

MALE CONTENTUS AD ROMAM: B.C. 63 (PARS I)

PUGNA ORDINIS ET RES CIVILI IN ROMA POPULARIS

Cum libris translatis verbis scriptorem commentaribusque Bellum Catilinae Sallustii et
In Catilinam I-II Ciceronis (Limatus Dec. 29, 2009)

BY E. H. CAMPBELL

[Codex Manuscriptus 1.0]

INOPIBUS PRESS: MISSOULA, MT

PRIMA EDITIO

© E. H. CAMPBELL 2006, 2009

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Ἐλάττους τε γὰρ ὄντες [30] ὅπως ἴσοι ὥσι στασιάζουσι,

καὶ ἴσοι ὄντες ὅπως μείζους.

They being subservient would be revolutionaries so as to be equals;

and they being equals, so as to be mighty. (The Politics 5.1302a29-30)¹

¹ Aristotle, *Aristotle's Politica*, ed. W. D. Ross, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1957.

TEMPORUM ORDO

Foundation of Rome (753 B.C.)

Foundation of the Republic (509 B.C.)

Thucydides (460-455 B.C. to 400 B.C.)

Plato (427 BC-347 BC)

Catiline (87-62 B.C.)

Cicero (106-43 B.C.)

Sallust (86-35 B.C.)

Varro (136-27 B. C.)

Diodorus Siculus (80-20 B.C.)

Pollio (76/75 B.C.-A.D. 5)

Livy (59 B.C.-A.D. 17)

Elder Seneca (54 B.C.-A.D. 39)

Quintilian (35-95)

Martial (38-41 to 103-102)

Tacitus (56-117)

Plutarch (46- 127)

Suetonius (75-60)

Appian (95-165)

Cassius Dio (155-229)

Jerome of Stridonium (340-420)

Augustine of Hippo (354-430)

Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People (1416)

Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy (1531)

Ben Jonson, Catiline: His Conspiracy (1611)

Voltaire, Rome Sauvée (1754)

SIGLA

1st = first person	Inf. = infinitive mood
2nd = second person	Lat. = Latin
3rd = third person	Lit. = literally
Abl. =ablative case	Masc. = masculine gender
Acc. = accusative case	Mid. = middle voice
Act. = active voice	Mid./Pass. = middle/passive voice
Adj. = adjective	Neut. = neuter gender
Adv. = adverb	Nom. = nominative case
Aor. =aorist tense	Op. Cit = operas citatas
AUC = anno urbe condita	Opt. = optative mood
Ca. = circa	Part. = participle
Cf. = confer, compare	Pass. = passive voice
Collat. = collateral	Perf. = perfective tense
Comp. = comparative	Pl. = plural
Dat. = dative case	Pluperf. = pluperfective tense
Dor. = Doric	Pres. = present tense
Fem. = feminine gender	Pr. = proem
Fut. = future tense	Sing. = singular
Gen. = genitive case	Superl. = superlative
Gk. = Greek	
I.e. = id est, that is	
Impf. = imperfective tense	
Imper. = imperative mood	
Ind. = indicative mood	

EPITOME

TEMPORUM ORDO.....	4
SIGLA	5
I. PRŌOEMIUM.....	7
I. PRAEFATIO.....	8
II. TU IPSE SCITE.....	16
III. HISTORIA RATIO ET RATIO DEFINITIONIS	19
IV. QUODQUE ET OMNIS.....	21
V. SINGULI ET SUBTILIS	22
VI. OPUS ET OPUS ARTIS.....	24
VII. RHETORICA ET ORATIO	25
VIII. ETHICA ET LOGICA	29
IX. EMBOLIUM HISTORIAE	29
X. HISTORIAM BELLI DENUO MANUS SUMIT	32
XI. DISPUTATORES CERTAMINA	41
OPERAS CITATAS	44

I. PRŌEMIUM

I. PRAEFATIO

[1.1] Manifesto omnes mortales in Cultum; atque plurimus in plus quam singulum sunt. [1.2] Contra opinionem omnium, servi dominatorem creat, illi est qui programma dogmatis et Cultem generant; [1.3] quod paradoxum. [1.4] Nam educatio et doctrina et causa et eventum cultarum of res civili Cultius sunt. [1.5] quoniam Cultus et cultura idem significatio habent, [1.6] Cultus culturam generat. [1.7] Cultus est illud maximum malum et maximum pure. [1.8] Maximus malus quod praedicatum super vim solam, hauddum in rationem. [1.9] Maximus purus quod per vim mentes et veteris et infantis similis imbuit. [1.10] Id est, dicere, cultura aqua in quam ab die natalis natamus. [1.11] Ergo aliquid non posse libare nos ipsi nec ex videre. [1.12] Nemo tyrannide culturae effugit nec vi dominatoris supra illud, attamen mentes aliqui paucorum, daemon suos sequunt, ad liberta cogitatis nixerunt. [1.13] Sed liberta cogitatis cum tacenda non liberta est, [1.14] atque cum loquenda, non liberta, [1.15] nam dehinc in vim dominatoris, dominatoris Cultuis, in currit, et illa opprimebantur.

Χρῆ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι,

μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· τὰ σ' ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα. (Parmenides 6.1-2)²

[1.16] Statim iam duitissime caput, quod id brevem vivit post securim feire, usus ita oraculum erat. [1.17] Carnifex ante regem tenet qui directe in oculos victimae inspexerit rogare: “Dominusne videre potes?”

² Parmenides, *On Nature*, Herman Alexander Diels, Philoctates: URL: <http://philoctetes.free.fr/parmenides.htm>

I. PREFACE

[1.1] It is clear everyone is in a Cult and most are in more than one. [1.2] Contrary to the opinion of all men, the slaves create their Lord; [1.3] that is a paradox. [1.4] For education and learning are both the cause and effect of the culture of Cult practice. [1.5] Whereas Cult and culture have the same meaning, [1.6] the Cult generates the culture. [1.7] The Cult is the thing both most bad and most pure. [1.8] Most bad because it is predicated on force alone, and by reason not at all. [1.9] Most pure because through force it fills the minds of the old and young alike. [1.10] That is, to say, culture is the water we swim in from the day we were born, [1.11] therefore something we from which we are not able to free ourselves, or see out from. [1.12] No one escapes the tyranny of the culture, nor the might of the Lord standing above it, some few nevertheless, following their genius, strove for freedom of thought. [1.13] But freedom of thought, when unspeakable, is not freedom, [1.14] and when spoken, not free, [1.15] for thither it runs into the might of the Lord, Master of the Cult, and is by it overcome.

It is necessary both to think and to speak the being to be, for it is to be and nothing is not; these things I bid thee ponder. (6.1-2)

[1.16] Once upon a time a human head, because it for a short time lives after decapitation, was used as an oracle. [1.17] The executioner held the head up in front of the king who looked directly in the eyes of the victim and asked: "Can you see the Lord?"

[1.18] Ob factum rex et dominus significationem eadem habet veritatem in proverbio vulgare percipiamus: “Dominus dedit, Dominus abstulit.” (Job 1.21) [1.19] Porro: “Principium sapientiae timor Domini.” (Proverbs 9.10) [1.20] Id te ego jubeo considerare.

Et unde Dante materiam gehennae eius nisi a vita ipse.

[1.21] Illi soli philosophos appellantur qui exprimerunt, nam qui taciti erant videntur ad vis dominatoris, conenterunt, [1.22] et ad tyrannide super mentem et programme culturae. [1.23] Non philosophus numquam programmata culturae affirmavit, nam affirmare in toto non affirmasse quod: [1.24] Omnia aut α aut non- α ; non- $\alpha = \beta$, ita omnia est aut α aut β , sed et α et β non est, idem principium exclusi tertii. [1.25] Tantis hominibus, non terror maior quam ignratio erat.

