labour has always made claims to support a conception of “international 
 solidarity”.\n\nCastells raised questions concerning the ability of the 
 labour movement to adapt itself to the Information Age:\n\nThe labor 
 movement does not seem fit to generate by itself and from itself a project 
 identity able to reconstruct social control and to rebuild social 
 institutions in the Information Age. Labor militants will undoubtedly be a 
 part of new, transformative social dynamics. I am less sure that labor 
 unions will. (1997: 360)\n\nThis paper/presentation seeks to contribute to 
 a consideration of the question Castells raises by examining how 500 
 Liverpool dockworkers, sacked for refusing to cross a picket line, used the 
 Internet very effectively to organise widespread international action in 
 their support. They did not just act as isolated “labor militants”. 
 They used official union structures where and when these gave them support, 
 but bypassed them “as damage” when they did not, and instead used 
 a\n\nhost of unofficial channels and structures to build an extremely 
 powerful network bringing about worldwide action in their support.\n\nThese 
 actions brought them into growing conflict with the existing official union 
 structures over their use of the Internet to build an international support 
 network outside their control. Many union officials saw this Internet-based 
 networking as a threat to their dominant position, based, as it is, largely 
 on their control of channels of information and command.\n\nIt was these 
 internal conflicts within the union structures that ultimately defeated the 
 Liverpool men. Enormous pressure was ultimately exerted on the shop 
 stewards by the leadership of their union, the Transport and General 
 Workers' Union (TGWU), forcing them to end the dispute.\n\nThe author of 
 this paper is in a unique position, through having been the coordinator of 
 the Liverpool dockworkers' Internet work, to produce an analysis of this 
 work and to consider what it showed concerning the potential for the 
 international labour movement to adapt to a globalized Information 
 Age.\n\nBy its nature, this paper cannot take the form of a dispassionate 
 and neutral academic exercise, though I do think a serious independent 
 theoretical analysis of the lessons of the events it describes are 
 necessary. They seem to have been ignored by Castells and others 
 considering the nature of social movement networks. Analysis of the 
 Liverpool dockers' international network and the issues it raised ought 
 surely to be an important aspect of considering the question posed by 
 Castells above, and yet, despite the fact that in terms of what it was able 
 to achieve it must surely rate as one of the most powerful social movement 
 networks so far, it has been singularly missing from academic social 
 analysis. My contribution here must take the form of supplying some new 
 original source material, largely in the form of personal narrative, 
 hopefully contributing towards such an eventual analysis.\n\nMy story is a 
 unique story, much of it not written down before. It is in many ways an 
 incredible story. But the fact remains that for over two years the Internet 
 work that played a backbone role in the creation of an extremely powerful 
 international network, inflicting hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth 
 of damage on port and shipping employers around the world, was the work of 
 two people, myself and Greg Dropkin. In this partnership, despite his later 
 work concerning use of the Internet for the labour movement, Dropkin made 
 clear that his job was to be that of a journalist and reporter. Although I 
 often consulted widely, ultimately all decisions concerning the handling of 
 the Internet communications network in support of the Liverpool dockers 
 were mine. Neither I nor Dropkin wanted it that way. We tried continuously 
 to involve the Liverpool dockers themselves in the use of the Internet. It 
 did not happen. Although, as a result of the success of the Liverpool 
 dockers’ website, several dockers’ organisations in various parts of 
 the world did themselves set up websites, generally through 
 Internet-knowledgeable sympathisers (Santos in Brasil, Amsterdam, Montreal, 
 Los Angeles, Sweden,\n\nAustralia); most of these websites eventually 
 disappeared after the defeat of Liverpool.\n\nOrigins: A message in a 
 bottle!\n\nShortly before the Liverpool dockers' dispute began, Greg Coyne 
 from the Merseyside Trade Union Centre, with the help of Jagdish Parikh, 
 who had been involved in developing the Institute for Global Communications 
 (IGC) in San Francisco, started a UK-based union email list called 
 union-d.\n\nWhen the Liverpool dockers' dispute began, we agreed on union-d 
 to start propagating information about the dispute as widely as possible on 
 any email lists that might reach support. One of the aspects of the 
 Liverpool strike that made it so suitable for using the Internet to gain 
 support was the tradition of internationalism that already existed amongst 
 the Liverpool dockers. They had built up some international contacts with 
 other dockworkers in the 1980s. They quickly set out to renew these and 
 were enthusiastic to establish new ones. Before the Internet work began 
 they were already in contact with dockworkers in Sweden and Spain, who both 
 gave solid support throughout the strike. Communication with these was 
 outside the Internet and took place through phone and fax directly from the 
 Merseyside Portworkers Shop Stewards Committee (MPSSC).\n\nAfter we started 
 distributing news about the strike on the email lists, the Liverpool 
 dockers told the local press that they were now "using the Internet" to 
 gain support for their strike. This produced an immediate response as to 
 "Where was their website?". At this time, I had been in discussions with 
 GreenNet, a mainly environmental movement Internet Service Provider, 
 concerning the possibility of starting a "LabourNet" website devoted to 
 supplying a "computer communications and news " service for the labour 
 movement. It was now agreed that I should launch LabourNet as website 
 support for the Liverpool dockers.\n\nThis centralised the Internet work 
 for the Liverpool dockers. From now on, information about the Liverpool 
 dispute for dissemination on the email lists was sent via me, with me 
 adding the information onto the website and referencing the website in 
 messages distributed through email.\n\nWe now tried to set up direct 
 communication between me and the dockers for them to supply the updates. 
