

# NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

6 July 2009

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THRU: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

SUBJECT: (U/<del>FOUO)</del> Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA Activities -INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//<del>FOUO)</del> Except as previously reported to you or the President, or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that any intelligence activities of the National Security Agency during the quarter ending 31 March 2009 were unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and thus should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.6(c) of Executive Order 12333.

(U//<del>FOUO</del>) The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by inspections, surveys, training, review of directives and guidelines, and advice and counsel. These activities and other data requested by the Board or members of the staff of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) are described in the enclosure.

Inspector General

VITO T. POTENZA

General Counsel

(U/<del>FOUO)</del>) I concur in the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

> KEPH B. ALEXANDER Lieutenant General, U. S. Army Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:

Quarterly Report

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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Approved for Release by NSA on 12-19-2014, FOIA Case # 70809 (Litigation)

Dated: 20070108

#### TOP SECRET//COMINT/NOFORN

4,	(U// <del>FOU</del>	<del>O) I</del> ntel	lligence,	counteri	ntelligence	, and	intellig	ence	e-related	ac	tiviti	es
					y substant							
ac	tions tak	en as a	result o	f the viol	ations							

(U) Intelligence Ac
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(TS//SI// REL TO USA, FVEY) Unintentional collect persons. This quarter, there were ☐ instances in whice inadvertently targeted or collected communications to, for pursuing foreign intelligence tasking. All intercepts and as required by United States SIGINT Directive (USSID)	ch Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) analysts rom, or about U. S. persons while reports have been deleted or destroyed
(U) Unauthorized Targeting (b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 8	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)
(TS//SI//NF) On occasions, selectors for U.S. per collection before the approval process was completed. A submitted the prerequisite consensual collection forms in the final approval had not been granted by the Director, I prior to tasking. The NSA analyst erroneously believed with tasking, and did not complete the approval process.  when the selectors were detasked. No	Although the  National Security Agency (DIRNSA)  OGC approval was sufficient to proceed
(S//SI//NF) NSA targeted a 1	U.S. telephone number in error. The
number passed to NSA from	was incorrect because
of a typing error. NSA analysts discovered the typing er	rror on when
	Within 30 minutes, the
analysts replaced the incorrect number with the number	which was
obtained through a consensual collection authorization.	
tasked in error.	
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	(b) (1)
(U) Travel to the United States (b) (3) -P	(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) During this reporting peri	od. valid foreign targets
the United States. Tasking was terminal	
of the instances, was purged from NSA databases.	
-(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) In of the instance	es of the United
	have been avoided had timely action
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Ithough the analyst requested a review of
	ith access to the database was on sick
	caled the target was in the United States
/	ated collection was deleted from an NSA
(b) (1)	
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3034(i)	Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	Dated: 20070108

Declassify On: 39480914

#### -TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-

databa future	ase on violations.	and the analyst applied	for a research accou	unt to reduce the risk of	
_(30115	<u> </u>	V) la analian "Cala "Ca		(b) (3)-P.L.	86-36
entere attem	d the United States on oted unsuccessfully function of the graphic	In another of the aform on the tall user interface application. Once the database w	arget selector on tion prevented execu	an NSA analyst	<u> </u>
databa	Collection occurred or	n	intercepts were p	ourged from the NSA	I
targets were c	s were in the United Sta detasked. Collection, o	Y) On occasions, co ates. In all instances, co occurring in of the incidents, violations resu	llection was termina instances, was pur	ted and selectors (b) (seed from NSA)	L) 3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024	outside of the United initial information appreciate the analysis of the United Initial Initia		g a query of an NSA ronic mail (e-mail) a ector on the violation on the United States	without the and and are issued from that	
> 2		asked inThe in the United State	e selector belonged to selector belonged to selector belonged to select the selector belonged to selector belong	st found a selector that to a foreign national elector, believed to have	
(U) D	atabase Queries	(b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L.	. 86-36		
from t	n_of those occasions,	On occasions, NSA the queries returned rest omplete queries was dele violations.	ults from the databas	e. The returned results	
<b>%</b>	targeting of a U.S.	g a communication, one that he could query	without author	ization. With the	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