[Apol.] Τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι,³ ὃ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα: δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναί⁴ ἐστὶν ἅ⁵ οὐκ οἶδεν.⁶ Ωἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς⁷ τὸν θάνατον οὐδ’ εἰ τυγχάνει⁸ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὄν⁹ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ’ ὡς εὔ εἰδότες.
(Apology 29a)¹⁰

³ perf. act. inf. of δεῖδω, stand in awe of, dread, fear.

⁴ perf. act. inf. of οἶδα, to have seen or to know.

⁵ nrel. pron. ὅ, he.

⁶ 3rd sing. perf. act. ind. of οἶδα.

⁷ adj, masc. nom. sing., no one, nothing.

⁸ 3rd sing. pres. act. ind. of τυγχάνω, to happen; gain one's end or purpose, succeed.

⁹ neut. nom. sing. pres. act. part. of εἶμι.

¹⁰ Plato, Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet, London: Oxford University Press: 1903.

[1.26] Etiam si illi homines, egestas, exsilium, et caedes multas clamitates tulerunt, numerandi, [1.27] atque ad nos sapientiam suos exprimerunt et tradiderunt. [1.28] Verbi causa: principia liberalis, exclusi tertii, rationis sufficientis, rei eiusdem normae, contradictionis, et continuitatis, et cetera. [1.30] Sunt quatuor iura cogitatio: (a) Monas¹¹ par est summa praedicamentorum ipsorum, $\alpha = \alpha$, idem principium eiusdem; (b) Simul non praedicamentum potest et affirmare et negare ad monadam, $\alpha \neq -\alpha$, idem principium contradictionis; (c) Omnia aut α aut non- α ; non- $\alpha = \beta$, ita omnia est aut α aut β , sed et α et β non est, idem principium exclusi tertii; (d) Verum est ratio iudicii ad aliquid externum pro rationi sufficienti, si...ergo...quod, idem principium rationis sufficientis.

Principium rationis sufficientis principium omnium explanationis.

[1.18] On account of the fact 'king' and 'Lord' have the same meaning we should see the truth in the common proverb: "The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away." (Job 1.21) [1.19] Furthermore: "The first principle of wisdom is fear of the Lord." (Proverbs 9.10) [1.20] This I bid thee ponder.

For whence did Dante get the material for his hell, if not from this actual world of ours. (Will and Representation 325)¹²

[1.21] Those alone who expressed themselves are called philosophers, for they who were silent appear to consent to the might of the Lord, [1.22] and to tyranny over thought and the cultural program. [1.23] No philosopher ever affirmed the cultural program, for not to affirm in toto is not to affirm because: [1.24] Everything is either α or not α ; not $\alpha = \beta$, thus everything is either α or β ,

¹¹ Subiectum, i, n., foundation, subject (Logic).

¹² Schopenhauer, Arthur, *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. I, translated by E. F. J. Payne, Toronto: Dover Publications: 1969.

but not both α and β , in the same manner the principle of the exclusion of the third term. [1.25] To such men, no terror was greater than ignorance.

[Apol.] For to have feared death, gentlemen, is nothing other than to think to be wise without being, for him not knowing to think to know. For no one knows whether or not, if death happens to a man it would be everything great and good.

[1.26] And although those men endured many calamities, including indigence, and exile, and murder, to name a few, [1.27] they expressed themselves and handed down to us their wisdom.

[1.28] For instance: the principle of generosity, the law of the excluded middle, the principle of sufficient reason, the law of identity, contradiction, and continuity, etc. [1.30] There are four laws of cognition: (a) A subject is equal to the sum of its predicates, $\alpha = \alpha$, thus the principle of sameness;¹³ (b) No predicate can be both affirmed and denied to a subject at the same time, $\alpha \neq -\alpha$, likewise the principle of contradiction; (c) Everything is either α or not α ; not $\alpha = \beta$, thus everything is either α or β , but not both α and β , in the same manner the principle of the exclusion of the third term. (d) Truth is the relation of a judgement to something external according to sufficient reason, if...then...because, thus the principle of sufficient reason.

[1.31] Elementa ad principium rationis sufficientis sunt quattuor: principium essendi, et fiendi, et agendi, et cognoscendi. [1.32] Cum hic in hoc libro versamur de historia versabimur cum principio rationis sufficientis agendi. [1.33] Sunt quattuor propositiones quae hoc maior principium fiunt, unaquis partis totae est atque proposito unaquis respondet satisfacere maior principium ex necessitate sed principium rationis agenda maximus gravis ad historiam est. [1.34] Catilina

¹³ Law of Homogeneity.

praedicari posse neque ad Christum nec Tacitum nec Lenin atque quod non sanctus, non eloquens, non sapiens, non 'paulum magnus aliquis,' non rerum novarum molitor¹⁴ verus fuit; quia haec verba non alterantia verba sunt eadem ita homines non dicitur esse illa quae ambulare bipes. [1.35] Item non signum¹⁵ pro his propter signum verum stare pro essentia illius, si non ex parte essentia non est praedicamentum. [1.36] Essentia est illius maxima accidentia aut summus idem; principio simile a natura; per Occam: 'Entia praeter necessitate non esse multiplicanda,' cum essential summa praedicamentorum ipsorum. [1.37] Tamen Catilina est nomen singulae hominis, ita principio proprio; per Kant: 'Entium varietates non temere esse minuendas.' [1.38] Ita signum generaliter proprietatem indicat, nomen singulam proprium. [1.39] Qua Aristoteles vir, animal rationis, auctor, et profugus fuit. [1.40] Lenin idem fuit praeter non profugus sed exsul qui rederit patriam factus est rerum novarum molitor. [1.41] Aristoteles utitur instanter philosophus, Lenin instanter rerum novarum molitor. [1.42] Qua Catilina instanter criminis auctor tametsi res profugus fuit.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason is the principle of all explanation. (On the Principle of Sufficient Reason 184)¹⁶

[1.31] The elements of the principle of sufficient reason are four: the principle of being, of becoming, of motives, and of knowing. [1.32] Since in this book here we are concerned with history; we shall be concerned with the principle of sufficient reason of motivation. [1.33] There are four propositions which make up the major principle, each one a part of the whole and each proposition must answer

¹⁴ rerum novarum molitor = 'agitator, or contriver, for new affairs, i.e., a revolutionary.

¹⁵ signum = sign or symbol.

¹⁶ Schopenhauer, Arthur, *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, translated by Karl Hillebrand, Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books: 2006.

to satisfy the major principle, but the principle of sufficient reason for motivation is to history most weighty. [1.34] Catiline can be predicated against neither Christ, nor Tacitus, nor Lenin; for he, was neither holy, nor eloquent, nor 'a little something great,' nor a revolutionary, because these words are not alternative words for the same things in the same way a man is not said to be that which walks on two legs. [1.35] Likewise, not a symbol for these things on account of the fact that a true sign stands for the essence of that thing; if it is not a part of its essence, it is not a predicate. [1.36] The essence of a thing is its greatest quality or its highest degree of sameness; per Occam: 'Things are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.' [1.37] Just as Catiline is the name of an individual man, thus the principle of individuality; per Kant: 'Differences between things are not to be reduced without purpose.' [1.38] Symbol indicates general property, name the individual. [1.39] Aristotle, on the one hand, was a man, a rational animal, an author, and a fugitive. [1.40] Lenin was the same however not a fugitive, but an exile who returned to his fatherland and became an agitator for new affairs. [1.41] Aristotle was, however, most emphatically a philosopher, Lenin most emphatically a revolutionary. [1.42] Catiline, on the other hand, was most emphatically

[1.43] Ille in principium non fuit rerum novarum molitor at vero fuit eorum partes qui pristinum rerum statum revocare volunt quidem dux eorum. [1.44] Ita habemus Lenin esse rerum novarum molitor ita Christum esse propheta ita Tacitum historicus. [1.45] Qua Catilinam habitur esse ciminis auctorem generis singulae, vidlicet: anthropophagus, homicida, parricida, qui raptor et raptus, qui incestum cum filia admittere, et cetera. [1.46] Si quidem nulla illia criminal sunt de anterioris putati sunt aut argui errant, ex necessitate concludimus compare Catilina ad alteros est contradictio in adjectio. [1.47] Igitur Catilina non est essentia aut definition ad alteros, hinc non signum illis quod ille est non praedicari posse aliquoribus.

