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DESCRIPTION:2/29 Berkeley Conference In Berkeley: Unmasking the Bay Area Biolab and 
 Synthetic biology–Health, Justice and Communities at 
 Risk\n\nhttp://www.synbiowatch.org/2012/02/unmasking-bay-area-biolab-dialogue/\n\nLawrence 
 Berkeley National Lab and the Department of Energy plan to build a 
 high-profile experimental laboratory in Richmond.  While public 
 pronouncements tell us the lab will focus on “green” energy research, 
 the truth is more complex.\nA primary focus of the new lab will be 
 synthetic biology: an extreme form of genetic engineering that creates 
 self-replicating artificial life forms from synthesized DNA.  The 
 development of these high-risk genetic technologies is largely driven by 
 the oil, chemical, agribusiness, and pharmaceutical industries, the 
 military, and other federal agencies, in a rapid, high-profit commercial 
 race.  But the risks synthetic biology poses to worker safety, public 
 health, social justice, and the environment are poorly understood, and lack 
 adequate oversight, transparency or protections.\nJoin us for a 
 presentations and public dialogue on the expansion of the Lawrence Berkeley 
 National Lab, the dangers of synthetic biology, and the local and global 
 implications of this controversial industry.\nPresenters include:\n• 
 Nnimmo Bassey, Right Livelihood Award Winner (the Alternative Nobel Prize) 
 (Nigeria)\n• Maria José Guazzelli, Center for Ecological Agriculture 
 (Brazil)\n• California Coalition For Workers Memorial Day\n• Injured 
 Workers National Network\n• Andrew Kimbrell, Director, Center for Food 
 Safety\n• Jeremy Gruber, President, Council for Responsible Genetics\n• 
 Jim Thomas, ETC Group\n• International Center for Technology 
 Assessment\n• Global Justice Ecology Project\n“When scientific power 
 outruns moral power, we end up with guided missiles and misguided men.” 
 – Martin Luther King Jr.\nMarch 29th 2012\n7-9:30 PM\nDavid Brower 
 Center\n2150 Allston Way, Berkeley, CA 94704\n\nA Synthetic Biology Lab In 
 Berkeley\n\nhttp://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/GeneWatch/GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=346 
 \n\nA SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY LAB IN BERKELEY \nBy Jeremy Gruber, Tina Stevens, 
 Becky McClain \n\n\n\nIn April of this year, U.C. Berkeley researchers 
 announced the creation of the U. C. Berkeley Synthetic Biology Institute 
 (SBI), which will ramp up efforts to "engineer" cells and biological 
 systems.1 Part of its research will include experiments that insert 
 manufactured stretches of DNA into existing organisms to create new, 
 self-replicating artificial life forms-experiments that pose implications 
 for worker safety, public health and environmental safety. A collaboration 
 of university and industry, the SBI enterprise is designed to catapult 
 basic research into profit making applications. From a press release, "SBI 
 will be an important link in a constellation of research centers focused on 
 synthetic biology at UC Berkeley and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
 (LBNL), both of which have made the field a research priority. SBI is 
 unique in its planned collaborations with leading companies, designed to 
 translate leading research on biological systems and organisms efficiently 
 into processes, products, and technologies."2 \n\nWhere this extensive new 
 research will take place is a matter of some speculation. LBNL, managed by 
 U.C. Berkeley but funded by the Department of Energy, is seeking to open a 
 second campus somewhere in the East Bay, across from San Francisco. The new 
 facility hopes to combine three existing facilities presently scattered 
 throughout the cities of Berkeley and nearby Emeryville: the Joint 
 BioEnergy Institute, the Life Sciences Division, and the Joint Genome 
 Institute. Potential sites for a new campus include a number of locations 
 in the City of Berkeley itself.3 \n\nWhat do residents make of this idea? 
 Lawsuits have stymied LBNL's effort to expand into the region's Strawberry 
 Canyon watershed, described by activists as "a rich repository of 
 wildlife."4 Now concern over second campus proposals, which include 
 targeted locations along the west Berkeley shoreline, has centered on 
 issues of job creation, tax revenues, zoning, and predictions of rising sea 
 levels. It remains to be seen whether health and safety issues uniquely 
 associated with this research also will be raised. Do adequate safety 
 protections exist? Or are entirely new safety assessment and reporting 
 methodologies for this research required in order to safeguard worker, 
 public and environmental wellbeing? \n\nBiosafety level (BL) containment 
 labs are ranked from 1-4 according to the risk of harm they pose, with 
 increasing levels indicating increasing danger. Typically, BL1 labs perform 
 research on non-human infectious agents; BL2 labs use biological agents 
 that could infect humans but are assumed to cause only "moderate harm"; BL3 
 labs experiment with biological agents capable of killing humans but for 
 which there are known antidotes (like anthrax); and BL4 labs conduct 
 research using agents that could kill humans and for which there is no 
 known antidote. \n\nWhich safety lab levels will the new campus house? What 
 constitutes "moderate harm?" Will the citizenry of this densely populated 
 urban area know what pathogens are being used for research? Since academic 
 and private interests operate under different safety, liability, and 
 oversight restrictions, which research safety guidelines will apply? What 
 remedies will apply in the event of lab worker injury, or environmental or 
 public safety hazard? Will there be a public safety infrastructure 
 facilitating transparency and accountability? Is the patchwork of voluntary 
 regulatory guidelines from existing agencies adequate? \n\nA brief review 
 of just a few incidents of lab worker exposure to hazards suggests that 
 even current biolab regulation and oversight is not adequate. These include 
 Dr. Jeannette Adu-Bobie, who after visiting a New Zealand lab suffered a 
 meningococcal infection from a laboratory strain causing loss of both legs 
 and an arm; Ru-ching Hsia, a Department of Agriculture scientist who became 
 infected by laboratory E.coli strain and lapsed into a coma for a month;, 
 and University of Chicago scientist Malcolm Casadaban, who died after 
 unknowingly being infected with a laboratory plague bacterium.5 One of this 
 essay's co-authors, molecular biologist Becky McClain, won a whistle-blower 
 suit against pharmaceutical giant Pfizer after reporting public health and 
 safety concerns.6 She fell ill after an untrained lab worker used a human 
 infectious genetically engineered virus, without suitable biocontainment, 
 on McClain's personal workspace. She began experiencing periodic paralysis 
 and spinal pain, a result consistent with the DNA-coded effects that had 
 been engineered within the pathogen. Recently, researchers from the U.S. 
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that a University 
 of Illinois laboratory worker was infected by a genetically engineered 
 cowpox laboratory virus, one with which she had never worked. CDC 
 investigators not only found cowpox DNA in many areas around the lab, they 
 also discovered that supposedly harmless stocks of viruses had been 
 contaminated.7 Problematically, releases of laboratory bio agents are 
 difficult to track since exposures often are not visible to a worker who 
 succumbs to a mystery illness. Scientists can become ill from dangerous 
 biological exposures without knowledge of having endured an exposure. 