#### TOP SECRET//COMNT/NOFORN

(b)(1)	A STATE OF CHARACTERS CONTRACTOR
(b)(3)-P.L. 86	
(b) (3) -50 USC	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
97	(TS //STI/DEL TO LIGA DIVEY) A nother NS A analyst year the town
	in his search for foreign intelligence related to the U.S. presidential
	inauguration. From the analyst mistakenly believed that the
	term typed in was permissible. The mistake, found on was
	corrected that day. No collection resulted from the query.
	(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Human error resulted in the targeting of
and the second s	An NSA analyst and his auditor
	incorrectly applied targeting guidance, resulting in queries to an NSA database.
(3)-P.L. 86-36	
***********	queries. The mistake produced query results, which were deleted without review.
**	(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) An NSA analyst used the term in his (b) (3) -P.L. 86-3
	search for foreign the
	analyst mistakenly believed that the term typed in was permissible.
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	The query, found by the analyst's auditor, was deleted on and all related
50.(1-)	collection was destroyed.
o)(3)=P.L. 86-36	(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
N The state of the	(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) In an attempt to locate a translated intercept, an (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(1)
1	NSA analyst searched on the of the transcribing linguist. The
1	violation was found by the analyst's auditor. No results were returned.
//	(b) (1) (b) (1)
// // // // // // // // // // // // //	etasking Delays (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-18 usc 798
// (0) 2.	(b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i) (b) (3) -18 USC 798 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)
//	telephone numbers remained tasked after an Attorney
	ral authorization had expired on The NSA analyst detasked the
\ <b></b> S6	electors but was not aware of
\	The violation was identified on and the
select	ors were detasked the same day. No collection occurred between and
1	A review of the incident resulted in a change in operating procedures.
	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
<u>/TS//</u>	SI//NF) The selectors of valid foreign targets tasked
( 1 1257 7 12	
Y7!	were not removed from tasking when they were approved for targeting under
	gn Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Order Consequently, the targets'
	nunications were intercepted after they entered the United States in
2008.	This oversight was found during a selector review The selectors
were o	detasked on NSA analysts have not found
	collection on the targets since they entered the United States.
	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-3
<del>-(\$//\$1</del>	<del>//REL-TO-USA, FVEY)</del> Unintentional dissemination of U.S. identities. There
	instances in which SIGINT analysts disseminated communications to, from, or about
	persons while pursuing foreign intelligence tasking this quarter. All data have been deleted
0.9.1	strong de provincia de la la constante de la c
or des	stroyed as required. In of the instances, SIGINT products were cancelled because
/they c	contained the identities of U.S. persons, organizations, or entities. The reports were either
/ not re	rissued or were reissued with proper minimization.
(b) (1)	

(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	TOP SECRET//COMINT	*//NOFORN	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-			
SIGINT before he sha The data,	nalyst was contacted on and he destroyed the data. No reports were issued on					
-(TS//SI//REL TO US/	<del>A, FVEY) -</del> While NSA	analysts were	developing			
		, ,	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86 (b)(3)-18 USC (b)(3)\-50 USC (			
	hared with analyst to associate a telephon		y an NSA (b)(3)-1			
		Although the	complete			
number was not given			nt to associate			
it with the owner, who (U) Report Cancellation	***************************************		(b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-3 (b) (3) -50 USC 30:			
unauthorized collection	ollection was purged from NSA on were not cancelled until miscommunication between two	Although the selectors were latabases. reports gener The delay in report	ated from the cancellation			
(U) The Foreign Int	elligence Surveillance Act (f	FISA) (b) (1)				
(U) Unauthorized Tar		(b) (3) -P.L. 86 (b) (3) -50 USC				
Court Order and p	Order, had expired. ticed that an e-mail selector had r The selector was removed froelated collection was purged from	m and and an NSA database on	eening, an			
ino reports based on u	nauthorized collection were issue	a.	Yb) (1)			