 They had only a very vague idea of what the Internet was. They started to 
 fax me a mass of documents mostly totally unsuitable for inclusion.\n\nIt 
 was at this point that Greg Dropkin phoned me. He was working with the 
 dockers trying to get reports into various media channels, without much 
 success. There was a virtual blackout by press and TV. He had heard about 
 my efforts from the Labor Beat TV programme in Chicago. We immediately 
 formed a partnership that lasted for the rest of the dockers' dispute. He 
 met with dockers'\n\nrepresentatives virtually every day, discussed the 
 latest developments and news and then wrote them up for me to put on the 
 website and distribute via email. Soon we were running a daily Internet 
 news service for the dockers.\n\nBut was anyone reading it? Dropkin 
 characterised this period as “sending a strike message in a bottle”. 
 Would our news service begin to reach other dockworkers around the world? 
 The first clear sign that it had came when I received an email message from 
 Akinobu Itoh, General Secretary of the All Japan Dockworkers' Union, 
 informing me that his union was sending a 1 Million Yen donation to the 
 Liverpool strike fund.\n\nShortly afterwards the Maritime Union of 
 Australia contacted the MPSSC directly and invited them to send a 
 delegation to discuss the strike. They also had heard about it through the 
 Internet. The Liverpool men who went to Australia reported that by the time 
 they got there everyone they met seemed well informed about the dispute and 
 were already producing leaflets they had printed from the Internet.\n\nThe 
 next key development came in the form of an email message I received from 
 Robert Irminger, a young member of the Inland Boatmen's Union who worked on 
 the run from San Francisco's Fisherman's Wharf to Alcatraz. He had been 
 following the dispute on the Internet and would be passing through the UK 
 on a holiday shortly. He wanted to discuss how to give support and we 
 arranged to meet. We met in a pub in Cambridge and I gave him a pile of 
 literature about the dispute to take back to San Francisco.\n\nAfter 
 Irminger got back to San Francisco he contacted Jack Heyman, an 
 International Longshore Workers' Union (ILWU) Local 10 Executive Committee 
 member who was also at that time a ships inspector for the International 
 Transport Workers' Federation (ITF). The ITF is the international trade 
 union body for dockworkers, with most dockworkers unions affiliated. 
 Irminger showed Heyman how to use the Internet to read news about the 
 Liverpool dispute. He started at an opportune time. The ITF in the form of 
 its Communications Officer, Richard Flint, had written to me complaining 
 about what he insisted were false allegations on LabourNet concerning the 
 ITF's lack of support for Liverpool. I had published his communication for 
 public debate. Heyman immediately wrote to me privately. As an insider to 
 the ITF who had been present at internal meetings Flint had referred to, he 
 insisted the original allegation was correct. The public discussion 
 continued with Heyman guiding me from behind the scenes. Finally he became 
 so angry about some of the excuses Flint was making concerning the ITF's 
 role that he resigned his post as ITF inspector and joined the debate 
 publicly in a scathing attack on the ITF's lack of support for Liverpool. 
 Shortly afterwards he was delegated from the ILWU to come to the UK and 
 establish direct connections with the MPSSC.\n\nThis feature of private 
 insider communications was to become a permanent aspect of the Internet 
 network. Quite a lot of people emailed me wanting me to keep\n\ntheir 
 identity hidden, but saying they wanted to help support the strike. They 
 were often a source of invaluable inside information from trade unions, 
 port employers, shipping companies, etc. Eventually, Flint from the ITF 
 himself opened up a private discussion with me in which he indicated that 
 he wanted to work for LabourNet after the dispute was over.\n\nAfter these 
 first slow beginnings the Internet network really began to take off. 