 \n\nPublic health also is a serious consideration. Severe acute respiratory 
 syndrome (SARS) killed nearly 800 people in 2003. Lab versions of the SARS 
 pathogen are known to have escaped BL 3 and BL 4 labs via infected lab 
 workers.8 And a few years ago, at Berkeley itself, workers handled deadly 
 Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever (which spreads in the air) without containment 
 when it was mislabeled as harmless.9 The U.S.'s 2001 anthrax scare10 and 
 the unknown source of the virulent, antibiotic-resistant strain of E.coli 
 that has recently infected thousands in Europe and, so far, killed 27 raise 
 serious questions about the effectiveness of tracking, as well as 
 accountability.11 \n\nThere is no central authority that coordinates 
 research and planning on synthetic biology. Even though synthetic biology 
 poses serious risks, there are no specific standards for determining threat 
 levels to humans, animals, plants, microorganisms or the environment. 
 Experiments involving the synthesis of completely novel synthetic DNA 
 sequences can make a harmless microbe into a new pathogen with dangerous 
 and far reaching consequences. There are very real concerns that synthetic 
 biology research could result in enhanced virulence, the ability to infect 
 a wider range of organisms, and resistance to antimicrobials, antivirals, 
 vaccines and other treatment or containment responses. As Jonathan Tucker 
 and Raymond Zilinskas explain in "The Promise and Perils of Synthetic 
 Biology," because synthetic microorganisms are self-replicating and capable 
 of evolution, they could proliferate out of control and cause environmental 
 damage and, if they escape from a research laboratory or containment 
 facility, threaten public health. For this reason, they pose a unique risk 
 unlike those associated with toxic chemicals or radioactive materials.12 
 Synthetic biology research also raises new issues regarding the degree to 
 which laboratory workers are prepared to engage in such research. Synthetic 
 biology is an interdisciplinary field, involving the activities of 
 chemists, engineers, physicists, and computer scientists as well as 
 biologists. Many practitioners in these fields have never had training, let 
 alone professional experience, in biosafety13. \n\nThe most recent issue of 
 GeneWatch featured Lynne Klotz's report on Boston University's feeble risk 
 assessment efforts, undertaken to assure Boston citizens that its lab, 
 which is likely to be conducting research on SARS and the deadly 1918 flu 
 virus, is acceptably safe.14 The University and the NIH claimed that 
 emergency simulations supported moving ahead with the desired research. The 
 National Research Council did not agree, concluding that "the model did not 
 appear to recognize biological complexities and reflect what is known about 
 disease outbreaks and other biological parameters."15 In other words, both 
 Boston University and the NIH had conducted a risk analysis that ignored 
 the most basic information actually needed to assess the lab's risks. This 
 cautionary tale should provoke additional public scrutiny of any new biolab 
 facility. Berkeley's City Council, as well as the governing entities of the 
 other Bay Area cities who want the lab, may want to keep track of what 
 unfolds in Boston-remembering that Boston, unlike the San Francisco Bay 
 Area, is not even on a major earthquake fault line. Considering the current 
 limitations of oversight and the problems of accountability of the various 
 public and private partners involved in the project, it is less than clear 
 what steps they are prepared to take in order to ensure the safety of any 
 new facility engaged in synthetic biology research. \n\nBoosters have 
 heavily promoted the theoretical benefits of synthetic biology to the 
 public and local officials. They need now to be much more forthcoming in 
 detailing the very real dangers attendant to such research, including 
 broadly publicizing comprehensive risk assessments. Potential neighbors, 
 and others who stand to be impacted by any facility conducting synthetic 
 biology research, deserve better from the University and its partners, and 
 from government representatives charged with protecting public health and 
 safety. \n\n\n\nTina Stevens and Becky McClain are board members of 
 Alliance for Humane Biotechnology. Jeremy Gruber is President of Council 
 for Responsible Genetics. \n\n\nEndnotes \n\n1. "Lab, Campus Collaborate in 
 Formation of Synthetic Biology Institute," Today at Berkeley Lab, April 21, 
 2011. 
 http://today.lbl.gov/2011/04/21/lab-campus-collaborate-in-formation-of-synthetic-biology-institute/; 
 Synthetic Biology Institute, University of California, Berkeley. 
 http://synbio.berkeley.edu/index.php?page=news-events \n\n2. "UC Berkeley 
 Launches Synthetic Biology Institute to Advance Research in Biological 
 Engineering," Agilent Technologies, April 19, 2011. 
 http://www.agilent.com/about/newsroom/presrel/2011/19apr-gp11012.html 
 \n\n3. "LBNL Announces Community Meetings on Second Campus at Berkeley 
 Chamber Forum," The Berkeley Daily Planet, June 8, 
 2011.http://www.berkeleydailyplanet.com/issue/2011-06-8/article/37958?headline=LBNL-Announces-Community-Meetings-on-Second-Campus-at-Berkeley-Chamber-Forum-News-Analysis 
 \n\n4. http://savestrawberrycanyon.org \n\n5. "A Higher Bar for Pathogens, 
 But Adherence Is an Issue," Andrew Pollock, NY Times, May 27, 2010. 
 ttp://http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/28/business/28hazardside.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Casadaban&st=cse 
 \n\n6. "A Roach in the Kitchen: Interview with Becky McClain," GeneWatch 
 March/April 2010, vol 23, Issue 2, 
 http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/genewatch/GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=248&archive=yes 
 \n\n7. "First U.S. Cowpox Infections: Acquired from Lab Contamination," by 
 Sarah Reardon, Science Insider February 17, 2011. 
 http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2011/02/first-us-cowpox-infection-acquired.html?ref=ra 
 \n\n8. "SARS in the City," by Lynn C. Klotz, GeneWatch April/May 2011. 
 http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/genewatch/GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=337 
 \n\n9. "Texas A&M Bioweapons Accidents More the Norm than an Exception," 
 Sunshine Project July 2007. 
 http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/pr/pr030707.html . (accessed 
 3rd of July 2011). \n\n10. "Amerithrax or Anthrax Investigation" US Federal 
 Bureau of Investigation. 
 http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/anthrax-amerithrax/amerithrax-investigation 
 \n\n11. "German E. coli death toll rises further," CNN World June 9, 2011. 
 http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-09/world/europe.e.coli_1_ecoli-sprouts-sign-of-e-coli?_s=PM:WORLD 
 \n\n12 "The Promise and Perils of Synthetic Biology," Jonathan B. Tucker, 
 Raymond A. Zilinskas, The New Atlantis, Spring 2006. 
 http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-promise-and-perils-of-synthetic-biology 
 \n\n13 "Diffusion of Synthetic Biology: A Challenge to Biosafety," by 
 Marcus Schmidt Systems and Synthetic Biology Journal (June 2008). \n\n14 
 "SARS in the City," by Lynn C. Klotz, GeneWatch April/May 2011. 