[1.48] Philosophia studium sapientiae est, aliquid nunquam certe tenet nam quod tenet fine est et studium agitatio et motus animi est.

Nunquam animus insistens agitatione et motu esse vacuus potest. (De Divinatione 2. 128)¹⁷

[1.49] Et quod immotus mortuus est nam vita motus est et quod mortuus est fine est et quod fine certus est. [1.50] Hinc sapientia ad finem attulit dogma est atque quis quis dogmatem promulgat praedictor non philosophus est, quia dogma certus est. [1.51] Finis rei mortua illius rei est, nam quod mortuum fine est, ergo illud certum est mortuum est. [1.52] Sic praedictor homo ambulatio mortuus est, nam animus sui immotus est et illud immotum est mortuum est. [1.53] Cum studium aeternum sit studium sapientiae aeternum est, hinc philosophus est qui incertus in animo ad certum absolutum sui quod mortuus sui est. [1.54] Tamen plerisque omnes mortales in animum ante certum absolutum certum sui fiunt ergo ante tempora sui morerunt. [1.55] Hinc non philosophi erant, nam aut certum quaerant aut aliqua fiunt ante finem necessitas erat.

a criminal, notwithstanding the fact that he was also a fugitive. [1.43] He was, in the first place, not an agitator for new affairs, but was, in truth of those parties who sought to return to the status of former affairs, and was, indeed, their leader. [1.44] Just as we hold Lenin to be a revolutionary, we likewise hold Christ to be a prophet just as Tacitus is a historian. [1.45] Catiline, on the otherhand, is held to be a criminal of a singular kind, to wit: a cannibal, a murderer, a parricide, who seizes by force and rapes, one who committed incest with his daughter, et cetera. [1.46] Seeing that none of these crimes are supposed or alleged about the former, we must conclude that to compare Catiline to

¹⁷ Cicero, Marcus Tullius, De Divinatione, C. F. W. Müller, Leipzig: Teubner: 1915.

the others is a contradiction in terms. [1.47] Therefore Catiline is not the essence or the definition for the others, thus not a symbol for them because he is not able to be predicated to them.

[1.48] Philosophy is the study of wisdom, something never completely held, for what is held is at an end and study is the activity and motion of the soul.

The soul is never able to be continuous devoid of thought and motion. (De Divinatione 2. 128)

[1.49] And what is motionless is dead and what is dead is at an end and what is at an end is determinate. [1.50] Hence wisdom carried through to an end is dogma and whoever propounds a dogma is a preacher, not a philosopher, because a dogma is determinate. [1.51] The end of a thing is the death of that thing, for what is dead is at an end. [1.52] Thus the preacher is a dead man walking, for his soul is unmoving and that which is unmoving is dead. [1.53] Since study is eternal, the study of wisdom is eternal, hence the philosopher is he who is indeterminate in spirit until his absolute determination which is his death. [1.54] Yet most men become determinate in spirit before their absolute determination, therefore died before their time. [1.55] Hence were not philosophers, for they either sought determination, or somehow became determinate, before an end was necessary.

II. TU IPSE SCITE

[2.1] Historia eadem philosophia incipens cum problemati in forma rogatum postulavit, quis responsa postulationem satisfacit. [2.2] Multi credunt problema historiae esse de actu rerum in praeteritiis, hinc rogatum: "Quae in actu factus erant?" statim in mentem venit. [2.3] Postulatio vera responsari historia non est utut: "Quis res fuit?" sed "Quis res est?" [2.4] Nam praeteritum semper est inerat atque modo potest vivere in mentis illorum adsunt. [2.5] Necessesse est utcumque prior

rogare: “Quis res fuit?” ut postulatio praecipus “Quis res est?” ire. [2.6] Igitur proposito nostri : “Quis Catilina fuit?” ut “Quis Catilina est?” ibimus. [2.7] Cognoscemus brevi utcumque responsum ne id est quidem vero responsum huic rogatum quaerimus quod proposita philosophiae est tu ipse scite, idem “Quis ego est?,” et Socrate ipsum morti parare.

Ἐρωτηθεὶς τί δύσκολον, ἔφη, “τὸ ἑαυτὸν γινῶναι” τί δὲ εὐκόλον, “τὸ ἄλλω ὑποθέσθαι”(Thales: 36)¹⁸

Sciens tu ipse intelligere sciens primum qui esse mortalis est deinde sciens qui esse genus mortalis tu est; tertio sciens qui esse mortalis tu et nemo est. (The Idea of History¹⁰)

[2.8] Si quidem, ‘Non homo insula est,’ nobis rogare necesse est: “Qui nos sunt?”

II. KNOW THYSELF

When you would ask him, “What is difficult?” He said, “To know it himself; but what is easy, for it to be explained to another.”

[2.1] History, the same as philosophy, begins with a problem in the form of a question asked, a reply to which satisfies the postulate. [2.2] Many believe the problem of history is about actual

¹⁸ τί is a neut.nom. sing, hence ‘that thing which,’ of the protasis and is the antecedent for τὸ... τὸ of the double apodosis. ὑποθέσθαι is a pres. mid./pass. inf. ‘the being placed over,’ ἄλλω, ‘to another.’ Hence that thing which is being handed over to another. Or perhaps: When you asked him, “What thing is hard to explain?” He said, “The ‘knowing himself’ thing; and what is easy, the ‘being explained to another’ thing. This reveals a double entendre since τό could represent both a thing outside oneself which is to be explained, or it could represent the self as the thing which is to be explained. Furthermore, that thing which is difficult is the knowing himself thing and that which is easy is the giving ‘advice’ thing. For our purposes here the knowing of history is the knowing of the self and the knowing of the self is precisely in the seeing of the self in it, the explaining of the self through it, and furthermore how the telling of it explains he who tells it which is perhaps more revealing to they who receive the telling than it is to he who tells, but, as far as I am concerned it is the self which ought be known and is ultimately the reason for the study of history and for the telling of history, for its study and telling is the middle term in the mediated path from the self to the self. Cf. Diogenis Laertii, *Vitae philosophorum*, Ed. H.S. Long, London: Oxford: 1964. URL: <http://www.mikrosapoplous.gr/dl/dl.html>.

things in the past, hence the question: “What actually happened?” at once comes to mind. [2.3] The true question to be answered by history is however not: “What was?” but “What is?” [2.4] For the past is forever gone and alone can live in the minds of those present. [2.5] We must, however, first ask: “What was?” so as to arrive at the principle question “What is?” [2.6] For our purposes, accordingly: “Who was Catiline?” so that we may arrive at “Who is Catiline?” [2.7] We shall, however, soon find the answer to this question is indeed not what we truly seek, because the question of philosophy is γνωθι σαυτόν, hence “Who am I?” and according to Socrates is preparation for death.

Knowing yourself means knowing, first, what it is to be a man; secondly, knowing what it is to be the kind of man you are; thirdly, knowing what it is to be the man you are and nobody else is. (The Idea of History¹⁹)

[2.8] Seeing that, ‘No man is an island,’ it is necessary for us to ask: “Who are we?”