 Dockworkers organisations from around the world began to make contact 
 expressing their support for the Liverpool men and in the case of Santos in 
 Brazil and Amsterdam brought their own particular battles concerning 
 similar issues to Liverpool into the arena. The underlying factor in these 
 disputes and the strong feeling of solidarity being generated with 
 Liverpool was clearly the worldwide decasualisation of port labour taking 
 place through globalisation. Through LabourNet, dockers around the world 
 were learning the similarities between the problems they were facing and 
 were developing a strong sense of international identity. The network was 
 resembling a classic case of what Castell's calls a “reactive” network 
 against globalisation. At the same time, besides portworkers, we were also 
 attracting wider layers around the dispute. Support networks and groups 
 were being set up in many parts of the world and were writing to me asking 
 to be kept in the loop. Other already existing organisations were also 
 contacting to express their support. Many of these were from the 
 traditional labour movement, but support was also coming in from sections 
 of the new social movements.\n\nDays of Action\n\nBut the big question now 
 was could this support be translated into international action in support 
 of Liverpool?\n\nAn international day of action was called for January 20th 
 1997. I put out the appeal for action via LabourNet. It was addressed to 
 “dockers of the world” in five languages calling on them to “blockade 
 Liverpool on January 20th”. Once again, it was Itoh of the All Japan 
 Dockworkers' Union that made the first response . He wrote to me promising 
 to close every port in Japan, more than 50 he said, with “stop work 
 meetings” of Japanese port workers. I immediately sent this through to 
 Heyman. A couple of days later he emailed me back saying the Japanese 
 decision “was going down really big here”. But he asked me a question I 
 just couldn't understand. How many hours were the Japanese stopping for - 
 “8, 16 or 24”? This did not make sense to me. How could a meeting last 
 more than about an hour?\n\nWhat I did not understand was that, because of 
 the US contract system, US portworkers were bound by a no-strike clause, 
 making it illegal for them to strike. They got around this periodically by 
 having “stop work meetings” about a grievance. After the meeting they 
 went home without working, so this amounted\n\nin practice to being an 8 
 ,16 or 24 hour strike, depending on how many different shifts of workers 
 were included.\n\nBy now, through ILWU control of the hiring halls, printed 
 versions of LabourNet news were being posted regularly at the point where 
 men signed on for work all down the US West Coast. They were interpreting 
 the Japanese decision as being for at least an 8 hour strike!\n\nThere now 
 followed a sharp discussion within the ILWU about what action they should 
 take in support of Liverpool. At first, the top leadership tried to propose 
 taking only token action, saying it was sad, but very little support was 
 coming in internationally. But they were shouted down by portworkers armed 
 with the Japanese decision. Various opposition factions to the leadership 
 within the ILWU began to jump on the bandwagon demanding real action for 
 Liverpool. The first clear decision, and it was for a 24 hour stoppage, 
 came from the Seattle longshoremen. Stoppages were then eventually agreed 
 in all US West Coast ports.\n\nAfter the ILWU decisions, I began to be 
 flooded with messages from portworkers, support groups, etc pledging 
 various actions. The ITF had decided to support the action from the 
 beginning. But it immediately had a problem. The press started approaching 
 it asking for details of the latest news on what actions were going to be 
 taken. The ITF could not tell them. They wanted to give the appearance of 
 being in charge of events, but the information channels were bypassing them 
 completely. Flint now wrote to me what amounted to a begging letter, asking 
 to be kept informed of developments. I contacted the MPSSC concerning this 
 and received the humorous reply “Tell him we'll show him ours, if he will 
 show us his!”. They were referring to the fact that the ITF appeared to 
 have done nothing itself towards the actions. I wrote back to Flint asking 
 for him to outline what actions the ITF were bringing about. He claimed 
 they were going to stop the US East Coast, where there was a different 
 union from the ILWU. I duly reported this on LabourNet in a summary of 
 promised actions issued just before the day of action. I later received 
 disappointed emails from support groups who had gone to take part in the 
 supposed actions at the East Coast ports only to find them working 
 normally!\n\nEveryone knew the ILWU action was the big one. Because of the 
 time difference, the Liverpool men were waiting eagerly on the afternoon of 
 the day of action to hear whether they had actually succeeded in shutting 
 down the entire US West Coast. I was in contact with them by mobile phone 
 with instructions to check my email every five minutes. But most of the 
 people who would inform me were busy ensuring the stoppage took place. We 
 got well past the time it should have started and the Liverpool men were 
 getting impatient. At this point, I decided to start watching CNN on my TV 
 via satellite to see if any news came in that way. I was watching this 
 whilst checking my email regularly when suddenly I did get the news from 
 CNN, but via email! I received a message from their San Francisco newsdesk. 