 http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/genewatch/GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=337 
 \n\n15 National Research Council (2007). Technical Input on the National 
 Institutes of Health's Draft Supplementary Risk Assessments and Site 
 Suitability Analyses for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases 
 Laboratory, Boston University: A Letter Report, Washington, DC: National 
 Academies Press. http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12073. (accessed 
 3 July 2011). \n\n16. The authors acknowledge helpful comments from Stuart 
 Newman. \n\nDangers in Embryonic Stem Cell Research: Lack of Safety 
 Oversight and Lack of Worker Rights & Becky McClain 
 Presentation\n\nhttp://labornet.org/cgi-bin/ib/cgi-bin/ib.cgi?action=read&id=256\n\nSource	Becky 
 McClain\nDate	08/11/21/11:53\n\nDangers in Embryonic Stem Cell Research: 
 Lack of Safety Oversight and Lack of Worker Rights \nBy Becky McClain 
 \nwww.cpab.info \ndirector@cpab.info \n\nTHERE IS A SERIOUS problem in 
 embryonic stem cell research, a problem that affects every American 
 citizen, their safety and the safety of their children and the safety of 
 their children’s children in generations to come. It is such an alarming 
 problem that it should provide common concern even amongst Americans whose 
 views have become polarized within the current embryonic stem cell 
 controversy. It is a problem that has been unwittingly left out of the 
 embryonic stem cell debate for far too long, and one that we no longer can 
 afford to ignore. \nThis problem concerns dangerous recombinant (i.e. 
 genetically-engineered) technologies being employed and developed within 
 embryonic stem cell research, technologies that undeniably present a public 
 health threat if left unchecked. Specifically, the problem centers around 
 the lack of regulations and oversight in embryonic stem cell research with 
 the creation of new human infectious genetically-engineered agents, the 
 lack of worker rights in this industry and the repercussions from a 
 biomedical community rife with conflicts of interest, which altogether 
 present a serious public health threat. \nThe knowledge of this public 
 health threat, encompassing lack of safety regulations and oversight, lack 
 of scientist rights and impacts from deleterious conflicts of interest, 
 comes from first-hand experiences while working on embryonic stem cell 
 technologies as a career scientist within the research industry for 23 
 years. I have interacted with the biomedical community (i.e., government 
 agencies, academia and private industry) in regard to safety issues and 
 illnesses caused by exposures in an embryonic stem cell laboratory and 
 retaliation for bringing safety issues forward. Through these experiences I 
 have discovered bioethical and public safety issues which are being ignored 
 and kept from the public knowledge. These issues play a big part in 
 understanding the controversies associated with funding embryonic stem cell 
 research and need to be brought to the public’s attention. \nDangerous 
 technologies: With our current knowledge of molecular genetics combined 
 with the sophistication of recombinant DNA technologies, we now have the 
 scientific ability to easily create a variety of new human infectious 
 agents that are designed to cause a specific human disease in embryonic 
 stem cells through genetic engineering. In fact human infectious 
 genetically-engineered viruses are being used to create disease-state 
 embryonic stem cells in major academic and private research centers 
 throughout the United States for biomedical research, drug discovery and 
 biological “defense” purposes. Although it is somewhat troubling to 
 realize that these dangerous embryonic stem cell technologies are being 
 engaged for biodefense purposes, the majority of scientists, however, are 
 employing them to advance the understanding for medical cures or for drug 
 discovery. For example, in order to find a cure for a particular disease, a 
 scientist must first make an embryonic stem cell “sick” or 
 “diseased”. For this purpose genetically-engineered infectious viruses 
 are created and developed to target the destruction of specific genetic or 
 metabolic cellular processes and thus create a “defined” disease-state 
 embryonic stem cell. Despite the fact that these agents are being employed 
 for biomedical advances to help man-kind, these dangerous genetically 
 engineered agents that can be infectious to both humans and animals, pose a 
 serious public health threat by having the potential to contribute to new 
 emerging disease if released into the environment and not handled and 
 biocontained properly. \nOur current scientific ability to create new 
 infectious genetically-engineered microorganisms is remarkable and 
 powerful. And although this serves great purpose for exploratory research, 
 it also is obviously dangerous. For example, we now have the technical 
 ability to make viruses expand their infectivity range to other cellular 
 types and other species. One such technology that is currently being used 
 in this manner for a variety of research projects in embryonic stem cell 
 research is the HIV-derived lentivirus (yes, the one derived from the AIDS 
 virus). In order to ensure entry into embryonic stem cells, HIV 
 derived-lentiviruses have been genetically-engineered in the laboratory to 
 promiscuously extend the “tropism” (infectivity range) to other 
 species, as well as, to any cell type in humans, thus, providing this virus 
 with the ability not only to infect by blood to blood, but also expands 
 infection routes to inhalation and ingestion5. Increasing the infectivity 
 range of a virus through recombinant technologies is just one example of 
 how dangerous these genetic engineered technologies have evolved and 
 consequently how they obviously present a public health threat if not 
 regulated efficiently. \nIn addition to the dangers associated with our 
 ability to increase the infectivity range of a virus, we also have the 
 ability through standard recombinant technology to express any endogenous 
 or foreign gene product inside a human cell via the virus resulting in an 
 over expression of proteins or toxins that can cause metabolic disruption 
 or disease. And with our ability to express gene products through 
 recombinant technologies, we also have the ability to “silence” gene 
 products which is yet another mode to cause metabolic disruptions in human 
 cells. This “silencing” technology which is the product of the recent 
 scientific 2006 Nobel Prize is being harnessed in embryonic stem cell 
 research with the use of recombinant “molecular missiles”, called 
 shRNAs. These “molecular missiles” can be easily created in the 
 laboratory and cloned into viruses which then enables the virus to 
 “search and destroy” targeted human gene products in any cell that it 
 infects causing defined metabolic disorders to occur6. This “molecular 
 missile” technology, as well as, technologies which over express gene 
 products and toxins are standard tools used with embryonic stem cells to 
 specifically create human and animal cellular “metabolic disease” 
 models for research purposes. With the current ease and power of these 
 technologies to create new infectious human agents and with the ever 
 widening use of them in biomedical research laboratories throughout the 
 United States, it should not be difficult for the average American to 
 understand the public health threat that these present if not used, 
 biocontained or secured properly. \nA disturbing fact is that tracking 
 genetically engineered viruses and the effects from a “release” into 
 the environment is very difficult to assess. We unfortunately have no 
 comparable “Geiger counter” available to detect biological releases as 
 is used to detect harmful radiation release into the environment. Tracking 
 these biological releases and their effect is almost impossible, 
 strategically impractical and overtly expensive. This gives impetus for 
 some scientists to inaccurately state that these technologies are safe 
 because no harm has been detected to the general public since their 
 development and use. But the truth may be that a physician who sees an 
 atypical frequency of people in a small community with an unusual illness 
 such as pancreatic cancer and finds it to be a mystery, may in fact, be 
 seeing an illness possibly caused by a released genetically-engineered 
 virus. Just because we do not have the “practical” technology available 
 to track genetically-engineered infectious viruses and their effects, does 
 not mean that no harm has occurred from them. And although some scientists 
 might further argue that these viruses are “safe” because they are 
 engineered to infect but not replicate, there is no real guarantee to this 
 premise due to the promiscuity of viruses and their uncanny ability to 
 “recombine” or swap DNA (genetic material) with a variety of organisms, 
 providing the potential to create meaner, more resistant diseases or to 
 create new emerging diseases over time. In fact, such 
 genetically-engineered infectious viruses, when thought to be safe, 
 unfortunately, have killed people in “controlled” gene therapy clinical 
 trials7. \nI have seen first hand where infectious genetically-engineered 
 viruses were being developed without appropriate risk-assessments, were 
 being used by untrained personnel, were not being properly screened for 
 safe non-replicating infectious forms, and were not properly and safely 
 contained within a certified biological containment hood. The consequence 
 of all of this is release of these harmful agents into the environment. 