The selector was detasked on and collection from was purged from NSA databases the same day. To reduce the risk of a recurrence, oversight (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

to determine that

ID: 4165207	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOPORN	(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)
procedures have been modified to include	
	(b) (1) (c) (3) -P.L. 86-3
(TS//SI//NF) On oecasions, collection continued after FISC order expired. violations were isolated on to a malful	ers
selectors continued after the FISC Court Order expired on	Collection
	databases. The selectors
were retasked under the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) the FISC Court Order exp	Certification
Collection from selectors was purged from NSA database on	(b) (1)
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) a NSA analysi (	(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
intelligence on a U.S. person for a period not covered by FISC Orde	queried an NSA database for Although the
order was signed and effective as of the analyst que	
The analyst terminated his query and deleted the results on	when he recognized
his mistake.	
(TS//SI/NF)	
-(tonount)	
	(6) (1)
(U) Business Records (BR) Order (b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798
(C) masiliess (Courts (1917) (1905)	(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
(TS//SI//NF) On 7 January 2009, while searching collection	
NSA analysts found BR FISA data inclu	ded in the query results. Of (b) (3)-P.L. 8
the selectors used in queries, only had been approved under	the reasonable articulable
suspicion (RAS) standard. Although the numbers were associated v selectors had not been approved for call chaining in the BR FISA da	
	No data was retained, and no
reports were issued.	
CECUCATION CO. O. C.	
(TS//SI//NF) On 9 January 2009, an NSA analyst violated NSA call he inadvertently did an extra hop, or call-chaining expansion during	-chaining procedures when

(18//81//NF) On 9 January 2009, an NSA analyst violated NSA call-chaining procedures when he inadvertently did an extra hop, or call-chaining expansion during a BR FISA chaining event resulting in four call-chaining expansions or hops. The Court order prohibits more than three. Immediately, the analyst realized four hops were processed, and he deleted all of the results, which were foreign.

#### TOP SECRET/COMPAT//NOFORN

$(U)$ $\cup$	pdate	ţO	previous	report
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(TS//SI/NF) As reported last quarter, on 15 January 2009, the Department of Justice reported to the FISC that NSA had been using an "alert list" to compare incoming BR FISA metadata against telephone numbers associated with counterterrorism (CT) targets that NSA had tasked for SIGINT collection. The Agency had reported to the FISC that the alert list consisted of numbers for which NSA had determined that a RAS existed that the numbers were related to a terrorist organization associated with
against CT target selectors, and in the conduct of a comprehensive review, NSA identified other processes used to query the BR FISA metadata that also did not conform with the Court's orders or that were not fully explained to the Court. The review also identified some manually entered queries that were noncompliant with the Court's orders. None of the compliance incidents resulted in the dissemination of any reporting from NSA to any other department or agency. Upon discovery of these compliance incidents, NSA immediately made changes to its processes to ensure that the Agency is handling and querying the telephony metadata in accordance with the Court's orders. The corrective measures include implementation of controls that prevent any automated process from querying the telephony metadata NSA receives pursuant to the Court's orders and which also guard against manual querying errors.
(TS//SI/NF) The Department of Justice filed preliminary notices of compliance incidents with the FISC on 15 January, 21 January, 26 January, 2 February, 25 February, and 31 March 2009. The FISC issued an order on 5 March 2009 allowing NSA to continue to acquire the BR FISA metadata but imposing further restrictions on use of the data until the completion of the government's end-to-end system engineering and process report. The report will include further information on steps to remedy areas of concern, oversight efforts, and minimization and oversight procedures to be employed if the FISC allows resumed regular access to the BR FISA metadata.
(U) Pen/Trap Order
(U) Nothing to report.
(U) The Protect America Act (PAA)  (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) A delay in the review of intercept contributed to collection on a target while he was in the United States. The selector was tasked under PAA
Certification on but not checked by the analyst until
the United States. The query results were deleted on No reports were issued.
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 788