 San Francisco port had stopped work – could I explain to them what 
 was\n\n\nhappening? They only had video footage of Tilbury docks in London 
 - was this relevant? Could I get them relevant material within 45 minutes 
 for their next news broadcast? I contacted the San Francisco Labor Video 
 Project, who rushed video footage they had of the Liverpool men to the CNN 
 studio, where it was just in time for the news broadcast.\n\nThis was one 
 of the very few news items from the mainstream media concerning the day of 
 action. Actions took place in 27 countries at more than 100 ports and 
 cities, resulting in what one international union official, Jim Catterson 
 from the International Federation of Chemical, Energy and General Workers' 
 Unions, described to myself and Heyman as being “the biggest 
 international working class action for 100 years”. Yet there was an 
 almost total news blackout from mainstream media. The effect of this was to 
 further build readership of LabourNet as a daily source of information not 
 available elsewhere. Other alternative media sources also tried to fill the 
 gap by producing videos, etc about the action.\n\nThe success of this first 
 day of action caused major tensions within the ITF. Although the ITF had 
 nominally supported this first international day of action, it was obvious 
 that it was not at all in control of it. In the period following the day of 
 action, David Cockcroft, the General Secretary of the ITF, acknowledged 
 that the Liverpool dockers had shown “the tremendous power of the 
 Internet”, but stressed the need to “harness” this power. At the same 
 time, the leadership of the Liverpool men's own union, the Transport and 
 General Workers' Union (TGWU), were increasingly dismayed at the widespread 
 international support they were gaining, as the union was trying to impose 
 a settlement of the dispute that would mean the men being paid a cash sum 
 to accept the loss of their jobs.\n\nThings came to a head in the 
 preparations for a second day of action. Cockcroft wanted the ITF to 
 support this second day, whilst wishing to find some formula whereby the 
 ITF could take the credit for it. The TGWU vetoed this and insisted that 
 the ITF should not support the action. It made little difference – if 
 anything it was bigger than the first – and this time it closed down all 
 the American West Coast ports from Alaska, through Canada, down to Los 
 Angeles. A sign of the flexibility the dockers' network had now acquired 
 was the fact that the actual date of this second day of action was kept 
 quiet until the last moment except to those who needed to know. As with the 
 first day of action, it included a mix of dockers actions and a range of 
 activities by various supporting groups around the world.\n\nAll this was 
 further proof that the official union structures had lost control of the 
 dispute. They were being bypassed by an international network, with the 
 Internet as its backbone, that was directly under the control of the 
 Liverpool shop stewards committee. In the period leading up to this second 
 day of action a number of union officials at various levels within the ITF 
 opened up private contact with me expressing their disgust at the failure 
 of the ITF to support the action and declaring their own personal 
 support.\n\nThe Neptune Jade actions\n\nThe US West Coast support for 
 Liverpool in the days of action had been solid. The MPSSC now discussed 
 with sections of the ILWU how that support might be used in further 
 actions. The big problem was that no ships from Liverpool actually sailed 
 to the US West Coast. A plan was made that widened the target. Ships did 
 sail from Thamesport in London to the US West Coast. The Port Authority for 
 Thamesport was Medway Ports Limited, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the 
 Mersey Docks and Harbour Company, which the Liverpool dockers were in 
 dispute with. On the strength of this it was decided to target a ship from 
 Thamesport, the Neptune Jade, for boycott action.\n\nAs pointed out 
 earlier, the ILWU is bound by contract not to take strike action and, of 
 course, this applies to boycott actions, too. In the early 80s, however, 
 this problem was circumvented quite cleverly in a boycott action against a 
 South African cargo in a protest against apartheid. The person who came up 
 with the idea then for a legal way to carry out a boycott was a 
 longshoreman called Howard Keylor. A picket was set up, made up of 
 anti-apartheid students at Berkeley University. The longshoremen then 
 refused to cross the picket line on the grounds that it was “a threat to 
 their health and safety” to do so. For a while this worked, though Keylor 
 was ultimately threatened by the employers with a lawsuit for a massive sum 
 of money, which forced an end to the action.\n\nKeylor was now retired and 
 living in Hamburg, but he had made contact with me very early on in the 
 Liverpool dispute, offering whatever support he could give. It was now 
 decided to re-employ his method of bringing about a boycott, using it 
 against the Neptune Jade.\n\nFor three days at the end of September 1997, 
 supporters of the Liverpool dockers in the San Francisco community 
 maintained a picket against the Neptune Jade, docked at Oakland. 