Non homo insula est plenus ipse omnes continens continentis terrae pars toti. Si glaebam mare lavatur, Europa minor, atque pharus fuit, atque praedium amici et tui fuit: quisquam mors hominis me minuit, quia ego in genu hominem, ergo nunquam rogarat scire cui campana ea tibi movet.

[2.9] Historia communis est, tum eam bona nostrum tenemus tum bona in nobis omnes. [2.10] Et nos eadem tenet et fiemus eandem ab esse ad ens transibimus. [2.11] Igitur necesse est rogamus tum

¹⁹ Collingwood, R. G., *The Idea of History*, New York: Oxford University Press: 1969.

quam de historia aestimemus tum eadem quos nobis aestimet. [2.12] Ad hoc in addicanti mores Catilinae etiam censebimus aequalia temporum quia Catilina non solus criminis suus facit nec Cicero solus illa repugnans.

III. HISTORIA RATIO ET RATIO DEFINITIONIS

[3.1] Nunc si verbum est definitio illud verbi quae est brevis et circumscripta explicatio.

Nihil est sine ratione sufficiente cur potius sit, quam non sit. (Philosophia Prima Sive Ontologia 70)²⁰

[3.2] Ut verbum Catilina sic definitionem verbi habemus cum adepta per rationem adferens, metalogus; rebus definiendis verbisque proprie circumscribendis studere.

No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend's or of thine own were: any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind, and therefore never send to know for whom the bells tolls; it tolls for thee. (Meditation XVII)²¹

²⁰ Wolfio, Christiano, *Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia*, 2nd ed.: Frankfurt and Leipzig: 1736) URL: <http://books.google.com/books?id=1HsPAAAAQAAJ&ots=-M3rENNoqa&dq=Philosophia%20prima%20sive%20ontologia&pg=PP7#v=onepage&q=&f=false>

²¹ Donne, John, Essays, Online Literature: URL: <http://www.online-literature.com/donne/409/>

[2.9] History is common property, but not only property owned by us but also in us all. [2.10] We both are owned by it and shall it become as we cross over from being to Being. [2.11] Accordingly, we must ask not only what we should make of history, but also what it shall make of us. [2.12] Moreover in adjudging the character of Catiline we shall also estimate contemporaries because Catiline is not alone in his crimes, nor Cicero alone in opposing them.

III. HISTORY AS REASON AND REASON FOR A DEFINITION

[3.1] Now if there is a word there is a definition for that word which is a brief and circumbribed explanation.

Nothing is without sufficient reason why it would be rather than not be.

[3.2] Just as we have a word, Catiline, thus we have a definition for that word which is arrived at through a 'rational account,' being eager for setting boundries to things and properly circumscribing words.

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ.

(On Interpretation 16a4)²²

Ἔστι δ' ὁρος μὲν λόγος οὗ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων. (Topica 101b39)²³

²² Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, with an English translation by Harold P. Cooke, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press: 1938.

²³ Aristotle, *Topica*, with an English translation by E. S. Forster, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press: 1938.

[3.3] Nihilominus ieiuna verborum concertatio de verbo definitione, definitio vero est aliquid in tabulas referre. [3.4] Nam dominator dominatum tenet atque servi prudenti subjiciunt. [3.5] Qui quaerens in tabulas mutatiem pro supplici ab quo imperium habet petat; "Pluton dues est...Pluton planeta est...Pluton non planeta est," atque factum ita est, per lex subtiliter enumerare, hinc definitiones res obiectae proprius rhetoricae sunt. [3.6] Et subtiliter nomen L. Sergius Catilina, illi, aut heros, aut non peior quam alius, aut aenigma, aut paulum magnus, adior illince exprimere significatam correctam praedicare essentiam nomenis. [3.7] Exemplum: Catilina non aenigma quia nam Y dicere X aenigma est non est dicere X mysterium vere, sed dicere X mysterium ad Y, quod Y de X perplexus est.

IV. QUODQUE ET OMNIS

[4.1] Omnes qui interficiunt homicidae sunt, qui corporibus humanis vescunt anthropophagus, qui rapiunt raptus, qui ducunt filiam incestus, qui interficiunt aut filium aut uxorem aut fratrem paracidae, qui humanis hostiis ferus litarant. [4.2] Omnes par sunt.

Things in sounds are symbols of impressions in the soul is and written things of those things in the sounds.

And a definition is a reason for the thing which was to be signified.

[3.3] Notwithstatnding the barren controversy about the definition of words, a true definition is something noted in the legal records. [3.4] For the Lord has dominion and prudent slaves submit.

[3.5] Let he who seeks a change in the records as suppliant beg from he who holds power; "Pluto is a

God...Pluto is a planet...Pluto is not a planet," and in this way it is done, per the law of specification, therefore the meanings of words are the proper objects of rhetoric. [3.6] And it is precisely this name L. Sergius Catiline, that he was a hero, or no worse than others, or an enigma, or a little great, I rise to assault in order to express a correct definition, to proclaim the essence of the name. [3.7] For example: Catiline is not an enigma because for Y to say X is an enigma is not to say X is truly a mystery, but to say X is a mystery to Y, because Y is perplexed.

IV. EVERY AND ALL

[4.1] All who kill are murderers, those who eat human flesh cannibals, those who rape rapists, those who marry their daughter incestuous, those who kill son or wife or brother parricides, those who sacrifice a human victim, a savage. [4.2] All are equal.

V. SINGULI ET SUBTILIS

[5.1] Omnes inferior dignitate qui rerum novarum molitor sunt parem dignitate cupiunt, omnes par dignitate qui rerum novarum molitor sunt magnum cupiunt, ergo non rerum novarum molitor vero; nam cupiens magnum est non res novarum moliens sed rerum veteris, quod est rerum novarum moliens progressus est et tollens parem dignitate ad magnum contraries est. [5.2] Catilina

par, Lenin impar erat; singulae non par, Lenin rerum novarum molitor, Catiline rerum veteris molitor sunt.

In nova fert animus²⁴ mutatas²⁵ dicere formas²⁶

corpora; di, coeptis nam vos mutastis²⁷ et illas²⁸

adspirate²⁹ meis³⁰ primaque ab origine mundi

ad mea perpetuum deducite³¹ tempora carmen. (Metamorphoses 1.1-4)³²

V. SINGULAR AND PARTICULAR

[5.1] All who are inferior in dignity, who are agitators for new affairs, desire equal rank, all who are equal in rank, who are agitators for new affairs, desire greatness, therefore not truly revolutionary; for seeking might is not agitating for new affairs but for old affairs, because agitating for new affairs is progressive and raising an equal in rank to greatness the opposite. [5.2] Catiline

²⁴ Animus is masc. nom. sing. and Subject of the sentence.

²⁵ Mutatas is fem acc. pl. perf. pass. part. of muto.

²⁶ Formas is an Accusative and direct object of dicere.

²⁷ 2nd pl. perf. act. ind. of muto.

²⁸ Illas refers to formas

²⁹ Adspirate is the 2nd pl. pres. act. imperat. of ad + spiro, 'to breathe to.'

³⁰ Coeptis...meis is Dative of Separation, cf. Allen and Greenough: 381.

³¹ 2nd pl. pres. act. imperat. of deduco, 'to lead away, draw out, turn aside, divert, bring out, remove, drive off, draw down.

³² Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, Hugo Magnus, Gotha, Germany: Friedr. Andr. Perthes.: 1892.

was an equal, Lenin unequal; the individuals are not equal, Lenin a revolutionary, Catiline a reactionary.

Spirit brings me to speak of Forms into new bodies changed.

From my work, and to these Forms, Gods breathe!

for you have changed. And lead forth! from the origin of all,

and into my times, the Elements in unbroken song.