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(b) (3) -P: 1- 86-36	-TOP SECRET//CON	#INT//NOFORN	(b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
The state of the s	***************************************		(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(
are norman are to	KAR SENST SA	The state of the s	
	FVEY) During a tasking re		NSA \
analysts learned that	target selectors had beer		
selectors, tasked on		een tasked under the PA	
instead of the FA		ertification 2008. The	selectors were
retasked under the corre	•		was purged because
	are the same minimization	rules and database stora	age protections. No
reports were issued.			(b)(1)
-(CEC) / (C) / (/N ) (C)   3 Y	4. 4	0 1 17:0 1	(b) (3)-P.L. 86-
(13//31/NF) Human en	or resulted in the targeting		citizen after
an NSA analyst learned		The ar	nalyst failed to detask
the e-mail address while			through
	on. When this process wea		the
	No collection occurred dur	ing the period of unauth	orized targeting, and
no reports were issued.			1
A Mint P NID R AT A			(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(U) The FISA Amend	ments Act	/(b) (1)	(b)(3)-50 USC 3024
/87\ *9**	د سد در پیسان	(b)(3)-P.L.	
(U) Tasked under an in	correct FAA Certification	(3)-50 0	JSC 3024(i)
1755 Ca 1 1 Ch a 1 1 may may be 1900 for 19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	and the second s	_ / //	<u>,                                      </u>
	FVEY) During a tasking r		NSA
	arget selector had been task	//	
tasked on	had been tasked under	//	Certification
instead of the F		The selector was ret	tasked under the
correct certification on	No colle	ction/occurred.	
		- Annual Control of the Control of t	
(TS//SI//REL TO USA,		and the state of t	
An NSA analyst discov	ered that a selector had bee		
		analyst tasked a selector	The state of the s
authority from		Both selectors had bee	**************************************
FAA	Certification 6	nstead of the FAA	
			(b)(1)
			(b)(3)-F
		-search the search	
		are and the contract of the co	/
(TS//SI//REL TO USA,	FVEY) A selector for a fo	reign target was mistake	enly tasked
	***************************************		
Apparently, the analyst	used the wrong		į.
and the state of t	The error was o	verlooked by the tasking	g review team. The/
selector was removed fr		he problem was identifi	
No collection oc			
			(b)(3)-P.L.
(TS//SI//REL TO USA.	FVEY) During a tasking s	elector review	NSA
	arget selector had been task		
tasked or	had been tasked under t		
the FAA	Certification	The selector was re	
correct certification on		tion occurred.	monte and an
THE TOTAL COLUMN THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY O		HUH UVUHITUR.	
(b) (1)			(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)			(2),(3), 1.11. 00 00

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	(U) Unauthorized Targeting	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	
	(TS//SWNE)	without FAA 705(b) authorization, an	NSA intern gueried
		target who is a U.S. ci	
and the same	whether he was still in		the search was deleted
***************************************	on No other	collection resulted. The intern has comple	eted additional formal
U1)		d has been assigned to work with senior as	nalysts. (b)(3)-P.L. 86-3
) (3)-P.L	(TS//SI//NF) Collection occurre		
11 /	an NSA analyst	***************************************	tasked
	the target on	The tasking was based on a	report that
		d to an unidentified associate of a counter	
		and purged all related collection from NSA	A databases on (b) (1)
\			(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
\	(TS//SI//NF) Human error resu	Ited in the targeting of a	lon
		st incorrectly	and tasked a
		tification. In addition to activity	and
	the selector was	through daily due di	ligence reviews of
	selectors. The selector was det	asked on	
	(U) U.S. Person Status		(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
_	<del>(TS//SI//NF)</del> On	an FAA-authorized target was using an	e-mail address that
		The selector was detasked on	and collection was
	purged from an NSA database	and the second s	e event, NSA analysts
	found that the target was	in the United States on	The event was
	not immediately found because	of a software error. A software modifica	tion was implemented
		he problem. No reporting occurred from t	the unauthorized
	collection.		
	(TS//SI <del>//NF)</del> On	7-5044	** *1
•	(10//01//13/) (///	an FAA-authorized target was using an e	No collection
	resulted. Additionally, the anal		N 140 conection
	, , , , , ,	that the target possessed a U.S.	passport, in conflict
	with the results of a previous N	SA status request	Ithat revealed no U.S.
	citizenship. A second request t		izenship status on
			(b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
	<del>(TS//SI//NF)</del>	NSA analysts learned that an FAA-auth	orized target was active
	in the United States on	The e-mail selector was detasked	
	Although appropriate actions w	vere taken to purge the data from NSA data	abases, the time taken to
	complete the action exceeded N	ISA's self-imposed goal of purging data w	
	reporting occurred,		No
	reporting occurred,		

#### TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN

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	(TS//SI/REL TO USA, FVEY) Human error caused a three-day detasking delay, which resulted
	in collection while the target was active in the United States. The request to terminate the
	FAA-authorized collection was submitted on but the selector was not detasked
	until The analyst did not The resulting collection
	was purged from a NSA database on No reporting occurred on the (b)(1)
	unauthorized collection. (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	(TSUSIVED TO USA TWEN) An NSA analyst did not detail a torgated talanhaya number
	When he discovered the telephone number telephone number
	Trying to garner intelligence on a target authorized by FAA 705b docket the analyst (b)(1)
	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	selector remained tasked when the analyst was directed to
	detask the selector. No collection occurred during the period of unauthorized targeting.
/31-D	.L. 86-36
(3)-P	
\	
1	collection of a foreign target while he was in the United States. An NSA analyst believed that a routine detasking request submitted on would be completed prior to the (b)(1)
/	(b)(3)-P L 86-3
,	target's he United States on The analyst was on sick leave
	and was not able to verify the detasking action. The intercepts
	obtained while the target was in the United States were purged from NSA databases on
	/TO HOLIST TO TICK THEY IN
	(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Human error resulted in the pursuit of an FAA 704-authorized
	target while he was in the United States.
	the e-mail selector remained tasked
	The analyst from the
	responsible target office was in training during the target's to (b)(3)-P.L. 86-3
	trip to the United States. The analyst recognized the mistake on
	No collection occurred as a result of the violation.
	(S//SI//NF) A selector was not detasked during a target's visit to a United
	States territory. NSA learned of the travel on and detasked the selector on
	Collection occurred before the selector was removed from tasking. That
	collection was purged from an NSA database on No reporting occurred.
	(TS//SI//NF) A miscommunication between two NSA analysts contributed to collection on a
	foreign target after he entered the United States. When the analysts learned
	the United States oneach analyst believed the other terminated(b)(1)
	collection for the duration of the visit. The mistake was found and the selector
	was detasked on were purged from the //
	NSA databases.
	- (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) A communication problem resulted in delayed removal of
	an FAA selector from targeting while the target was in the United States.

	to the United States of an FAA 702 authorized target. The report requested detasks		minimu.ZF2747
	selector before The selector detasked before the e-mail selector to the Uni	was not ted States on	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-3
	The error was identified on and the selector was of	***	
	Collection did not occur from the activity.	(b)(1)	
_	(TS//SI//NF) Research of an incident revealed	(b)(3)-F	P.L. 86-36 18 USC 798
_	soon after the selector was tasked for collection According to		50 USC 3024(i)
	procedures, a target analyst should have detasked a selector when the collection de		
	lack of useful intelligence. Subsequently, the e-mail address  The selector was detasked on No collection on the target w	on formal in	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-3
	NSA databases. No reports were issued.	as found in	
	•		
	(U) Dissemination of FAA Data		
	(TS//SI//NF) unminimized collection was forwarded to	(b	)(3)-P.L. 86-3
	A U.S. selector was not minimized in an anal		
	exchange. When the violation was identified, the message was successfully recalled	ed on	
	(U) Destruction Delay		(1) (3)-P.L. 86-36
			(O)-1 .L. 00-00
	(TS//SI//NF) U.S. person data was retained before an NSA analyst pure from NSA databases. The target, believed to be foreign at the time of tasking on	ged the data	
	was found to be a U.S. citizen in The analyst i	ntended to	
	request authorization to retain the calls collected but did not pursue the reque	est. The	
	collection was purged from NSA databases No reports were is	sued.	
	(U) Other		
	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L.	86-36
	(U) Unauthorized Access		JSC 3024(i)
	an NSA analyst enlisted the help of another NSA	analyzet for	
		authorized for	
(b) (1)	the data. The analyst recognized the mistake and deleted the data.	(b) (المرتبة المستربة	(1) (3)-P.L. 86-36
(b) (3)-P.	The state of the s	/ (b)	(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	(C//RELTO USA, FVEY) A newly-created established authority to conduct SIGINT, attempted to obtain such authority by ina	with no	
	using a parent organization's SIGINT address to sponsor analysts	NSA	
	authority and directives were bypassed by NSA deleted the SIGINT data	base accounts	
	of the and instructed on proper access pro	ocedures.	
	(S//SI//REL) An NSA supervisor mistakenly granted SIGINT database access to a	person not	
	authorized for access.	<u>, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , </u>	
	analyst detailed to an NSA Cryptologic Center a		
	databases. The unalyst's NSA supervisor did not follow the documented pro	cess for	
		(b)(1)	
		(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	