 Longshoremen refused to cross the picket on grounds of health and safety. 
 An independent arbiter was called in, who ruled that their grounds were 
 legitimate. After the Pacific Maritime Association failed to obtain a 
 temporary restraining order against the picket, the Neptune Jade left 
 Oakland without unloading.\n\nCrew members had indicated that it was bound 
 for Japan. Upon being informed of this, Itoh immediately assured me that it 
 would not be unloaded there. However, there was a suspicion that it might 
 still try to unload its cargo somewhere along the American coast. Alerts 
 were put out appealing to supporters along the US West Coast, Canada and 
 Mexico to watch out for it. On October 4th, it turned up in Vancouver. A 
 new community picket was quickly organised and Vancouver longshoremen, also 
 members of the ILWU, refused to cross it.\n\nThe ship eventually did 
 proceed on to Japan without unloading its cargo. It arrived in Yokohama on 
 October 15th, where dockworkers refused to unload its\n\nThamesport cargo. 
 It then proceeded on to Kobe where again it was unable to unload the 
 Thamesport containers.\n\nThis action terrified the shipping companies even 
 more than the days of action had. The losses to a shipping company through 
 carrying containers around the world without being able to unload them can 
 be horrific. It is believed the Neptune Jade was ultimately sold off 
 somewhere in East Asia, together with its Thamesport cargo, rather than 
 making the return trip to the UK.\n\nAfter the Neptune Jade boycott, 
 meetings of lawyers and shipping company representatives took place in the 
 US where attention was drawn to the role of the LabourNet website. I 
 received an email message from a representative of Thamesport claiming I 
 had spread false information which caused them serious damage, but no 
 further action followed.\n\nBut if I was in the clear, Irminger and Heyman 
 were not. The Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) launched a lawsuit against 
 both of them for damages, potentially for millions of dollars. In addition, 
 they sought a jail sentence for Irminger after he refused to name others 
 involved in the Neptune Jade actions. The MPSSC called on dockworkers 
 throughout the world “to join in Irminger's defense just as they have 
 acted in support of Liverpool”. Eventually the lawsuits were dropped 
 after the ILWU indicated to the PMA that it would not conclude another 
 contract with the PMA until they were.\n\nYet the most powerful network the 
 labour movement has created in the age of the networked information society 
 was to be destroyed from within its own ranks. Suddenly, out of the blue, 
 on 26th January 1998, the MPSSC announced the dispute was over, because of 
 “very important and significant developments which made it more or less 
 impossible to continue”. These developments were never publicly spelled 
 out, but they are believed to have involved virtual blackmail from the TGWU 
 that might have involved older dockworkers with a lifetime on the docks 
 losing both redundancy payments and pension rights.\n\nThere was enormous 
 shock throughout the support network following this announcement. Although 
 dockworkers websites had begun to sprout up elsewhere, most of these soon 
 disappeared. The dockers' network had relied on a central authority, the 
 MPSSC, for its existence. LabourNet still had a very big readership 
 internationally amongst dockworkers, but it had lost its central 
 focus.\n\nThe potential for a new focus arose shortly afterwards, in April 
 1998, when Patrick Stevedores in Australia sacked its entire union 
 workforce of 1400 dockworkers. There followed a major confrontation with 
 Australian dockworkers which the dockworkers eventually won with much of 
 the Liverpool support network playing an important international support 
 role. However, coinciding with the beginning of the Australian dispute, 
 LabourNet, with the largest readership of dockworkers around the world, was 
 put out of action and disappeared for a couple of weeks when its Internet 
 Service Provider GreenNet was hacked. Within days of it coming\n\nback on 
 line, GreenNet was then threatened with court action over an article on the 
 LabourNet website. I could not help feeling that someone out there did not 
 like us!\n\nSome ethical questions\n\nThe MPSSC was part of a long 
 tradition of democratic rank-and-file control of union structures that had 
 been a central feature of the historical growth of trade unions in Britain. 