VI. OPUS ET OPUS ARTIS

[6.1] Etsi hoc opus historiam attinet, in prima auditor hoc id animadvertio est non similis quidquam opus historiae legit quia idem opus philosophiae. [6.2] Vero non solum opus historiae et philosophiae sed etiam opus artis est. [6.3] Est, quemadmodum Martin Heidegger dixerit, lis artificii cogitantis in objecta historiae creans foramen inter naturam et mundum quod concedum ens ipsum

in formam librum adesse, verus per opus artis deduxetur stare. [6.4] Et cum est artificio opus artis cretur et hic artificium exercet est cogitans et disserit id in chartam, est cum historia generali et ad scribam historiam propria, cum philosophia generali tum ratio historiae propria est.

Condens veritas in opera ferens entem nunquam antequam et iterum nunquam existere.

VII. RHETORICA ET ORATIO

[7.1] Non est cum historia usitata qua non modo opus scripti rem adest pertinens habet, Bellum Catilinae et al, quia ego tum rationem de fonte eius historiae explico et quos sententias dixerunt; ratiocinationem constitutens conclusionem expono a rhetorica et igitur et a vasto fontis et vasta philosophiae antiquus, medieval, Renaissance, et Enlightenment. [7.2] Quoniam rhetorica est, eius gentilis oratoria ars est. [7.3] Ita semitam ad foramen explico a philosophis et historicis in adversaria medio loco contendere.

VI. A WORK AND A WORK OF ART

[6.1] Although this work concerns history, the first thing the reader should notice is that it is not like any other work of history he has read for it is also a work of philosophy. [6.2] Indeed it is not only a work of history and philosophy but also at the same time a work of art. [6.3] It is, in the

manner Martin Heidegger might have said, the strife of the craft of thinking against an object of history creating an opening between nature and world which permits being to come to be in the form of a book, truth being brought to stand through a work of art. [6.4] And since it is a craft which creates a work of art and here the art practiced is thinking and setting that on paper, it is history in general and writing of a history in particular, not only philosophy in general but the philosophy of history in particular.

The establishing of truth in the work is the bringing forth of a being such as never was before and will never come to be again. (The Origin of the Work of Art 181)³³

VII. RHETORIC AND ORATORY

[7.1] But it is not ordinary history in so far as it treats not only treat written works pertaining to the matter at hand, the *Bellum Catilinae* et al, because I also develop a line of reasoning about the sources for that history, developing a theory, deliver a conclusion by means of rhetoric and therefore I expound from both a wide range of sources, and a wide range of philosophy, ancient, medieval, Renaissance, and Enlightenment. [7.2] Whereas it is rhetoric, it is in the family of oratory.

[Dialog. Orat. 30.5] Neque oratoris vis et facultas, sicut ceterarum rerum, angustis et brevibus terminis cluditur, sed is est orator, qui de omni quaestione pulchre et ornate et ad persuadendum apte dicere pro dignitate rerum, ad utilitatem temporum, cum voluptate audientium possit. [31.1] Hoc sibi illi veteres persuaserant, ad hoc efficiendum intellegebant opus esse, non ut in rhetorum scholis declamarent, nec ut fictis nec ullo modo ad veritatem

³³ Heidegger, Martin, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, in *Basic Writings* revised and expanded by David Farrell Krell, San Francisco: Harper & Row: 1977.

accedentibus controversiis linguam modo et vocem exercerent, sed ut iis artibus pectus implerent, in quibus de bonis et malis, de honesto et turpi, de iusto et iniusto disputatur; [2] haec enim est oratori subiecta ad dicendum material nam in iudiciis fere de aequitate, in deliberationibus de honestate disserimus, ita ut plerumque haec ipsa in vicem misceantur: de quibus copiose et varie et ornate nemo dicere potest, nisi qui cognovit naturam humanam et vim virtutum pravitatemque vitiorum et intellectum eorum, quae nec in virtutibus nec in vitiis numerantur...[7] Neque enim sapientem informamus neque Stoicorum comitem, sed eum qui quasdam artis haurire, omnes libare debet. Ideoque et iuris civilis scientiam veteres oratores comprehendebant, et grammatica [8] musica geometria imbuebantur. (Dialogus de Oratoribus 30.5-31-7)³⁴

[7.3] In this way, I develop a path to an opening by setting philosophers and historians in opposition to contend for the middle ground.

[Dialog. Orat. 30.5] The virtue and power of oratory, unlike other matters, is that it is not enclosed by a narrow and short boundary, but he is an orator who would be able to speak on every question beautifully, ornately and to persuasion suitable to the dignity of the affairs,

³⁴ Tacitus, *Dialogus de Oratoribus*, Opera Minora, Henry Furneaux, Clarendon Press: Oxford: 1900.

utility of the times, and the delight of the audience. [31.1] By this the ancients had convinced themselves, to bring about this thing they understood to be a work, not in the way they would declaim in the schools of rhetoric, nor in the manner exercising the tongue and voice in debates approaching reality, but in such a way that should fill the breast with these arts which examine the good and the bad, the honorable and the dishonorable, justice from injustice; [2] these in fact are subject matters for an orator to speak about, for we speak about complete equality in court and honesty in deliberation; these should mix themselves in such a way so as to be interchangeable about which no one is able to speak abundantly with both variety and adornment except he who knows human nature, both the power of virtue and the crookedness of vice, and understanding those things which are counted as neither virtues nor vices...We are fashioning neither a Wiseman nor a companion of the Stoics—he who draws from certain kinds of arts, but he who samples them all. For that reason both the knowledge of law and being saturated with grammar, music, and geometry was common to ancient orators. (Dialogus de Oratoribus 30.5-31-7)

[7.4] Est rhetorica sed aliqua figura rhetorica classica non imitate. [7.5] Conductus cogitato classico in mentem harum tempestatis communans. [7.6] Est oratio in scriptum. [7.7] Forensis rhetorica est quia singulas factis praeteritis accusat et defendit. [7.8] Deliberativus est quia cum quo honorifico versat et facta futura hortat dissuadetque. [7.9] Epidicticus est cum virtuta vitioque et in aequalis temporibus mihi laudat condemnatque.

VIII. ETHICA ET LOGICA

[8.1] Historia meus est tum historia bello tum historiae vitare belli scriptoribus temporibus, in Anno Domini 1850, cum a Henrik Ibsen fabulam edere coepit, vindication classicus litterarum, defensio rhetoricae ethicas exponere historiam uti. [8.2] Est et historia belli et historia mentis de bello, qui Catiline fuit, et qui illi eum defendere sunt.

IX. EMBOLIUM HISTORIAE

[9.1] A Hegel ratio historia meus nec primigenius quia res pro oculis meo suo tenet non dissero et non communicat animum eudem ut actores temporis. [9.2] Nec reciprocatio quia solam singulam episodium³⁵ historiae grandis habet. [9.3] Ergo suo consilio id historia philosophica ducatur. [9.4] Nunc dubito mortales habent ullum alium animum qua mea semper habuerant praeterea dubito id non est reciprocatio, sed affirmo id philosophicus est. [9.5] Siquidem qui memoriam habet docilis est:

[7.4] It is rhetoric but not imitative of any form of classical rhetoric. [7.5] Conditioned by classical thought, it lives in the spirit of these times. [7.6] It is oratory in writing. [7.7] It is forensic rhetoric for it accuses and defends individuals for past acts. [7.8] It is deliberative because it is concerned with what is honorable and exhorts and dissuades future deeds. [7.9] Epidictic because it is concerned with virtue and vice and praises and condemns my contemporaries.

³⁵ Cf. Smith, William and Theophilus Hall, *Smith and Hall's Copious and Critical English-Latin Dictionary*, New York: American Book Co.: 1871.