	TOP SECRET//COM	INT//NOFORN	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	
database access. Acc SIGINT database acc	cess was terminated eess, he was compliant with the	While the intelligence oversigh	employee had nt training mandates.	
(U) Improper Storage	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36		(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86- (b)(3)-18 USC (b)(3)-50 USC	798
oversight during a re- in the development o was not built into the	- x 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	NSA researchers die	rotection because of an d not include FISA data perly label FISA data	(1)
researchers with acce	ess to the data were cleared for	FISA access. st entered U.S. identi		(3)-P.L. (3)-P.L. (
	This security violation was di	scovered by the Chie	f of the he chief	(0) 1 .2.
	entaining U.S. entities and confermination of the U.S. entities of	ccurred.	he	
(U) Improper Data T	ransfer	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86- (b)(3)-50 USC		
upgrade test. test information trans before it was sent fro	an NSA contra an NSA contra sfer between two NSA systems on one system to the other. Du id and the files were purged the	ctor used unminimize . The data was to have ring a system check.	ed SIGINT collection to	
(U) Minimization	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L.	36-36		
and relate	ith the minimization of FAA and graphical user interface have ral will track corrective action	been disabled pendi		
NSA analysts The NSA ar	x, FVEY) Accesses to sensitive were assigned to work with the nalysts accessed the databases are and unevaluated SIGINT by	periodically from		
/				

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SIGINT databases without the proper approval. Analysts are prohibited from logg	
databases while the access approval is pending. In both instances, the requests for	access had not
been completed by the parent NSA organization.	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
-(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) A software error resulted in premature approval to acce	ss FAA and
PAA data in an NSA database. The NSA/CSS	is
authorized to approve requests for SIGINT database access, while the SID approve	es access to the
While approving SIGINT databa	ise access, a
software error enabled approval by the This weak	cness was
identified, reported, and corrected during an access review	An
examination of accesses revealed that one analyst had access to	
The analys	t did not
publish reports containing FAA or PAA data.	
	(b)(1)
(U) Unauthorized Access	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(U//FOUO) During the quarter, an analyst's access to SIGINT databases was not to	erminated by a
Cryptologic Center upon completion of temporary additional duty on one occasion	a. Although
the analyst was cleared for access, losing organizations must terminate access spor	nsorship, and
the gaining organizations must sponsor database access. This mandated practice is	s an oversight
internal control.	
(U) Computer Network Exploitation (CNE)	
(TS//SL//REL TO USA, FVEY)	
	\\
	- 1
38	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	(b)(3)-18 USC 798
	(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
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	-(TS://SU/NF)				<b>-</b> (1)
	(10//5///41)				(3)-P.L. 86-36 (3)-18 USC 798 (3)-50 USC 3024(i)
					(3)-30 030 3024(1)
	ZETA ENGLISH AND	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36			]
	(U) Dissemination	(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)			
	(S//REL TO USA, AU	S, GBR, NZL)	NSA terminat	od	٦
				- The second section of the section	
	weaknesses with additi	While researching the proonal oversight internal con-			 r
		g for the account holders. e	nsure auditors are assi	gned to each analyst,	
	limite	ed access was restored	Ito block known U.S	person information. was restored on	
	L L		*		_
	/-(C//.Nr)	data t	hat was not releasable	10	
/	e-mails were deleted up NSA.	pon recognition. Computer	Security Incident Rep	oorts were submitted to	1
	11021.				
	(S//SI//REL TO USA,	<del>FVEY)</del>			<b>1</b> (b)(1)
					(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(
	* <del>(\$//\$I//REL TC</del>	USA, FVEY) In inst	ances NSA analysts	that	
	•	person information to the			
		In the first instances,		a tance occurred on (b)(	1)
		when the	was in the Un	ited States The (b)(3	)-P.L. 86-36 )-18 USC 798
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-	hellestersterstersterstersters	ntercept and notified NSA o	of the incidents.		3)-50 USC 3024(i)
	(S//SI//RELTC			containing	
	Cos, person min	ormadon was			(b)(1)
	when collection	A 11700		ATT Construct notice	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(
	the U.S. person			A U.S. analyst notic	ea
	was aline with the		NSA	has begun	
	working with the person information of the person information of the person information of the person in the perso		o esiabiish jormai proc	edures for handling U.	.5.
	person morma	uon.	The state of the s		
	регзон иногиа	tion.	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	