 Throughout the 70s and 80s, this strong democratic tradition came under 
 increasing attack. The full-time paid union officials sought to "modernise" 
 union structures by tearing up the old union rulebooks and imposing much 
 less democratic structures that were firmly under their own 
 control.\n\nSome of the tensions that existed between the MPSSC and the 
 TGWU leadership undoubtedly reflected this wider context. My own background 
 when I started the Internet work for the dockers was as a trade union 
 activist within the lay structures. I had served twice on the National 
 Committee of my own union, where I had been actively involved in resisting 
 attempts from full-time officials to encroach on the longstanding 
 democratic traditions of the union.\n\nInitially, I saw my Internet work 
 for the dockers within this context. I was convinced at the time of the 
 universally democratising effect the Internet would have, and saw it as a 
 strong weapon for reasserting democratic rank-and-file control of union 
 structures, not only in the UK, but internationally.\n\nThere can be little 
 doubt that the Liverpool dockers' fight did become a rallying point within 
 the international labour movement for those seeking to defend union control 
 by rank-and-file members against what appears to be a universal 
 international trend towards curbing this. However, in other ways, things 
 did not come out the way I expected. As time went on, I began increasingly 
 to doubt whether the Internet has an intrinsic democratising effect per 
 se.\n\nMuch of this doubt concerned my own role. Initially I had seen this 
 role as simply being one of providing a medium through which the dockers 
 could get their message around the world. However, I became more and more 
 aware as time went on that what I did or did not do was having a powerful 
 effect on events. The building and development of a network does not just 
 happen of its own accord. I found myself at the centre of a giant web of 
 interactions that required steering in certain directions if it was to 
 survive and continue to grow. It was not just a question of putting 
 everything I received onto the Internet. Where I sent what, what I chose to 
 emphasise, what I chose to hold back – all these were critical to the 
 life and expansion of the network.\n\nBringing about the closure of all 
 ports on the West Coast of the USA on the first international day of 
 action, for instance, involved me in intricate day-to-day email discussions 
 with rival factions of the ILWU. They were all communicating directly with 
 me, because each felt they might otherwise miss some vital piece 
 of\ninformation that the other factions could then use against them. 
 Deciding who to feed what information was a delicate question, and I 
 strongly believe the decisions I made played a key role in bringing about 
 the eventual stoppage at the West Coast ports.\n\nBut where did this put me 
 in terms of using the Internet to develop union democracy? I was not even a 
 member of the ILWU, let alone in any elected position, yet I appeared to be 
 playing a not inconsiderable role in determining its actions and 
 interfering in its internal politics.\n\nAnother issue that arose in this 
 first US West Coast stoppage in support of Liverpool further emphasised the 
 fact that building the power of the network required careful manipulation. 
 The first decision for a stoppage came from Seattle port. It was for 24 
 hours. Since San Francisco portworkers were regarded as being much more 
 militant than Seattle, it was assumed that it would be relatively easy to 
 get a similar decision there. It proved not to be so simple, however. The 
 majority of San Francisco longshoremen are black. Some of them began to ask 
 the question, "Where are the black Liverpool dockworkers?". The truth was 
 that there was not a single black Liverpool docker, despite the fact that 
 Liverpool has a large black population. The dockers had always operated a 
 highly restrictive practice that insisted on keeping dock jobs in the 
 family, passing them on from father to son.\n\nThe failure to produce a 
 black dockworker from Liverpool made getting a stoppage in San Francisco 
 much harder, and eventually the decision there was for 8 hours rather than 
 24 – a decision that then spread to Los Angeles as well. However, 
 salvation arrived before the second international day of action, after 
 dockworkers in Durban, South Africa, communicated to me that they had 
 participated in the first day of action by stopping work. The MPSSC 
 contacted them and obtained a statement from them that they were pleased to 
 support the Liverpool men now in return for the support Liverpool had given 
 them in the fight against apartheid, a claim that was certainly at least 
 partially true. This statement was used to considerable effect in San 
 Francisco in preparations for the second day of action, and helped secure 
 the decision for a 24 hour stoppage at all American West Coast ports, 
 including Canada and Alaska.\n\nAnother important point where extremely 
 careful manipulation was necessary for the survival of the network came 
 when the MPSSC announced they were considering a deal whereby the sacked 
 dockworkers would be helped to set up their own company to compete for jobs 
 with the scabs, who were employed by a company called Drakes. It seems that 
 talks between the TGWU and the MPSSC on such a settlement had been taking 
 place in the background for some time – now they surfaced. The MPSSC 
 issued a statement trying to compare such a settlement with the agreement 
 the ILWU has for the control of the hiring halls. I knew the comparison was 
 absolutely absurd. The fight to control the port hiring halls on the US 
 West Coast had been a major historic battle of US labour. Workers had 
 been\n\nshot dead in this battle. The deal cooked up by the TGWU was 
 something else entirely. I knew that if I simply distributed the MPSSC 
 statement it would be seen as a sell-out of the strike, particularly by the 
 West Coast longshoremen, and was likely to collapse the international 
 support network. I emailed Heyman and Keylor and explained the situation to 
 them. I then rifled through the books on my bookcase to find more on the 
 history of the ILWU battle to control the hiring halls. I found a detailed 
 account in the book, Strike!, by Jeremy Brecher. I accompanied the MPSSC 
 statement with an excerpt from this account, and announced that LabourNet 
 was initiating a debate on whether any comparison could be made between the 
 TGWU deal the MPSSC was considering and the ILWU hiring halls agreement. 