 This not only poses a threat to small populations of people that may be 
 exposed and become ill while unknowingly infected, but more seriously could 
 contribute to a devastating epidemic of new emerging diseases over time. 
 Many of these genetically engineered viruses contain “man-made” genetic 
 elements that are not found in nature and are specifically used to cause 
 genetic metabolic illnesses in humans or animals. Release of these 
 “artificial” genetic elements into the environment basically 
 accelerates the speed of evolution and thereby enhances the possibility and 
 probability of a new emerging disease. \nNo effective oversight: Through my 
 experience, I can assuredly tell you that the public’s safety is not 
 protected against accidental, negligent or intentional misuse of 
 genetically-engineered infectious agents developed for embryonic stem cell 
 research in biomedical research. OSHA, NIH and state public health agencies 
 that are responsible for laboratory safety practices within private and 
 academic laboratory research, have no effective oversight regarding the use 
 and biocontainment of dangerous recombinant (i.e. genetically-engineered) 
 technologies used in embryonic stem cell research. One of the problems is 
 that the OSH ACT1, which is the pertinent legislative frame work overseeing 
 laboratory practices, was written prior to the biotechnology boom. It is an 
 antiquated piece of legislation which was written mostly for chemical 
 safety and, therefore, holds little relevance to the advanced biological 
 technologies and laboratory practices being developed today. Secondly, 
 local government authorities currently do not have the expertise or funding 
 to effectively and knowledgably perform safety inspections within molecular 
 biology laboratories that work on “state of the art” embryonic stem 
 cell technologies. Thirdly, local government officials (i.e., Connecticut) 
 and their jobs are often intimately tied to state-run programs to promote 
 embryonic stem cell research which inherently provides unprecedented 
 conflicts of interest toward special interest groups and the biomedical 
 community2 and consequently, places public health policy secondary to the 
 “economic development” of the state. \nAnd although NIH sets 
 biocontainment “guidelines“ (not regulations)3,4 for academic 
 institutes that use federal funds for research involving recombinant 
 infectious agents, there is no effective oversight to enforce these 
 “guidelines”. Oversight is intra-institutional which of course is 
 analogous to the “fox guarding the hen house” and which, consequently, 
 does not provide incentive to protect workers, to publicize biocontainment 
 “accidents” or to prioritize public health and safety. \nEven more 
 alarming is that private industries, such as biotech and pharmaceutical 
 companies, which have no ties to federal funding are under no obligations 
 whatsoever to legally and safely biocontain dangerous agents used in 
 embryonic stem cell research since they are not under NIH jurisdiction or 
 any other state or federal law. Historically, employers do not protect 
 employees or prioritize public safety until compelled by law. Regulations 
 and oversight are seriously and dangerously lacking in this area of 
 research within private industry. This presents a real and serious public 
 health threat. \nNo employee rights in the biotech industry: Employees who 
 are exposed and become seriously ill from genetically-engineered infectious 
 agents have no rights to exposure records and materials for their medical 
 evaluation and treatment even after having physicians request this 
 information for their healthcare. Under the facade of “trade secrets”, 
 the biomedical community is refusing to advocate release of this 
 information, thus leaving no avenue for “exposed” employees to secure 
 appropriate healthcare and basically causing them to silently blend into 
 the woodwork unseen and unheard of. This of course, keeps the biomedical 
 community free of responsibility. It also keeps the public ignorant and 
 unfortunately, continues to promote the façade that biotechnology and 
 embryonic stem cell research are safe and carries no risk to the public. 
 \nIn addition to the lack of appropriate medical evaluation and care for 
 exposed employees, there are no laws that require the biotech and 
 pharmaceutical industry to provide a forum to address safety concerns from 
 scientists who work with these dangerous and emerging technologies. 
 Scientist can be halted and silenced within safety committees with no 
 recourse. Furthermore, there is no appropriate “whistleblower” law to 
 protect workers in biotech industry. Scientists can be “legally” 
 terminated after incurring biological exposures, subsequent illness and 
 encountering hostility after raising safety issues. And when there are no 
 adequate laws governing the safety practices of using embryonic stem cells 
 and emerging technologies, then there is no legal recourse no matter how 
 indecent this industry behaves. This is a clever way to continue to keep 
 the public ignorant about the risks and dangers to public safety in an 
 effort to self-promote this field of embryonic stem cell research. It also 
 gives the biomedical industry free reign to develop dangerous technologies 
 without the responsibility to safely use them, to protect against 
 environmental release and to protect the public health. The lack of laws 
 and lack of effective oversight in embryonic stem cell research equals a 
 threat to public health and safety and serves as a dangerous precedent with 
 today’s use of sophisticated genetically engineered agents. \nConflict of 
 interest: Although I have compassion for Michael J. Fox and the suffering 
 he endures from his illness, the face and the posture of the biomedical 
 community involved in embryonic stem cell research are far from the 
 altruistic and life-saving community that he portrays. The reality of the 
 situation is that embryonic stem cell research in America is driven by 
 money and power and, unfortunately, not by the altruistic desire to heal 
 the general public of Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s disease. Like it or 
 not, this is the way of the world. The world of embryonic stem cell 
 research is no different. Embryonic stem cell research is a money driven 
 business. \nThe consequence of this money driven industry leads to a web of 
 conflicts of interest resulting in a lack of real effective oversight in 
 areas involving money allocation, patent royalty, medical ethics and 
 women’s health issues10. It also leads to distorted public awareness of 
 the true benefits that this research can provide resulting in a reckless 
 frenzy to fund this research without first addressing these critical 
 ethical issues. \nEven more concerning is that academia and certain 
 government agencies are so entrenched in large monetary interests to 
 develop embryonic stem cell research with the pharmaceutical industry that 
 there is no longer a group that is free of conflicts of interest to first 
 protect and advocate for the public health and safety8,9. The lack of 
 appropriate funding of both government-oversight agencies and basic 
 academic research has resulted in an unhealthy monetary relationship to 
 powerful pharmaceutical companies to the degree that public health issues 
 are being ignored especially regarding the containment of dangerous 
 genetically engineered technologies, as well as, to worker’s rights for 
 medical exposure records and medical treatment. It is ironic that on one 
 hand, the biomedical community promotes embryonic stem cell research as the 
 future “cure all” to a variety of horrendous human diseases, but then 
 on the other hand, refuses to advocate basic human rights and medical care 
 to workers incurring occupational exposures from the very technologies they 
 promote. This is a tell-tale sign of the integrity of this community and an 
 unfortunate product of the conflicts of interest within this community. The 
 biomedical community continues to hide and ignore the risks that embryonic 
 stem cell technologies impose upon public health to promote their own 
 agenda and to keep their investments safe. Education within medical schools 
 and university settings regarding these technologies is lacking, keeping 
 community physicians, local legislators and the general public in complete 
 ignorance concerning these dangers. Unfortunately, when the biomedical 
 community is entrenched in large monetary interests to develop embryonic 
 stem cell research within an environment with no effective oversight and no 
 legal responsibility, the consequences will be that public health issues 
 will fall by the wayside. \nImmediate regulations needed: The ease and 
 power to manipulate the genetic characteristics of the embryonic stem cell 
 through recombinant technologies holds much promise for biomedical 
 advances, but unfortunately it is dangerous and becoming more dangerous 
 with unregulated use. Scientists involved in human embryonic stem cell 
 research know very well that embryonic stem cell technology holds little 
 promise to find cures for illnesses in any near future. The lack of 
 scientific breakthroughs in developmental biology pertaining to the 
 “differentiation” of the human embryonic stem cell into therapeutic 
 cell types, remains the weak link, and thus provides severe limitations to 
 any therapeutic advancement in the near future or even far-off near future. 