VIII. ETHICS AND LOGIC

[8.1] My history is both the history of the war and the history of the falsification of the war by contemporary writers, which in A.D. 1850, with the publication of a play by Henrik Ibsen began, a vindication of classical scholarship, a defense of rhetoric in the manner of expounding ethics using history. [8.2] It is the history of the war and the history of thought about the war; who Catiline was and those who defend him are.

IX. AN EPISODE OF HISTORY

[9.1] By Hegel's method neither original because I do not discuss affairs held before my own eyes and it does not share the same spirit as the actors of the time. [9.2] Nor reflective because it treats only one episode of a grand history. [9.3] Therefore, on his advice, it should be considered philosophical history. [9.4] Now I doubt mortals have any other spirit than always have had and I doubt besides that it is not reflective, but I affirm it is philosophical. [9.5] Seeing that he who has a memory is teachable:

Ὅλως τε σημείον τοῦ εἰδότης καὶ μὴ εἰδότης τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τέχνην τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἡγούμεθα μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. (Metaphysics 981b7-8)³⁶

[9.6] Ob factum auctores material agemus artifices fuerunt operas suos cogitemus res mortalium rationem tolerant, mortui vivos erudiunt. [9.7] Et narration Romae est narration ut res ab optimo incepto ad pessimum finem it. [9.8] Cum id tum ut Sallust notavit: "Ut initium sic finis est."³⁷

³⁶ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, ed. W.D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1924.

[Top.] Ἔστι δὴ συλλογισμὸς λόγος ἐν ὧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἑτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει διὰ τῶν κειμένων . Ἀπόδειξις μὲν οὖν ἐστίν , ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἢ ἀληθῆς ἢ ἐκ τοιούτων ἀδιὰ τινῶν πρώτων καὶ ἀληθῶν τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ γνώσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφεν· διαλεκτικὸς δὲ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξων συλλογιζόμενος. Ἔστι δὲ ἀληθὴ μὲν καὶ πρώτα τὰ μὴ δι' ἑτέρων ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτῶν ἔχοντα τὴν πίστιν... ἐνδόξα δὲ τὰ δοκούντα πασὶν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς ... ἐριστικὸς δὲ ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐκ φαινομένων ἐδόξων, μὴ ὄντων δὲ ... οὐ γὰρ παντὸ φαινόμενον ἐνδόξον καὶ ἐστὶν ἐνδόξον. (Topica 100a18.25- 100b18.26)³⁸

And as a whole it is a sign of knowledge or ignorance to be able to teach, and, on account of this, we hold Art over Experience to be scientific knowledge.

[9.6] On account of the fact the authors of the material we shall deal with were master artisans (of the Liberal Arts) we ought to consider their works to be bearing reason, the dead instructing the living. [9.7] And the story of Rome is the story of how things from the best of beginnings go to the worst of ends. [9.8] Not only that but also as Sallust noted: "Just as there is a beginning thus there is an end."

³⁷ Cf. *Bellum Catilinae* 2.

³⁸ Aristotle, *Topica*, with an English translation by E. S. Forster, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press: 1938.

[Top.] Now syllogism is an account in which what is being laid down through its laying down comes to be laid down a different thing, by necessity. A demonstration, then, is either reasoning out of true things and first things; or out of such things which has left the origin of our knowledge about them from first things and true things; dialectical reasoning, on the other hand, is reasoning out of accepted opinions. And things are true and primary which not through other things but through themselves commands belief...accepted opinions, however, are things which are thought by the whole, the majority, or the wise...but contentious reasoning appears to be from accepted opinions, but is not so...for not every thing which appears to be accepted opinion is accepted opinion.

X. HISTORIAM BELLI DENUO MANUS SUMIT

[10.1] Sic historiam belli status est denuo manus sumit ut sententiam accepit universitatis, aut justorum, aut major partis, aut sapientis et iterum statuit eo diversum adesse. [10.2] Est philosophia ethica exemplum historicam ducit nam historia ut narratio merus factum solum transmittit inanis est.

Iam, ut id est haec assumptio ipsa a priori illud omne rationem suam habet necesse est, quae nos potestatem auctoritatem quaere cur facit.

[10.3] Cum mandata est fabulam tum rationem fabulae comprehendimus. [10.4] Siquidem necesse est fibula rationem habet et fabulam narrare historiam constituit etiam rationem historiae comperimus necesse est.

[Poly. 1.14.5] Όταν δὲ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας ἦθος ἀναλαμβάνη τις, ἐπιλαθέσθαι χρὴ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων καὶ πολλάκις μὲν εὐλογεῖν καὶ κοσμεῖν τοὺς μεγίστους ἐπαίνοις τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, ὅταν αἱ πράξεις ἀπαιτῶσι τοῦτο, πολλάκις δ' ἐλέγχειν καὶ ψέγειν ἐπονειδίστως τοὺς ἀναγκαιοτάτους, ὅταν αἱ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἀμαρτίαι τοῦθ' ὑποδεικνύωσιν. [6] Ὡσπερ γὰρ ζῶον τῶν ὀψέων ἀφαιρεθεῖσων ἀχρειοῦται τὸ ὅλον, οὕτως ἐξ ἱστορίας ἀναιρεθείσης τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀνωφελὲς γίνεται διήγημα. [7] Διόπερ οὔτε τῶν φίλων κατηγορεῖν οὔτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐπαινεῖν ὀκνητέον, οὔτε δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ψέγειν, ποτὲ δ' ἐγκωμιάζειν εὐλαβητέον, ἐπειδὴ τοὺς ἐν πράγμασιν ἀναστρεφόμενους οὐτ' εὐστοχεῖν αἰεὶ δυνατόν οὔθ' ἀμαρτάνειν συνεχῶς εἰκός. [8] Ἀποστάντας οὖν τῶν πραττόντων αὐτοῖς τοὺς πραττομένους ἐφαρμοστέον τὰς πρεπούσας ἀποφάσεις καὶ διαλήψεις ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν. [9] ὡς δ' ἔστιν ἀληθὴ τὰ νῦν ὑφ'.

(Polybius 1.14.5-9)³⁹

X. THE HISTORY OF THE WAR TAKEN IN HAND

³⁹ Polybius, *Historiae*, Theodorus Büttner-Wobst after L. Dindorf. Leipzig: Teubner: 1893.

[10.1] The the history of the war, having been lain down, is once again taken in hand as the accepted opinion of the whole, or the just, or the wise, and is again lain down coming to be a different thing. [10.2] It is ethical philosophy drawn from a historical example, for history as mere narration, the transmission of facts alone is void.

Now, as it sis this very assumption *a priori* that all things must have their reason, which authorizes us everywhere to search for the *why*, we may safely call this *why* the mother of science. (The Principle of Sufficient Reason 5)⁴⁰

[10.3] It is imperative we understand not only the story, but also the reason for the story. [10.4] Seeing that the story must reason have, and telling the story constitutes history, we must also ascertain the reason for History.

[Poly. 1.14.5] Whenever anyone assumes the moral character of History, it is necessary, on the one hand, to have forgotten everything such as this, and often, on the other hand, necessary to speak well of, and honor with the greatest commendations, the enemy; while at the same time you shall pass over they who demand this very thing, many times, moreover, to shame with reproach and censure with force, whenever a failure of their practices should make itself known. [6] For just as an animal which has had its eyesight taken away is rendered completely useless, in the same way, History itself, having been razed of truth, is left behind a useless thing and becomes a tale. [7] Therefore hesitate neither to speak against friends nor commend enemies, nor to blame them both, but to praise at any time one must beware of turning things upside down, for it is neither possible to always hit the mark nor to

⁴⁰ Schopenhauer, Arthur, *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, translated by Karl Hillebrand, Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books: 2006.

miss the mark holding together a likeness of truth. [8] Standing aloof, at any rate, from the doers, one must adapt to be clearly seen speaking plainly and making determinations in the remembrances for the actions themselves, [9] so as they be true now by itself.

[10.5] Hoc documentum historiae aspectum dualem habet, materiam historiam et sententiam de material, historiam et ethicam, problem et prontiatum: Catiline crimen aut non crimen? [10.6] At vero ceterum contra opinionem omnium nec virum nec rem judicamus sed tantum abest ut convinctum ut absolutem sententias scriptorium nam cancellum et judicam historiam fert.

Πρόβλημα δ εστὶ διαλεκτικὸν θεώρημα τὸ συντείνον ἡ πρὸς αἴρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἡ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν καὶ γνῶσιν. (Topica 104b1)⁴¹

[10.7] Iam problema: Catilina sceleratissime est? [10.8] Plena tabula facinorum ad L. Sergium Catilinam attribuit sunt: Necare uxorem, necare filium, necare fratrem Quintum Caecilium, necare Marcum Marium Gratidianum, necare Lucium Tanusium, rapere Viginem Vestam Fabiam, incestum cum filia Aurelia Orestilla sacerfiare puero fecit et sanguine eius bibendi et corpus eius vescendi, conjuration contra rem publicam, molire homicidam consularis Ciceronis, sacrilegium et ambitus. [10.9] Catilina necesse est convicta ad solum horum factum sons reri appellare scelestus ad vos refero in oppositionem adversaria mei necesse est tum haec falsus tum virtus suus eum heros criminalis probare appelere. [10.10] Si procedam certissimis argumentis primo tum praesumptus historiam accepimus veritas est tum criminalis ad eum attribuit sunt criminalis vero. [10.11] Nunc necesse est promovere principium liberalis et ergo praesumere scriptores historiae sincerus fuerunt,

⁴¹ Aristotle, *Topica*, with an English translation by E. S. Forster, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press: 1938.

non mendaces. [10.12] Dicere homo non mendax non est dicere nunquam falsum dixit enim falsus non est mendacium. [10.13] Dicere homo est mendax dicere est falsum consideratum dixit.

[10.5] The history lesson has dual aspect, historical material and opinion about the material, history and ethics, problem and proposition: Catiline was a criminal or not? [10.6] But in truth, on the other hand, contrary to the opinion of all men, we pass judgement neither on the man nor upon the affair, but instead convict and acquit the opinions of authors, for it is the historian who is brought to the bar and sits in the dock.

A dialectical problem is an investigation contending either to acceptance or avoidance or to truth and knowledge.

[10.7] Now, the problem: Is Catiline most vile? [10.8] The complete list of crimes attributed to L. Sergius Catiline are: murdering his wife, murdering his son, murdering his brother Quintus Caecilius, murdering Marcus Marius Gratidianum, murdering Lucium Tanusium, raping the Vestal Virgin Fabia, incest with his daughter Aurelia Orestilla, sacrificing a boy and drinking his blood and eating his body, conspiracy against the republic, contriving to murder the Consul Cicero, sacrilege, and bribery. [10.9] Catiline needs only be convicted of one of these deeds to be called a wicked and you in opposition to me need prove both these false and prove his virtue to call him a hero. [10.10] If I were to proceed by way of demonstrative argument I must first presume not only the history we have received is true, but also that the crimes attributed to him were and indeed are truly crimes. [10.11] Now I must advance the principal of generosity and therefore presume the authors of the

history were sincere, not liars. [10.12] To say a man is not a liar is not to say he never uttered a falsehood. [10.13] To say a man is a liar is to say he spoke a deliberate falsehood.

[10.14] Falsum aut mendacium comperimus solum ex principio rationi sufficient. [10.15] Sic qua discendo in causam, capimus historiam ut accepimus sicut veritas nisi testimonia contraria comperimus. [10.16] Qua in oppositionem item ceterissimis argumentis ad problema moralis procedam praesumens crimina ad Catilinam attribuit erant et sunt criminal necesse est totum et absolutum moralis quails principium moralis praesumere: “non occides,” (Exodus 20.13) et demonstrare Catilina interficit ergo nefarious est. [10.17] Sed potest facta cuius de moribus totibus et absolutibus aliquid in se demonstrare. [10.18] Verbi causa: Moses qui id principium moralis promulgavit homicida fuit.

[Ex. 2.11] In diebus illis postquam creverat Moses egressus ad fratres suos vidit adfflictionem eorum et virum Aegyptium percutientem quendam de Hebraeis fratribus suis [12] cumque circumspexisset huc atque illuc et nullum adesse vidisset percussum Aegyptium abscondit sabulo. (Exodus 2.11-12)⁴²

[10.19] Postea homines sui iussit interfieri aliquos brevi postea quam id prohibet.

[Ex. 32.27] Quibus ait haec dicit Dominus Deus Israhel ponat vir gladium super femur suum ite et redite de porta usque ad portam per medium castrorum et occidat unusquisque

⁴² Jerome, *Jerome's Latin Vulgate Bible*, Bible Foundation and On-Line Book Initiative URL: <ftp.std.com/obi/Religion/Vulgate>

fratrem et amicum et proximum suum [28] fecerunt filii Levi iuxta sermonem Mosi cecideruntque in die illo quasi tria milia hominum [29] et ait Moses consecratis manus vestras hodie Domino unusquisque in filio et fratre suo ut detur vobis benediction. (Ibid. 32.27-29)

[10.14] We only discover falsehood and lie in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason.

[10.15] Thus descending on our cause, we take the history as we have received it as true unless we find testimony to the contrary. [10.16] In contradistinction, if I were likewise with respect to the moral problem, by means of demonstrative argument, presuming the crimes attributed to Catiline were and are crimes, it is necessary to presume a complete and unqualified absolute moral principle: "Thou shalt not kill," and show that Catiline killed and is therefore nefarious. [10.17] But it can be shown that the deeds of the demonstrative moralist, words belie deeds. [10.18] For example: Moses, who propounded that moral principle was a murderer.

[Ex. 2.11] In those days, after Moses had separated, having gone out to his own brothers, he saw their suffering and an Egyptian striking a man, as one might say one of their Hebrew brothers, [12] and when he looked about, this way and that, and saw no one to be about, struck the Egyptian and hid him in the sand.

[10.19] Thereafter, he ordered his men to kill others shortly after he prohibited it.

[Ex. 32.27] To whom he said these things: "The Lord God of the land of the Gods of El says let a man put a sword on your leg and go from gate to gate and return to the middle of the camp and let him kill each one of these: a brother, a friend, and a next of kin of yours. [28] The sons of Levi did near to the speech of Moses and they killed almost three thousand men

on that day. [29] And Moses said, today you have consecrated your hands to the Lord, a blessing to y'all, each one gave by means of a son or a brother.

[10.20] Id quod pro principio primo promulgerat non argumentum stulans quidem tantummodo sententiam accipit, id est quidam non occidat. [10.21] Ultra vere nota bene quaestionem offert supra est homicida sive spectatus aut sive non spectatus sunt et qui definitionem inter spectatum homicidamque et non spectatum se dominus ipse fit. [10.22] Sic differentia ipsa inter criminal Catilinae et criminal Mosis super ubi quidam stans in rationem ad dominum dependet. [10.23] Sed id subijcere Moses dominus et Catilina non dominus et tum principium individuationis ergo amor sui ad dominum concedere tum ad principium individuationis hominis poestas vitae necisque in suos habet et dicere quodpian homicidia spectatum non alia sunt. [10.24] Est negans homicidae nemo cogitare [prosecuting] exsequens libere circumit, hoc veteranus milites, ibi vigil, illic carnifex.⁴³ [10.25] Sunt iam ei vitam eius eam non volit servat. [10.26] Omnes illi angeli domini sunt enim inter spectati sunt. [10.27] Id problema offert. [10.28] Quomodo quos determinamus spectati a manu domini morere si quodpian homicida spectata sunt et alia non sunt? [10.29] Id videtur comperire causam aliam moribus egemus. [10.30] Et dubito mores fundare molior quam Arthur Schopenhauer in tractatum palmarem sui *On the Basis of Morals* qui vere memorabilis fecit possum.

Recipiens super conationem basim tutiorem mori comperire super duos miliens annum fecerant id fortasse appertum factus erit sunt none mores naturalis liber institutis humanis,

[10.20] That which was propounded as a first principle requiring no proof indeed is merely accepted opinion, that one should not kill. [10.21] Moreover, note well the question presented above is a whether homicide is approved or is not approved and who makes the determination between and approved murder and and unapproved murder but the Lord himself. [10.22] Thus, the real difference between the crimes of Catiline and the crimes of Moses depends upon where one stands in relation to the Lord. [10.23] But this is to suggest Moses was a Lord and Catiline not a Lord and not only to grant the Lord the principle of individuality, therefore egoism, but also the power of life and death over his followers and to say that some murders are approved and others are not. [10.24] There is no denying there are murderers that no one considers prosecuting walking about freely, here veterans from the military, there a policeman, yonder an executioner. [10.25] There are even those who save the life of he who does not want it. [10.26] All those are angels of the Lord for they are among the approved. [10.27] This presents a problem. [10.28] In what manner do we determine who is approved to die by the hand of the Lord if some murders are approved and others not approved? [10.29] It appears we need to find another ground for morals. [10.30] I doubt I can found morals better than Arthur Schopenhauer did in his prize essay, which is truly memorable, *On the Basis of Morals*.

From looking back over the attempts to find a secure basis for morals made in vain for more than two thousand years, might it perhaps become apparent that there are no natural morals independent of human institutions and that it is rather an artifact through and through,

quam artificialis pentissimus modum melior inventus cupidis et scelestis propterea sine fulcamento religionis affirmativae quia non interiorem recognoscendi quia non basim naturalis habet?

[10.31] Sed etiam ille vir ingeniosus id problema defecit dare meritis quia est Cultus qui dominum creat et dominus progama per potentiam sui id significationem dat. [10.32] Schopenhauer ipse potentiam domini per conjurationem sacerdos ad illum sensit. [10.33] Propter progama Cultus contradicentem a academia exterminavit, tractus Palmaris non corona, operae indoctus sunt. [10.34] Qui ad illum ad veritatem accidit. [10.35] Cultus parrhesiam non permittit.

XI. DISPUTATORES CERTAMINA

[11.1] Probans qui Catilina fuit, et qui quidem est, me requirit pregere ad certamina disputatores. [11.2] Id est dicere illi ad rationem ipsam neque ad probelma historicae contenderunt. [11.3] Postea examinans singular rei concluderunt Catilina non fecit sed solummodo maldictus, aut fortasse aliqua fecit alterum non fecit sed tamen non pejor quam alter qui eodem tempore vixerant. [11.3] Henrik Ibsen illum 'paulum magnus aliquis' appellaverat, contradiction in adjectio. [11.4] Ego demonstro quoniam specie Catilinam malficia non comisit quod ad illos non malficia probant, [11.5] propter probatores rei esse sub iudice lis conant ideo nemo hominem sunt stramenti incubitum specie diversus incubitum ipsum est. [11.6] Sunt non probatores rei sub iudice lis, histriones spectatoresque.

a means invented for better restraining the selfish and wicked human race, and that consequently it would collapse without the support of positive religions, because it has no inner authentication and no natural basis? (Two Fundamental Problems 181-2)⁴⁴

[10.31] But even that genius failed to give this problem merit, because the Cult creates the Lord and the Lord through his might gives meaning it. [10.32] Schopenhauer himself felt the power of the Lord through the conspiracy of the professors against him. [10.33] On account of contradicting the Cult he was exiled from the academy, his prize essay was not crowned, and his works are not taught. [10.34] What happened happened to him, happened to the truth. [10.35] The Cult does not free speech permit.

XI. CONTENTIOUS REASONERS

[11.1] Proving who Catiline was, and who he indeed is, requires me to proceed against contentious reasoners. [11.2] That is to say, they contend against reason itself and not against an historical problem. [11.3] After examining the particulars of the affair, they concluded Catiline did not do it but was merely calumniated; or perhaps did some things not others but still was no worse than others who lived at the same time. [11.3] Henrik Ibsen called him 'a little something great,' a contradiction in terms. [11.4] I demonstrate whereas they ostensibly show Catiline did not commit crimes, what they do prove is to them they are not crimes, [11.5] because there are no provers of fact

⁴⁴ Schopenhauer, Arthur, *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, edited and translated by Christopher Janaway, New York: Cambridge University Press: 2009.

in moot court, their real aim is different from their ostensible aim. [11.6] For there are no provers in moot court, only actors and spectators.

OPERAS CITATAS

Aristotle, *Aristotle's Politica*, ed. W. D. Ross, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1957.

--, *Metaphysics*, ed. W.D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1924.

--, *On Interpretation*, with an English translation by Harold P. Cooke, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press: 1938.

--, *Topica*, with an English translation by E. S. Forster, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press: 1938.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius, *De Divinatione*, C. F. W. Müller, Leipzig: Teubner: 1915.

Collingwood, R. G., *The Idea of History*, New York: Oxford University Press: 1969.

Diogenis Laertii, *Vitae Philosophorum*, Ed. H.S. Long, London: Oxford: 1964. URL:

<http://www.mikrosapoplous.gr/dl/dl.html>

Donne, John, Essays, Online Literature: URL: <http://www.online-literature.com/donne/409/>

Heidegger, Martin, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, in Basic Writings revised and expanded by David Farrell Krell, San Francisco: Harper & Row: 1977.

Jerome, *Jerome's Latin Vulgate Bible*, Bible Foundation and On-Line Book Initiative, URL:

<ftp.std.com/obi/Religion/Vulgate>

Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, Hugo Magnus, Gotha, Germany: Friedr. Andr. Perthes.: 1892.

Parmenides, *On Nature*, Herman Alexander Diels, Philoctates: URL:

<http://philoctetes.free.fr/parmenides.htm>

Plato, *Platonis Opera*, ed. John Burnet, London: Oxford University Press: 1903.

Polybius, *Historiae*, Theodorus Büttner-Wobst after L. Dindorf. Leipzig: Teubner: 1893.

Schopenhauer, Arthur, *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. I, translated by E. F. J. Payne, Toronto: Dover Publications: 1969.

--, *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, translated by Karl Hillebrand, Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books: 2006.

--, *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, edited and translated by Christopher Janaway, New York: Cambridge University Press: 2009.

Smith, William and Theophilus Hall, *Smith and Hall's Copious and Critical English-Latin Dictionary*, New York: American Book Company: 1871

Tacitus, *Dialogus de Oratoribus*, *Opera Minora*, Henry Furneaux, Clarendon Press: Oxford: 1900.

Wolfio, Christiano, *Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia*, 2nd ed.: Frankfurt and Leipzig: 1736) URL:

<http://books.google.com/books?id=1HsPAAAAQAAJ&ots=->

[M3rENNoqa&dq=Philosophia%20prima%20sive%20ontologia&pg=PP7#v=onepage&q=&f=false](http://books.google.com/books?id=1HsPAAAAQAAJ&ots=-M3rENNoqa&dq=Philosophia%20prima%20sive%20ontologia&pg=PP7#v=onepage&q=&f=false)