 Keylor was already preparing a lengthy contribution to such a 
 discussion.\n\nMeanwhile Heyman had contacted leading members of the MPSSC 
 directly, warning them that the TGWU deal would be seen by the 
 international support network as a complete betrayal of the strike. He 
 eventually convinced them of this. Further public statements on the deal 
 were avoided by the MPSSC, and the original statement was left as a 
 debating point on LabourNet, accompanied by Keylor's reply.\n\nThis 
 episode, however, revealed clearly that there was a considerable contrast 
 between the MPSSC as it was in reality and the portrayal of it that was 
 necessary to maintain and build the international network. The MPSSC knew 
 that its unprecedented international support was the strongest card it had 
 in its negotiations with both the TGWU and the employers, but, as any trade 
 union organisation would, it was using it to try to negotiate the best deal 
 it could get. That deal might prove to be one that would appear as totally 
 unacceptable to the international support network.\n\nWhen I started 
 LabourNet I had a rather vague underlying idea of the Internet as being 
 something like the conception of the public sphere propagated by Habermas 
 and Arendt. I thought its potential for free debate and discussion would 
 lead towards closer approximations to “the truth”. From the above 
 developments I was now becoming more and more conscious that I was heavily 
 involved in manufacturing a myth – an idealised version of the MPSSC for 
 international consumption. Without this myth, the network would 
 collapse.\n\nThis situation was troubling me greatly. In effect, I felt 
 that the network was controlling me. It was achieving some incredible 
 results - beyond my wildest dreams. But it had rules of its own that I had 
 to conform to and I was not sure that it was ethical to do so. Certainly I 
 wanted the dockers to win, but was this to be done at the expense of 
 dropping my original ideals of using the Internet to extend democracy and 
 propagate truth? Later I was to find that very similar issues surrounded 
 the Zapatista network, particularly through reading the account of its 
 development in Ronfeldt and Arquilla's “The Zapatista "Social Netwar" in 
 Mexico” (1998). There too, tensions clearly arose between the actuality 
 of the Zapatistas\n\npage7image1804064page7image1805632\nand the mythology 
 that was necessary to build an international network. I suspect the 
 manufacturing of the image came more from those who needed to keep the 
 network alive than from the Zapatistas themselves. But they quickly 
 realised that they needed the international network to survive and to be 
 able to negotiate with the Mexican government. They therefore acceded to 
 and cooperated with the myth producers responsible for building their 
 international support network.\n\nHow ethical is this myth-building by 
 those responsible for creating and developing a support network? I was 
 uneasy about it, but convinced myself that the intended aim justified the 
 means. No doubt those who worked on building the Zapatista network thought 
 similarly. But is there a difference in principle between using mythology 
 to build and sustain the dockers' network or the Zapatista network and 
 using it to build and sustain an Al-Qaeda?\n\nThe Internet first impressed 
 me as a democratising force through the role it played in the development 
 of the women's movement and the environmental movement. Since my work with 
 the dockers, I have also seen, and to a certain extent been involved in, 
 other powerful uses of the Internet in the fight for democracy. I am 
 thinking particularly of the extensive use of the Internet by the Korean 
 Confederation of Trade Unions, and the young activists that worked with it, 
 in the fight for democracy in South Korea. I later saw similar uses of the 
 Internet by Radio B92 and Belgrade students in the overthrow of Milo!evi" 
 in Serbia. Both of these reaffirmed for me the democratising potential of 
 the Internet.\n\nWhat is different about the types of network required by 
 the dockers, the Zapatistas, or for that matter Al-Qaeda, when compared 
 with many other clearly democratising networks? Why must they base 
 themselves on the creation of a mythology rather than approximating towards 
 a public sphere?\n\nI have looked at the difference between these types of 
 network and those of the new social movements elsewhere (Bailey: 1999). I 
 think the decisive issue is that they require a form of command structure. 