 Therefore, the rush to promote and fund human embryonic stem cell research 
 without first implementing appropriate laws and oversight to regulate the 
 use of dangerous recombinant technologies is not in the best interests of 
 the public’s health and safety. \nThe adoption of new regulations that 
 would ensure appropriate oversight to public safety and worker’s rights 
 might also fortuitously serve as a template for creating appropriate 
 bioethical oversights within embryonic stem cell research which is a 
 concern for many Americans today as well. With the muscle and influence of 
 the biomedical industry at present, however, it remains doubtful if the 
 current administration or any new future administration at this point will 
 be powerful enough to implement effective protections or oversights unless 
 funding is used as leverage for change. Therefore, I unconditionally 
 support President Bush’s veto on any legislation which advocates any 
 funding or “loosening of restrictions” toward embryonic stem cell 
 research. \nTimes have changed since the famous Asilomar Conference in 1975 
 where scientists met to mitigate the perceived risks posed by the newly 
 discovered power of recombinant DNA technologies. Now after thirty years 
 and subsequent prevailing advancements, the threats of using recombinant 
 DNA technologies are no longer perceived but real. Accidental, negligent or 
 targeted release of infectious genetically-engineered microorganisms that 
 cause “disease” in embryonic stem cells can harm the public. Laws 
 providing protection to the public health relating to the control and use 
 of these dangerous recombinant technologies are out-dated or non-existent, 
 triggering the activation of a time-bomb for an inevitable catastrophic 
 event. Economic factors have also changed the way the government, academia 
 and the pharmaceutical industry interact, creating deleterious “conflicts 
 of interests” amongst this biomedical community and a scientific culture 
 where economic self-interest inherently dominates over public safety and 
 worker’s rights. The combination of our current economic culture, 
 scientific advancements and lack of laws have made embryonic stem cell 
 research increasingly dangerous to the point that millions of lives can be 
 tragically affected by one simple careless mistake or even by an 
 intentional act. These critical issues have been completely left out of the 
 embryonic stem cell equation. Congress should act responsibly and 
 prioritize public health and safety by implementing effective and 
 enforceable regulations that address these issues before endorsing any 
 further funding or lessening restrictions toward embryonic stem cell 
 research. \nIf we remain irresponsible and continue to ignore the fact that 
 dangerous embryonic stem cell technologies have the potential to create 
 emerging disease and catastrophic pandemics, but nevertheless continue to 
 promote embryonic stem cell research without first implementing effective 
 oversight, we inevitably will face an ugly monster and a public health 
 crisis costing us a higher price than one can imagine for generations to 
 come. Despite the hope and potential that embryonic stem cell research may 
 bring to biomedical advancements, unfortunately, within today’s 
 scientific and regulatory environment, it currently poses a greater 
 devastating health and safety risk to mankind than any perceived future 
 medical benefit. It is a risk that the public should not have to tolerate. 
 \n\n1. OSH Act: 
 www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owasrch.search_form?p_doc_type=OSHACT \n2. Stem 
 Cell Gold Rush: State Board Rife With Conflict by Jesse Reynolds, Hartford 
 Courant, August 20, 2006 \n3. Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical 
 www.cdc.gov/OD/ohs/biosfty/bmbl4/bmbl4toc.htm\n4. NIH guidelines for 
 research involving recombinant DNA molecules 
 www4.od.nih.gov/oba/rac/guidelines/guidelines.html \n5. Safety 
 Considerations for Retroviral Vectors: A Short Review, Dr. Donald E. 
 Mosier, TSRI Institutional Biosafety Committee Chair; DMosier@scripps.edu 
 www.sf.med.va.gov/e3/image-library/research/forms/Biosafety/safety.pdf \n6. 
 Lee, JS et. al., 2004, Stable Gene Silencing in Human Monocytic Cell Lines 
 Using Lentiviral-delivered Small Interference RNA J. Biol. Chem., Vol. 279, 
 Issue 10, 9379-9388, \n7. Marshal, Eliot, 2000. Gene Therapy on Trial, 
 Science 288:951-957 \n8. Academic public private partnership program (ap4) 
 deainfo.nci.nih.gov/concepts/AP4conceptU54.htm \n9. Secretive Biodefense 
 Legislation Moves Forward: Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act ( (S. 
 3676), www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/3598/1/1?TopicID=1 \n10. Jesse 
 Reynolds, “Stem Cell Gold Rush: State Board Rife With Conflicts” 
 Hartford Courant 8/20/06 \n\nCopyright March 10, 2007---not to be published 
 without author’s written permission.\n\nThe "Nightmare at Pfizer "- 
 Injured Biotech Worker Becky McClain Speaks at 2009 April 28, 2009 SF 
 Workers Memorial Day \nhttp://blip.tv/file/2061380\n\nPfizer Biotech Stem 
 Cell Researcher Becky McClain Reports On Health And Safety Dangers In The 
 Biotech Industry.\nThe Nightmare at Pfizer:  Injured Biotech Worker, 
 Molecular Biologist Becky McLain,  Speaks at San Francisco Workers’ 
 Memorial Day, April 28, 2009\n \nI want to thank you very much.  I’m very 
 honored to be here today to speak at Workers Memorial Day, to honor those 
 who have been killed or injured or disabled on the job.  I want to 
 especially thank you Steve [Zeltzer] because biotechnology and 
 nanotechnology and these advanced emerging technologies are subjects the 
 public doesn’t know much about. So bravo to you for bringing this issue 
 forward.  I really do appreciate that. \n \nI’m here basically to share 
 my concerns about serious public health and safety issues and about 
 workers’ rights issues, especially those that exist in embryonic stem 
 cell technologies and basic laboratories that are using genetically 
 engineered viruses and other genetic recombinant DNA technologies.  These 
 laboratories are run using these advanced technologies without any 
 regulatory oversight. The dangers are being hidden from the public.  I 
 think it is time to convince the public of the dire need for health and 
 safety protections for both the workers and the public.\n \nNow I’m a 
 molecular biologist.  I have 23 years of research experience and a 
 Master’s degree from the University of Texas School of Public Health and 
 a Biology degree [Becky: Is that a B.A. or an M.A. in biology?] from 
 Indiana University.  I said I’m a molecular biologist.  I don’t know if 
 any of you know what that is.  People confuse it with microbiologist a lot. 
  But a molecular biologist studies the cell on a molecular level, 
 manipulating DNA or RNA using assays of genetics, and analytical assays and 
 cloning.  You’ve heard the word “cloning,” I think.\n \nI have a 
 broad range of research experience in neurobiology, developmental biology, 
 human genetic disorders, vaccine design, and embryonic stem cell 
 technologies.  And that’s where I was injured. I was injured [while 
 working with] embryonic stem cell technologies at a Pfizer lab in Groton, 
 Connecticut.  I was employed there for nine years.  During the latter part 
 of my time there, from 2000 through 2004 I worked in mouse embryonic stem 
 cell technologies, and I was a member of the safety committee.  And as a 
 member of the safety committee I saw rather interesting unsafe work 
 practices and unsafe working conditions.  For example, people found a virus 
 where we eat and drink.  It was a contained virus, but where we would go 
 and eat lunch, there was a genetically engineered virus.  We had problems 
 with reporting out blood samples:  human blood samples and monkey blood 
 samples.  And then a story was reported to me from this lady who had 
 finished her lunch and she found a micro-centrifuge tube at the bottom of 
 her Coke.  Now as a safety committee member, I really knew the importance 
 of documenting these things. \n \nMost of our problems were a result of the 
 design of our department.  Remember I was working a Pfizer,  but we had 
 offices inside our laboratory at a computer, and also our department break 
 room was in the hallway where there was a working hallway. So this was 
 reasonably unsafe, because during times we couldn’t have personal 
 protection—of course when you work with biologicals  you wear gloves 
 because you can get contaminated.  So at times when you’d eat and drink 
 there would be people walking around with biologicals or isotopes so it 
 presented a problem.  Some of Pfizer’s management’s  response was a 
 little bit odd.  For example, one time I brought up an issue  that there 
 were some carcinogens where we eat and drink.  I  brought it up to this 
 manager and said , “Hey, we need to work out this situation.”  He said, 
 “Well I was in graduate school and I had my hands in this and I don’t 
 have cancer yet.”  And there were these other kind of off-handed 
 remarks—of course they were inappropriate—but I thought it was very 
 bizarre.  If I’m a manager, and someone came up and said that to me, I 
 would try to remedy it as much as I can.\n \nSo I thought, “Is there a 
 money issue here with upper management?”  Basically I tolerated it for 
 awhile, then a building blew up at Pfizer.  The roof came off, the 
 neighborhood was evacuated and it was a safety issue, so I thought, “Well 
 hey, this is a time to go to upper management and discuss these issues 
 about unsafe work practices in biotechnology.  So I just wrote a letter and 
 I said, “Could you explain the safety budget a Pfizer in response to 
 these unnecessary risks that you’re  putting people through  with our 
 offices inside the labs?”\n \nThey met with me finally after four 
 months,and this is what they told me: they basically said that  under OSHA 
 standards it’s legal.  Your unsafe work environment is legal.  They said, 
 “This is how it’s run.  Pfizer’s safety budget is based on what is 
 legal, and not necessarily on what is safe.”  Several other departments 
 had similar problems.  (She was the head of environmental health and 
 safety.  She apologized.  She said, “I’m sorry, but that’s how 
 Pfizer’s run.” \n \nIn 2002 we had a mystery illness in the embryonic 
 stem cell laboratory, where several people were becoming ill.   There was 
 vomiting, nausea, or headaches.  And it happened over months…several 
 months  of continual exposures and illness.  We finally pinpointed the 
 source of the illness.  It was the exhaust coming from a biological hood 
 where we used mouse embryonic stem cells in genetically engineered viruses. 
  We didn’t know what was going on, but we knew it was coming from the 
 hood.  Well Pfizer plugged the hood and just blew it outside into the 
 Groton air. That was one of their trials to solve the problem.  Apparently 
 Pfizer thought this was legal.  And allegedly Pfizer’s actions were again 
 based on what is legal and not necessarily on what is legal and not on what 
 is safe in regard to public health and safety.  \n \nSo you can imagine 
 that if we don’t have regulations on this industry, this is just the way 
 of the world.  The companies…it’s about money, right?  It’s probably 
 no only Pfizer, but it’s the bottom line.  And if you don’t have 
 regulations-- and historically this is known--then they’re going to have 
 safety budgets that are based on what’s legal rather on what’s safe. \n 
 \nNow up to this point, to make a long story short, my continued safety 
 complaints  about unsafe working conditions had become unpopular.  I was 
 even told to stop documenting my safety concerns within the safety 
 committee.   Hostility and threats against my career ensued, with 
 concomitant drops in my performance evaluations.  Co-workers confided in me 
 that they were afraid to speak out in regard to safety problems, because 
 they feared retaliation.  And unbelievably all this was happening and of 
 course I was somewhat stressed out about being retaliated against—you 
 know if you’ve ever been targeted-- but again, right at that time,  I get 
 another exposure to a genetically engineered virus that   someone had  been 
 working  on right on my personal workbench for a whole month, without my 
 knowledge.  And when I did find out, I asked them, “Well, what is the 
 virus?”  He had told me it was a lenti-virus, but he didn’t know 
 anything other than that.  So I said, “Will you please find out what it 
 was?”  Well he came back the next day and said “Oh, it’s safe,”  
 and he inferred it wasn’t a human infectious agent,  and he said there 
 were no problems.  But he said I need to disinfect, so he disinfected 
 everything.\n \nI didn’t think much of it, because if it’s not a human 
 infectious agent you shouldn’t get ill from it.  Everybody’s exposed to 
 mouse viruses, but it has to be really a human infectious agent to set 
 something off.  I didn’t think too much about it.  Unfortunately, right 
 after that, I started developing a chronic illness, a slow progressively 
 chronic illness so that I eventually had to go on medical leave, I was 
 hospitalized, and I still have this illness today.  It’s better 
 maintained, but I still have it. Consequently, in 2004, with no other 
 options, because Pfizer  just would not negotiate about these issues, I had 
 to report to OSHA.  And Pfizer terminated me individually after reporting 
 to OSHA.\n \nOkay, now, every workplace has to have these OSHA posters 
 posted.  [Unravels  poster and shows it to audience].  It says, [reads in 
 ironic tone]   “You Have a Right to a Safe and Healthful Workplace,”  
 and in large red capital letters:  IT’S THE LAW!”  And it lists the 
 statute, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 assures safety and 
 healthful working conditions for working men and women throughout the 
 nation. [Points to photos of workers at bottom of poster]  I should have 
 gotten a clue because of two things:  first of all there are no scientists 
 up here…I thought this was a scientist but she’s holding a big can of 
 meat or a plate of meat with a butcher knife.  But it also says here that 
 “The rights listed here may vary depending on the particular 
 circumstances.”  So I will tell you the particular circumstances in the 
 biotech area are that:  you are not protected by OSHA. \n \nThis is a 
 serious problem, because remember we’re working with biological agents 
 and infections agents, and if you’re not protected by OSHA then the 
 public really is not protected by OSHA. And I’ll got over this quickly:  
 there are three things I went to OSHA for, just documentation:  1)first: 
 we’ve got unsafe lab conditions; here’s the documentation, the 
 documentation of what they told me to be quiet about in the safety 
 committee.  2)  Here’s documentation of people who have been ill.  OSHA 
 said “We don’t have jurisdiction to go in and do a safety inspection 
 for you.  Statute of limitations.  Which I didn’t quite understand, 
 because the place was still unsafe. \n \nBut they [OSHA] did tell me they 
 thought I’d been discriminated against.  They’re the ones who told me 
 they thought I’d been retaliated against.  So they said,  “Wait:  our 
 investigator’s on vacation,”  so I met with her a month later.   She 
 sat down with me and she said, “Becky, most likely OSHA will not bring 
 this retaliation claim forward, because only one out of 200 claims they do 
 bring forward…remember [protection against retaliation means] protecting 
 the public health [when]  scientists and physicians [can] stand up and say 
 “Hey we’ve got a public health problem” and they don’t get fired.  
 But only one in 200 that OSHA brings into court wins.  And she said, 
 “Becky, this is a very weak law.  I can try and negotiate for you with 
 Pfizer, but if that doesn’t work, nothing will happen.  So she did, and 
 nothing happened, and of course it [my case] was dismissed.  Remember I was 
 on the safety committee, the safety committee that was raising those issues 
 ….\n \nThe worst part of it is that I did end up having a very, very 
 serious illness.  Initially, when it was developing, a doctor wrote in my 
 notes that I had “post-viral syndrome.”  I said I was exposed to some 
 viruses, but they told me, they inferred they were non-human infectious 
 agents.  So I wrote Pfizer and I said, “Could you please let me know 
 exactly what those viruses were?”  and they wrote back, “What 
 viruses?”  You know, “What viruses?”  So I knew, right then, that uh 
 oh….So eventually I must admit that OSHA did help me force Pfizer to tell 
 me the name of the viruses, because Pfizer was not cooperating.  And sure 
 enough, when that was disclosed, they were human infectious agents.  And 
 this was two years after the exposure. \n \nIf you are exposed to a 
 chemical like formaldehyde at Company A or Company B. formaldehyde at 
 Company A or Company b  has the same chemical structure, so you don’t any 
 information about the chemical structure if you’re exposed.  You just 
 need to know that you were exposed to formaldehyde, this is what is going 
 to happen.  If you get exposed to a genetically engineered virus, every 
 virus is different, because they’re hand-made.  So you need the genetic 
 code, you need to know how it was cloned, you need to know how it was 
 produced, to understand the characteristics of the virus.  So I went to 
 OSHA and said,  “Hey, the name’s not the identity.  You can name a 
 virus anything.”  This went all the way from OSHA Hartford, to Boston, to 
 Washington, D. C. for a ruling. And it was ruled by our federal government 
 at an OSHA level that trade secrets supersede a worker’s right to get 
 those exposure records.  Now this left me with no rights for medical care.  
 This is a real serious thing.  I don’t know if you folks want your 
 biotech workers who have been exposed walking out into the public without a 
 chance to get health care.  Think about that right now.  That’s very 
 serious.   \n \nI went to other agencies.  They were just as inept.  
 Workers’ compensation also claimed they had no authority to order the 
 release of my exposure records.  So that was the end of my  claim over 
 there.  The Connecticut Department of Public Health….remember I want you 
 to know that here in California you have a $3 billion stem cell thing going 
 on; in Connecticut we have a $100 million program, a lot less than you 
 folks…we didn’t get vote on it like you did….The Connecticut 
 Department of Public Health heads that [laughs] embryonic stem cell 
 agency….They said they don’t have any jurisdiction over genetically 
 engineered viruses.  And embryonic stem cells and genetically engineered 
 viruses, that’s what we’re using in there, which probably the public is 
 not that aware of….NIH,[1] NIOSH,[2] CDC, [3] they were equally 
 ineffective, and I couldn’t get help, so I was forced to file a federal 
 lawsuit in an attempt to get my exposure records for my health care.   
 I’m in discovery phase now, so I can’t give you too much specifics 
 about that right now, but I’d like to let you know that after a 
 doctor’s request, after a professor of genetics request, and even after 
 the judge has ordered Pfizer to release those records, they still have not 
 release those records.  It’s interesting. \n \nI just want to share this 
 personal story not to garner any sympathy,  but just to let you know that 
 we really are in dire need of health and safety protections both for the 
 workers and for the public in biotechnology.  My story is not an isolated 
 case.  Last year David Bell was speaking.  He’s a biotech workers who was 
 exposed and who got sick.  He had the same problems I had.  He was exposed, 
 he couldn’t get his exposure records, he had the same problems with 
 workers’ comp, and biotech workers better realize that this is a major 
 problem. \n \nI want to go over the dangers of these technologies.  We’ve 
 had a talk about nanotechnology.  I’m going to talk a little bit about 
 genetically engineered viruses.  I also want to say a few words about 
 synthetic biology.  Does anybody know what “synthetic biology” is?  
 Synthetic biology basically means they are making new types of life. 
 \nThey’re getting all these new genes and cloning them together and 
 making new life.  They also have the capability to synthesize in the lab 
 any virus or any mean bug or bacteria or infectious agent that they want.  
 These aren’t regulated either.   I’m just telling you about that, 
 because that’s the biotechnology that you need to be aware of ….when 
 you read about the field. \n \nNow let’s talk about genetically 
 engineered viruses.  Are you aware that genetically engineered viruses are 
 being created in every common university, and biotech industry? I don’t  
 think the public really realizes this.   Why they using genetically 
 engineered viruses?  We need them to make things sick.  Because if you make 
 an embryonic stem cell line sick, or  a mouse, you can add disease state 
 models so that you can find the biochemical or the physiological mechanism 
 of a disease, or you can look for drugs to help find  [Becky, don’t you 
 mean “cure?” ] the disease. Now that’s a legitimate use for a 
 genetically engineered virus.   But of course these are called 
 “dual-purpose technologies”  because you use them for good, and you can 
 also use them for bad.  If they’re making cells sick, and they’re 
 making animals sick, they can also make people sick. \n \nNow I’m talking 
 a about BL-2 labs. Bio-level-2 labs, not bio-level-3 or bio-level-4 labs. 
 Bio-level-3 and 4 are biological war, they calls them “biological defense 
 labs.  These are Bio-level-2 labs, in your backyard or your neighborhood.  
 This is what’s going on.  They’re making genetically-engineered 
 viruses.  It’s very common, like Betty Crocker cookbook as a matter of 
 fact. It’s not a difficult technology. \n \nWhy are the scientists saying 
 that these are safe?  They’re saying it because they make them,  
 theoretically,  not to replicate.  If they don’t replicate, they won’t 
 cause a communicable disease.  Well, theoretically, yes, that’s 
 theoretically a good safety mechanism, but when they produce these in a 
 BL-2 lab they don’t check to see if it’s replicating or not.  So you 
 don’t know, because they could find viruses, as you know with this Swine 
 flu [you called it “Mexican flu, Becky] it has four separate genetic 
 elements.  How did they get those four separate genetic elements?  It 
 either recombined, or I don’t want to mention what you might be thinking 
 (laughs)…it may be biotechnology, because it is a mystery how four 
 distinct genetic fragments from human, avian, and two swine [elements] from 
 different parts of the world  got together from different parts of the 
 world  and they didn’t know that this was happening. \n \nSo they don’t 
 replicate, in theory, [Berman rewrote this slightly]  but in fact they 
 might be replicating, because they just don’t know it, because they 
 don’t test whether or not it’s replicating.  What they don’t tell you 
 is that even if they don’t replicate, they infect.  Not only do they 
 infect, but they permanently integrate into your DNA. \n \nHow 
 sophisticated are these technologies?  I’m just going to give you an 
 analogy.  You know of a naval ship with missiles on-board?  You launch a 
 missile and they have a GPS unit onboard?  With those missiles we can 
 strike a building in any country we choose to attack. We have that same 
 technology on the molecular level, and we’re using that technology in 
 common laboratories.  We can target any specific gene and knock down a gene 
 and cause a metabolic disorder.  We can do this because we’ve sequenced 
 the whole genome, and we know the genome.  We can also produce toxins in 
 viruses.\n \nMy job at Pfizer was to make traditional expression systems 
 for embryonic stem cells .  I wasn’t personally working with viruses.  
 But my genetic systems could be inserted into viruses, where they could 
 destroy a gene of interest and cause a metabolic disease  to try and 
 attempt to make a disease state model. \n \nWhat are the dangers?  There 
 are two parts to this.  Of course they can infect; that’s a danger.  But 
 we also have the capability of changing the tropism of a virus.  The 
 tropism determines how a virus infects.  The HIV virus, in general has a 
 protein coat around it, and that protein coat determines where it infects.  
 So in general it infects into CD-4 and CD-8 receptors and a leucocyte.  So 
 basically you can get HIV by blood to blood. If someone sneezes on you, 
 you’re not going to get HIV.  You have to get a needle stick, if you’re 
 working in a lab, for example, with HIV.  But now we have the knowledge to 
 strip the coat off any virus, and place any other viral coat on these 
 viruses. \n \nFor example, we can take the HIV virus and place a 
 rabies-like coat on this HIV virus.  So now this HIV virus has the ability 
 of infecting you through your eyes, or if you breathe it, or ingest it. . 
 So that’s the danger of these.  They might not replicate, but they are 
 highly infectious. The other problem is that now because the tropism is so 
 highly infectious, it not only infects humans, but now you have an HIV 
 virus with this code that can infect insects and  it can infect mammals.  
 So now if you release it the environment, you’re in trouble.\n \nWhat are 
 the dangers if these are released into the environment by accidental 
 negligence or intentional release?  They include increased chronic illness, 
 new emerging disease, metabolic disorders, cluster of cancer, and possibly, 
 if it’s replicating, it could cause an epidemic.  The other difficult 
 part of a genetically engineered virus is that they’re difficult to 
 detect.  If they’re released and they’re not replicating, you might see 
 a cluster of people come down with cancer, but you can’t find the virus, 
 because it’s not replicating. So it’s a public health issue.\n \nLet me 
 quickly go over the regulations.  Basically there are no regulations on 
 this industry.  They’re using “guidelines.”   These guidelines are 
 established through NIH, but unfortunately guidelines only impact academia. 
  Whoever gets government money has to follow these guidelines.  Guidelines 
 are not regulations.  They don’t have legal teeth. \n \nPrivate industry 
 has no guidelines.  They say they follow these guidelines, but it they 
 don’t, it’s not against the law.  And as I told you, what does Pfizer 
 do?  Pfizer  bases their safety policy on what’s legal, and not on 
 what’s safe.  So if they’re working under guidelines, they can do 
 basically anything they want, legally, and you really can’t do anything 
 to them. \n \nWhy is the scientific industry trying to avoid being 
 regulated?  Well they want to really have the freedom to do any kind of 
 research without responsibility or liability.  They say it’s going to 
 halt science, and stop science if they pass regulations, but they want to 
 go forward without any liability.  They also don’t want to put the money 
 into their facilities.  Our problems at Pfizer could have been easily fixed 
 by a bit of remodeling of the department to give us a safe break room and 
 perhaps remove scientists out of office space where genetically engineered 
 recombinant DNA work is going on.  Also, they don’t want public scrutiny; 
 they don’t want the public find out what’s going on with these 
 dangerous technologies. \n \nWho pays the price?  It’s you, the public, 
 and the biotech workers.  It’s not the big scientists you see on TV, 
 because they’re not in there with the gloves on hand really making the 
 viruses.  It’s me and other biotechnologists who have no rights to safety 
 forums or stand up and say “Hey, there’s a problem” or rights to our 
 exposure records. \n \nWhat can the public do?  I think you folks have to 
 try and support regulations on this industry, know it’s for your own 
 health.  Whistleblower laws are among the most important things to do.  If 
 you don’t have doctors and scientists who can stand up and say “Hey, 
 there are some safety problems in here,” you’ll never find out 
 anything. \n \nTransparency is essential.  When regulations do come, you 
 want to be able to see what’s going on.  Stop giving money to large 
 non-profits and universities that are doing this research until they commit 
 to public health and safety standards.  Scientists…I forget to mention 
 this before….with these OSHA posters they should take a big Magic Marker  
 at work and write “You are not protected!”  This is the law, but you 
 are not protected.” \n \nAnd therefore, it’s so important for biotech 
 workers to know that they should have a right to unionize, because these 
 are big corporations you’re going up against, and big universities with 
 endowments, and you need to unionize to get rights.\n \nLet me just 
 conclude with this:  I hope I’ve shed light on an important issue which 
 is really being kept from the public’s eye. And it’s really not 
 mentioned in mainstream media:  that is the dangers of genetically 
 engineered viruses being created in BL-2 labs in your common universities 
 without regulations.  This lack of regulations has made for  intolerable 
 risks to worker safety with no freedom of speech, and a lack of rights to 
 exposure records for their own health care.  Again this is a human dignity 
 and human rights issue.  All of this creates an environment which keeps the 
 public in the dark about the dangers of biotechnologies.  We all want to 
 support scientific discovery, but it constitutes a double-edged sword.  
 Before promoting embryonic stem cell research and other advanced 
 technologies with public funding, we must support changes in current 
 regulatory landscapes that provide workers’ rights and effective 
 protections for you and your family. \n \nI want to end my talk and remind 
 you that it is Workers’ Memorial Day and it is also International Workers 
 Memorial Day. I want to honor Dr. Jeannette Adu-Bobi.  In 2005 she was 
 infected in a laboratory with a meningococcal vaccine. [Holds up large 
 color photo of Dr. Adu-Bob.  She had only worked seven days in a laboratory 
 in New Zealand with unsafe work practices occurring, and she mysteriously 
 came down with an infection.  She ended up in intensive care and the 
 infection was systemic.  She lost her two legs, one arm, and on her 
 remaining arm she lost some of her fingers.  And I want to honor her, 
 because she had broken the silence.  This has to be hard for her to allow a 
 picture to be taken.  She really illustrates the difficulty that biotech 
 workers and all the other workers I have heard speak today…what we have 
 to go through when we have a workplace injury.  I just want to say that 
 after she became infected they took a culture and it was the identical 
 bacterium that she had been working on in the lab.  And officials still 
 denied that it was a workplace injury.  \n \n[1] National Institutes of 
 Health\n[2] National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health\n[3] 
 Center for Disease Control \n\n 
 https://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2012/03/15/18709391.php
SUMMARY:Berkeley Conference: Unmasking the Bay Area Biolab and Synthetic biology–
LOCATION:David Brower Center\n2150 Allston Way, Berkeley, CA 94704
URL:https://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2012/03/15/18709391.php
DTSTART:20120330T020000Z
DTEND:20120330T043000Z
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR