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(U) Counterintelligence Activities
(U) Nothing to report. (b)(1)
(U) Intelligence-related Activities (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
(S//SI/NF) To reduce the risk of unauthorized telephony collection and prevent violations. NSA instituted a process to give analysts greater and faster insight into a target's location.  When collection occurred, it was purged from NSA databases.  (TS//SI/NF)  (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-F.D. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(l)
NSA analysts found that e-mail selectors this quarter. Collection
that occurred in of the instances was purged from NSA databases.
(C//REL TO USA, FVEY) Although not violations of E.O. 12333 and related directives;  NSA/CSS reportsinstances in which database access was not terminated when access was no longer required. Once identified, the accesses were terminated.  (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-3
(TS//SI//REL TO USA; FVEY) Collection occurred on U.S. persons because of a with the
collected as a result of the malfunction was purged from the database.  -and-the data(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
2. (U// <del>FOUO)</del> NSA OIG Intelligence Oversight Inspections, Investigations, and Special Studies.

(U/<del>FOUO)</del> During this quarter, the OIG reviewed various intelligence activities of the NSA/CSS to determine whether they had been conducted in accordance with applicable statutes, Executive Orders, Attorney General procedures, and Department of Defense and internal directives. With few exceptions, the problems uncovered were routine and showed that operating elements understand the restrictions on NSA/CSS activities.

## (U//<del>TOUO)</del> NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center

(U//<del>FOUO)</del> An NSA OIG inspection found that the intelligence oversight within NTOC is appropriately managed and compliant with standing regulations. NTOC has established effective

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management controls to ensure that authorities are properly executed on the NTOC operations floor. Based on training statistics reviewed, the inspector found a 95 percent rate of compliance for intelligence oversight training.
(U/4 <del>FOUO</del> ) Alleged Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information
(TS//SI//NF) The (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
is conducting an investigation into the release of a SIGINT report to an intelligence
officer before the report was sanitized or vetted for proper release. The data disseminated
included NSA data that is potentially a significant compromise of SIGINT (b)(1)
capabilities. The OIG will track this action through completion.  (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(U) Congressional, IOB, and DNI Notifications.
(TS//SI//NF) NSA/CSS notified the Majority Staff Director of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence of the process to resolve the Business Records matter, provide
additional information to the Committee on other matters that have been addressed previously to
the Committee, and to notify the Committee of one additional matter which was only recently
identified. A copy of the four part notification is included as an addendum to this report.
3. (U) Substantive Changes to the NSA/CSS Intelligence Oversight Program.
(U) Nothing to report.
4. (U) Changes to NSA/CSS published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities and the reason for the changes.
(U) Nothing to report.
5. (U) Procedures governing the activities of Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence components that affect U.S. persons (DoD Directive 5240.1-R, Procedure 15) Inquiries or Matters Related to Intelligence Oversight Programs.

(U) Nothing to report.