 By the nature of the tasks these networks set themselves, they cannot allow 
 individuals to simply make up their own minds about what actions they will 
 take as a result of the information they receive from the network. I 
 believe this contrasts sharply with the form the new social movement 
 networks take, where activities are far more spontaneous and 
 decentralised.\n\nIn describing the way the anti-globalisation movement 
 developed around use of the Internet, Castells says:\n\nBy using the 
 Internet, the movement did not need a centralized, command structure 
 invested with authority and decision-making power. (154)\n\nHe sees this as 
 the form of future globalized social movements:\n\nIt is a new political 
 culture: networking means no center, thus no central authority. (156)\n\nHe 
 then goes on to claim that the Zapatistas were the first to develop this 
 form later generalised by the anti-globalisation movement:\n\nIf the 
 Zapatistas were the first informational guerrillas, in the terms defined 
 above, the anti-globalization movement generalized this strategy to a whole 
 array of convergent struggles against the capitalist global order. 
 (156-157)\n\nI find this statement quite astonishing. Surely, the network 
 the Zapatistas developed did have a central authority, quite unlike the 
 form that later developed for the anti-globalisation movement in general. 
 Certainly the actions taken in support of the Zapatistas were taken at 
 local level and left to local initiative, but there was a central 
 authority, ultimately concentrated around building Subcomandate Marcos into 
 a legendary figure. The dockers network also left the deciding of actions 
 to local level. At first the MPSSC was calling for traditional labour 
 movement strikes and boycotts in its support. But it soon realised that 
 calling for “Days of Action” was more effective. Besides the 
 traditional labour movement strikes, these actions ultimately included such 
 things as demonstrations at British Embassies, occupation of a shipping 
 company office in Switzerland, a giant “Worker's Picnic” in New 
 Zealand, and the blockading of Victoria Station in London by Reclaim the 
 Streets. All of these local initiatives took place in response to a call 
 from a central authority. This authority was the MPSSC.\n\nIt is simply not 
 true that “networking means no center, thus no central authority”, as 
 Castells argues. Networks clearly can have a central authority. 
 International capitalist corporations themselves are examples of giant 
 networks that leave many decisions to local level, but nonetheless 
 certainly do have a central authority. And for some networks opposing them 
 and/or the effects of globalisation it is also essential to have a central 
 authority for the network to function. This was the case with both the 
 dockers' network and that of the Zapatistas, and it is certainly true of 
 Al-Qaeda too.\n\nI have argued elsewhere (Bailey: 1999) that a central 
 authority is essential for a labour movement network. But is it possible to 
 build an alternative, democratically-based command structure for a network 
 rather than basing its authority on mythology? I think it is this question 
 more than any other that will ultimately decide the fate of labour in a 
 globalized, networked world. Historically, the power of organised labour 
 has involved the masses in a way no other movement in history has. At the 
 heart of this involvement has been the issue of democracy. The masses 
 joined the movement of organised labour because, often for the first time 
 in their lives, they were given the right to make their voices heard in 
 deciding policies and direction. The authority that unions possessed to 
 call these masses out in powerful actions ultimately derived from this 
 fact.\n\nGlobalisation has undermined these democratic structures which 
 established social rights at the level of nation-states. In an attempt to 
 survive and hang on to their relevance as bargaining instruments with 
 employers and governments, unions around the world have become more 
 bureaucratised. They have viewed much of their old democratic structures as 
 being an expensive and outdated luxury that has had to be dispensed with. 
 Yet it is very clear that this is not solving their problems. They are 
 losing their mass base, and their bureaucratised and rigidly hierarchical 
 structures pose an insurmountable obstacle to them being able to adapt to a 
 globalized and networked Information Age. If unions are to re-establish 
 their relevance, they need to find a way to regain their former mass 
 democratic nature, but at an international rather than nation-state level, 
 and in forms that embrace the globalized and networked world we now live 
 in.\n\nReferences\nBailey, Chris (1999). The labour movement and the 
 Internet.\n\nhttp://lmedia.nodong.net/1999/archive/e39.htm\nCastells, 
 Manuel (1997). The Power of Identity, Vol. II of The Information Age: 
 Economy,\n\nSociety and Culture, Oxford: Blackwell.\nRonfeldt and Arquilla 
 (1998). The Zapatista "Social Netwar" in 
 Mexico.\n\nhttp://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR994/\n\nDownloaded from 
 EastBound / Journal / 2006 / 1 
 http://www.eastbound.info/journal/2006-1/\n\n\n 
 https://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2022/07/15/18851038.php
SUMMARY:Dockers Rebellion and Betrayal, The Lessons For Today of the Liverpool Dockers Strike
LOCATION:LaborFest On Line Event with link on laborfest.net 
URL:https://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2022/07/15/18851038.php
DTSTART:20220725T170000Z
DTEND:20220725T190000Z
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR
